CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 24 février 2011

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page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s7CB9076 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA68D9128 { width:171.94pt; display:inline-block }       FIFTH SECTION             CASE OF BENET PRAHA, SPOL. S R.O. v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC   (Applications nos. 33908/04, 7937/05, 25249/05, 29402/05 and 33571/06)             JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   24 February 2011   FINAL   24/05/2011   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of BENet Praha, spol. s r.o. v. the Czech Republic, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Dean Spielmann, President,   Elisabet Fura,   Karel Jungwiert,   Boštjan M. Zupančič,   Ann Power,   Ganna Yudkivska,   Angelika Nußberger, judges, and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 1 February 2011, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in five applications (nos. 33908/04, 7937/05, 25249/05, 29402/05 and 33571/06) against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by BENet Praha, spol. s r.o. (“the applicant company”), on 17 September 2004, 1 March 2005, 11 July 2005, 11 August 2005 and 15 August 2006, respectively. 2.     The applicant company was represented by Mr P. Klimeš, a lawyer practising in Prague. The Czech Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr V. A. Schorm, of the Ministry of Justice. 3.     The applicant company alleged, in particular, violations of its right to property under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and to a fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. 4.     On 10 September 2007 the President of the Fifth Section decided to give notice of the applications to the Government. It was also decided to examine the merits of the applications at the same time as its admissibility (Article 29). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant, BENet Praha, spol. s r.o., is a limited liability company incorporated under Czech law with its registered seat in Prague. 6.     Between 1994 and 1997 the applicant company dealt in ferrous alloys. 7.     In April 2001 customs authorities initiated a set of administrative proceedings against the applicant company in order to check the accuracy of the customs debt (concerning customs plus VAT) the company had paid during the aforementioned period of time. 8.     Simultaneously, criminal proceedings were instituted against a person, who was a manager ( jednatel ) of the applicant company during that period of time, on suspicion of tax evasion while he was managing the applicant company. According to the Government the damage caused to the State exceeded 200,000,000 Czech korunas (CZK; 7,770,000 euros (EUR)). 9.     Within the framework of the criminal proceedings a search of the applicant company's premises was carried out on 24 April 2001. Cash in several currencies in the total amount of approximately CZK 20,000,000 (EUR 770,000) and several documents such as financial files, books of accounts and business documents were seized. According to the applicant company these documents and most of the cash have not yet been returned to it. 10.     On 25 and 27 April 2001 the prosecuting authorities seized all of the applicant company's assets deposited on its five bank accounts on the suspicion that they constituted profits from the criminal activities of the former manager. The applicant company's bank accounts contained at that time funds equivalent to CZK 98,458,516 (EUR 3,786,866). The seizure orders, which were notified to the applicant company on 8 October 2001, did not specify what assets had been seized, nor to what amount. This was remedied on 28   November 2001 by the Prague High Prosecutor ( vrchní státní zástupce ) who amended the original decisions by writing in the sums to be seized. While doing so, he froze all assets deposited on the applicant company's accounts on that day, which included payments which had come in after 25 April 2001 and 27 April 2001 respectively. The applicant company's assets amounting to CZK 101,909,105 (EUR 3,919,580) were thus seized. 11.     Simultaneously with the criminal investigation, the customs and tax administrative proceedings resulted in the delivery of numerous payment orders assessing duty payable by the applicant company. With all of its assets frozen, the applicant company requested the prosecuting authorities on a number of occasions to lift the seizure in order to discharge these duties, but only few of these requests were granted. Its appeals did not suspend the effect of those orders payable within thirty days of delivery. Consequently, the company had to take out a loan, among other measures adopted to overcome this situation, and avoid insolvency, as it was obliged to pay under these orders a sum totalling CZK 55,000,000 (EUR   2,115,385). 12.     Between 2004 and 2005, upon the applicant company's appeals, all of the payment orders and other decisions adopted by tax and customs authorities imposing the duties on the applicant company were quashed as unlawful either by superior authorities or administrative courts. The tax proceedings were discontinued and sums paid by the applicant company upon the orders reimbursed accordingly. 13.     