CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 25 janvier 2011

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display:inline-block }       FOURTH SECTION             CASE OF REINBOTH AND OTHERS v. FINLAND   (Application no. 30865/08)               JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   25 January 2011   FINAL   25/04/2011   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Reinboth and Others v. Finland , The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Nicolas Bratza, President,   Lech Garlicki,   Ljiljana Mijović,   Päivi Hirvelä,   Ledi Bianku,   Nebojša Vučinić,   Vincent A. de Gaetano, judges, and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 4 January 2011, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 30865/08) against the Republic of Finland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Finnish nationals, Ms Susanna Helena Reinboth and Mr Janne Sakari Virkkunen, and a Finnish newspaper company Helsingin Sanomat Oy (“the applicants”), on 24 June 2008. 2.     The applicants were represented by Mr Petteri Sotamaa, a lawyer practising in Helsinki. The Finnish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 3.     The applicants alleged, in particular, that they had been convicted of a crime in violation of Article 7 of the Convention and that their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention had been violated. 4.     On 10 September 2008 the President of the Fourth Section decided to communicate the applicants' complaints under Articles 7 and 10 to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The first and second applicants were born in 1963 and 1948 and live in Helsinki. The applicant company is based in Helsinki. The applicant company is the publisher of a daily newspaper called Helsingin Sanomat which has a circulation of approximately 430,000. The first applicant was a journalist and the second applicant the editor-in-chief of the publication at the relevant time. 6.     On 3 February 2000, during the presidential election campaign, a short article was published in the newspaper Ilta-Sanomat, entitled “ The ex-husband of [R. U.] and the person in charge of communications for the [E.A.] campaign have found each other ”. The article stated that P.N., who was separated from his wife, had found a new partner, O.T. The wife of P.N. was known as a political reporter in the election-related TV debates and previously as a news reader. It was mentioned in the article that O.T. was in charge of communications for the E. A. campaign and that, in her civilian life, O.T. was the communications manager in a specified pension insurance company and a mother. 7.     The article went on to state that, before joining the campaign, O.T. had been active in the same political party as P.N. and that she had been involved in some “insider committees”. The article continued to note that P.N. worked as a director for F., a company promoting Finnish exports, and that in the 1990s he had been posted in New York, where his wife had followed him, taking leave from her own job. The article stated that P.N. and his wife had two children and that they had separated in the autumn of 1999. Pictures of O.T. and P.N.'s wife were included in the article. 8.     On 1 February 2002 the journalist and the editor-in-chief of Ilta-Sanomat were convicted by the Forssa District Court ( käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten ) for having violated O.T.'s private life by publishing the original article. On 12 December 2002 and 4 July 2005, respectively, the Turku Court of Appeal ( hovioikeus, hovrätten ) and the Supreme Court ( korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen ) upheld the judgment. These proceedings were public. 9.     On 2 and 10 February 2002 the applicant company published two articles on the trial and the judgment of the Forssa District Court, written by the first applicant and approved by the second applicant. 10.     The first article summarised the judgment of the District Court, including O.T.'s full name and the court's sentence. It also described the court proceedings and stated that the decision had required a vote as one of the lay members of the court would have preferred to dismiss the charges. Moreover, the first article also included some of the details about O.T.'s private life already published in the original article of 3 February 2000. 11.     The second article was published as a legal column in a Sunday edition of the paper. The article reproduced the content of the original article without mentioning any names. It made reference to the trial and went on to explain the history of the Penal Code section concerning invasion of privacy that had been introduced in 1974. The article went on to state that the law did not define privacy, but left it to the courts to interpret on a case-by-case basis. The section was amended in 2000, but the only change in essence, according to the article, was the title of the section, now known as dissemination of information violating private life. The article further noted that the worst fears of the press had never materialised but there had been some surprises. The article made reference to a decision of the Supreme Court from 2001 to convict Alibi magazine for publishing a story with a picture and the name of a person who was at the time accused and later convicted of fraud on public pension funds. The article then reverted to the judgment in question pondering, without mentioning any names, as to who could be considered a private person and what was the responsibility of such a person with regard to his or her public performance and behaviour. 12.     On 14 March 2002 O.T. requested that a criminal investigation be initiated against the applicants on the basis of the articles. The prosecutor pressed charges on 31 January 2003 and the applicants were summonsed on 31   March and 1 April 2003. 