CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 15 janvier 2009

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text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s81CCF55C { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .s7CB9076 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s82D7B801 { width:22.93pt; display:inline-block } .sF9287AF { width:174.97pt; display:inline-block } .sF2E32F9B { width:36.61pt; display:inline-block } .s5F32E900 { width:208.31pt; display:inline-block }       FIRST SECTION             CASE OF MICHAEL THEODOSSIOU LTD. v. CYPRUS   (Application no. 31811/04)               JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   15 January 2009     FINAL   15/04/2009   This judgment may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Michael Theodossiou Ltd v. Cyprus, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Christos Rozakis, President,   Anatoly Kovler,   Elisabeth Steiner,   Dean Spielmann,   Sverre Erik Jebens,   Giorgio Malinverni,   George Nicolaou, judges, and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 11 December 2008, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 31811/04) against the Republic of Cyprus lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Cypriot registered company, Michael Theodossiou Ltd (“the applicant company”), on 4 August 2004. 2.     The applicant company was represented by Mr G. Savvides, a lawyer practising in Cyprus. The Cypriot Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr P. Clerides, Attorney-General of the Republic of Cyprus. 3.     On 11 January 2006 the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 4.     The applicant company was the registered owner of 4,462 square metres of immovable property located in the seaside area of Limassol, on which a complex of stores had been used as bonded warehouses since 1965. A.     The compulsory acquisition proceedings 5.     On 10   July 1972 the municipality of Limassol decided to acquire the applicant company’s seaside properties for public benefit purposes which included “town planning” and “construction, maintenance and development of land communications” in furtherance of a municipal plan to rid the Limassol seafront of privately owned buildings. On 1 December 1972 a notice of acquisition of the relevant property was published in the Official Gazette of the Republic. The notice referred to the applicant’s property, which constituted part of the relevant Land Registry plan, and having total area approximately 4,462 square meters. On 26   January 1973, an order for compulsory acquisition was published in the Official Gazette. 6.     On 14   February 1973 the applicant company lodged judicial review proceedings with the Supreme Court (case no.   47/73) to contest the order. On 31 May 1975 judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court dismissing the applicant company’s application. The land in question was one of the few remaining plots for the completion of a project that had been implemented in stages for more than two decades. From the evidence adduced it was clear that the financial implications of the project had been carefully considered by the municipality having due regard to whether it was the opportune moment to proceed with the acquisition. 7.     On 5 May 1977 the municipality requested the Lands and Surveys Office (LSO) to provide an evaluation of the property so as to determine the amount of compensation to be paid to the applicant company. On 7   September 1978, the LSO concluded that the value of the property amounted to 100,000 Cypriot pounds (CYP). On 3 September 1980 the municipality informed the applicant company that they would pay CYP   70,000 as compensation. It added that given that the applicant company’s own evaluation was excessive, a friendly settlement could not be concluded. 8.     On 1 March 1984 a meeting was held between the applicant’s representatives and the municipality. The latter disclosed the estimated value of the property and offered CYP 190,000, including interest, as compensation. 9.     On 23 February 1985 the applicant company requested the municipality to make a new offer of compensation within seven days. It notified the municipality that in the event that no such offer was made, it would consider that there was no longer an interest in the compulsory acquisition, which would be taken as abandoned. 10.     The municipality offered to pay the applicant company by 28   February 1985 the amount of CYP 200,000, which included compensation as assessed by the LSO and interest. This was not accepted by the applicant company which made a counter-offer of CYP 250,000 including interest. The municipality agreed to the amount of CYP 230,000, an offer which was, however, not approved by the Government. 11.     On 8 May 1985 the applicant company filed application for judicial review no. 517/85 with the Supreme Court, requesting a declaration that the omission of the municipality to revoke the acquisition order of 1973 was contrary to section 7 of Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law no. 15 of 1962 and/or section 8 of Compulsory Acquisition of Property (Amendment) Law no. 35 of 1983, and Article 23 of the Constitution. Moreover, a declaration was requested that the acquisition order was null and void as a result of the non-compliance by the respondents with the requirements under the aforementioned legislation to offer compensation. 12.     On 28 November 1987 the Supreme Court delivered its judgment, dismissing the application. An omission of the municipality did not lead to the nullification of the acquisition: the requirement for prompt payment of compensation aimed only at safeguarding the financial interests of the owner and any omission in this respect had only financial consequences on the municipality. The financial interests of the applicant company were safeguarded by the provision for payment of interest and the possibility of applying to the courts for assessment of the amount of compensation. Moreover, the owner of property subject to acquisition had no right to demand the revocation of an acquisition order on the ground that the property was not required for the purpose of the acquisition or that the purpose for which it was to be acquired had become unattainable, or for failure of the municipality to offer compensation. B.     