CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 18 mars 2010

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s523616E0 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s75A32C27 { border-collapse:collapse } .s38F24627 { height:66.1pt } .s938C1CCA { padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:top } .s51F416E0 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; font-size:12pt } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s967D43C6 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s7EE1C8F0 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sC702907E { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s8378218E { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .sE7A0A3F4 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.25pt; text-align:justify } .s34D46E87 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s88A92475 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sDD165512 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s69DCC830 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s55075881 { width:212.41pt; display:inline-block } .s9269B87C { width:9.86pt; display:inline-block } .s60AABD82 { width:249.56pt; display:inline-block } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .s5D0B476F { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s25D4CC02 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt } .s81534B18 { padding-right:5.4pt; padding-left:5.4pt; vertical-align:middle } .sF3108B01 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s598389F7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt } .s85646119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:12pt } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } FIRST SECTION DECISION AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF Application no. 18299/03 by Pavel Alekseyevich FINOGENOV and Others against Russia lodged on 26 April 2003 Application no. 27311/03 by Zoya Pavlovna CHERNETSOVA and Others against Russia lodged on 18 August 2003   The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 18   March 2010 as a Chamber composed of:   Christos Rozakis, President,   Anatoly Kovler,   Elisabeth Steiner,   Dean Spielmann,   Sverre Erik Jebens,   Giorgio Malinverni,   George Nicolaou, judges, and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar, Having regard to the collective applications lodged on 26 April 2003 ( Finogenov and Others v. Russia , no. 18299/03, hereinafter Finogenov and Others ), and on 18 August 2003 ( Chernetsova and Others v. Russia , no.   27311/03, hereinafter Chernetsova and Others ), Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants, Having regard to the comments submitted within the proceedings in the case of Finogenov and Others by Interights, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The applicants in the above two cases, listed in the appendix, are relatives of the victims of the hostage-taking in the “Dubrovka” theatre in October 2002 in Moscow. Some of them were also personally among the hostages. The applicants in the first application are represented before the Court by Ms   K. Moskalenko and Ms O. Mikhaylova, lawyers practising in Moscow. The applicants in the second application are represented before the Court by Mr Trunov and Ms Ayvar, lawyers practising in Moscow. 2.     The respondent Government were represented in both cases by Mr   P.   Laptev and Ms V. Milinchuk, former Representatives of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights. A.     The circumstances of the case 3.     The facts of the above two cases are disputed between the parties. Their submissions may be summarised as follows. 1.     Hostage-taking 4.     On the evening of 23 October 2002 a group of terrorists belonging to the Chechen separatist movement (over 40 people), led by Mr B., armed with machine-guns and explosives, took hostages in the “Dubrovka” theatre in Moscow (also known as the “Nord-Ost” theatre, from the name of a musical comedy which was formerly performed there). For three days more than nine hundred people were held at gunpoint in the theatre’s auditorium. In addition, the theatre building was booby-trapped and eighteen suicide bombers were positioned in the hall among the hostages. Another group of terrorists occupied the theatre’s administrative premises. 5.     Over the following days several journalists and public figures were allowed to enter the building and talk to the terrorists. The terrorists demanded the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Chechen Republic and direct negotiations involving the political leadership of the federal authorities and the separatist movement. As a result of negotiations, the authorities persuaded the terrorists to release several of the hostages. However, the terrorists refused to surrender or to accept food or drinking water for the remaining hostages, while continuing to insist on their demands. 6.     It appears that some of the hostages managed to maintain occasional contact with the outside world through their mobile telephones. Some even managed to talk to journalists. 7 .     The Government claimed that hostages who tried to escape or resist were shot by the terrorists. Thus, in the night of 23-24 October 2002 Ms   R.   asked the terrorists to release the hostages. She was taken out of the auditorium and executed by an unknown terrorist. Mr Vl., one of the hostages, was wearing a military uniform. He was shot by one of the terrorists on 25 October 2002. On the same day Mr V. was first beaten by the terrorists in the theatre auditorium and then taken out and executed. Mr   G., who witnessed this, tried to escape, but the terrorists fired and wounded him, and he was then taken out, beaten and executed. While firing at Mr V., the terrorists wounded another hostage, Mr Z., who later died in hospital. 8.     