13.     As the original decision of 1 February 2002 by the Forssa District Court had been upheld by the Turku Court of Appeal on 12 December 2002 and was pending before the Supreme Court, the Vantaa District Court decided on 15 September 2004 to wait for the final decision in the original case before examining the applicants' case. It is stated in the decision of the Vantaa District Court that the request for adjournment was made by the applicants. This is contested by the first applicant. 14.     On 4 July 2005 the Supreme Court gave a lengthy judgment in the case against Ilta-Sanomat ( KKO 2005:82 ) wherein the question of whether the article had infringed O.T.'s privacy was thoroughly examined in the light of the national legislation and the case-law of the Court. 15.     On 18 October 2005 the Vantaa District Court held a hearing in the applicants' case. 16.     On 3 November 2005 the District Court convicted the applicants of dissemination of information violating private life. The first applicant was ordered to pay 740 euros (EUR), the second applicant EUR 1,140, both amounts being 10 day fines as adjusted by their taxable income. All three applicants were ordered jointly to pay compensation to O.T. in the amount of EUR   6,000 plus interest for suffering and distress and EUR 11,845.95 plus interest for her legal costs. 17.     The court found that as two years had passed since the publication of the original article, O.T. was now entitled to the total enjoyment of private life and that there had thus been no ground for the disclosure of her name. As to the legality principle, a Penal Code could not be drafted in a manner covering all possible situations that might be envisaged. The first applicant had been well aware of the legal situation, and the interpretation of the provision in question had been well established and foreseeable. When a court found that private life has been invaded, another offence will be committed if that judgment is reported by mentioning the very same details of private life. The court was not unanimous as one of the lay judges dissented. 18.     By letters dated 30 November and 1 December 2005 the applicants appealed to the Helsinki Court of Appeal claiming, inter alia , that the conviction and sanctions imposed on them violated Article 10 of the Convention and that no grounds had been presented to show why it had been necessary in the present case to restrict their freedom of expression. Confidential information could only be disclosed once. The District Court judgment was public and everyone had a constitutional right to have information about a public document. The information had also been published twice before. The applicants had lacked intent as they had not realised that they were committing a crime when publishing the articles. 19.     On 20 April 2007 the Court of Appeal upheld the Vantaa District Court's judgment. The applicants were obliged to cover O.T.'s legal fees before the Court of Appeal in the amount of EUR 2,623 plus interest. The court found that the present case was about conflicting fundamental rights, namely the core areas of protection of private life and the margins of the freedom of expression. It was not juridically relevant whether the disclosed information was based on court case files or whether somebody else had earlier disclosed that information. As the Forssa District Court had on 1   February 2002 already found that the information disclosed in the original article had invaded O.T.'s privacy and as she was no longer in the same position as in 2000, the applicants had had no right to disclose her name when reporting on the Forssa District Court judgment. 20.     By letters dated 24 May and 13 June 2007 the applicants appealed to the Supreme Court, reiterating the grounds of appeal already presented before the Court of Appeal. 21.     On 28 December 2007 the Supreme Court refused the applicants leave to appeal. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Constitutional provisions 22.     Article 8 of the Constitution of Finland ( Suomen perustuslaki, Finlands grundlag , Act no.   731/1999) provides that no one shall be found guilty of a criminal offence or be sentenced to a punishment on the basis of a deed, which has not been determined punishable by an Act at the time of its commission. The penalty imposed for an offence shall not be more severe than that provided by an Act at the time of commission of the offence. 23.     Article 10 of the Constitution guarantees everyone's right to private life. According to it, “Everyone's private life, honour and the sanctity of the home are guaranteed. More detailed provisions on the protection of personal data are laid down by an Act. The secrecy of correspondence, telephony and other confidential communications is inviolable. Measures encroaching on the sanctity of the home, and which are necessary for the purpose of guaranteeing basic rights and liberties or for the investigation of crime, may be laid down by an Act. In addition, provisions concerning limitations of the secrecy of communications which are necessary in the investigation of crimes that jeopardise the security of the individual or society or the sanctity of the home, at trials and security checks, as well as during the deprivation of liberty may be laid down by an Act.” 24.     Article 12 of the Constitution concerns the freedom of expression and provides the following: “Everyone has the freedom of expression. Freedom of expression entails the right to express, disseminate and receive information, opinions and other communications without prior prevention by anyone. More detailed provisions on the exercise of the freedom of expression are laid down by an Act. Provisions on restrictions relating to pictorial programmes that are necessary for the protection of children may be laid down by an Act. Documents and recordings in the possession of the authorities are public, unless their publication has for compelling reasons been specifically restricted by an Act. Everyone has the right of access to public documents and recordings.” B.     