The building permit applications 13.     On 10 November 1972 the applicant company submitted to the municipality an application for a building permit concerning the relevant property for the construction of three blocks of flats consisting of 32 shops and 13 three-bedroom and 32 two-bedroom flats. The application for a building permit was refused due to the decision for the compulsory acquisition of the property (see paragraph 5 above). 14.     On 5 January 1973 the applicant company brought an application before the Supreme Court of Cyprus contesting this refusal (case no. 11/73), which was joined with case no. 47/73 (see paragraph 6 above). On 31 May 1975 it was held that the refusal was contrary to law and null and void, as a building permit could not be refused given that the applicant company remained the owner of the property and would only cease to be the owner upon payment of compensation for the property under acquisition. 15.     Approximately fifteen years later, on 30 December 1988 the applicant company applied again for a building permit. On 30 March 1989 the applicant company lodged application for judicial review no. 229/89 contesting the municipality’s failure to reply. On 3   February 1990 the municipality refused the building permit application emphasising that the acquisition order was still valid. Given the municipality’s reply the applicant company withdrew its application for review. 16.     On 10 February 1990 the applicant company lodged new judicial review proceedings contesting the refusal and maintaining that Law no. 84 of 1988 amending the Compulsory Acquisition Law of 1962 rendered the acquisition order void. On 18   February 1993 the Supreme Court found the amending law by virtue of which acquisition orders could be annulled as contravening the principle of separation of powers and, as such, unconstitutional. Hence, the acquisition order was found to be valid and the application was dismissed. C.     The proceedings concerning compensation 17.     On 4 January 1994 the applicant company filed an application with the District Court of Limassol requesting payment of compensation for its property under compulsory acquisition. 18.     On 25 November 1994 a requisition order was published in the Official Gazette pursuant to section   4   of Requisition of Property Law 21/62 as amended. The order concerned the requisition of the entire property covering an area of approximately 4,447 square meters for a period of two years. 19.     On 29 December 1994 the municipality made an offer for compensation to the applicant company, in accordance with section 8 (2) of Law no. 15 of 1962 as amended by Law no. 35 of 1983, amounting to CYP   100,000 plus statutory interest. The applicant company accepted the offer, without prejudice (in accordance with section 8 of Law 25 of 1983, see paragraph 31 below), and withdrew its application pending before the district court for payment of compensation. 20.     On 16 January 1995 the applicant accepted payment of the amount of CYP   277,994.51 and ownership of the property was transferred to the municipality. The amount paid corresponded to CYP 100,000 for the value of the plot, plus CYP 177,994.51 annual interest at the rate of seven per cent from 1   December 1972 until 27 May 1983, then at a rate of nine per cent until the date of payment. 21.     On 15 February 1995 the applicant company lodged proceedings with the District Court of Limassol concerning the determination of the amount of fair and reasonable compensation for the compulsory acquisition of its property (see paragraph 30 below). According to its expert evidence the value of its property at the time of notification of the acquisition amounted to CYP 336,368. The parties agreed that the market value of the property in 1994 was CYP 2,150,000. The applicant company’s main argument in the proceedings was that compensation should be based on the value of the property in 1994. Following approximately twenty appearances before the court, the hearing commenced on 27   March 2000. It appears that there had been sixteen adjournments of the case at least one of which was requested by the applicant company. The hearing was completed after at least seven sessions and judgment was reserved on 12 April 2001 and was delivered on 11   March 2002. 22.     The court found that the municipality had made at some unspecified time before 1980 an offer of CYP 70,000 as compensation and then on 1   March 1984 a new offer of CYP 190,000 including interest, both of which had been rejected by the applicant company. Given the previous offers, the court could not agree with the applicant company that the amount of compensation should be based on the value of the property in 1994, when the municipality’s offer was made. Under section 10 (a) of Compulsory Acquisition Law no. 15 of 1962, the time relevant for determination of the amount of compensation was that of notification of the order of acquisition. The applicant company’s argument that a fair amount had to be based on the market value of the property in 1994 was not justified by law. Turning to whether the actual compensation paid on the basis of the value of the applicant company’s property in 1972 was equitable, the court noted that it could not accept the applicant company’s expert evidence, which had been based on an inappropriate comparison with properties having different building density coefficients from the applicant company’s property and other important differences in their legal and factual characteristics. Having thoroughly examined the suggestions of the applicant company’s expert witness concerning his evaluation, the court dismissed his evidence, finding that he had merely tried to serve the financial interests of the applicant company and not to assist the court. The expert evidence submitted on behalf of the municipality had been accurate, used comparators that had similar legal, physical and real characteristics to those of the applicant company’s property and had accurate adjustments of the value of the property based on adequate and well-substantiated explanations. The court accepted therefore that, on the basis of the evaluation, the value of the applicant company’s property on 1 December 1972 was CYP 103,056. The court awarded the latter sum (minus the amount of CYP 100,000 already paid by the municipality) plus different taxes and other expenses paid by the applicant company. 