CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 19 septembre 2008

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margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt }     GRAND CHAMBER             CASE OF KORBELY v. HUNGARY   (Application no. 9174/02)                     JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   19 September 2008     In the case of Korbely v. Hungary, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   Jean-Paul Costa, President ,   Christos Rozakis,   Nicolas Bratza,   Peer Lorenzen,   Françoise Tulkens,   Loukis Loucaides,   Ireneu Cabral Barreto,   Karel Jungwiert,   Volodymyr Butkevych,   András Baka,   Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,   Antonella Mularoni,   Elisabet Fura-Sandström,   Renate Jaeger,   Sverre Erik Jebens,   Dragoljub Popović,   Mark Villiger, judges , and Michael O’Boyle, Deputy Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 4 July 2007 and 19 June 2008, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 9174/02) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr János Korbely (“the applicant”), on 20 January 2002. 2.     The applicant alleged that he had been convicted for an action which did not constitute any crime at the time when it had been committed. He also submitted, in rather general terms, that the proceedings had not been fair and that they had lasted an unreasonably long time. He relied on Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention. 3.     The application was allocated to the Second Section of the Court (Rule   52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 3 May 2007 a Chamber of that Section, composed of Françoise Tulkens, András Baka, Ireneu Cabral Barreto, Riza Türmen, Antonella Mularoni, Danutė Jočienė, Dragoljub Popović , judges, and Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar, relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, neither of the parties having objected to relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72). 4.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24. 5.     The applicant and the Government each filed a memorial. 6.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 4 July 2007 (Rule 59 § 3).   There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Mr   L. Höltzl ,   Agent , Ms   M. Weller ,   Co-Agent , Mr   Z. Tallódi ,   Co-Agent ; (b)     for the applicant Mr   A. Cech ,   Counsel , Mr   L.S. Molnár ,   Counsel .   The Court heard addresses by Mr Cech and Mr Höltzl. 7.     On the same day the Grand Chamber decided, applying Article 29 §   3 of the Convention, to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 8.     The applicant was born in 1929 and lives in Kisoroszi, Hungary. He is a retired military officer. A.     The events in the town of Tata on 26 October 1956 9.     At the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution in Budapest on 23   October 1956, the applicant, then a captain ( százados ), was serving as an officer in charge of a training course ( tanfolyam-parancsnok ) at the Tata military school for junior officers. Following the demonstrations, gunfight and uprising in the capital on 23 October 1956, on 24 October martial law was introduced, providing, inter alia , that any person bearing arms without authorisation was punishable by death. The applicant was aware of these provisions, which had been announced on national radio. 10.     At dawn on 26 October 1956 insurgents unsuccessfully attacked the military school. During the exchange of gunfire, an officer was killed and another wounded. Shortly afterwards, the building of the local prison and prosecutor’s office was occupied by the insurgents. The applicant had the task of regaining control of the building. He managed to convince the insurgents, without using force, to leave the premises. 11.     In a similar assignment, the applicant was subsequently ordered to disarm other insurgents who had taken control of the building of the local Police Department by force on the afternoon of 26 October 1956. Having overcome the resistance of the police forces, the insurgents, including a certain Tamás Kaszás, armed themselves with guns taken from the police. Among the insurgents, Tamás Kaszás and another person took command. Their intention was to execute the chief of the Police Department, but eventually they refrained from doing so. Tamás Kaszás and a smaller group of insurgents stayed behind in the building, in order to secure their position; Tamás Kaszás informally assumed their leadership. 12.     As in his previous assignment, the applicant was specifically ordered to organise a group of officers, deploy them at the Police Department and regain control of that building, using force if necessary. Each member of the applicant’s squad, composed of some fifteen officers, had a 7.62 mm sub-machine gun and a pistol; the group was, moreover, equipped with two 7.62   mm machine guns and some twenty-five hand grenades. 13.     On their way to the Police Department, the applicant’s squad met two young men, one of whom was carrying a sub-machine gun. The applicant’s subordinates confiscated the gun and released the two individuals unharmed. 14.     The applicant divided his men into two platoons, one of which stayed outside, near the entrance to the police building, while the other went inside. In the yard there were four or five disarmed police officers as well as five civilians, the latter belonging to the group of insurgents. On arrival, the officers in the applicant’s platoon aimed their sub-machine guns at the insurgents. One of the insurgents, István Balázs, stated that they were unarmed. However, one of the disarmed police officers said that Tamás Kaszás had a gun. István Balázs asked the latter to surrender the weapon. Thereupon, a heated dispute, of unknown content, broke out between the applicant and Tamás Kaszás. 15.     