Penal Code 25.     Chapter 24, section 8, of the Penal Code ( rikoslaki , strafflagen as amended by Act no. 531/2000) reads as follows: “ Dissemination of information violating private life : A person who unlawfully (1)   through the use of the mass media, or (2) in another manner publicly spreads information, an insinuation or an image of the private life of another person, such that the act is likely to cause that person damage or suffering, or subject that person to contempt, shall be convicted of injuring personal reputation and sentenced to a fine or a maximum term of two years' imprisonment. The spreading of information, an insinuation or an image of the private life of a person in politics, business, public office or a public position, or in a comparable position, shall not constitute injury to personal reputation, if it may affect the evaluation of that person's activities in the position in question and if it is necessary for the purposes of dealing with a matter of importance to society.” 26.     According to the travaux préparatoires (see government bill HE   184/1999), the content of this provision corresponds to the old Chapter   27, section 3(a), of the Penal Code. The amendments and clarifications made to the existing provision were mainly technical. The provision thus still restricts the protection of the private life of persons having important political or economic powers. Functions in respect of which the protection of private life is narrower in scope under paragraph 2 include political functions, business functions and public functions or duties. The matter must have social significance. This restriction, however, applies only to the persons referred to, not to their close friends and family. According to the Parliamentary Law Committee's Report ( lakivaliokunnan mietintö, lagutskottets betänkande LaVM 6/2000), the purpose of that provision is to permit the dissemination of information on the private life of such persons if the information may be relevant in assessing the performance of their functions. 27.     The government bill HE 184/1999 further provides that in the assessment of interferences with private life, the lawfulness of the interference and the concept of private life are taken into account. The publicity of a document does not automatically give the right to present in the mass media information concerning one's private life included in the document. A person's consent to the provision of information has relevance in the assessment of the lawfulness of the interference. Without explicit consent, there is usually no reason to believe that the person in question would have consented to the publication of information relating to private life (see Parliamentary Law Committee's Report LaVM 6/2000). Moreover, private life is, in particular, protected against dissemination of information which may be correct as such. In order for the act to be punishable, it is necessary that the information concerns the private life of the person in question (see government bill HE 184/1999). With regard to the concept of private life, a reference is made to the explanatory works concerning the Constitutional provisions on fundamental rights and to the government bill HE 84/1974. 28.     In the travaux préparatoires concerning the old Chapter 27, section   3(a), of the Penal Code (see government bill HE 84/1974), there was no precise definition of private life but matters such as, inter alia , family life, spare time activities, health and relationships and such conduct in socially significant positions that had no significance to the relevant exercise of power, were considered as a part of private life. It was further required that the act might have caused damage or suffering. Such damage might have also been “immaterial damage, which might have manifested itself in problems with social interaction or respect”. An ordinary person enjoyed the strongest protection of private life. His or her involvement in an incident of importance to society might have warranted an exception to the protection. In any case, if an offence was of such a kind that it could not be regarded as having social significance, it was a matter to be protected as belonging to the sphere of private life, otherwise the protection of private life did not restrict publishing . Moreover, the publishing could not be to a greater extent than was necessary. Thus, the necessity of mentioning a person's name or other description of a person enabling identification was always subject to careful consideration. C.     Provisions concerning publicity 29.     The Act on the Openness of Government Activities ( laki viranomaisten toiminnan julkisuudesta, lagen om offentlighet i myndigheternas verksamhet ; Act no. 621/1999) contains provisions on the right of access to official documents in the public domain, officials' duty of non-disclosure, document secrecy and any other restrictions of access that are necessary for the protection of public or private interests, as well as on the duties of the authorities to achieve the objectives of the Act. However, there are specific provisions that apply to court hearings. 30.     According to section 22 of the Act on the Publicity of Court Proceedings in General Courts ( laki oikeudenkäynnin julkisuudesta yleisissä tuomioistuimissa , lagen om offentlighet vid rättegång i allmänna domstolar; Act no. 370/2007), the court decisions are public unless the court orders that they be kept secret. The parties and the public have the right to be present when the decisions are pronounced. 