CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 25 août 2009

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display:inline-block } .s973C4527 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:12pt } .sD93DDAC3 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:12pt } .s662FD3B { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right; font-size:12pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .s30F3DAE9 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:12pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s1B97388 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:right; font-size:12pt } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left }       FOURTH SECTION         CASE OF GIULIANI AND GAGGIO v. ITALY   (Application no. 23458/02)             JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   25 August 2009     THIS CASE WAS REFERRED TO THE GRAND CHAMBER WHICH DELIVERED JUDGMENT IN THE CASE ON 24/03/2011   This judgment may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Nicolas Bratza, President,   Josep Casadevall,   Lech Garlicki,   Giovanni Bonello,   Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,   Ljiljana Mijović,   Ján Šikuta, judges, and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 26 June 2008 and on 18 June 2009, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last ‑ mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 23458/02) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Italian nationals, Mr Giuliano Giuliani, Mrs   Adelaide Gaggio (married name Giuliani) and Ms Elena Giuliani (“the applicants”), on 18 June 2002. 2.     The applicants were represented by Mr N. Paoletti and Mr   G.   Pisapia, lawyers practising in Rome. The applicants are the father, mother and sister respectively of Carlo Giuliani. The Italian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs   E.   Spatafora, and by their co-Agent, Mr F. Crisafulli. 3.     The applicants alleged, in particular, that Carlo Giuliani had died as a result of the excessive use of force by the law-enforcement agencies. 4.     A hearing on admissibility and the merits (Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court) took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 5   December 2006 (Rule 59 § 3).   There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Mr   F . Crisafulli,   Co-Agent ; (b)     for the applicants Mr   N. Paoletti, of the Rome Bar, Mrs   A. Mari, of the Rome Bar, Mrs   G. Paoletti, of the Rome Bar,   Counsel . 5.     By a decision of 6 February 2007, the Chamber declared the application admissible. 6.     The applicants and the Government each filed further written observations (Rule 59 § 1). The parties replied in writing to each other's observations. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 7.     The applicants were born in 1938, 1944 and 1972 respectively and live in Genoa and Milan. A.     The background to the G8 summit in Genoa and the circumstances preceding the death of Carlo Giuliani 8.     On 19, 20 and 21 July 2001 the G8 summit was held in Genoa. Numerous “anti-globalisation” demonstrations were staged in the city and substantial security measures were put in place by the Italian authorities. Under Law no. 349 of 8 June 2000, the prefect of Genoa was authorised to deploy armed forces personnel. In addition, the part of the city where the G8 were meeting (the historic centre) was designated as a “red zone” and cordoned off by means of a metal fence. As a result, only residents and persons working in the area were allowed access. Access to the port was blocked and the airport was closed. The red zone was contained within a yellow zone, which in turn was surrounded by a white (normal) zone. 9.     With regard to the written orders issued by the officer in charge of the law ‑ enforcement agencies, who was responsible for maintaining and restoring public order, the Government submitted to the Court service orders dated 14, 17 and 19 July 2001. Each of these orders began with the sentence: “The present order amends and supplements service order no.   2143/R of 12 July concerning law enforcement and security at the G8 summit to be held in Genoa from 20 to 22 July, as follows.” The order of 12   July was not submitted. 10.     The service order of 19 July 2001 is the one issued the day before the events. It sums up the priorities of the law-enforcement agencies as follows: establishing a line of defence within the “red zone”, with the task of repelling rapidly any attempt to break through; establishing a line of defence within the “yellow zone” to deal with any incidents, taking account of the position of the demonstrators in various locations and of actions perpetrated by more extremist elements; finally, putting in place public ‑ order measures on the streets concerned by the demonstrations, in view of the risk of violence encouraged by the presence of crowds of people. 