CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;COMMITTEE;ENG — 21 décembre 2010

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s7BE5FA78 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:center; font-size:11pt } .s85016119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sEC177689 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s967D43C6 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s87F05BA2 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sC443675D { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:30pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sD2857263 { margin-top:30pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s401C450A { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s7EE1C8F0 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s11869A80 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s3B3A5DE9 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s507703F { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s984A15CA { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s9F223FEE { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sD0489F03 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s471F7CE { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sAB173E38 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s81CCF55C { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .s48DB3670 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s7CB9076 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s7D9000BB { width:17.92pt; display:inline-block } .sE896C043 { width:180.96pt; display:inline-block } .s576DFC5F { width:15.93pt; display:inline-block } .sAA5C5B93 { width:187.63pt; display:inline-block }       FIFTH SECTION             CASE OF KRYUKOV v. UKRAINE (VI)   (Application no. 53249/07)                       JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   21 December 2010     This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Kryukov v. Ukraine (VI) , The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:   Rait Maruste, President,   Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,   Zdravka Kalaydjieva, judges, and Stephen Phillips, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 30 November 2010, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 53249/07) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a   Ukrainian national, Mr Sergey Aleksandrovich Kryukov (“the applicant”), on 10 November 2007. 2.     The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Zaytsev, of the Ministry of Justice. 3.     On 19 October 2009 the President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the application to the Government. In accordance with Protocol   No. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges. THE FACTS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 4.     The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Melitopol. A.     The first set of proceedings 5.     On 23 October 1995 Mrs P., the applicant's former wife, instituted divorce proceedings in the Melitopol Court against the applicant. She also sought separation of their property. 6.     On 19 March 1996 the applicant lodged a counter-claim. 7.     On 10 January 1997 the court disjoined the divorce proceedings from the proceedings concerning separation of property. 8.     By a judgment of 15 May 2002, the court allowed the applicant's counter-claim in part and ordered the separation of property comprising of various household items (furniture, kitchen utensils, etc.). 9.     On 25 July 2002 the Zaporizhzhya Regional Court of Appeal upheld the above judgment. 10.     On 16 October 2002 the applicant lodged an appeal in cassation against the above decisions and on 11 November 2002 he requested the courts to renew the procedural time-limit for lodging it.   On 2 December 2002 the Melitopol Court rejected the applicant's request as unsubstantiated. On 24 March 2003 the Zaporizhzhya Court of Appeal upheld the above decision. On 19   August 2004 the Supreme Court quashed the above decisions as unsubstantiated and on 27 September 2004 the Melitopol Court renewed the applicant the time-limit for lodging his appeal in cassation. 11.     On 24 March 2007 the Supreme Court forwarded the applicant's appeal in cassation to the Odessa Regional Court of Appeal, which, acting as a court of cassation, rejected it as unsubstantiated on 7   May 2007. 12.     According to the Government, in the course of the proceedings the applicant amended his counter-claim on several occasions. The courts adjourned eight hearings following his requests or due to his failure to appear. Some nine hearings were further adjourned following the requests of Mrs P., her failure to appear or due to the illness of a judge. B.     The second set of proceedings 13.     The applicant stated that in September 2005 he had been deprived of a flat he had lived in together with Mrs P. The applicant instituted court proceedings against Mrs P. concerning his right to live in the flat. He has not provided any information as to their outcome. THE LAW I.     THE COMPLAINT ABOUT THE LENGTH OF PROCEEDINGS 14.     The applicant complained that the length of the first set of proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a   ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...” 15.     The Government contested that argument. 16.     The period to be taken into consideration began only on 11   September 1997, when the recognition by Ukraine of the right of individual petition took effect. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that date, account must be taken of the state of proceedings at the time. The period in question ended on 7 May 2007. The proceedings thus lasted for about nine years and eight months before three levels of jurisdiction. A.     Admissibility 17.     The Court notes that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 18.     The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). 19.     The Court considers that the complexity of the case and the conduct of the applicant, who somewhat contributed to the length of the proceedings (see paragraph 12 above), cannot explain their overall length. On the other hand, the Court finds that the protraction of the proceedings was mainly caused by the lengthy consideration of the case by the Melitopol Court (see paragraphs 7-8 above) and by the Supreme Court (see paragraphs 10-11 above), for which the Government did not provide plausible explanation. Furthermore, the Government did not explain and did not provide any supporting documents to demonstrate that the applicant's requests for the adjournment of some of the hearings caused lengthy delays. 20.     The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present case (see, for instance, Frydlender v. France , cited above; Pavlyulynets v. Ukraine , no. 70767/01, § 53, 6 September 2005; and Moroz and Others v. Ukraine , no. 36545/02, § 62, 21 December 2006). 21.     Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in the instant case the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the   “reasonable time” requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1. II.     REMAININIG COMPLAINTS 22.     The applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the Convention about the outcome of the proceedings. He further complained under Article 8 of the Convention that he had been unlawfully deprived of the flat. Relying on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant alleged that the separation of the property jointly owned by him and his former wife had not been in accordance with the law. 23.     Having carefully examined the applicant's submissions in the light of all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention. 24.     It follows that this part of the application must be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. III.     APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 25.     Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” 26.     The applicant submitted his claims for just satisfaction out of time. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum on that account. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY 1.     Declares the complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the first set of proceedings admissible and the remaining complaints inadmissible;   2.     Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 December 2010, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.   Stephen Phillips   Rait Maruste   Deputy Registrar   President