The applicants indicated that Mr V., Mr Vl. and Ms R. had not been in the building during the show, but entered it sometime later at their own initiative. They referred to the statements by several former hostages, in particular Ms Gubareva and Ms Akimova. 9.     On 25 October 2002 FSB officers apprehended Mr Talkhigov, an alleged accomplice of the terrorists, who had spoken to them by telephone and had given them information about the situation outside the theatre. 10.     On the same day the director of the FSB made a public statement on television following a meeting with President Putin. He promised to keep the terrorists alive if they released the hostages. 2.     Preliminary plan of the rescue operation 11 .     Shorty afterwards the authorities created a “crisis cell” under the command of Mr P., the deputy head of the Federal Security Service (“the FSB”). The crisis cell was located in the premises of War Veterans Hospital no.   1, situated in the vicinity of the theatre building. It included representatives of various State services and organisations. 12.     As follows from the materials submitted by the parties, the Federal Rescue Service was responsible for the evacuation of the hostages and for clearing away rubble if the building collapsed. From 24 October 2004 several teams of rescue workers were stationed in the vicinity of the theatre building. The Rescue Service placed various heavy machines, such as bulldozers, excavators, cranes, dump trucks, etc., about 400 metres from the theatre building. 13.     The Moscow Centre for Urgent Medical Treatment (MCUMT), and the All-Russia Centre of Disaster Medicine ( Zashchita ) at the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation were in charge of medical assistance to the hostages and their relatives. Mr Sl., the Head of the Public Health Department of the City of Moscow and a member of the crisis cell, coordinated the efforts of the MCUMT, Zashchita , ambulance teams, and city hospitals. 14.     From 24 October 2002 five ambulances and one brigade of MCMUT medics with a special medical bus were permanently on duty near the theatre. Another brigade of MCUMT medics and psychologists provided aid to the relatives of the hostages in the building of Professional School no.   194. The MCUMT was functioning in crisis mode, so all of its workers were permanently on duty. 15.     The patients of the War Veterans Hospital (the medical facility closest to the theatre) were re-located to other hospitals, which were not supposed to take part in the rescue operation. The staff of the War Veterans Hospital was reinforced with surgeons and emergency physicians from the Sklifosovskiy and Botkin Hospitals. Two additional reanimation and six surgery blocks were made available. By 26 October 2002 the admission capacity of the War Veterans Hospital had been increased to 300-350 beds. 16.     The authorities designated several other hospitals which would admit the hostages initially. Besides War Veterans Hospital no. 1 (the closest), those were City Hospitals nos. 1, 7, 13 (the next closest hospitals), City Hospitals nos. 15, 23, 33, 53, 64, 68, 79, the Research Institute of Emergency Medical Treatment, the Sklifosovskiy and Botkin Hospitals, and Children’s Hospitals nos. 9, 13, and 20. Between 24 and 26 October 2002 Mr   Ev., the Chief Emergency Physician of Moscow City, visited some of those hospitals and checked whether they were ready to admit hostages. The hospital officials were required to free up wards for the hostages, to ensure that the hospital staff were ready to arrive at short notice, and that additional equipment, emergency treatment rooms and medical supplies and bandages were prepared.   The admission capacity of most of the hospitals was increased. Thus, Hospital no. 13 reported that it was prepared to admit up to 150 patients, including 50 in a critical state. Hospital no. 7 reported that it was prepared to admit up to 200 patients. There is no information about the admission capacity of other hospitals, but it appears that it too was increased. The MCUMT brigades were informed which hospitals were designated to participate in the rescue operation, and how many places they would have available for the hostages. 3.     Storming and the rescue operation 17.     In the early morning of 26 October 2002, at about 5-5.30 a.m., the Russian security forces pumped an unknown gas into the main auditorium through the building’s ventilation system. When the terrorists controlling the explosive devices and the suicide bombers in the auditorium lost consciousness under the influence of the gas, the special squad stormed the building. The suicide bombers were shot while unconscious; others tried to resist but were killed in the ensuing gunfire. 18.     Soon afterwards Mr Ign., a member of the crisis cell with responsibility for public relations, made a statement to the press. He informed the journalists that the terrorists had executed two hostages and wounded several more and that, in response, the special squad had stormed the building and killed some terrorists and arrested others. He did not mention the use of the gas. 19.     As a result of the operation the majority of the hostages were released (over 730 people [1] ). However, a large number of hostages were affected by the gas; according to information gathered by the investigative authorities by the end of 2002 [2] , 129 hostages died: 102 died on the spot, including 3 people who were shot, 21 died in the course of evacuation and transportation to hospital, and 6 people died in the emergency rooms of various hospitals. Many of those who survived continue to suffer from serious health problems. For instance, one of the applicants, Ms Gubareva, who was amongst the hostages, was taken unconscious to the intensive therapy unit of City Hospital no. 7, where she underwent treatment until 28   October 2002. A week later she was hospitalised again. The applicants submitted medical records in respect of several former hostages from hospitals where they underwent medical treatment after their release. 