11.     The parties agreed as to the fact that the service order of 19   July   2001 amended the plans hitherto established regarding the deployment of the available means and resources to enable the law ‑ enforcement agencies to counter effectively any attempt to enter the red zone by participants in the demonstration by the Tute bianche (“White overalls”) which had been announced and authorised for the following day.   Referring to testimonies given during the criminal proceedings instituted against twenty-five demonstrators (see “the trial of the twenty-five” below), the applicants stated that the service order of 19 July gave the detachment of carabinieri concerned a “roving brief”, whereas it had previously been supposed to remain in one location. As regards the manner in which these instructions were circulated, the Government stated that the orders issued and received by the officers on the ground were communicated orally. The applicants, meanwhile, referred to the evidence given to the public prosecutor and also in the context of the “trial of the twenty-five”, in particular by Mr Lauro (see paragraph 56 below). 12.     The parties agreed that a radio communication system had been put in place, with an operations control room located in the questura (police headquarters), which was in radio contact with the officers on the ground. The carabinieri and police officers could not communicate directly amongst themselves by radio; they could only contact the control room. 13.     The judgment given in the “trial of the twenty-five” (see below), which was added to the case file, makes clear that there had been some tensions before the G8 summit began. Hence, on 16 July, a bomb had been sent to the carabinieri . On 17 July a van containing an explosive device had been found near the Carlini stadium, where accommodation was to be provided for the persons taking part in the large demonstration on 20 July (the Tute bianche march). On 18 July law-enforcement officers went to the stadium to carry out checks. Approximately 500 demonstrators were there. The search lasted for about an hour and was conducted in the presence of journalists. The demonstrators showed their “personal protective equipment” in the form of Plexiglas shields and clothing designed to absorb the impact of possible clashes with the law-enforcement agencies. 14.     The same judgment noted that on the morning of 20 July groups of particularly aggressive demonstrators, wearing balaclavas and masks (the “Black Bloc”) had sparked numerous incidents and clashes with law ‑ enforcement officers. At around 1.30 p.m. the Tute bianche march was ready to set off from the Carlini stadium. This was a demonstration involving several organisations: representatives of the “No Global” movement and of community centres, and young communists from the Rifondazione comunista party. While they believed in non-violent protest (civil disobedience), they had announced a strategic objective, namely to try to penetrate the red zone. For that reason the Genoa police chief ( questore ) had decided on 19 July 2001 to prohibit the Tute bianche procession from entering the red zone or the zone adjacent to it, and had deployed law ‑ enforcement officers to halt the procession at Piazza Verdi. Consequently, the demonstrators were able to march from the Carlini stadium and all the way along Via Tolemaide to Piazza Verdi, that is to say, well beyond the junction of Via Tolemaide and Corso Torino, where the events dealt with below took place. At around 1.30   p.m. the procession set off and headed slowly westwards. As they proceeded, the demonstrators appeared calm and in good spirits, at least until they saw columns of smoke coming from the direction of Via Canevari and a burnt-out car on Via Montevideo, at which point some tension set in. There were signs of earlier disorder in the area around Via Tolemaide. The procession was headed by a contact group made up of politicians and a group of journalists carrying video recorders and cameras. The procession slowed down and made a number of stops. Further down, around Via Tolemaide, there were incidents involving persons wearing masks and balaclavas and law-enforcement officers. The procession reached the railway tunnel at the junction with Corso Torino. Suddenly, tear gas was fired on the demonstrators by carabinieri under the command of Mr Mondelli. 15.     