Finally, Tamás Kaszás reached towards a pocket in his coat and drew his handgun. The applicant responded by resolutely ordering his men to fire. Simultaneously, he fired his sub-machine gun at Tamás Kaszás, who was shot in his chest and abdomen and died immediately. One of the shots fired on the applicant’s orders hit another person and three hit yet another person. A further insurgent was shot and subsequently died of his injuries. Two individuals ran out onto the street, where the other platoon of the applicant’s men started to shoot at them. One of them suffered a non-lethal injury to his head; the other person was hit by numerous shots and died at the scene. As the applicant was subsequently driving away from the premises on a motorcycle, he was shot at by unidentified persons, fell off the motorcycle and suffered some injuries. B.     Proceedings before the Constitutional Court 16.     On 16 February 1993 Parliament passed an Act (“the Act”) which provided, inter alia , that – having regard to the 1968 United Nations Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (proclaimed in Hungary by Law-Decree no. 1 of 1971) – certain acts committed during the 1956 uprising were not subject to statutory limitation. Subsequently, the President of the Republic initiated the review of the constitutionality of the Act prior to its promulgation. 17.     On 13 October 1993 the Constitutional Court adopted a decision in the matter, laying down certain constitutional requirements concerning the prosecution of war crimes and crimes against humanity. It held that the statutory limitation on the punishability of a certain type of conduct could be removed by the lawmaker only if that conduct had not been subject to a time-limit for prosecution under Hungarian law at the time when it had been committed – the sole exception being if international law characterised the conduct as a war crime or a crime against humanity and removed its statutory limitation, and moreover if Hungary was under an international obligation to remove that limitation. Consequently, it declared section 1 of the Act unconstitutional, since that provision was aimed at the removal of the statutory limitation on the punishability of such conduct which did not fall within the category of war crimes. 18.     The relevant parts of the reasoning of the Constitutional Court’s decision (no. 53/1993) read as follows: “IV.     The particular characteristics of war crimes and crimes against humanity 1.     War crimes and crimes against humanity are criminal offences which did not arise as part of domestic criminal law but are deemed to constitute criminal offences by the international community, which defines their essential elements. These criminal offences – according to the prevailing legal standard of international law that has evolved since the Second World War – are not simply offences punishable by the domestic law of most countries. (Therefore, homicide may not, in itself, be classified as amounting to a crime against humanity.) Their international status is linked with their definition at a supranational level either on the basis of natural law ... or by reference to the protection of the ‘foundations of the international community’, or by citing the threat posed by these activities to all humanity: their perpetrators are ‘enemies of the human race’. Thus, the significance of these offences is too great to allow their punishment to be made dependent upon their acceptance by, or the general criminal-law policy of, individual States. 2.     It is the international community that prosecutes and punishes war crimes and crimes against humanity: it does so, on the one hand, through international tribunals, and, on the other hand, by obliging those States which wish to be part of the community of nations to undertake their prosecution. ... 4.     The prosecution and punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity may only proceed within the framework of legal guarantees; it would be contradictory to protect human rights without such guarantees. But these international guarantees cannot be replaced or substituted by the legal guarantees of domestic law. (a)     International law applies the guarantee of nullum crimen sine lege to itself and not to domestic law. ‘Customary international law’, ‘the legal principles recognised by civilised nations’ and ‘the legal principles recognised by the community of nations’ constitute a lex which classifies certain types of behaviour as prosecutable and punishable according to the norms of the community of nations (through international organisations or the States belonging to the international community), irrespective of whether the domestic law contains a comparable criminal offence or whether the relevant treaties have been incorporated into domestic law. The gravity of war crimes and crimes against humanity – namely the fact that they endanger international peace and security and mankind as such – is irreconcilable with leaving their punishability within the ambit of domestic laws. ... Article 15 § 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – which, in its content, matches Article 7 § 1 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms – obliges member States to uphold unconditionally the principles of nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege. The reference by international law to the criminal offence defined (‘[n]o one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed’) has been interpreted by legal scholars to refer only to those criminal offences which are undoubtedly punishable by domestic law, either through ratification or direct application. By Article 15 § 2 of the Covenant, ‘[n]othing in this Article shall prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by the community of nations’. (The content of Article 7 § 2 of the European Convention is similar, with the distinction that the latter substitutes ‘civilised nations’ for the term ‘community of nations’.) This separation makes possible the prosecution of the previously noted sui generis