20.     The applicants alleged that the evacuation of hostages from the theatre building had been chaotic: the semi-naked bodies of unconscious hostages were piled up on the ground outside the building, where the temperature was 1.8ºC [3] . Some of them died simply because they were laid on their backs and subsequently suffocated on their own vomit or because their tongues were blocking their airways. According to the applicants, there were not enough ambulances, so the hostages were transported to hospitals in ordinary city buses without the accompaniment of medical staff and without any assistance from traffic police to facilitate their quick arrival at the hospitals. The medical staff in the hospitals were not equipped to receive so many victims, had not been informed of the properties of the narcotic gas used by the security forces and did not have appropriate equipment. In the first days after the events no information was provided about the number of victims, their names and the places where they had been taken. The victims’ relatives had to call the city morgues to find out where the corpses were being kept. 21.     The authorities disputed that view. They argued (see below, the conclusions of the official investigation) that the medical assistance to the victims had been adequate, that the medics and rescue workers had had the necessary information, medicine and equipment to provide initial medical aid to the victims, that the evacuation of those hostages affected by the gas from the theatre building and their transportation to hospital had been quick and well-organised, that the hospitals had been equipped to admit them, and that, in general, the rescue operation had been conducted in the most efficient manner possible in the circumstances. 22.     In the aftermath of the events of 23-26 October 2002 the Moscow City Administration paid the victims of the terrorist attack “compassionate compensation”: the survivors received 50,000 Russian roubles (RUB) and the relatives of the deceased hostages received RUB 100,000. In addition, the City Administration covered certain funeral expenses and paid a certain amount for the property lost during the rescue operation. 4.     The criminal investigation 23.     On 23 October 2002 the Moscow City Prosecutor’s Office (“the MCPO”) opened a criminal investigation into the events of 23 ‑ 26   October 2002. The case was attributed no. 229133. The prosecution qualified the facts as “a terrorist attack” and “hostage-taking”. 24 .     On 24 October 2002 the MCPO formed an investigation team which included officials working in the Prosecutor’s Office, the FSB, and the Ministry of the Interior (police). The investigation team was headed by investigator K. from the MCPO. On the same day a judge of the Lefortovo District Court, at the request of the investigator, ordered the wiretapping of a telephone line which had allegedly been used by an accomplice to the terrorists. Also on the same day, a judge of the Moscow City Court authorised the wiretapping of a number of other telephone lines allegedly used by the terrorists. 25.     On various dates in 2002-2003 the applicants (as well as the relatives of other victims) were given the status of injured parties. In that capacity they obtained access to the materials of the case file. Despite their requests, however, they were not allowed to make copies of the materials in the case file or to disclose their content to third persons, including independent medical experts. Furthermore, the applicants were not allowed to contact the experts who had examined the bodies. 26.     On 17 December 2002 investigator K. requested the MCPO to extend the time-limit for the investigation in case no. 29133. The request contained a further action plan for the investigative team; the plan included measures to obtain further details of the terrorist attack itself, an examination of the explosives and the bodies of the deceased hostages, identification of the terrorists, and so on. The plan did not include consideration of the rescue operation as such. 27.     The Government produced documents from case no. 229133. It is unclear whether these documents constitute the entirety of the materials in the case file or only parts of it. The documents include witness statements by those who participated in the negotiations with the terrorists; witness statements from several former hostages; witness statements from the officials of the public health service and rescue service who were involved in the rescue operation; witness statements from the head doctors of the hospitals which admitted the former hostages; witness statements from the field personnel directly involved in the evacuation of and medical assistance to the hostages (rescue workers, medics of MCUMT, medics from the ambulances, medics in the city hospitals). The questioning was carried out by investigators from the Ministry of the Interior, the MCPO and the FSB. The Government also produced a report on the examination of the explosive devices used by the terrorists, a report by the Public Health Department on the organisation of medical aid to the hostages, a summary of the medical records of the deceased hostages, results of forensic medical examinations of the deceased hostages, copies of official correspondence and decisions by the investigative bodies, and some other documentary evidence. The documents produced by the Government, in so far as relevant and readable, are summarised below. (a)     Witness statements by the negotiators 28.     Mr Asl., a Duma Deputy and an ethnic Chechen, testified that he had spoken with the terrorists in the theatre building. According to Mr Asl.’s testimony, the leader of the terrorists told him that he was prepared to die; he was very nervous and was not open to dialogue. 