Mondelli, commander of the Alpha company of carabinieri , had informed his headquarters that his radio could only receive messages and that he did not have a guide to Genoa who knew the streets well. He was on Piazza Tommaseo with 200 carabinieri who were equipped with the new Tonfa truncheons, shields, new CS gas grenades and guns for firing them, as well as flame-resistant suits and fire-fighting equipment. At 2.29 p.m. the communications centre ordered Mondelli to go quickly to Piazza Giusti, as the Tute bianche procession was on its way down Corso Gastaldi. Mondelli agreed. Although there were three possible routes to his destination, he chose the route which put the company at risk of crossing the path of the Tute bianche , taking them along Via Invrea to the intersection with Corso Torino. A few minutes before 3 p.m. the carabinieri , finding themselves in the path of the demonstrators, attacked the Tute bianche , first using tear gas, then advancing and using their truncheons. The procession was pushed back towards the east (to the junction with Via Casaregis). The attack lasted for about two minutes. It had not been ordered either by the carabinieri control room or by the person authorised to do so. The carabinieri pushed the demonstrators back to the junction with Via Invrea. Once there, the demonstrators split up: some headed towards the seafront, while others sought refuge in Via Invrea and then in the area around Piazza Alimonda. Some demonstrators retaliated, finding hard objects such as glass bottles or rubbish bins and starting to throw them at the law-enforcement officers. Armoured vehicles belonging to the carabinieri drove up Via Casaregis and Via Invrea at high speed, knocking down the barriers erected by the demonstrators using containers, and forcing the demonstrators at the scene to leave. At 3.22"52' p.m. the control room ordered Mondelli to move away and allow the Tute bianche to pass. Once the attack was over, the carabinieri withdrew to Via Casaregis and then Via Invrea, to the north, before heading west along Via Tolemaide. 16.     Some of the demonstrators retaliated with violence and engaged in clashes with the law-enforcement agencies. At around 3.40 p.m. a group of demonstrators attacked an armoured carabinieri van and subsequently set it alight. 17.     At approximately 5 p.m. the presence of a group of demonstrators who appeared very aggressive was observed by, among others, the Sicilia battalion consisting of around fifty carabinieri stationed close to Piazza Alimonda. 18.     Police officer Lauro ordered the carabinieri in question to charge the demonstrators. The carabinieri charged on foot, followed by two Defender jeeps. 19.     Shortly afterwards, however, the demonstrators succeeded in pushing back the attack by the law-enforcement agencies. The carabinieri withdrew in disorderly fashion near Piazza Alimonda, leaving the two Defender jeeps which were bringing up the rear unprotected (the public prosecutor, in his request to have the proceedings discontinued, described this as “ ripiegamento disordinato che lascia scoperti i due defender che si trovano alle spalle del reparto ”). Pictures taken from a helicopter show the demonstrators running along Via Caffa at 5.23 p.m. in pursuit of the law ‑ enforcement officers. B.     The death of Carlo Giuliani 20.     The two jeeps in question were blocking each other on Piazza Alimonda. When one of the jeeps eventually managed to move out the other, owing to an error by the driver, remained stuck on Piazza Alimonda, its exit blocked by an overturned waste container. 21.     A group of demonstrators armed with stones, sticks and iron bars approached the jeep. The two side windows at the rear and the rear window of the jeep were smashed. The demonstrators shouted insults and threats at the jeep's occupants and threw stones at the vehicle. 22.     There were three carabinieri in the vehicle: Mario Placanica, Filippo Cavataio and Dario Raffone. 23.     One of them, Mario Placanica (“M.P.”), was a twenty-year-old carabiniere trained in the use of grenades. Suffering from the effects of the tear-gas grenades he had thrown during earlier clashes, he had been given permission by Captain Cappello (commander of the ECHO contingent within the CCIR – contingente di contenzione e intervento risolutivo ) to get into the jeep in order to get away from the scene of the earlier clash. Crouched down in the back of the jeep, injured and panicking, defending himself on one side with a riot shield (according to the statement of a demonstrator named Predonzani) and shouting at the demonstrators to leave “or he would kill them”, M.P. drew his Beretta 9 mm pistol, pointed it in the direction of the smashed rear window of the vehicle and, after some tens of seconds, fired two shots. 24.     The first shot struck Carlo Giuliani in the face, under the left eye, seriously injuring him. At the time he was no more than a few metres from the back of the jeep and had just picked up an empty fire extinguisher. Carlo Giuliani fell to the ground near the left-side rear wheel of the vehicle. 25.     Shortly afterwards the driver, Filippo Cavataio (“F.C.”), managed to restart the engine and, in an attempt to move the vehicle away, reversed, driving over Carlo Giuliani's body. He then engaged first gear and again drove over the body as he left the square. The jeep then drove towards Piazza Tommaseo. 