criminal offences defined by international law even by those States belonging to the community of nations whose domestic system of law does not criminalise or punish that action or omission. It follows logically, therefore, that such acts are permitted to be prosecuted and punished in accordance with the conditions and requirements imposed by international law. The second paragraphs of the Covenant’s and the European Convention’s relevant articles evidently override the guarantees of domestic criminal law, all the more so since Article 4 § 2 of the Covenant and Article 15 § 2 of the European Convention both imperatively require the prevalence of the principles of nullum crimen and nulla poena , even in situations of war or in states of emergency. For those States which incorporate into domestic law the international legal norms concerning war crimes and crimes against humanity subsequent to the commission of these crimes, the second paragraphs of the above-mentioned Articles amount to authorising retrospective criminal legislation in the State’s domestic legal system. It is the international, rather than the domestic, law which must have declared, at the time of their commission, these acts to be punishable. Historically, this exception has been applied in respect of the punishability of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed during the Second World War. But the development of international law has since separated the sphere of ‘international humanitarian law’ from the context of war and made the prosecution and punishment of these crimes independent of the requirements and conditions laid down in the domestic criminal-law system, with regard also to statutory limitations, inasmuch as two conventions on the non-applicability of statutory limitations for war crimes and crimes against humanity have been concluded. ... V.     Criminal offences defined by international law and the Constitution 1.     The definition of, and conditions for, punishing war crimes and crimes against humanity are laid down in international law; these crimes – directly or indirectly through the obligations imposed on States – are prosecuted and punished by the community of nations. The rules on the punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity – since these crimes threaten the foundations of humanity and international coexistence – constitute cogent rules of general international law. Those States which refuse to assume these obligations cannot participate in the community of nations. ... 2.     The regulation under international law of war crimes and crimes against humanity disregards the principle of nullum crimen prevailing in domestic laws, inasmuch as it punishes these crimes, irrespective of whether or not they were punishable under domestic law at the time of their commission. ... It is not the very principle of nullum crimen that is breached in the circumstances but [only] its limitation to the sphere of domestic law. Within its system, international law demands that certain criminal acts be characterised, on the basis of the general principles recognised by the community of nations that were prevailing at the time when the act was committed ... as war crimes or crimes against humanity. In the context of these crimes, it is indeed the international community’s criminal-law power that is being exercised – under conditions and guarantees prescribed by the community of nations – through the Hungarian State’s criminal-law power. Domestic law is applicable to the extent that international law expressly so requires (for instance, as is the case with the determination of penalties). No domestic law in conflict with an express cogent rule of international law may be given effect. ... 4.     ... (b)     Acts defined in Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions constitute crimes against humanity; [this Article] contains those ‘minimum’ requirements which all the conflicting Parties must observe, ‘at any time and in any place whatsoever’. The International Court of Justice has recognised that the prohibitions contained in common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions are based on ‘elementary considerations of humanity’ and cannot be breached in an armed conflict, regardless of whether it is international or internal in character ( Nicaragua v. United States of America , judgment of 27 June 1986, ICJ Reports 1986 , p. 114). In defining crimes against humanity, paragraph 47 of the Report [1] on the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia also makes reference to common Article   3. ... (d)     A typical feature of war crimes and crimes against humanity is that they are punishable irrespective of whether they were committed in breach of domestic law. ... It is therefore immaterial whether the Geneva Conventions were properly promulgated or whether the Hungarian State fulfilled its obligation to implement them prior to ... 23 October 1956. Independently [of these issues], the responsibility of the perpetrators existed under international law, and potential subsequent domestic legislation may give effect to this responsibility in its original scope. ...” 19.     In pursuance of decision no. 53/1993, the Act was subsequently amended and promulgated as Act no. 90 of 1993. C.     Investigation and indictment in respect of the applicant 20.     On 14 December 1993 the Budapest Investigation Office started an investigation into alleged crimes against humanity perpetrated in Tata during the 1956 revolution. On 20 April 1994 the applicant was questioned as a suspect. 21.     