29.     Mr Yastr., another State official, testified that Mr B., the leader of the terrorists, had proposed to the authorities that several hostages be released in exchange for a partial withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. He had also requested that the relatives of the victims organise a public march on Red Square in support of the withdrawal of the Russian troops. He had further requested that the federal authorities appoint a representative for talks with the separatists, someone who would be entitled to take political decisions. Among such persons he had named Mr Kz., the former commander of the federal troops in Chechnya. 30.     Mr Yav., a Duma Deputy, testified that the terrorists had initially demanded the immediate withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Chechnya, but they had then put forward other demands with regard to the federal forces, namely that the latter stop using artillery and air raids and cease “clean-up operations”, and that direct telephone negotiations between President Putin and Mr Maskhadov, the president of the separatist government, be organised. The terrorists had told Mr Yav. that they were prepared to die, and that they knew that they would not leave the city alive. Mr Yav. understood that if the requirements of the terrorists were not met, they would have been prepared to start executing the hostages. 31.     Ms Plt., a journalist, testified that “Abu-Bakr” (another leader of the terrorists) put forward the following demands: the withdrawal of federal troops from any district of the Chechen Republic, and a public statement by President Putin that he would stop the hostilities. The terrorists had agreed to accept food and water; some time afterwards food and water had been supplied. (b)     Witness statements by former hostages 32.     The investigators questioned 737 former hostages about the situation in the main auditorium of the theatre where they had been held. The materials of the case file contain a memo prepared by the investigator recapitulating their testimonies. In addition, the parties produced several full-text written testimonies by the former hostages. These documents, to the extent that they are relevant, can be summarised as follows. 33.     Most of the hostages testified that there had been about 40-60   terrorists in the theatre building. Initially the terrorists allowed those hostages who had mobile phones to call their relatives and ask them to hold a “peace rally” against the war in Chechnya and require the Government not to storm the building. Later the terrorists confiscated the mobile phones, under threat of execution. 34.     On 25 October 2002 one of the hostages, a young man, tried to escape from the auditorium and started to run; the terrorists fired at him, wounding him in the head, took him outside and executed him. While shooting at the escapee, the terrorists seriously wounded another person. At a certain point one of the leaders of the terrorists ordered the shooting of another person whom he considered to be an agent of the security forces, and who had penetrated the building from the outside. 35.     It is clear from the witness statements that most of them took the terrorists’ threats seriously. Some of them, however, noted that they feared storming by the security forces more than the terrorists themselves. 36.     When the gas penetrated the auditorium Mr B. (the leader of the terrorists) ordered that the windows be smashed for better ventilation. Those terrorists who were on the scene started to shoot around; they appeared to be aiming at the windows. The women terrorists sitting among the public did not try to blow up the explosives; they covered their faces with handkerchiefs and lay on the floor with the hostages. In 10 minutes most of the people in the auditorium were unconscious. (c)     Examination of the explosive devices 37.     On 19 November 2002 the investigator commissioned an expert report on various technical aspects of the terrorist attack. In particular, the investigator sought to establish the destructive capacity of the explosives planted by the terrorists in the building. The examination was entrusted to FSB experts. The experts established that the terrorists had had about 76   kilos of various explosives (in TNT equivalent) [4] ; that the latter’s simultaneous detonation would have killed or seriously injured most of the hostages in the auditorium through the blasts or shrapnel, but that it had been unlikely that the detonation would have led to the collapse of the entire building. The position of the stationary explosives and the placement of the “suicide bombers” within the auditorium guaranteed maximum efficiency in the case of detonation and showed the terrorists’ technical expertise. (d)     Report of the Public Health Department 38.     On 20 November 2002 Mr Sl., the Head of the Public Health Department of the City of Moscow, submitted a report concerning the organisation of the evacuation of and medical assistance to the hostages. The report stated that 5 ambulances and 2 MCUMT teams had been dispatched to the scene immediately; in addition, city hospitals took measures to free places in preparation for the eventual arrival of hostages. At about 5.55 a.m. on 26 October 2002 458 medical emergency teams were sent to the site of the events. The hostages were evacuated by the rescue workers and the special squad officers in the “face-up” position. Coordination of the evacuation was ensured by the workers of the Zashchita (Protection) Centre of the Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation. The first 20 ambulance brigades arrived at the scene at 6.09-6.14 a.m. 39.     