31.     According to the preparatory works of the Act (see government bill HE 13/2006), “... the case files are to a large extent public and the publicity does not limit itself to publicity of oral hearings. On the other hand, in Finland the publicity of the case files does not automatically mean that all public documentation could as such, for example, without invading privacy, be published in the media. This right of the media to publish is limited not only by its self-regulation but also for example by the provisions of the Penal Code concerning the protection of privacy. It can, thus, be said that publicity is wider and the control of the protection of privacy is done mostly in arrears. It is for the media themselves to consider which of the public documentation they shall publish.” D.     Provisions concerning liability 32.     Section 39 of the Freedom of the Press Act ( painovapauslaki, tryckfrihetslagen ; Act no. 1/1919), as in force at the relevant time, provided that the provisions of the Tort Liability Act applied to the payment of compensation for damage caused by the content of printed material. 33.     Chapter 5, section 6, of the Tort Liability Act ( vahingonkorvauslaki, skadeståndslagen , Act no. 412/1974, as amended by Act no. 509/2004) stipulates that damages may also be awarded for distress arising, inter alia, from an offence against liberty, honour, home or private life. Under Chapter   5, section 1, of the said Act, damages shall constitute compensation for personal injury and damage to property. Section 2 provides that a person who has suffered personal injury shall be entitled to damages to cover medical costs and other costs arising from the injury, as well as loss of income and maintenance and pain and suffering. 34.     According to the government bill to amend the Tort Liability Act (HE   116/1998), the maximum amount of compensation for pain and suffering from, inter alia , bodily injuries had in the recent past been approximately FIM 100,000 (EUR 16,819). In the subsequent government bill to amend the Tort Liability Act (HE 167/2003, p. 60), it is stated that no changes to the prevailing level of compensation for suffering are proposed. In the recommendation of the Personal Injury Advisory Board ( Henkilövahinkoasiain neuvottelukunta, Delegationen för personskade-ärenden ) in 2008, compensation awards for distress in defamation cases can go up to EUR 10,000 and in cases concerning dissemination of information violating personal privacy up to EUR 5,000. On the other hand, the maximum award for, for example, attempted manslaughter, murder or killing varies between EUR 3,000 and EUR 5,000. E.     Supreme Court practice 35.     The Supreme Court decision ( KKO 1980-II-99 ) concerned public showing of a series of photographs of half-naked children. The act was committed before the entry into force of Chapter 27, section 3(a), of the Penal Code and no criminal sanctions were requested. 36.     In a Supreme Court decision ( KKO 1980 II 123 ) the following was noted (summary from the Yearbook): “The accused had picked up a photograph of the plaintiff from the archives of a newspaper and published it in the context of an electoral campaign without the plaintiff's consent. He was convicted of a violation of private life and ordered, jointly with the political organisations which had acted as publishers, to pay damages for mental suffering.” 37.     On 11 June 1997 the Supreme Court delivered two decisions relating to articles which had given information on cases of arson. The first decision ( KKO 1997:80 ) concerned a newspaper article (summary from the Supreme Court's Yearbook): “A newspaper published an article concerning cases of arson, in which it was said that the suspect was the wife of the head of a local fire department. As it was not even alleged that the head of the fire department had any role in the events, there was no justifiable reason for publishing the information on the marriage between him and the suspect. The publisher, the editor-in-chief and the journalist who wrote the article were ordered to pay compensation for the suffering caused by the violation of the right to respect for private life.” 38.     The second decision ( KKO 1997:81 ) concerned an article published in a periodical, which was based on the afore-mentioned newspaper article (see the previous paragraph) and on the records of the pre-trial investigation and the court proceedings, but did not indicate that the newspaper article had been used as a source (summary from the Yearbook): “Compensation was ordered to be paid for the reason that the article violated the right to respect for private life. Another issue at stake in the precedent was the relevance to liability for damages and the amount of compensation of the fact that the information had been reported in another publication at an earlier stage.” The article published in the periodical had similarly mentioned the name and profession of the head of the fire department, although the offence was not related to the performance of his duties. Thus, it had not been necessary to refer to his position as head of the fire department or to his marriage to the suspect in order to give an account of the offence. The fact that the information had previously been published in print did not relieve the defendants of their responsibility to ensure, before publishing the information again, that the article did not contain information insulting the persons mentioned in it. The mere fact that the interview with the head of the fire department had been published in the newspaper did not justify the conclusion that he had also consented to its publication in the periodical. Repeating a violation did not necessarily cause the same amount of damage and suffering as the initial violation. The readers of the