23.     On 17 April 2002 the applicant company filed an appeal with the Supreme Court contesting the district court’s judgment. It maintained that the LSO had estimated the value of its property in January 1980 as CYP   735,000 which, by simple deduction, suggested that the value of the property in 1972 was approximately CYP 350,000, as confirmed by its expert evidence. Further, it maintained that the municipality’s obligation to provide it with just compensation as required by Article 23 (3) of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence of this Court could not be considered to have been fulfilled by an offer of compensation made 22 years after the acquisition notification and estimated on the basis of the value of the property at the time of the notification. 24.     The appeal was heard on 18   February 2004 and on 19 March 2004 it was dismissed. The court noted that the fact that the value of the property had been estimated by the LSO to be CYP 735,000 was a non sequitur , as both expert witnesses appearing before the district court had used the comparative method of valuation to determine the property’s value at the relevant time and any subsequent evaluation was based on different grounds and could not confirm or disprove an outcome reached by using the comparative method in respect of a particular point in time, which was acceptable per se and could not be falsified by a subsequent estimation based on different grounds. Further, the court found the applicant company’s argument under Article 23 of the Constitution to be misconceived: firstly, the municipality had made offers for compensation on at least two occasions before 1994, and any delay in payment of compensation was attributable to the applicant company, which had chosen repeatedly to contest the lawfulness of the acquisition procedure instead of referring the matter of compensation to the district court for determination. The applicant company knew at all times that the value of the property, as at 1972, had been estimated as CYP 100,000 and that its own evaluation was substantially higher. It was further aware that the relevant law provided that compensation must be based on the market value of the property at the time of notification of the compulsory acquisition. The applicant company should therefore have applied to the courts to obtain determination of the amount of compensation, as provided by law, or could have challenged the municipality’s offer of 1 March 1984 before the courts. Instead, it only contested the same old valuation in 1995 when it challenged the new offer which was made on its basis. 25.     Lastly, it added that section 10 (a) of the Compulsory Acquisition Law (see paragraph 30 below) providing that the relevant date for determination of the amount of compensation should be that of notification of the acquisition did not contravene Article 23 of the Constitution or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The latter provision explicitly accepted the regulation of acquisition proceedings by the conditions provided for in domestic law. It was added that: “The relevant case-law of the Court was referred to, not to dispute the time relevant for determination of compensation, a point which was clearly determined by the law, but rather to emphasise that, given that the delay in payment was attributed to the applicant company for not using the proceedings available to have it determined, and while the municipality had consistently offered to provide compensation on the basis of the value at the time of notification of the acquisition, the core of the applicant company’s claim had vanished.” 26.     On 2   October 2006 the Government paid the applicant company in accordance with the district court’s judgment CYP 3,056 plus interest amounting to CYP 8,670.25 (calculated on the basis of the statutory rate of seven per cent from 1 December 1972 until 26 May 1983 and then nine per cent from 28 May 1983 until 2 October 2006). II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE 27.     Article 23 of the Cyprus Constitution provides as follows: “(1)     Every person, alone or jointly with others, has the right to acquire, own, possess, enjoy or dispose of any movable or immovable property and has the right to respect for such a right... (2)     No deprivation or restriction or limitation of any such right shall be made except as provided in this Article. (3)     Restrictions or limitations which are absolutely necessary in the interests of public safety or public health or public morals, or town and country planning or the development and use of any property for the promotion of the public benefit or for the protection of the rights of others, may be imposed by law on the exercise of such a right. Just compensation shall be promptly paid for any such restrictions or limitations which materially decrease the economic value of the property; in the event of disagreement, such compensation is to be determined by a civil court. (4)     Any movable or immovable property or any right over or interest in