The former manager has been prosecuted for acts committed in his capacity as the manager of the applicant company and in the context of its business activities. On 4 June 2009 the former manager was acquitted by Prague Municipal Court ( městský soud ) from some of the charges, and on 30 April 2010 Prague High Court ( vrchní soud ) upheld that judgment. The investigation concerning other charges is apparently still pending. During the investigation the prosecuting authorities, inter alia , collected over 100,000 pages of documentary evidence, interviewed several hundred witnesses, including homeless persons with unknown whereabouts whose names the accused had allegedly used in sham transactions to evade customs and other duties, and requested legal assistance from the competent authorities of sixteen countries. Application no. 33908/04 14.     In December 2001 the Frýdek-Místek Customs Office ( celní úřad ) ordered the applicant company to pay customs duties in the amount of CZK   280,672 (EUR 9,955). 15.     In May and June 2002 the Prague 4 Customs Office ordered the applicant company to pay customs duties of CZK 3,361,940 (EUR   119,242). 16.     On 6 June 2002 the High Prosecutor granted the applicant company's request for the seizure to be lifted for the sum of CZK 280,672. 17.     On 5, 17 and 21 June 2002 respectively, the applicant company requested the High Prosecutor to lift the seizure in order to enable it to pay the customs duties ordered in May and June 2002. 18.     On 11 July 2002 the High Prosecutor dismissed its requests, finding that the orders had not yet become final. According to the prosecutor, it was premature to lift the seizure under these circumstances, as such a step might have been contrary to the interests pursued by the prosecuting authorities. 19.     The applicant company appealed to the High Court, which dismissed its appeal on 27 August 2002. 20.     On 18 November 2002 the applicant company lodged a constitutional appeal ( ústavní stížnost ) maintaining that the customs authorities, together with the prosecuting authorities, had misused the law to its detriment and consequently had violated Article 4 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms ( Listina základních práv a svobod ) (hereinafter “the Charter”). 21.     In December 2002 the Constitutional Court ( Ústavní soud ) invited the respondent parties to the proceedings, the High Court and the High Prosecutor, to submit written observations on the applicant's constitutional appeal pursuant to section 42(4) of the Constitutional Court Act. 22.     The High Prosecutor did not submit any observations. The High Court submitted written observations, referring to the reasoning of its impugned decision. It expressed the view that the applicant's constitutional appeal should be dismissed. This submission was not communicated to the applicant company. 23.     The Constitutional Court also requested the Prague High State Prosecutor's Office to send it the criminal file in the context of which the seizure had been carried out. The Constitutional Court made copies of the relevant documents, which were included in the case file of the Constitutional Court. Subsequently the criminal file was returned to the Prosecutor's Office on 29 May 2003. 24.     On 22 May 2003 the applicant company's acting manager consulted the case file at the Constitutional Court. The next day he sent a letter to the court with the following text: “On 22 May 2003, when consulting the case file, I found that it should also include nine files [covering the criminal proceedings] submitted by the Prague High Prosecutor ... [A]bout nine files annexed to the reply of the Prague High Prosecutor submitted upon the Constitutional Court's invitation of 5 December 2002 were dispatched on 8 January 2003 ... and delivered to the Constitutional Court on 9   January 2003. At the time of my study of the case file these nine files had been sent somewhere for consultation. ... I kindly ask you to set another date on which consultation of the case file including the aforesaid documentary evidence, will be possible.” 25.     In a letter of 29 May 2003 from the Constitutional Court judge, the applicant company's acting manager was told to make a direct approach to the High Prosecutor's Office to which the file in question had been returned. The same letter also informed the representative of the applicant company that he was free to inspect the Constitutional Court's file after arranging a   visit to do this with the court's registry. 26.     In a letter of 5 June 2003 the applicant company's acting manager asked the Constitutional Court judge to remedy the situation and ensure the applicant company had access to those criminal files. The latter replied, on 1   July 2003, that pursuant to section 30(1) of the Constitutional Court Act, a party to the proceedings must be legally represented. He further stated that the criminal case file was not a Constitutional Court file, but subject to the Code of Criminal Procedure, in particular Article 65, which governs access to criminal files. On 11 March 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant company's constitutional appeal (II. ÚS 708/02). It held in particular: “As it appears from the decision refusing to lift the seizure of the assets, in the High Prosecutor's view, to lift it could jeopardise the purpose of the criminal proceedings. ... [The High Court] shared his opinion ... In its written observations, it found that there was no ground justifying the conclusion that the seizure of the [applicant company's] assets ... was no longer necessary. In the present case, the Constitutional Court did not consider the conduct of the State authorities a misuse of law to the applicant company's detriment, contrary to the basic requirements of fairness and of Article 4 of the Charter. The mere fact that the applicant company was not successful in its request cannot be in itself considered as violating its right to a fair trial.” 