On 27 December 1994 the Budapest Military Public Prosecutor’s Office indicted the applicant for the role he had played in the incident in Tata on 26 October 1956. He was charged with having commanded a military squad in an assignment to regain control of the Police Department building, and with having shot, and ordered his men to shoot at, civilians, causing the deaths of, and injuries to, several persons. On account of these alleged facts, the applicant was indicted for: “[A] crime against humanity in violation of Article 3 § 1 of the Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted in Geneva on 12 August 1949 and proclaimed in Hungary by Law-Decree no. 32 of 1954, punishable pursuant to section 1(2a) of Act no. 90 of 1993 [on the procedure concerning certain crimes committed during the October 1956 revolution and freedom fight].” D.     First-instance proceedings before the Budapest Regional Court 22.     On 29 May 1995 the Military Bench of the Budapest Regional Court discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant, holding that the crime with which he was charged constituted homicide and incitement to homicide, rather than a crime against humanity, and was thus statute-barred. 23.     The relevant part of the reasoning of the decision states as follows: “[T]he legal provision to be applied by the court is an international convention in respect of its hypothesis, but refers back to the domestic criminal law in respect of the sanctions. Article 7 § 1 of the Constitution requires that the relevant international legal instrument be applied, incorporating it into domestic law; and Act no. 90 of 1993 transforms it into a provision of positive criminal law. Given that the hypothesis of the crime in question has been incorporated into domestic law – but domestic law does not have its own notions in this connection – the interpretation of that hypothesis can only be carried out in accordance with the international law. Both Act no. 28 of 1990 on the enactment of the significance of the 1956 revolution and freedom fight and Act no. 90 of 1993 on the procedure concerning certain crimes committed during the October 1956 revolution and freedom fight state that in 1956 a revolution and a freedom fight took place in Hungary. On this basis, as well as according to the [commonly known] facts, it can be established that at the time of the perpetration of the crime on 26 October 1956 a revolution was in progress in Hungary. Nevertheless, this definition contained in the domestic legislation does not make it unnecessary to examine whether there was a non-international armed conflict. In its part establishing the hypothesis [of the crime in question], Act no. 90 of 1993 refers to the Convention signed on 12 August 1949; consequently, the interpretation [of this hypothesis] can only be carried out according to the relevant international legal practice or to international legal documents if such exist. The above-mentioned Convention defines its own scope of application in Article 2 as follows: ‘in addition to the provisions which shall be implemented in peace-time, the present Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them’. Moreover, Article 3 provides that its rules have to be applied ‘[i]n the case of an armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties’. The court had to examine whether at the time of the perpetration of the crime on 26   October 1956 an armed conflict not of an international character was taking place in Hungary. The term ‘armed conflict not of an international character’ is defined by the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), proclaimed by Law-Decree no. 20 of 1989. Article 1 § 1 of this Protocol lays down the conditions of application of the relevant provisions as follows: ‘This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application, shall apply to all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol.’ Article 1 § 2 states that ‘[t]his Protocol shall not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts’. The problem which may emerge because the term ‘armed conflict not of an international character’ is defined in Article 1 § 1 of the Protocol relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, signed on 8 June 1977 and promulgated in Hungary by Law-Decree no. 20 of 1989 – that is, in an international convention that was concluded after the perpetration of the crime – is merely illusory, since Article 1 § 1 of Protocol II declares that ‘[t]his Protocol develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 without modifying its existing conditions of application’. Therefore, it can be ascertained that although Protocol II develops and supplements the substantive norms (that is, the rules of conduct in the case of a non-international conflict), it does not introduce any modifications to their existing conditions of application. In view of this, Article   1 § 1 of Protocol II itself establishes that the definition of an armed conflict not of an international character, which is contained in the same paragraph, does not modify the meaning of that term as used by the 1949 Geneva Conventions, but merely interprets it. With respect to [the original definition], [this one] is neither a restrictive nor an extensive interpretation, but the very first interpretation defining the meaning of the initial term. (In the court’s view, this interpretation cannot be either restrictive or extensive in any event, since no other international legal document contains a definition of the term with which to compare this interpretation.) Accordingly, the term ‘armed conflict not of an international character’ must be seen as having been already conceived with this meaning at the time when the Convention was signed. When analysing the term, it can be observed that such armed conflicts fall into the category of conflicts that ‘take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organised armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol’. ... During the night of 23 to 24 October 1956, the first spontaneously organised armed groups came into existence in the territory of Hungary, especially in those parts of Budapest where they confronted the Soviet army which was being deployed unexpectedly. It can be unambiguously established that these armed groups were opposing the central power, although several of them maintained regular negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People’s Republic and the Ministry of Defence. It can also be determined that the armed groups did not operate under any central command, because by the time the joint command of the national guards and the government’s forces was established under the leadership of Béla Király, appointed by Prime Minister Imre Nagy, the armed conflicts in the country had already essentially ceased. Consequently, it is self-evident that, although the armed groups maintained a loose network of information between themselves, they did not perform their military operations in various parts of the country in a concerted manner. It seems that it will forever be impossible to ascertain the territories in which and the extent to which the armed groups stood under the control of the various spontaneously organised revolutionary bodies or under that of the former administration, which remained partly operational throughout. Comparing the definition of Protocol II and the statements contained in the opinion of the expert historian, it can be ascertained that Act no. 90 of 1993 and, consequently, Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, signed in Geneva on 12 August 1949, are not applicable to the instant conduct as set out in the indictment. This is so because, according to the opinion of the expert historian, on 26 October 1956 the operating armed groups did not remain under a central command. There were no distinct combatant parties, since the armed groups and persons that were effectively operating, while they might even have been active in the same area yet independent from each other, were often guided by different political motivations. It cannot be ascertained which territories of the country were controlled, and to what extent, by armed groups which may have allowed them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations. On no account can it be established that the armed groups reached a level of organisation or submitted to a central command to such an extent that enabled them to implement the regulations of the Protocol during the military activities. In view of the above, the court has found neither the international Convention promulgated in Hungary by Law-Decree no. 32 of 1954 nor Act no. 90 of 1993 to be applicable to the present crime. The conduct of the accused ... would constitute multiple homicide, committed in part as an inciter, had it occurred as stated in the bill of indictment. ... The crime committed by the accused – even if proven – became statute-barred on 26   October 1971; therefore, the court has discontinued the criminal proceedings.” 24.     On 8 June 1995 the prosecution appealed to the Supreme Court. E.     Suspension of the case pending further proceedings before the Constitutional Court 25.     On 29 November 1995 the relevant bench of the Supreme Court suspended the appeal proceedings pending the outcome of a new case before the Constitutional Court in which the President of the Supreme Court and the Attorney-General had challenged the constitutionality of the Act (referred to in paragraph 16 above) on the ground that it was allegedly in breach of international treaties. 26.     On 4 September 1996 the Constitutional Court abrogated the entirety of the Act as being unconstitutional. It observed that although the Act had been amended in the light of decision no. 53/1993 of the Constitutional Court and had been aimed at prosecuting those who had committed war crimes or crimes against humanity in 1956, it nevertheless represented an unconstitutional legislative obstacle to the lawful prosecution of those perpetrators, as required by the general principles of international law. It noted that since the Act contained errors of codification, namely incorrect references to various provisions of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, it did not meet the constitutional requirement of harmony between domestic and international law and was therefore inapplicable. The Constitutional Court’s decision (no. 36/1996) contained the following conclusion: “II. 2.     According to the complainants, the Act, being incompatible with the international treaty [the Geneva Conventions], was impossible to interpret or apply. Through its abrogation, the impediment to the Hungarian authorities’ prosecuting and punishing [the perpetrators of] war crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined in international law, has been removed ... The Constitutional Court ... draws attention to the fact that it is international law itself that determines all the hypotheses and sanctions for offences ... punishable under international law.” F.     Remittal to, and repetition of the proceedings before, the Regional Court 27.     On 6 December 1996 the Supreme Court’s appeal bench quashed the decision of 29 May 1995 and remitted the case to the first-instance court with the instruction that the proceedings be conducted afresh from the investigation stage onwards. It gave the following guidance on the manner in which the proceedings were to be conducted: “III.     ... [T]he court will have to examine whether the elements and conditions of the offence as set out in the [Geneva] Conventions [and its Protocols] can be identified in the instant case. This will allow the [defendant’s] conduct to be characterised either as a crime against life or as a crime against humanity, not subject to statutory limitation. The Military Bench failed to elaborate on the facts in a manner detailed enough to allow the establishment of the above elements of the crime, failing which it is impossible to determine unequivocally whether or not the above Conventions apply in the case. Consequently, the decision of the Bench, including the order to discontinue the proceedings, is unsubstantiated (section 239/2a of the Code of Criminal Procedure). IV.     