In view of the victims’ symptoms, they were given injections of Nalaxone , an “antagonist of narcotic analgesics”. These injections were administered within the theatre building by the special squad officers. However, the efficiency of Nalaxone was low when applied to those who had been in a state of hypoxia for a long time. The rescue workers had been instructed to turn the victims face down if they showed signs of vomiting. There was sufficient Nalaxone available to the doctors, since it was part of the standard first-aid kit of an emergency team. Mr Sl. further testified that the majority of the hostages received an injection of Nalaxone inside the building. The injections had been administered by the officers of the special squad; the officers informed the medics which hostages had not received an injection; that group then received an injection from the medical emergency teams. The victims in a coma were transported in the ambulances; others were transported in city buses, but always accompanied by medics. 40 .     Most of the victims had been dispatched to War Veterans Hospital (no. 1) and City Hospital no. 13. The evacuation of 770 hostages had taken 1 hour and 15 minutes. Only 6 people died in hospital. 114 people were already dead on arrival at the hospitals. The report concluded that the efforts of the various services participating in the evacuation and medical assistance to the victims had been well coordinated, and that the evacuation operation had been efficient and adequate. (e)     Examination of medical records 41.     On 27 November 2002 Ms Usm., one of the investigators, analysed the medical records of the surviving hostages and drew up a report containing information on the timing of the hostages’ arrival at various Moscow hospital. That report did not include statistics on the deceased hostages. 42.     According to the report, on 26   October 2002 War Veterans Hospital no. 1 admitted 53 patients in the period between 6.30 and 7 a.m., 20 patients between 7 and 7.30 a.m., 10 patients between 7.30 and 8 a.m., and 6   patients after 8 a.m. 43.     City Hospital no. 13 admitted 3 patients between 7.15 and 8 a.m. (two of them arrived “on their own”, one was brought in an ambulance); 213 patients arrived between 8 and 8.30 a.m. (153 arrived “on their own”, apparently in buses; 60 – in ambulances); between 8.30 and 9 a.m. the hospital admitted 21 patients (10 arrived in ambulances); between 9 and 9.30   a.m. the hospital admitted 27 patients (9 arrived in ambulances); between 9.30 and 10 a.m. the hospital admitted 20 patients (1 arrived in an ambulance); and after 10 a.m. the hospital admitted 45 patients (1 arrived in an ambulance). 44.     City Hospital no. 7 admitted 8 patients between 7 and 8 a.m. (all brought in ambulances); 16 patients between 8 and 8.30 a.m. (6 were brought in ambulances); 13 patients arrived between 8.30 and 9 a.m. (5   were brought in ambulances), 8 arrived between 9 and 9.30 a.m. (2 were brought in ambulances); 15 arrived between 9.30 and 10 a.m. (1 was brought in an ambulance); and 17 arrived after 10 a.m. 45.     City Hospital no. 1 admitted 9 patients between 7 and 8 a.m. (all were brought in ambulances), and 19 between 8.30 and 9 a.m. (12 in ambulances). (f)     Statements by public health officials and chief doctors 46.     Witness Ev., the Chief Emergency Physician of the Moscow City, testified that as from 23 October 2002 he had been responsible for preparing War Veterans Hospital no. 1 to receive hostages. He had checked the staffing situation: the hospital had received support staff from other medical institutions, including surgeons and emergency physicians from the Sklifosovskiy Hospital. He had also verified the necessary equipment. Eight emergency operation tables had been prepared. On 24 and 25 October 2002 he had checked the readiness of City Hospitals nos. 7, 13 and 53. The two hospitals (nos. 7 and 13) had been prepared to admit up to 70 [5] patients in a critical state. However, there was no decision as to the exact number of hostages to be dispatched to each hospital. He had learned about the storming of the building at 6 a.m. from the mass media. At 7.20 a.m. he arrived at the Sklifosovskiy Hospital, where he started to prepare additional emergency teams to be sent to the site of the events. At 10 a.m. he arrived at the War Veterans Hospital. By that time the victims had already been divided into several groups and the doctors had identified the most serious cases. He examined the victims personally; in most cases they were suffering from cardiac and respiratory insufficiency, aggravated by dehydration, “aeleontropic” ( sic ) disorder, a high level of ferments and “myoglobin”, and shock. He had learned from the mass media that the security forces had used gas. The victims had received, in the first place, artificial ventilation of lungs, cardiac support, etc. Two or three hours later he had left for Hospital   no. 13, which had admitted a large number of the victims. As to the possible treatment, he testified that it had been difficult to prepare any antidote in advance, given the situation of the hostages at the time of the storming of the building. Nalaxone was a specific antidote for opiate drugs and was widely used from the beginning of the operation. The fact that the victims were suffering from opiate poisoning had been evident from their symptoms. However, the use of Nalaxone had not been effective, as it had not produced any tangible positive results. 47.     