newspaper and the periodical were partly different, and the circulation of the newspaper apparently did not entirely coincide with that of the periodical. Therefore, and considering the differences in the content and tone of the articles, the Supreme Court found it established that the article published in the periodical was conducive to causing the head of the fire department additional mental suffering. The events reported in the article did not concern the plaintiff's conduct in the performance of his duties as head of the fire department and it had not been necessary to mention the complainant's name and profession for the purpose of discussing a matter involving significant public interest or reporting on the offences. By associating the complainant's name and profession with the offences in question, the article had unlawfully spread information and insinuations concerning his private life likely to cause him damage and suffering. The disclosure of the complainant's name and the emphasis on his occupation had amounted to an insult. By again reporting on the matter two months after the events had occurred, the periodical was found to have caused the complainant additional suffering for which separate compensation was to be paid. 39.     The Supreme Court's decision of 26 September 2001 ( KKO   2001:96) concerned the publication in a magazine of an article which had described a pending criminal case in which the accused had been charged with, inter alia , aggravated fraud. The article had been illustrated, without the accused's permission, with another article published previously in another magazine and with a picture of the accused published in that connection. The accused's name had been given in the text of the article and she could be recognised from the picture. The Supreme Court found that the criminal case had no such social significance that would justify its publication without the accused's permission and, consequently, her private life had been invaded. 40.     The Supreme Court's decision of 25 June 2002 ( KKO 2002:55 ) concerned an incident following which A., a public figure, and B., his female friend, had been convicted. When interviewing A., B.'s name was mentioned in the television broadcast in January 1997, that is, after they had been convicted. The court found that the facts discussed in the television programme with regard to B. were part of her private life and enjoyed the protection of privacy. The fines imposed on her as punishment for the assault did not constitute a criminal-law sanction justifying publication of her name. The interviewer and the television company were ordered to pay B. damages in the amount of EUR 8,000 for disclosing her identity in the television programme. 41.     The decision of 4 July 2005 ( KKO 2005:82 ) concerned the publishing of the original article in the present case. The article had been written about a relationship between A., who worked as a press officer for a candidate in the presidential elections, and B., the ex-spouse of a TV journalist. A.'s photo was included in the article. The Supreme Court, having assessed the provision on the invasion of privacy in the Penal Code in the light of this Court's case-law, found that A. did not hold a position that meant that such details of her private life were of public importance. The article had thus invaded A.'s privacy. 42.     In a decision of 19 December 2005 ( KKO 2005:136 ), the Supreme Court noted that an offence was not a private matter for the offender. In principle, however, a person convicted of and sentenced for having committed an offence also enjoyed the right inherent in private life to live in peace. According to the Personal Data Act, any information about the commission of an offence and the resulting sentence qualified as “sensitive” personal data. The publicity per se of criminal proceedings and of related documents did not mean that information made public during the proceedings could be freely published as such by the media. The Supreme Court concluded that publishing the name of a person convicted of, inter alia , assault and deprivation of liberty did not invade his privacy as the person concerned had been convicted of offences of violence which had also degraded the victim's human dignity. Furthermore, the article in question did not include his photo. 43.     The Supreme Court's decision of 16 March 2006 (KKO 2006:20) concerned the scope of the private life of a leading public prosecutor whose name or identity had not been revealed in an article which mainly concerned his wife, who had been suspected of having committed a crime. The Supreme Court concluded that the issue had had social significance as the person under suspicion was the public prosecutor's wife. Even though the public prosecutor could have been identified from the article, this was justified by the fact that his own impartiality as a prosecutor was at stake. 44.     In the Supreme Court's decision of 22 January 2009 ( KKO   2009:3 ) A. had been convicted of incest with his children and the case file was declared secret. Later A. revealed certain details of the case in a television programme. The court found that, even though the children had remained anonymous in the programme, they could still be identified because A. had appeared in the programme undisguised and his first name had been given. The privacy of the children and their mother had thus been invaded. 45.     The latest Supreme Court decision of 16 June 2010 ( KKO 2010:39 ) concerned invasion of privacy of the Prime Minister by his ex-companion. The Supreme Court found that the ex-companion had had no right to disclose intimate details about the Prime Minister's private life and their dating in her book. F.     Self-regulation of journalists 46.     