26.     After “a few metres”, carabinieri Sergeant-Major Amatori got into the jeep and took over at the wheel, “as the driver was in a state of shock”. Another carabiniere named Rando also got in. 27.     After the jeep had driven away a demonstrator, J.M., went over to Carlo Giuliani and observed that he was losing a large amount of blood, which was spurting from a wound near his left eye. J.M. noted that “Carlo Giuliani's pulse was very rapid and weak”. A few moments later, when several police officers and carabinieri arrived, J.M. moved away. 28.     Police forces stationed on the other side of Piazza Alimonda intervened and dispersed the demonstrators (according to the statement of Captain Cappello). They were joined by some carabinieri . 29.     At 5.27"25' p.m. a police officer present at the scene called the control room to request an ambulance. A doctor who arrived at the scene subsequently pronounced Carlo Giuliani dead. 1.     Information provided by the parties concerning the moments leading up to the death of Carlo Giuliani 30.     The moments leading up to the death of Carlo Giuliani were reconstructed as follows in the Interior Ministry memorandum added to the file by the Government: “At 6 a.m. the sector received the service order and three detachments took up positions close to the questura . After a few hours the contingent was dissolved; two detachments remained. Towards the end of the morning the contingent was sent to Piazza Tommaseo, arriving after the clashes with demonstrators had ended. Police officer Lauro took over command of the contingent. The men were stationed on Via Rimassa, near the King gardens, and had a variety of objects thrown at them. From 3 p.m. onwards the contingent, following the demonstrators, went along Via Ivrea and arrived on Piazza Alimonda, where the situation was relatively calm; as a result, the contingent was reorganised. There were about fifty carabinieri present. The two Defender jeeps used to liaise between the contingents were at the scene. Officer Lauro and Captain Cappello decided to deploy the contingent on Via Caffa, in the direction of Via Tolemaide, in order to deal with a group of demonstrators who had built a barricade using waste containers. The carabinieri were subjected to a barrage of stones and bottles. Fearing that other demonstrators coming from Via Odessa would join in, the carabinieri retreated on foot, leaving the two jeeps which were at the rear of the contingent exposed. In the momentary confusion the drivers of the two jeeps attempted to withdraw as quickly as possible by reversing towards Piazza Tommaseo. In trying to turn around, the two jeeps got in each other's way; the jeep driven by Filippo Cavataio (F.C.) was unable to complete the manoeuvre and found its way forward blocked by a waste container. A few moments later demonstrators coming from Via Tolemaide and Via Odessa reached the jeep.” 31.     Relying, inter alia , on evidence given by law-enforcement officers during the “trial of the twenty-five”, the applicants described the circumstances surrounding the death of Carlo Giuliani as follows: “The procession of Tute bianche (“White overalls”) demonstrators arrived in Via Tolemaide at around 2.50 p.m. At 2.53 p.m. the law-enforcement agencies (the company of carabinieri from the Lombardia battalion) attacked them. The demonstrators were attacked eight times, with nineteen armoured vehicles, fire engines, tear gas and truncheons being used. The last attack took place at 5.15 p.m. In the meantime the ECHO company – which had assisted the Lombardia battalion during some of the attacks – had taken up position at the intersection of Piazza Alimonda and Via Caffa, under the orders of police officer Lauro. Two Defender jeeps joined them. The carabinieri were able to take off their gas masks, eat and rest. At the same time the police took up positions on Via Caffa, under the orders of police officer Fiorillo. With the situation calm, Captain Cappello ordered M.P. and D.R. to board one of the two jeeps. He thought it wise to allow the two carabinieri to board, as they were mentally exhausted (' a terra ') and were no longer physically fit for duty. Cappello also considered that M.P. should stop firing tear gas and took away his tear ‑ gas gun and the pouch containing the tear-gas grenades. At 5.20 p.m. the ECHO company, comprising about one hundred men at that point, following an order from police officer Lauro, donned their gas masks and riot shields again and set off on foot along Via Caffa towards Via Tolemaide. A decision was taken in the presence of Lieutenant-Colonel Truglio to attack the procession. The two jeeps followed the detachment. Several waste containers were being used as a barrier by the demonstrators. The ECHO company began to withdraw along Via Caffa, towards Piazza Alimonda, accompanied by the two jeeps travelling in reverse. About seventy demonstrators followed the carabinieri . When it arrived on Piazza Alimonda, the jeep in which M.P. was travelling found its path blocked by a waste container. Demonstrators threw stones at the vehicle, and then a fire extinguisher, which fell to the ground. Carlo Giuliani moved towards an extinguisher which was lying on the ground. At that point one of the carabinieri in the jeep already had a pistol in his hand and was ready to fire. Carlo Giuliani took hold of the extinguisher and raised it up. It was 5.27 p.m. In the same instant he was struck by the fatal bullet.” 