Witness Ks., director of the MCUMT, stated that the information about the storming of the building was received by her on 26 October 2002 at 5.30 a.m. That information was immediately transmitted to several city hospitals. At 5.37   a.m. she received an order to mobilise 100 ambulances from the nearest medical emergency units. At 5.50 a.m. the MCUMT received information about the storming. The third MCUMT brigade (no. 6813) was ordered to move to the area near the theatre. That brigade was supposed to indicate the route for the ambulances. At 7.02 a.m. the third brigade received an order to approach the theatre building and to start the evacuation. The mass evacuation of hostages started at 7-7.05 a.m. in ambulances and city buses. The evacuation ended at 8.15 a.m. As a result of their training the emergency teams were well prepared for such situations, and they had all the necessary drugs, including Nalaxone . On the whole, the evacuation and medical assistance to the victims were well organised. Since there was a risk of explosion, it was impossible to treat the hostages near the building. The lack of information about the formula of the gas was irrelevant in the circumstances, and there had been no need to use military medics. 48.     Witness N., another official from the MCUMT, testified that he had been on duty from 25 October 2002. He had not received any special briefing; however, he had information about the plan for evacuation of the hostages. On 26 October 2002 at 2 or 3 a.m. he had participated in the evacuation of two wounded people from the theatre building to the nearest hospital. At 5.45 a.m., after the beginning of the operation, he ordered that 20 ambulances be positioned a few blocks away from the theatre. At 6 a.m. he was informed that the building had been cleared of the terrorists and that the ambulances could start evacuation. They had arrived on site at 7.05 a.m. He had been responsible for placing the hostages in the city buses and dispatching them to the hospitals under the convoy of escort vehicles. The first examination had shown that the victims had suffered from gas poisoning; immediate assistance had consisted in removing the hostages from the building, opening their breathing passages, injecting Cardiomin and restoring normal heart and lung functions. 49.     Witness Krt., the chief doctor of War Veterans Hospital no. 1 (which was the closest to the theatre) testified, inter alia , that on the eve of the storming they had received a machine for artificial lung ventilation. However, they anticipated that the hostages would have “traumatic injuries”. The hospital had had about 300-350 beds available, with a potential of 600 beds. The ground floor of the hospital had been allocated for emergency treatment, operating tables had been arranged and the doctors had prepared “materials for bleeding patients”. When the first victims started arriving at the hospital, it was unclear what had happened to them as most were unconscious. However, it was irrelevant whether or not there was information about the kind of the gas they had been exposed to. 50.     Witness Skh, the chief emergency physician of City Hospital no. 1, testified that the first patients had been delivered to his hospital at 7.15 a.m. by ambulance. At about 8 a.m. a city bus had arrived with 32 victims. All of them had signs of acute respiratory insufficiency: they were unconscious, their external respiration was deficient and they had yellowish skin (cyanosis). The victims had been escorted by two uniformed men with machineguns, and a man in plain clothes with a video camera. The victims had been sitting or lying on the floor of the bus; bodies were piled on top of each other. Mr Skh. had taken five persons out of the bus himself; then other people had arrived and the people were taken into the hospital. Six out of the thirty-two were already dead. Mr Skh. described them. 51.     Witness Ar., the chief doctor of Hospital no. 13, testified that on 26   October 2002 he had arrived at work at about 7.20 a.m. The first ambulance with the victims was already there. The main arrival of victims had been at 7.45 a.m., when about 47 ambulances, each carrying 2-3 people, and 5 buses with victims arrived at the hospital. It was later established that the hospital had admitted 356 former hostages, including 35 who had been in a state of clinical or biological death when they arrived at the hospital. 20   out of those 35 people had been at a stage where it was too late to carry out any reanimation procedures. In his opinion, it was immaterial whether the medics were informed about the gas used during the operation. He confirmed that there had been a stock of Nalaxone in the hospitals but it had been insufficient, so on 26 October 2002 they had received further supplies. 52.     Witness Kz., chief emergency doctor of Hospital no. 13, testified that they had been prepared for the arrival of hostages; however, they had not been informed of any eventual diagnosis they might face. The victims who had arrived at his hospital had received artificial lung ventilation, oxygen masks, etc. The doctors had no information about the gas used by the security forces, but realised that the victims had been exposed to a narcotic gas and so decided to use Nalaxone as an antidote. 53.     Witness Kn., the head of the emergency treatment unit of Hospital no. 13, testified that two of the hostages admitted to her hospital had been in a state of clinical death. At the same time, she noted that “there were no corpses” (in the buses transporting the victims). 54.     Witness Af., the chief doctor at Hospital no. 7, stated that they had had enough staff to treat the hostages. They had not received any additional drugs as the hospital pharmacy had had sufficient amounts of medicine. The first ambulances had arrived at the hospital at about 7.15 a.m., and continued to arrive for about 45 minutes. People had been in a very weak state. 14 hostages had died, but it was hard to say whether the deaths had occurred during the transportation or after their admission to hospital. 30   minutes after the first ambulance arrived, a doctor on duty at the City Health Department had called him and said that “ Nalaxone was on its way to the hospital”. 55.     Witness Rm., the chief emergency physician at Hospital no. 7, testified that 50-70 minutes after the arrival of the first victims someone from the hospital’s administration office had told the medics that they should use Nalaxone . There had been about 40 dozes of the medicine in stock. 