The Union of Journalists in Finland ( Suomen Journalistiliitto, Finlands Journalistförbund ry ) publishes Guidelines for Journalists ( Journalistin ohjeet, Journalistreglerna ) for the purposes of self-regulation. The 1992 Guidelines were in force at the material time and provided, inter alia , that matters falling in the sphere of private life, being detrimental to the relevant party or his or her near relative, should not be published unless the matters are of general significance (Article 24). The principles concerning the protection of an individual also apply to the use of information contained in public documents or other public sources. Information being public does not always mean that it is freely publishable (Article 29). 47.     New Guidelines came into force in 2005, which noted that when publishing public material regard must be had to the protection of private life. Highly delicate information relating to one's personal life may only be published with the consent of the person in question, or if such matters are of considerable public interest (Article 27). 48.     Also the Council for Mass Media ( Julkisen sanan neuvosto, Opinionsnämnden för massmedier), which is a self-regulating body established in 1968 by publishers and journalists in the field of mass communication and whose task it is to interpret good professional practice and defend the freedom of speech and publication, has issued a number of resolutions and statements, inter alia, in 1980 and 1981. The former concerned the content of private life and the latter disclosure of names in crime news coverage. 49.     In its statement of 1980, the Council for Mass Media stated, inter alia, that the protection of private life applies, in principle, to all citizens. The greater and more profound social implications a matter has, the more important it is to be able to publish information thereon. The Council divided persons into three groups as to the protection of identity: (1) persons exercising political, economic or administrative power; (2) other public persons, for example in the sectors of entertainment, sports, arts or science; and (3) ordinary citizens. The Council noted that the protection of identity is narrowest for group 1 and most extensive for group 3. However, this scale was not to be used formally, but the extent of protection should be interpreted on a case by case basis. A person's position had a great significance in determining the protection of private life but that alone could not be considered as a decisive factor. The significance of a matter also had an important impact. The conduct of a well-known person appearing in public in connection with his or her professional tasks or public role does not as such belong to such person's protected private life. On the contrary, information concerning lifestyle does normally belong to such person's sphere of private life even though his or her sphere of protection is narrower than that of an ordinary citizen. In some cases information concerning a person's lifestyle can be closely connected to his or her professional tasks in a way that its publication is justified. It is required, however, that the matter in question does have considerable general significance. Also, the publishing should not extend further than is necessary for the consideration of the matter. Finally, it is in accordance with good journalistic practice to see to it that the publishing does not cause undue suffering for the person in question or for his or her relatives. III.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS 50.     On 10 July 2003 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation No. Rec(2003)13 on the provision of information through the media in relation to criminal proceedings. In points 1, 2 and 8 of the principles appended to the recommendation, it considers as follows: “The public must be able to receive information about the activities of judicial authorities and police services through the media. Therefore, journalists must be able to freely report and comment on the functioning of the criminal justice system, subject only to the limitations provided for under the following principles. Respect for the principle of the presumption of innocence is an integral part of the right to a fair trial. Accordingly, opinions and information relating to on-going criminal proceedings should only be communicated or disseminated through the media where this does not prejudice the presumption of innocence of the suspect or accused. The provision of information about suspects, accused or convicted persons or other parties to criminal proceedings should respect their right to protection of privacy in accordance with Article 8 of the Convention. Particular protection should be given to parties who are minors or other vulnerable persons, as well as to victims, to witnesses and to the families of suspects, accused and convicted. In all cases, particular consideration should be given to the harmful effect which the disclosure of information enabling their identification may have on the persons referred to in this Principle.” 51.     On 4 October 2007 the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution 1577 (2007), Towards decriminalisation of defamation, in which it urged those member States which still provide for prison sentences for defamation, even if they are not actually imposed, to abolish them without delay. THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 7 AND 10 OF THE CONVENTION 52.     The applicants complained that they had been convicted of a crime in violation of Article 7 of the Convention and that their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention had been violated in respect of the articles published in February 2002. 53.     Article 7 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1.     No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 2.     