any such property may be compulsorily acquired by the Republic, or by a municipal corporation or by a commune for educational, religious, charitable or sporting institutions, bodies or establishments within its competence and only from the persons belonging to its respective community, or by a public corporation or a public utility body on which such a right has been conferred by law and only (a)     for a purpose which is to the public benefit and shall be specially provided by a general law for compulsory acquisition which shall be enacted within a year from the date of the coming into operation of this Constitution; (b)     when such purpose is established by a decision of the acquiring authority and made under the provisions of such law stating clearly the reasons for such acquisition; (c)     upon payment in cash and in advance of just and equitable compensation, to be determined in case of disagreement by a civil court.” 28.     Section 7 of Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law No. 15 of 1962 provides, in so far as relevant, as follows: “(1)     At any time after the publication of a notice of acquisition and before the payment or the deposit of compensation as in this Law provided, the acquiring authority may, by an order published in the Official Gazette of the Republic, revoke such notice and any relative order of acquisition that may have been published, either generally or in respect of any particular property or part of property referred to therein; and thereupon all proceedings consequential to such notice or order of acquisition shall abate and the acquisition shall be deemed to have been abandoned either generally or in respect of such particular property or part of property, as the case may be. .... (3)     Where the acquisition of any property or any part of any property is deemed to have been abandoned under the provisions of sub-section (1) or subsection (2), the acquiring authority shall pay to any person interested in such property any costs or expenses reasonably incurred by such person, and shall compensate him for any loss he has suffered since the publication of the notice of acquisition and in consequence of such notice or of any relative order of acquisition that may have been published; and in the event of any dispute as to the amount to be paid as aforesaid, such amount shall be determined by the Court.” 29.     Section 8 of Part III of Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law No.   15 of 1962 provides as follows: “The acquiring authority, within 10 months after the publication of a notice of acquisition, shall enter into negotiations for the acquisition of the property to which such notice relates by private treaty and the determination, by agreement, of the compensation payable therefor and of its apportionment amongst the persons interested.” In the event that no such agreement is reached the acquiring authority shall proceed with payment of compensation as assessed by itself.” 30.     Section 9 of Part III of Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law No.   15 of 1962 as applicable in 1972 provided as follows: “If, within one month of the publication of an order of acquisition, no agreement as in section 8 has been reached, or if, notwithstanding that the said period of one month has not elapsed, no such agreement can in the circumstances be foreseen, the acquiring authority or any person interested may apply to the Court for the determination of the compensation payable for the acquisition of the property or, where appropriate, for the apportionment of such compensation amongst the persons interested.” 31.     Section 8 of Law 25 of 1983 amending Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law no. 15 of 1962 provided, in so far as relevant, as follows: “In the event that the procedure of compulsory acquisition of immovable property was not completed by the time of entry into force of the present Law the following provisions shall apply: (a)     The acquiring authority shall, within ten months from the day of entry into force of the present Law, commence negotiations for acquisition of the property subject to compulsory acquisition and, if no agreement is reached within the afore-mentioned period, the acquiring authority shall proceed to offer the amount it had estimated as compensation. (b)     the owner is not estopped from accepting the offered compensation reserving his right to seek determination of the amount of compensation by an appropriate court, .... In such a case the owner must refer the case to the court within seventy-five days at the latest for determination of the amount of compensation; following the lapse of such period it will be presumed that the owner and the acquiring authority have reached an agreement. For the purposes of determination of compensation referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) above an annual interest of seven per cent from the date of publication of the notification of acquisition shall be estimated until the date of entry into force of the present Law ...and interest of nine per cent from the date of entry into force of the present Law until such time as the relevant compensation is paid.” 32.     Section 10 of Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law No. 15 of 1962, as amended by Law No. 25/83, sets out the criteria and principles for determining fair and equitable compensation for the expropriation of property. Paragraph (a) of that section provides as follows: “the value of the property, shall, subject as hereinafter provided, be taken to be the amount which the property, if sold in the open market on the date of the publication of the relative notice of acquisition by a willing seller, might be expected to realise”. 33.     