14 people died in the hospital within 30 minutes. 40 minutes later the hospital had received more Nalaxone . Nobody had died afterwards, except for one woman who had died 3 days later of a heart attack. 56.     Witness Ks., the chief paramedic at Hospital no. 7, testified that on 26   October 2002 they had admitted 98 victims. All of the victims had been treated; the medical staff administered injections in their arms. 57.     Witness Ksh., head of the toxicology unit at the Sklifosovskiy Hospital, testified that the victims had been transported to the hospital in ambulances. She had learned that the hostages were suffering from gas poisoning. The victims received ordinary treatment: they had not been subjected to any special procedures and the doctors had mainly tried to stop the hypoxia. Witness Ksh. also confirmed that the knowledge of the exact formula of the gas would not have helped the doctors. A statement in similar terms had been given by Mr Vd., an emergency toxicologist at the Sklifosovskiy Hospital. (g)     Statements by rescue workers 58.     Witness Chz. was the head of the rescue service of the Moscow City Administration. He stated that he had participated in the planning of the rescue operation. However, he had not been informed of the possible use of gas; he instructed his staff to intervene in the event of an explosion. He stated that the evacuation of the hostages had been well-organised. 59.     Witness Chs., another rescue service official, confirmed that the rescue workers had been expecting an explosion and had been equipped accordingly (bulldozers, cranes, etc). At 6 a.m. he received an order to start evacuation of the hostages. He had participated personally in the evacuation. They had carried victims face down in order to avoid suffocation by the tongue. On the way to the exit the medics gave injections to the victims, and the victims were then loaded into the buses. Mr Chs. also said that he had not known that gas had been used and had not smelled any gas in the building. 60.     Witness Pt., a rescue worker, testified that he too had been unaware of the use of gas. He had also seen the medics giving injections to the hostages; he later learned that this was an antidote. 61.     Witness Zhb., a rescue worker, also confirmed that he had not smelled gas when he entered the building. He also testified that the work of the special squad officers, rescue workers and the medics had been well-coordinated and that there had been no problem with the normal circulation of the buses. 62.     The investigators questioned several other rescue workers. They testified that the victims had received injections on the spot, that the doctors’ actions had been properly coordinated and that there had been enough vehicles to bring the victims to the hospitals. Some stated that the victims had been transported face down. They all testified that they had not been informed about the use of the gas. (h)     Statements by ordinary doctors and paramedics 63.     Witness Kr., a doctor from the MCUMT, testified that he had participated in the evacuation of the hostages. He had arrived at the scene at 7.02 a.m.; clinical examination of the victims had showed that they were suffering from poisoning by opiate drugs. The buses had been dispatched to various hospitals, and the victims who were in the most serious condition had been sent to the nearest hospitals. 64.     Witness Vlk., another doctor from the MCUMT, noted that he had not received any information about the situation at the scene, that the ambulances had been used as escort vehicles for the city buses, and that on-the-spot coordination had been organised by the MCUMT people. There had been no appropriate place on the ground to sort the victims, and the circulation of the ambulances had been slow. The rescue workers and doctors had had to take into account the risk of an explosion and the overall complexity of the situation. 65.     Witness A. entered the theatre building shortly after all the terrorists had been killed. He testified that he had seen special squad officers evacuating unconscious hostages from the auditorium to the ground outside the building. There the hostages had been placed on the ground near the entrance, where the doctors inspected their eyes with hand-torches and provided first aid, namely the administration of injections in the buttocks. 66.     Witness Mkh., a doctor in the emergency treatment unit in Hospital no. 13, testified that when he approached the hospital at 7.45 a.m. he had seen the buses at the entrance. He also confirmed that he had not seen any corpses among the victims admitted to the hospital. He described the medical procedures he had used to unblock the victims’ airways. 67.     Witness Zb., a doctor in Hospital no. 13, testified that she had arrived at work on 26 October 2002 at 8.05-8.10 a.m. By that time the buses with the hostages had already arrived. She had examined a number of patients; six of them were dead. The necessary records had been drawn up in the evening of that day, so the time of death had been indicated approximately, based on the time of the patient’s arrival at the hospital. 68.     Several other doctors from Hospital no. 13 testified about the admission process for the victims and the treatment they had received (cardiac massage, lung ventilation, injections of Nalaxone and Cardiamine ). Most of the doctors from the various city hospitals testified that there had been enough medical personnel to treat the hostages and that places had been freed up to admit hostages. The investigators showed the medics the photos of the victims for identification, and put questions about the record-keeping process on the day of the events. 69.     