To arrive at a well-founded decision, it is necessary to establish in the findings of fact the chronology of the military events during the October 1956 revolution and freedom fight. On this basis, it will be possible to ascertain whether the revolutionary armed forces operated under responsible command, exercised control over a part of the territory and carried out sustained and concerted operations. The ill-foundedness may be eliminated in the proceedings to be conducted afresh from the investigation stage onwards by obtaining the opinion of an expert military historian from the Institute for Military History. The first-instance court will have to examine at a hearing the existing expert opinion and the one to be obtained in the course of the supplementary investigation. The complete findings of fact, which would allow the determination of criminal responsibility, can only be established by way of an analytical assessment of the evidence.” 28.     On 16 February 1998 an expert military historian presented his opinion on the above questions. 29.     On 7 May 1998 the Military Bench held a hearing. At the hearing the military prosecutor argued that the applicant was guilty of a crime against humanity, prohibited by Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions, and punishable under sections 166(1) and 166(2) of the Criminal Code, which concern homicide. 30.     Defence counsel argued that the Fourth Geneva Convention was not applicable to the facts of the case and that, in any event, its application would run counter to the principles of nullum crimen sine lege and nulla poena sine lege , given that it had not been properly proclaimed in Hungary. 31.     On the same day, the Military Bench discontinued the criminal proceedings with the following reasoning: “In the course of characterising the crime, the court first examined whether the act described in the findings of fact constituted a crime against humanity or the crime of incitement to multiple homicide. Defence counsel’s argument – namely, that no criminal liability can be established on the ground of the Geneva Conventions since they had not been promulgated in due form in Hungary, and that criminal liability based on them would thus violate the principles nullum crimen and nulla poena sine lege – cannot be sustained. In decision no. 53/1993 (X.13.) the Constitutional Court stated that the legal system of the Republic of Hungary accepted the generally recognised rules of international law, which are likewise part of Hungarian law without any further (additional) transformation. According to chapter IV(4a) of the decision, international law applies the guarantee of nullum crimen sine lege to itself rather than to domestic law. Customary international law, the legal principles recognised by civilised nations and the legal principles recognised by the community of nations, constitute a lex which classifies certain types of behaviour as prosecutable and punishable according to the norms of the community of nations, irrespective of whether domestic law contains a comparable criminal offence or whether the relevant treaties have been incorporated into domestic law. In view of these considerations, this court has not found it necessary to examine whether the Geneva Conventions had been properly promulgated by Law-Decree no. 32 of 1954. Article 3 § 1 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted on 12 August 1949 and proclaimed by Law-Decree no. 32 of 1954, reads as follows: ... In view of the above and of chapters V(4) and II of Constitutional Court decision nos. 53/1993 and 36/1996 respectively, this court had to examine whether the conduct described in the findings of fact corresponds to the elements contained in [common Article 3 § 1 of the Geneva Conventions]. The Geneva Conventions do not define the notion of an armed conflict of a non-international character. In this connection, the court finds decisive Article 1 § 1 of Protocol II relative to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, adopted on 8 June 1977 and promulgated by Law-Decree no. 20 of 1989, which reads as follows: ... In view of the above, while making its findings of fact, the court had to examine whether in the material period, between 23 October and 4 November 1956, the armed groups operating in Hungary which were opponents to the armed forces of the government were under responsible command and exercised such control over a part of the country’s territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted operations. In its own findings of fact – in the light of the opinion of the expert historian – this court has not established that these conditions existed in the period when the impugned act was committed. The Conventions [the Fourth Geneva Convention and Protocol II] subject their scope of application to strict and conjunctive conditions. As is prescribed in the Convention, it becomes effective only if the armed conflict is of high intensity and the fighting activity of the opponents is institutionalised. From the established findings of fact this court has drawn the conclusion that no so-called armed conflict of a non-international character within the meaning of international law was in progress in Hungary on 26 October 1956. The historical background set out in the findings of fact does not substantiate the establishment of the crime defined in international law, since several elements of the crime as defined in international law are missing. In view of the above, the defendant’s act – even if proven – should be characterised, according to the rules in force at the time of its commission, as multiple homicide partly committed as an inciter, within the meaning of section 352 of the BHÖ [2] . This crime was, in accordance with section 25(a) of Act no. 2 of 1950 as then in force, statute-barred after a period of fifteen years had elapsed. Having regard to section 2 of the Criminal Code, section 33(2c) of the Criminal Code – which excludes statutory limitation in the case of aggravated murder – cannot be applied. The court has not established condemnatory findings of fact in regard to the defendant; however, it has not delivered an acquittal, since in its view, in the case of statute-barred conduct, the ground which eliminates punishability – that is, statutory limitation – has precedence over the fact that the impugned act has not been proven in any event. Therefore, the court has discontinued the proceedings against the defendant for the crime of multiple homicide partly committed as an inciter, since it became statute-barred on 26 October 1971.” G.     