Paragraph (g) of that section, as amended by section 6 of Law No.   25/83, provides as follows: “(g)     in the case of acquisition of immovable property the value of which has been affected by the imposition of any restrictions or limitations under the provisions of the Antiquities Law or any other Law, account shall be taken of any compensation which may be deemed payable in accordance with the provisions of Article 23 of the Constitution”. 34.     Paragraph (n) of that section, as amended by section 6 of Law No.   25/83, provides as follows: “an annual interest rate of nine per cent is included in the amount of payable compensation, assessed from the date of notification of the acquisition until the date of payment of the relevant compensation”. 35.     In the same section it is also provided that: “for the assessment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs (f) and (g) of the present section, the circumstances of the case existing at the time of notification of the acquisition are taken into account.” 36.     Section 12 of Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law No. 15 of 1962 provides, in so far as relevant, as follows: “Upon being agreed or determined under the provisions of this Law, the compensation payable shall be paid promptly and in cash to the person or persons interested.” 37.     Section 13 of Compulsory Acquisition of Property Law No. 15 of 1962 provides, in so far as relevant, as follows: “On payment ... of the sum agreed or determined to be paid as compensation for the acquisition of any property, such property shall vest in the acquiring authority free from all encumbrances; and where the property is immovable property, production of satisfactory evidence of such payment or deposit shall be sufficient authority to the Chief Lands and Surveys Officer of the Republic to cause registration of such property to be made in the name of the acquiring authority on payment of any fees or charges which, under the provisions of any Law in force, are leviable on such registration.” 38.     In the case of Andreas Mina Christophides v. The Republic of Cyprus   (1984) 1   C.L.R. 796, the Supreme Court held that interest should be awarded to a claimant in the event of compulsory acquisition of his property in order to compensate him for the loss that he has suffered as a result of being deprived of rights over his property, for instance the right to sell it at such time as he chooses to do so or the chance to improve his property. Compensation is paid in order to make sure that the person whose property is expropriated receives no less than what he would be entitled to receive at the time that the acquisition notice was published and, by receiving interest, he is considered to have been paid at the time of acquisition. 39.     In the case of Thekla Panaretou and another v. The Republic (judgment of 10 October 2002) the Supreme Court stated the following: “In the event that payment of compensation is not made at the same time as publication of the acquisition notice, which under the law is the critical time for assessment of payable compensation, the owner of property continues to possess it and enjoys the possibility to use it and even take a mortgage on its basis. At the same time, he is aware that the property will at some time pass to the acquiring authority and ought to know that the critical time for assessment of its value is the time of publication of the notice of acquisition. Therefore, if his intention is to replace it with another property of equal value he should not delay... We find that the provision for payment of interest until the date of payment of compensation, constitutes a just measure for preserving the value of the amount that would have been received by the owner had he accepted the offer outright, or had the parties reached an agreement concerning the value of the property at the material time of publication of the notice.... The plaintiffs’ claim that they are additionally entitled to compensation by the total amount of yearly increase of the value of the property, is equated in essence to a claim for compensation equal to the value of the property as on the day of payment instead of the time of publication of the notice of acquisition. This is an unrealistic claim which does not accord either with the letter or the spirit of the law. Should it be adopted, it would encourage all sorts of delaying tactics by owners aiming to receive compensation amounting to the yearly increase of their property while at the same time enjoying the use and benefit of the property.” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 40.     The applicant company complained that the length of each of the different sets of proceedings it had instituted was incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...” 41.     The Government contested that argument. A.     Admissibility 42.     The Court must first determine the issue of compliance with the six-month time-limit for the introduction of the application within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. Thus, the question arises whether and to what extent the different sets of proceedings can be considered in toto for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In the Government’s view there were different sets of proceedings, none of which was excessive, whereas the applicant company maintained that the different proceedings up until 19 March 2004 related to its rights over its property and should be considered as a whole. 43.     The Court has only considered such proceedings in toto where they are indissociable and concern essentially the same dispute (“ contestation” ); for example, where proceedings on the merits of a claim are followed by enforcement proceedings (see Di Pede   v. Italy , 26 September 1996, §§   22 ‑ 24, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, and Hornsby v.   Greece , 19 March 1997, § 40, Reports 1997-II) or where compensation proceedings follow proceedings concerning expropriation (see Bhandari v.   the United Kingdom , no.   42341/04, §   17, 2   October 2007; Kukkola v.   