27.     On 18 March 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed as manifestly ill-founded another applicant company's constitutional appeal regarding a decision of the High Court to reject another applicant company's request to partially lift the seizure. Application no. 7937/05 28.     In May and June 2002 the Prague II Customs Office ordered the applicant company to pay customs duties in the amount of CZK 16,527,646 (EUR 584,724). 29.     On 20 August 2002 the High Prosecutor dismissed the applicant company's request of 23 July 2002 for the seizure to be partially lifted in order to enable it to pay this amount. 30.     At the applicant company's request the Customs Office postponed the time-limit for payment of the company's customs duties until 28   February 2003. 31.     On 20 September 2002 the applicant company again requested the High Prosecutor to lift the seizure in order to enable the company to pay the customs duties ordered in May and June 2002. Its request was, however, refused by the prosecutor on 23 October 2002. This decision was approved by the High Court on 11 December 2002. 32.     On 10 December 2002 and 10 February 2003, the High Prosecutor partly lifted the seizure covering the sum of CZK 16,527,645. The applicant company then discharged its customs debt. However, as it had not done so in time, the Customs Office ordered it to pay a penalty of CZK 232,423 (EUR 8,223). 33.     On 10 October 2002 the High Court dismissed the applicant company's appeal against the High Prosecutor's decision of 20 August 2002. 34.     On 16 December 2002 the applicant company lodged a constitutional appeal against the High Court's dismissal. 35.     At the invitation of the Constitutional Court the High Court submitted written observations, referring to the reasoning of its impugned decision. It expressed the view that the applicant's constitutional appeal should be dismissed. This submission was not communicated to the applicant company. 36.     The appeal was dismissed as manifestly ill-founded by the Constitutional Court on 24 August 2004 (I. ÚS 723/02). Application no. 25249/05 37.     On 4 November 2002 the Mladá Boleslav Customs Office ordered the applicant company to pay customs duties in the amount of CZK   14,371,989 (EUR 508,460). 38.     On 12 and 29 November 2002 and 3 January 2003 respectively the Kladno Customs Office ordered the applicant company to pay customs duties amounting to CZK 1,219,922 (EUR 43,159). 39.     On 12 November 2002 and 29 January 2003 the applicant company requested the High Prosecutor to lift the seizure in order to enable the company to pay its customs duties. 40.     On 25 March 2003 the High Prosecutor decided not to grant the company's requests. 41.     On 2 July 2003 the High Court dismissed an appeal by the applicant company of 2 April 2003 challenging the High Prosecutor's refusal to lift the seizure. 42.     On 13 October 2003 the applicant company lodged a constitutional appeal alleging a violation of Article 4 of the Charter. 43.     Upon the invitation of the Constitutional Court the High Court and the High Prosecutor submitted written observations. They expressed the view that the applicant's constitutional appeal should be dismissed. These submissions were not communicated to the applicant company. 44.     On 15 December 2004 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant company's constitutional appeal as manifestly ill-founded (I.   ÚS   538/03). Application no. 29402/05 45.     On 2 June 2003 the High Prosecutor decided not to grant the applicant company's request of 19 May 2003 to lift the seizure. 46.     On 20 August 2003 the High Court, upon the applicant company's appeal of 9 June 2003, upheld the prosecutor's refusal. 47.     On 11 November 2003 the applicant company introduced a constitutional appeal challenging the aforesaid decisions and alleging, inter alia , that its property rights continued to be limited contrary to the national law. 48.     At the invitation of the Constitutional Court, the High Court submitted written observations, referring to the reasoning of its impugned decision. It expressed the view that the applicant's constitutional appeal should be dismissed. This submission was not communicated to the applicant company. 49.     Its appeal was dismissed as unsubstantiated by the Constitutional Court on 9   February 2005 (IV. ÚS 585/03). Application no. 33571/06 50.     On 25 May 2004 the applicant company requested the High Prosecutor to lift the seizure of its assets, maintaining in particular that it had discharged all its customs duties. 51.     On 16 December 2004 the prosecutor dismissed the request, holding that there was a reasonable suspicion that the assets represented profit from the criminal activities of the accused manager. 52.     On 23 December 2004 the applicant company appealed to the High Court. 53.     On 21 February 2005 the High Court accepted in principle that prolonged seizure of assets could constitute a disproportionate interference with property rights, but did not find such a disproportionality in the applicant company's case and thus rejected its appeal. 54.     On 26 July 2005 the applicant company appealed to the Constitutional Court, complaining of excessive length of the seizure of its assets. 55.     