32.     With regard to the pistol, the applicants referred to the photographs in the investigation file, and stressed that it was being held horizontally and pointing downwards. 33.     The Interior Ministry asserted that it was impossible to indicate the exact number of carabinieri and police officers at the scene at the moment of Carlo Giuliani's death; there had been approximately fifty carabinieri , some 150 metres from the jeep. In addition, 200 metres away, near Piazza Tommaseo, there had been a group of police officers ( reparto mobile della polizia di stato ). 34.     The applicants, for their part, referred to the statements made by Lieutenant-Colonel Truglio (see below), who said that he had been ten metres or so from Piazza Alimonda and thirty to forty metres away from the jeep. The carabinieri (around a hundred of them) had been some tens of metres from the jeep. The police officers had been at the end of Via Caffa, towards Piazza Tommaseo. The applicants further submitted that the photographs in the investigation file clearly showed some carabinieri a few metres from the jeep in question. 2.     Information supplied by the applicants concerning the immediate aftermath of the jeep's departure 35.     A film submitted by the applicants based on images in the investigation file shows several individuals and law-enforcement officers approaching the body of the victim. A bloodstained stone which does not appear at the beginning of the sequence of images can be seen at the end, close to the victim's head. In addition, a police officer (Mr Lauro) near to Carlo Giuliani's body is shown pointing at a demonstrator and shouting “ Sei stato tu, sei stato tu ” (“It was you! It was you!”), after which law ‑ enforcement officers are seen chasing after the demonstrator, to no avail. 36.     Captain Cappello, who gave evidence at the “trial of the twenty ‑ five” (hearing of 20 September 2005), stated that a young woman had approached Carlo Giuliani's body and lifted up the balaclava he was wearing. A star ‑ shaped wound was visible on the victim's forehead. The young woman said that Carlo Giuliani was dead and that, in her view, he had not been killed by a stone. About two minutes after she had said this, police officer Lauro had begun to “give vent to his feelings”, as Captain Cappello put it; this was later shown on television. C.     The investigation by the domestic authorities 1.     The first steps in the investigation 37.     The Genoa province mobile police unit (3rd division – offences against the person) arrived on the scene at around 6 p.m. The report written by Ms Bucci, a police officer with the Genoa mobile police unit, stated that, at around 6 p.m., she had gone to Piazza Alimonda with two other police officers after information had been received from the control room that a young man had died. She had found the victim's body covered with a sheet. She had done what she could to seal off the area (by closing Piazza Alimonda to the public) in order to allow forensic officers to take down details. The victim's face had been bare, as his balaclava was behind his head. Evidence had been taken from police officers Fiorillo and Martino (see paragraphs 41-42 below). 38.     A spent cartridge was found a few metres from Carlo Giuliani's body. No bullet was found. A fire extinguisher, a bloodstained stone, some money, a craft knife, a mobile phone, a lighter and a set of keys were found beside the body and were seized by the police. It also emerges from the file that the public prosecutor's office entrusted thirty-six investigative measures to the police. 39.     The jeep, after it left Piazza Alimonda, and also the weapon and equipment belonging to M.P., remained in the hands of the carabinieri and were subsequently seized under a court order. A spent cartridge was found inside the jeep. 40.     On the orders of the public prosecutor's office, the body was taken to Galliera hospital. It was identified by means of matching fingerprints in the database of the judicial authorities. 41.     