Finland , no.   26890/95, §   41, 15 November 2005; and Saarenpään Loma Ky v.   Finland , no.   54508/00, §   28, 13   February 2007). 44.     The Court notes that in Kukkola the parties had agreed that the period to be taken into account should be counted for the expropriation proceedings and the compensation proceedings in toto and that the Court found no reason to hold otherwise. It further notes that in Saarenpään Loma Ky it considered that the expropriation and compensation proceedings could be counted in toto as the applicant company’s property was the subject of judicial proceedings throughout the period. 45.     The Court finds in the instant case that the expropriation proceedings began on 1 December 1972, when the notice of acquisition of the applicant company’s property was published. The applicant company contested the municipality’s order of acquisition before the Supreme Court. In the meantime, the applicant company applied for a building permit on 10   November 1972 and its application was refused. On 5 January 1973 it lodged a new application for judicial review with the Supreme Court contesting the refusal of its application for a building permit. The two sets of proceedings were joined and ended on 31 May 1975 when the court dismissed the applicant company’s application for judicial review of the decision to expropriate its property and upheld its application challenging the refusal of a building permit. Negotiations then took place for determination of the amount of reasonable compensation for the compulsory acquisition of the applicant company’s property, but were unsuccessful. 46.     On 8 May 1985 the applicant company requested a declaration from the Supreme Court that the acquisition order was null and void given that the municipality had not proceeded to offer compensation for the acquisition. On 28 November 1987 the Supreme Court dismissed the application. 47.     On 30 December 1988 the applicant company made a new request for a building permit in relation to which it did not receive a reply. On 30   March 1989 it lodged another application for judicial review with the Supreme Court concerning the omission of the municipality to reply. On 3   February 1990 the municipality refused the request for a building permit and the applicant company withdrew its application for judicial review. 48.     On 10 February 1990, the applicant company lodged new judicial review proceedings contesting the refusal and maintaining that an amendment enacted in 1988 to the Compulsory Acquisition Law rendered the acquisition order void. These proceedings were dismissed by the Supreme Court on 18   February 1993. 49.     On 4 January 1994 the applicant company filed an application with the district court requesting payment of compensation for its property. On 25   November 1994 a requisition order was issued. On 29 December 1994 the municipality made an offer of compensation which the applicant company accepted without prejudice. On 15 February 1995 the applicant company then lodged proceedings with the district court seeking determination of fair and reasonable compensation for the compulsory acquisition. The hearing commenced on 27 March 2000, judgment was reserved on 12 April 2001 and was delivered on 11 March 2002. On 17   April 2002 the applicant company filed an appeal with the Supreme Court which was heard on 18 February 2004 and was dismissed on 19   March 2004. The applicant received the amount awarded by the district court on 2   October 2006. 50.     The Court observes that while the subject matter of all these proceedings was the applicant company’s property, the dispute was not the same in each set of them: the administrative proceedings lodged before the Supreme Court contested various and different administrative decisions concerning the property or its development and the civil proceedings lodged purported to determine the amount of equitable compensation for the compulsory acquisition. Moreover, there were significant lapses of time in which there were no ongoing court proceedings and the parties engaged in negotiations or were inactive. In the present circumstances, the various judicial proceedings which were associated with the acquisition of the relevant property cannot be counted in toto for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention as they were different in nature and purpose. 51.     The Court finds that the only set of proceedings falling within its six-month temporal jurisdiction are the civil proceedings introduced before the District Court of Limassol and ending with the Supreme Court’s judgment of 19 March 2004. All previous sets of proceedings are out of time for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. 52.     The Court notes that the complaint, in so far as it relates to the last set of proceedings, is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 53.     The Court reiterates that the last set of proceedings began on 15   February 1995 and ended with the Supreme Court’s judgment of 19   March 2004. The Court notes in this respect that the period to be taken into account for these purposes ends at the moment when the applicant’s civil right actually became effective (see Di Pede , cited above, § 22). Accordingly, the Court finds that the dispute between the parties was only resolved, on a domestic level, with the payment of the award of compensation made by the district court which was given to the applicant in October 2006. Hence, the period to be taken into consideration in this regard lasted approximately 11 years and 7 months for two levels of jurisdiction. 54.     The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). 55.     Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of justifying the length of the proceedings in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. 56.     There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION 57.     