Upon the invitation of the Constitutional Court, the High Court and the High Prosecutor submitted its written observations. The High Court proposed that the applicant's constitutional appeal be dismissed. The High Prosecutor informed in detail on several aspects of the criminal proceedings. He also addressed the issue of the length of the seizure by stressing the extent and complexity of the investigation and the need for foreign cooperation. He also proposed to dismiss the appeal. These submissions were communicated to the applicant company in September 2005. The applicant company reacted by sending a letter it had received from the Ministry of Finance which contained an assurance that all money held by the customs authorities would be returned to the applicant company. The letter also contained an apology from the Ministry for problems arising in the complex case of the applicant company. 56.     On 13 January 2006 the Constitutional Court again requested the High Prosecutor to inform it about the stage the investigation had reached and when it was expected to be finished. On 20 January 2006 the High Prosecutor submitted to the court a one-paragraph reply saying that almost all the sixteen States from whom assistance had been requested had responded and it was expected that they would send the required materials before April 2006. He further informed the court that he expected to conclude the investigation by mid-2006 and that it was highly likely that all the accused persons would be tried before a court. These submissions were not communicated to the applicant company. 57.     On 9 February 2006 the Constitutional Court rejected the appeal as manifestly ill-founded (III. ÚS 394/05). It held that the seizure of the assets was still proportionate in view of the complexity of the investigation and in this context it considered important the assurance of the High Prosecutor that the investigation should be finished that year. Subsequent developments 58.     On 30 January 2008 the Constitutional Court found a violation of the right to property of a company, Benet Czech, spol. s r.o., which was in the same position as the applicant company. It held that the length of the seizure, over six years, was unreasonable, which thus disrupted the fair balance between the general interest of fighting serious crime and the protection of the rights of the applicant company. Consequently, the applicant company lodged another request for the seizure of its bank accounts to be lifted referring to this decision of the Constitutional Court. 59.     On 6 March 2008 the High Prosecutor lifted the seizure of the applicant company's bank accounts, holding that the conclusions of the Constitutional Court also applied to the applicant company. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW Constitutional Court Act (no. 182/1993) 60.     Section 30(1) provides that the applicant must be represented in the proceedings before the Constitutional Court by an attorney. 61.     Section 32 provides that parties and joined parties are entitled to comment on a constitutional appeal, to make submissions to the Constitutional Court, to consult a case file (with the exception of records of voting), to make excerpts therefrom and copies thereof, to adduce any evidence, to take part in any oral hearing in the matter, and to assist at any taking of evidence. 62.     Under section 48, the Constitutional Court must take all evidence necessary to establish the facts of the case. It decides what evidence submitted by parties should be accepted and may take evidence which has not been adduced by the parties. It may assign a judge to take evidence obtained otherwise than at an oral hearing, or request another court to take such evidence. At its request, courts, public administrative authorities and other State institutions must assist it in its decision-making by procuring documentary evidence. A   record must be drawn up of all evidence taken outside an oral hearing, this record being signed by a judge, a clerk and other persons participating in that evidence session. The outcome of the taking of evidence must always be communicated at an oral hearing. 63.     Section 49(1) provides that any means which may be instrumental to establish facts of a case may be used in evidence, in particular the testimony of witnesses, expert opinions, reports and statements of State authorities and legal persons, documents, outcomes of inquiries and the testimony of parties. Code of Criminal Procedure (Act no. 141/1961 as in force at the material time) 64.     Pursuant to Article 9, prosecuting authorities shall assess preliminary issues arising in course of proceedings; should a final and binding decision on such an issue have already been adopted by a court or another state authority, prosecuting authorities shall be bound by it unless it concerns an issue of the guilt of the accused. 65.     Article 42 provides for the rights of a concerned person. It states that anyone whose property has been seized or is liable to be seized following an application for seizure must be provided with an opportunity to comment on the given case, may attend a hearing, raise its own requests, consult the case file within the meaning of Article 65, and lodge appeals as provided for by this law. 66.     Article 65 concerns access to files. The first paragraph provides, inter alia, that the accused, injured and intervening parties, their counsel and guardians shall have the right of access to files except for records and those sections of records containing personal data of anonymous witnesses, to make excerpts and notes therefrom, and to have duplicates of the files and the parts thereof made at their own expense. Other persons may do so with the authorisation of a president of a chamber and a prosecutor, or with police authority at the pre-trial stage of proceedings if it is necessary for the exercise of their rights. 67.     