This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.” 54.     Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” 55.     The Government contested these arguments. A.     Admissibility 56.     The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties' submissions (a)     The applicants 57.     The applicants noted that the first article on 2 February 2002 had been purely an account of a court trial. The article had described the judgment of the Forssa District Court in a neutral manner commonly used when reporting trials. It was undisputed that the account of the trial had been based on facts, that the events reported and comments quoted in the article had been based on the public case file, that the reporting had not compromised the prerequisites of a fair trial and that the trial had been public. There had been no reasons relating to the trial itself why reporting should have been restricted. The second article was a commentary on legal policy similar to a newspaper column. No names had been mentioned in that article. The information provided in the article had been based on public events which had come to light during the trial, and on public facts which could be found in official documents. 58.     At the time of the publication of the articles, national legislation had contained no provision criminalising the publication of public information, nor had any such provision been laid down in national legislation to this date. The internal Guidelines for Journalists had laid down clearly more stringent requirements than the legislation in force at the time. The Guidelines had, however, been prepared for the sole purpose of the industry's self-regulation and could not be used as a basis for criminal or tort liability. Such liability could only be based on law. 59.     The applicants argued, under Article 7 of the Convention, that Finnish law contained no provision which defined reporting of a public trial as a punishable offence. At the time of the publication of the articles, it had been unforeseeable and surprising to the applicants that penal sanctions could be imposed on them for having published public information that had been freely available to everybody and to which anyone could have had access on the basis of Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Constitution of Finland. The published information remained even today freely available. The interference with the applicants' freedom of expression had thus not been foreseeable or “prescribed by law”. 60.     The applicants maintained that nor had the interference been “necessary in a democratic society”. The press had the right and obligation to distribute information and thoughts about all issues of public interest and concern. A journalist was entitled to the protection safeguarded by Article   10 of the Convention at least in circumstances in which the journalist was distributing public information that was both correct and reliable. Journalistic ethics required a journalist to tell readers what was going on in society. This requirement was of particular significance with regard to the reporting of trials as trial accounts fostered the openness of court proceedings and was at the very core of the freedom of expression. Trials, and especially the already delivered court decisions, had to be reportable in the media. 61.     The applicants noted that the facts in the present case had in all respects been based on public official documents. There could be no pressing social need to prevent such reporting. Quite the contrary; the openness of court proceedings was in fact achieved through the media. Trial reporting was of great importance to society and it was the core mission of freedom of expression. The information reported in the article had previously been published in a newspaper of wide circulation and in a pre-election book published at the time by the presidential candidate. The information had already been freely available to the public, it had been public and it had remained freely accessible to anyone. The Government had not put forward any “pressing social need” to interfere with the applicants' freedom of expression. Finding the applicants guilty of an offence and ordering them to pay damages was not proportionate in relation to the acceptable aims for restricting freedom of expression. (b)     The Government 62.     The Government agreed that the conviction of the first and second applicants and the obligation of all applicants to pay damages and costs had amounted to an interference with their right to freedom of expression. 63.     As to the requirement that measures be “prescribed by law” the Government pointed out that the impugned measures had had a basis in Finnish law, namely in Articles 8, 10 and 12 of the Constitution and, in particular, in Chapter 24, section 8, of the Penal Code. Even if the Penal Code provision in question had only been in force for about one and a half years at the time of the events, already the earlier provision of the Penal Code, which had been in force for 25 years, together with the preparatory works, had described the concept of private life and had guided the interpretation of the said provision. The earlier provision had been interpreted by the Supreme Court on several occasions prior to the publication of the impugned article. The rules on criminal liability could thus be regarded as having been gradually clarified through judicial interpretation in a manner which had been consistent with the essence of the offence. There had been no greater difficulties in the application of the said provision, although the boundary between the protection of private life and the freedom of expression had been sought here more clearly than in the application of other provisions of the Penal Code. The general nature of the provision had allowed for its flexible application in