The appeal proceedings 32.     On an appeal by the prosecution, on 5 November 1998 the Supreme Court, sitting as an appellate court, upheld this decision. The court, which had obtained the opinions of three expert historians, put forward the following reasoning: “Spontaneously and unexpectedly, a revolution and freedom fight broke out in Hungary on 23 October 1956. In the course of these events, as early as during the night of 23 to 24 October 1956, the first spontaneously organised armed groups came into existence, especially in those parts of Budapest where they confronted the Soviet army, which was progressing unexpectedly. These armed groups were opposing the central power, although several of them maintained regular negotiations with the government of the Hungarian People’s Republic and the Ministry of Defence. The armed groups did not operate under any central command, because by the time a joint command of the national guards and of the government forces was established under the leadership of Béla Király, appointed by Prime Minister Imre Nagy, the armed conflicts in the country had essentially already ceased. Consequently, it is self-evident that, although the armed groups maintained a loose network of information between themselves, they did not perform their military operations in various parts of the country in a concerted manner. On 23 October 1956 the central government still regarded the people’s spontaneous revolutionary acts as a counter-revolution, and intended to suppress the armed revolt relying on their armed forces. Because of political disputes, an internal struggle within the leadership of the Hungarian Workers’ Party, the success of the armed groups and the political pressure exerted on the government, on 28 October the latter, headed by Imre Nagy, ceased to classify the events as a counter-revolution, and declared them to be a national uprising. ... Therefore, it was appropriate for the first-instance court to state the facts as follows: ‘As of 23 October 1956, the spontaneously organised armed groups in Budapest and in the provincial cities were fighting against the Soviet troops that were invading Budapest and also against the armed forces of the government, such as the State Security Authority, the police and units of the national army. In the first few days (between 23 and 28 October) the insurgent groups were formed in an unorganised manner and were fighting independently, without any common command. They were operating primarily in Budapest, but later on, some less organised and less numerous groups also emerged in the provincial cities. A characteristic of these groups was their continuous dissolution and reorganisation, their rather loose contacts among themselves, which generally concerned only the exchange of information, and the lack of any coordinated military actions between 23   October and 4 November 1956. They elected their commanders from their own ranks, according to their achievements in the course of the fights. The leaders of the groups changed rapidly, because the momentary situation, the success achieved and the defeats sustained spurred the fighters to elect new leaders. It cannot be established that these insurgent groups operated under a responsible command; they were not directed – and nor were their tasks determined – by orders emanating from their commanders. The members of the armed groups did not wear any signs distinguishing them from civilians. The government did not acknowledge the anti-government forces as insurgents or as a combatant party. The armed insurgent groups in Budapest controlled 3 to 4 square kilometres in the period between 23 and 28 October 1956. The control of this area meant that the activities of the government forces were obstructed and disturbed, but the revolutionary groups did not fully close off the area and the government forces could pass through it, though with losses. The armed groups formed outside the capital operated independently; and did not control any substantial territory. In the course of their armed operations in certain towns, they did not aim to establish their control over a certain region. ... In accordance with the requirements of constitutionality set out by the Constitutional Court for the purposes of the application of the law in [its decisions nos. 53/1993 and 36/1996], the Supreme Court has had to examine in the present case whether the multiple homicide committed on 26 October 1956, [i.e.] in the first period of the October 1956 revolution and freedom fight, constituted an offence under common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions – that is, whether that crime was committed in a manner prohibited by that provision. If all the elements and conditions of the above provision prevail, then the deliberate homicide committed in violation of international law will constitute a crime against humanity which is punishable irrespective of the date of its perpetration. Such a crime cannot be statute-barred pursuant to Article 1 (a) or 1 (b) of the Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in New York on 26   November 1968 and proclaimed in Hungary by Law-Decree no. 1 of 1971. If, however, the elements and conditions prescribed by the international law do not fully prevail, then the impugned act will constitute homicide under domestic law. Article 3 § 1 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, adopted on 12 August 1949 and proclaimed by Law-Decree no. 32 of 1954, reads as fo