Witness Bgr., a doctor from the War Veterans Hospital, stated that the first hostages had started to arrive at their hospital at about 6.30 a.m., mostly in ambulances. She learned from Ms Mkh., the chief emergency physician, that they were to use Nalaxone , but they had not had any Nalaxone in stock. However, they received supplies from an official of the Emergency Situations Ministry who arrived at the hospital with a plastic bag full of Nalaxone . Ms Bgr. testified that their hospital had had four machines for artificial lung ventilation. She said that if they had known about the use of the gas they would have tried to obtain additional equipment of that sort, and that the knowledge of the nature of the gas would have helped the doctors, although the treatment would probably have been the same. 70.     Witness Kr, a doctor from the MCUMT, testified that when his team arrived at the theatre building, they saw that the special squad officers, firemen and rescue workers had already started evacuating people from the building. The victims had been placed in buses; each bus had an ambulance as an escort vehicle. Mr Kr. had dispatched two or three city buses to the hospitals. Those hostages who had been able to sit had been placed in the upright position (about 20 people in each bus); others had been put on the floor (about 10 or 12 people in each bus). The latter group had included several dead people. At a certain point Mr Sl., the Head of the Moscow City Public Health Department, informed him by walky-talky that they should use Nalaxone . Mr Kr. noted further that the evacuation of the hostages had been somehow hindered by the “absence of traffic routes for the vehicles”. At the same time he concluded that the overall organisation of the evacuation of the hostages had been satisfactory. 71.     Witness Vl., a doctor from the MCUMT, testified that he had arrived at the theatre with his team at 7.13 a.m. According to Mr Vl., he had not had a predetermined procedure for action, but had organised the evacuation and coordination with other services “on the spot”. Not all of the buses which had transported the victims had a sufficient number of medical staff inside to accompany the victims. Some of the buses had only one paramedic. From his testimony it was unclear whether the buses had escort vehicles. Mr Vl. also noted difficulties in the circulation of the ambulances and the buses near the theatre. The efficiency of the medical assistance had been undermined by the lack of information about the gas used and by the risk of explosion. 72.     The investigators also questioned the doctors who had worked in the nearest ambulance cells (ambulance stations) or at the scene of the events on 26 October 2002. Witness Pch., senior doctor in an ambulance cell, testified that she had not been at the scene of the events, but, in her opinion, the absence of information about the gas applied in the course of the operation had not adversely affected the efficiency of the medics working there: they had acted on the basis of “the clinical presentation (poisoning by an unknown gas and other acute conditions)”. It had been enough to perform “cardio- and lung-resuscitation operations” and apply antidotes, which had been at available to the doctors. She testified that there had been no problems with the circulation of the ambulances and buses. The presence of military medics had been unnecessary. A statement in similar terms was given by Ms Kr., another doctor from the ambulance cell. 73.     Witness Fd., a doctor in another ambulance, testified that he had accompanied 40 victims in one of the city buses on their way to Hospital no.   13. Somebody from the MCUMT had given him 10 ampoules of Nalaxone and told him that he should give injections. 74.     Witness Scht., a doctor in an ambulance, testified that necessary medical assistance had been rendered to the victims in a timely manner. He did not know who had been responsible for the oversight of the work of various ambulance teams on the spot. He also testified that the doctors had been unaware of the content of the gas, so they had been unable to apply any specific methods of treatment to the victims. Among the negative factors which had affected the efficiency of the rescue operation, Mr Scht. noted the transportation of the victims in the city buses, lack of information about the possible diagnosis and the gas used by the security forces, or at least about the pharmaceutical group it belonged to, and a failure to sort the victims on the basis of their medical condition. 75.     Witness Fds., an ambulance doctor, testified that he had been in an ambulance located at the parking area near the building. His vehicle had transported two people to Hospital no. 7. They had not been informed about the use of the gas, and had not applied any special methods of treatment or any medicine. They had administered oxygen to the victims. Mr Fds. testified that there had been no problem with the circulation of the vehicles, but that there had been not enough medics to accompany the city buses which transported the hostages. The exact name of the gas had been irrelevant, but it would have been helpful if the doctors had known the content of the gas. 76.     Witness Chr., an ambulance doctor, testified that when he had seen the first victims he realised that they were suffering from an overdose of opiates and applied Nalaxone , but had not applied any other special medicine. He stated that he had not known who was overseeing the actions of the medics at the scene. He also said, that, in his opinion, the lack of information about the gas used and possible antidotes played a negative role. 77.     Witness Krg., a ambulance doctor, testified that at about 7.20 a.m. they had arrived at the theatre building, where their vehicle had waited for some time in the queue of other ambulances. When it was their turn to take a patient on board, somebody had opened the r