At 9.30 p.m. police officer Fiorillo, who had been in charge of the group of police officers in Via Caffa, gave evidence in the office of the Genoa mobile police unit. He said that he had seen a contingent of carabinieri on Piazza Alimonda being swept along (“ travolto ”) by a large number of demonstrators who were trying to attack the police officers. The two Defender jeeps were cut off in the middle of the group of demonstrators; they were surrounded and seriously damaged. Immediately afterwards, the two jeeps managed to drive away. A man wearing a balaclava was lying on the ground. A fire extinguisher was nearby. 42.     At 8.50 p.m., in the office of the Genoa mobile police unit, police officer Martino stated that he had gone to Piazza Alimonda with his group of officers on the orders of officer Fiorillo, and had seen the body of Carlo Giuliani on the ground, bleeding profusely from the head. Nearby was a fire extinguisher. When the ambulance arrived, a doctor had tried to resuscitate Carlo Giuliani, before pronouncing him dead and awaiting the arrival of the judicial officer. 43.     On 21 July 2001 Captain Cappello, who had been in charge of the ECHO company, recounted the events of the previous day and gave the names of the carabinieri who had been in the jeep in question, which had been surrounded by a large group of demonstrators armed with iron bars, stones and planks of wood. He stated that, once the jeep had managed to drive away, the police officers on the other side of the square had intervened and dispersed the demonstrators, thereby revealing the body of a person wearing a balaclava lying on the ground. Captain Cappello said that he had heard no shots, probably because of his radio earpiece, his helmet and his gas mask, which reduced his hearing. 44.     On 28 July 2001 officer Mirante drafted an official memorandum which echoed the statements made by Captain Cappello concerning the events on Piazza Alimonda. 2.     Placing under investigation of M.P. and F.C., two of the three carabinieri in the jeep 45.     On the evening of 20 July 2001 two of the three carabinieri in the jeep at the time of the events were placed under investigation on suspicion of intentional homicide and gave evidence to the Genoa public prosecutor's office at the headquarters of the Genoa carabinieri . (a)     First statement made by the person who fired the shots (M.P.) to the public prosecutor on 20 July 2001 at 11 p.m. at Genoa carabinieri headquarters 46.     M.P. was an auxiliary carabiniere assigned to Battalion no. 12 ( Sicilia ), and one of the members of the ECHO company constituted for the purpose of the G8 summit. Together with four other companies from different regions of Italy, the company formed part of the CCIR, under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Truglio. The ECHO company was under the orders of Captain Cappello and his deputies Mirante and Zappia, and was directed and coordinated by Mr Lauro, an officer ( vice questore ) of the Rome police. There was also a parachute battalion and units designated as G2 and G3. Each of the five companies was divided into four detachments of fifty men. The overall commander of the companies was Colonel Leso; Lieutenant ‑ Colonel Truglio was deputy commander in charge of coordination. 47.     M.P., who was born on 13 August 1980 and began serving as a carabiniere on 16 September 2000, was trained in the use of grenades and deployed to fire tear gas. He stated that during the public-order operation he had been supposed to move around on foot with his detachment. Having fired several tear-gas grenades, he had felt a burning in his eyes and face and had asked Captain Cappello for permission to get into the jeep being driven by F.C. Shortly afterwards, another carabiniere (Dario Raffone), who was injured, had joined them. 48.     M.P. said that he had been very frightened, because of everything he had seen being thrown that day, and was particularly afraid that the demonstrators would throw Molotov cocktails. He went on to explain that he had grown more afraid after being injured in the leg by a metal object and in the head by a stone. He said that he had become aware that the jeep was under attack because of the stones being thrown and had thought that “hundreds of demonstrators were surrounding the jeep”, although he added that “at the time [he] fired the shots, no one was in sight”. He said he had been “in a panic”. M.P. described the moment when he had fired, saying that at some point he had realised that his hand was gripping his pistol. He had thrust the hand carrying the weapon through the rear window and, after about a minute, had fired two shots. M.P. did not give any details as to when he had removed the safety catch from his pistol. He maintained that he had not noticed Carlo Giuliani behind the jeep either before or after firing. (b)     Statement made by the driver (F.C.) to the public prosecutor on 20   July   2001 at carabinieri headquarters 49.     