The applicant company further complained that it suffered a disproportionate interference with its property rights as a result of the acquisition proceedings and the amount of compensation eventually paid by the authorities, in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which reads as follows: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 58.     The Government contested that argument. A.     Admissibility 1.     The parties’ submissions (a)     The Government 59.     The Government maintained, concerning the applicant company’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, that the applicant company had failed to exhaust the available effective domestic remedies. Relying on Azinas v. Cyprus ([GC], no.   56679/00, ECHR 2004 ‑ III), they contended that the Convention formed an integral part of the Cyprus legal system and Article 1   of Protocol No. 1 was directly applicable in Cyprus. The applicant company could have relied on that provision, or on Article 23 of the Constitution guaranteeing the right to property, before the Supreme Court, but failed to do so. Furthermore, the applicant company should have referred the determination of the amount of compensation to the district court at an earlier stage. (b)     The applicant company 60.     The applicant company replied that it was under no obligation to apply to the courts to have the amount of compensation determined at an earlier point and it could not be said that it had failed to exhaust the available domestic remedies for not doing so. It had spent the last 32 years trying to defend its rights over its property by using all available legal means before the domestic courts, to no avail. Throughout such proceedings it had raised all the arguments presented before this Court either explicitly or in substance before the domestic courts. The applicant company referred, in particular, to its address to the district court, its grounds of appeal to the Supreme Court in which it had cited the relevant case-law of this Court, and its counsel’s pleadings before that court. The Supreme Court in its judgment had made clear why in its view no violation of the Convention had taken place, given that the applicant company had been responsible for taking steps for the determination of compensation. (c)     The Court’s assessment 61.     Having regard to the applicant company’s pleadings and skeleton arguments used in the domestic proceedings and submitted before the Court in reply to the Government’s objection, the Court finds that the applicant company did raise the issue of disproportionate interference with its rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 of the Convention with reference to the Court’s relevant case-law before the district court and Supreme Court. That being so, it cannot be disputed that the domestic courts were given ample opportunity to address the issues raised before the Court. Moreover, the Court notes that the Supreme Court in its judgment of 19 March 2004 considered that there had been no breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention as incorporated into the domestic legal order. 62.     Lastly, the Court notes that the applicant company referred the issue of determination of equitable compensation to the district court and subsequently challenged the district court’s findings on appeal before the Supreme Court. As such, it has exhausted the domestic remedies available to it. 63.     The Court therefore dismisses the Government’s objection. It moreover finds that no other grounds for declaring this part of the application inadmissible have been established and therefore declares it admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ submissions (a)     The Government 64.     The Government submitted that the main issue in this case was whether payment of compensation in 1994, on the basis of the market value of the property at the time of publication of the notice of acquisition in 1972 plus interest, laid a disproportionate burden on the applicant company. They maintained that responsibility for the delay between the notice of acquisition and the actual payment of compensation was attributable to the applicant company since despite its rights, under the relevant domestic legislation, to refer the issue of compensation to the district court for determination following the evident failure to reach an agreement in this respect, or to contest the municipality’s first offer for compensation made on 1   March 1984, the applicant company only chose to apply to the courts for determination of the offer made in 1984 in 1995. 65.     A determination of the amount of compensation would have resulted in immediate payment and transfer of ownership to the municipality. Instead of applying to the civil courts for determination of the amount of compensation for the acquisition, the applicant company pursued various other judicial proceedings challenging the acquisition. 66.     Despite the fact that the acquiring authority also had the right to apply to the civil courts for determination of the amount of compensation, it was the applicant company who was claiming that the value of its property was substantially more than what the municipality had offered and therefore it was the applicant company who should have made such an application and not wait until 1995 to institute the relevant proceedings. Had the applicant company done so at an earlier stage, no issue of loss of capital gain or difference between the market value of the property taken into account for the determination of compensation and actual market value at the time of payment would have arisen. Hence, the applicant company could have avoided any burden which was described before the Court as disproportionate, and a finding of violation under the circumstances would suggest that owners could delay the institution of legal proceedings under domestic law knowing that in the end such delay would be to their benefit. 67.     The relevant domestic law provided that in the event of compulsory acq