The driver, F.C., who was born on 3 September 1977, had been serving as a carabiniere for twenty-two months. He stated that he had been in an alleyway near Piazza Alimonda and had attempted to reverse towards the square, as the detachment was being pushed back by the demonstrators. However, he had found his path blocked by a waste container which he was unable to remove as his engine had stalled. He said that he had been concentrating his efforts on how to move the jeep out, while his colleagues inside the vehicle were shouting. As a result, he had not heard the shots from M.P.'s pistol. Finally he stated: “I did not notice anyone on the ground because I was wearing a mask, which partly blocked my view ... and also because it is hard to see properly out the side of the vehicle. I reversed and felt no resistance; actually, I felt the left wheel jolt and thought it must be a pile of rubbish, since the waste container had been turned over. The only thought in my head was how to get out of that awful situation.” (c)     Statement made to the public prosecutor on 21 July 2001 by the third carabiniere (D.R.) in the jeep at the time of the events 50.     D.R., who was born on 25 January 1982 and had been performing military service since 16 March 2001 ( carabiniere di leva ), stated that he had been struck in the face and back by stones thrown by demonstrators, and had started to bleed. He had tried to protect himself by covering his face, while M.P., for his part, tried to shield him with his body. At that point, he could no longer see anything, but he could hear the shouting and the sound of blows and objects entering the jeep. He heard M.P. shouting at their attackers to stop and go away, and immediately afterwards heard two shots. (d)     M.P.'s second statement to the public prosecutor 51.     On 11 September 2001 M.P., on being questioned by the public prosecutor, confirmed his statement of 20 July 2001, adding that he had shouted to the demonstrators: “Leave or I'll kill you”. 3.     Statements taken during the investigation (a)     Statements by other carabinieri 52.     Sergeant-Major Amatori, who was in the other jeep which was stuck momentarily on Piazza Alimonda, said that he had observed that the jeep in which M.P. was travelling had its path blocked by a waste container and was surrounded by a large number of demonstrators, “certainly more than twenty of them”. The demonstrators were throwing objects at the jeep. He saw in particular that one protestor had already thrown a fire extinguisher at the rear window. The sergeant-major said that he had heard shots and seen Carlo Giuliani fall down. He had also seen the jeep drive twice over Carlo Giuliani's body. Once the jeep had succeeded in leaving Piazza Alimonda, he went over to it and saw that F.C., the driver, had got out of the jeep and, visibly shaken, was asking for help. The sergeant-major took over the driving seat and, observing that M.P. had a pistol in his hand, ordered him to replace the safety catch. He said that he had immediately thought that this was the weapon that had just fired the two shots, but had said nothing to M.P., since the latter was injured and his head was bleeding. The driver (F.C.) told him that he had heard shots while he was manoeuvring the jeep. The sergeant-major was not offered any explanation as to the circumstances surrounding the decision to shoot and did not ask any questions on the subject. 53.     Carabiniere Rando said that he had gone over to the jeep on foot. He had seen that M.P.'s pistol was drawn and had asked M.P. if he had fired. M.P. said that he had, without specifying whether he had fired into the air or in the direction of one of the demonstrators. Mr Rando said that M.P. kept saying: “They wanted to kill me, I don't want to die”. 54.     On 11 September 2001 the public prosecutor heard evidence from Captain Cappello, who had been in command of the company of carabinieri to which M.P. was assigned during the G8 summit, under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Truglio. Captain Cappello stated that he had given M.P. permission to get into the jeep and had taken his tear-gas gun as M.P. was experiencing difficulties. He stated subsequently (at the “trial of the twenty ‑ five”, hearing of 20 September 2005) that M.P. had been physically unfit to continue on account of his mental state and nervous tension. Captain Cappello had then moved with his men – about fifty in number – to the corner of Piazza Alimonda and Via Caffa. Cappello stated that he was requested by police officer Lauro to proceed up Via Caffa in the direction of Via Tolemaide to assist the men engaged there in trying to push back the demonstrators. He said he had been puzzled by the request, given the number of men with him and their state of tiredness. Nevertheless, Cappello and his men had taken up positions on Via Caffa. The carabinieri were forced back by the demonstrators coming from Via Tolemaide; they initially withdrew in an orderly manner, and then in disorderly fashion. Cappello stated that he had not realised that, when the carabinieri withdrew, they were being followed by two Defender jeeps, as there had been no “operational reason” for the vehicles to be there. He further stated that the demonstrators had dispersed only when the mobile police units stationed on the other side of Piazza Alimonda had intervened, and that only then had he observed a man wearing a balaclava lying on the ground, apparently seriously injured. Finally, Captain Cappello said that some of his men had been wearing helmets equipped with video cameras, which would help to shed light on the sequence of events, and that the video recordings had been handed over to Colonel Leso, who was in charge of the CCIR. 55.     Lieutenant-Colonel Truglio stated that he had stopped some tens of metres from Piazza Alimonda and thirty to forty metres from the jeep, and had seen the jeep drive over a body lying on the ground. (b)     Statements made by police officer Lauro 56.     On 21 December 2001 Mr Lauro gave evidence to the public prosecutor. He stated that on 20 July 2001 he had reported at 6 a.m. to the location where he was due to commence duty in charge of two hundred men. Two hours later, as no one had turned up, he made inquiries of the questura and was told that the service orders had been changed. Mr Lauro later stated (during the “trial of the twenty-five”, hearing of 26 April 2005) that he had been informed on 19 July that no march was authorised for the following day. On 20 July he had been unaware that an authorised march was due to take place. He was requested to go to near the fairground and join a contingent of a hundred carabinieri in order to patrol the area. Lauro was not able to make contact with the contingent and its captain – Captain Cappello – until 12.30 p.m. He went to Piazza Tommaseo, where clashes were taking place with demonstrators. At 3.30 p.m., in a moment of calm, Lieutenant-Colonel Truglio and the two jeeps joined the contingent. Lunch was eaten. The contingent was involved in clashes on Corso Torino between 4 p.m. and 4.45 p.m. It then arrived at Piazza Tommaseo and Piazza Alimonda. Lieutenant-Colonel Truglio and the two jeeps came back. The contingent was reorganised. Lauro stated that he had observed a group of demonstrators at the end of Via Caffa who had formed a barrier using wheeled waste containers and were advancing towards the law ‑ enforcement officers. He said that he had asked Captain Cappello whether his men were in a position to deal with the situation and that Cappello had replied in the affirmative. Lauro and the contingent therefore took up positions close to Via Caffa. He heard an order to withdraw and took part in the disorderly withdrawal of the contingent. (c)     Statements made by demonstrators to the public prosecutor 57.     Some demonstrators present at the time of the events also gave statements. Some of them said they had been very close to the jeep and had themselves thrown stones and had struck the jeep with sticks and other objects. One demonstrator said that M.P. had cried: “Bastards, I'm going to kill the lot of you”. Another had observed that M.P., inside the jeep, had taken out his pistol; the demonstrator had then shouted to his friends to be careful and had moved away. Another demonstrator said that M.P. was protecting himself on one side with a riot shield (see paragraph 23 above). (d)     Other statements to the public prosecutor 58.     Some individuals who witnessed the events from the windows of their homes said they had seen a demonstrator pick up a fire extinguisher and raise it up. They had heard two shots and had seen the demonstrator fall to the ground. 4.     Audiovisual material 59.     During the investigation the public prosecutor's office ordered the law ‑ enforcement agencies to hand over any audiovisual material which might help in reconstructing the events that had taken place on Piazza Alimonda. During the public-order operation photographs had been taken and video recordings made by film crews, helicopter cameras and miniature video cameras in the helmets of some of the law-enforcement officers. Pictures taken by private individuals were also available. 5.     The expert reports (a)     The autopsy 60.     Within twenty-four hours an autopsy was ordered by the public prosecutor's office to establish the cause of death. On 21 July 2001 at 12.10   p.m. notice of the autopsy – specifying that the injured party could appoint an expert and a lawyer – was served on the first applicant. At 3.15 p.m. Mr Canale and Mr Salvi, the experts appointed by the public prosecutor's office, were officially sworn in and work commenced on the autopsy. The applicants did not send any representati