Article 79a § 1 provides for a seizure of financial instruments deposited on a bank account. If the given facts indicate that the financial instruments on a bank account are intended for the commission of a crime, or have already been used for such a purpose, or constitute profits from criminal activities, a president of a chamber and a prosecutor, or the police authority at the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings, are empowered to seize them. 68.     Pursuant to Article 79a § 3, the State authority listed in paragraph 1 lifts or reduces the seizure if such a measure is no longer necessary, or it is not necessary to maintain it at the given amount. A decision within the meaning of the previous sentence by police is subject to prior approval by a   prosecutor. 69.     Under Article 79a § 4 the owner of a bank account whose assets are seized, has the right to request that the seizure be lifted or reduced. A   prosecutor has to decide on such a request without delay. 70.     Article 79a § 5 provides that decisions adopted pursuant to paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 may be appealed by a complaint. 71.     According to Article 145 § 2 a complainant may rely on new facts and evidence. 72.     Pursuant to Article 149 § 4, if a decision is erroneous due to the fact that a part of its operative section is missing, an appellate authority is empowered either to amend the impugned decision, remit the case to the authority of first instance whose decision is challenged, for it to decide on the missing part of the decision or to amend it. Code of Administrative Proceedings on Taxes and Other Fees (No.   337/1992) 73.     Article 48 § 12 provides that an appeal shall not suspend the entry into force of a decision adopted in administrative proceedings on tax and other fees unless a special law provides otherwise. THE LAW I.     JOINDER OF APPLICATIONS 74.     The Court notes that the subject matter of the applications nos.   33908/04, 7937/05, 25249/05, 29402/05 and 33571/06 is identical and they were submitted by the same applicant company. It is therefore appropriate to join the cases, in application of Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION 75.     The applicant company complained that the seizure of its bank accounts, its business documents and cash had infringed its property rights, in breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which states: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” 76.     The Government contested that argument. A.     Admissibility 1.     Exhaustion of domestic remedies (a)     Seizure of the business documents and cash 77.     The Court notes that the domestic proceedings which are part of the present applications and which also gave rise to the impugned decisions of the Constitutional Court concerned solely the seizure of the applicant company's bank accounts. Regarding the seizure of the business documents and cash the applicant company did not pursue all the remedies that were available to it, in particular it did not bring this complaint before the Constitutional Court. It follows that this part of the applications is inadmissible for non-exhaustion of all domestic remedies within the meaning of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention and must be declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. (b)     Seizure of the bank accounts 78.     The Government submitted that the complaint was premature since at the time of lodging it there was a constitutional appeal of the applicant company regarding the seizure pending before the Constitutional Court. 79.     The applicant company disputed this argument. 80.     The Court reiterates that the only remedies which an applicant is required to exhaust are those that relate to the breaches alleged and which are at the same time available and sufficient. The existence of such remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. Moreover, an applicant who has availed himself of a remedy that is apparently effective and sufficient cannot be required also to have tried others that were available but probably no more likely to be successful (see T.W. v. Malta [GC], no. 25644/94, § 34, 29 April 1999). 81 .     The Court notes that as regards the seizure and its length up to 9   February 2006, the date of the last impugned decision of the Constitutional Court in the present applications, the applicant company pursued the natural remedies in respect of a seizure, namely, it asked for the seizure to be lifted, and pursued the subsequent refusals through the courts, in accordance with the rules of domestic law, up to the Constitutional Court. To that extent, the applicant company has exhausted domestic remedies (see Benet Czech, spol. s r.o. v. the Czech Republic , no. 31555/05, § 25, 21   October 2010). As regards the continuing seizure beyond that date, the Court notes that the applicant company again requested the prosecutor to lift the seizure, and again pursued refusals through the courts. The applicant company's complaints in respect of that period have been registered under application no. 38354/06, and do not fall to be considered in the present applications. 82.     The Court therefore rejects the Government's contention that the applicant company has not exhausted domestic remedies. 2.     The six-month rule 83.     The Government submitted that applications nos. 33908/04 and   7937/05 were submitted out of time. The applicant company disputed this argument. 84.     Regarding the application no. 33908/04 the Court observes that this application contains complaints against two Constitutional Court decisions, handed down on 11 March and 18 March 2004 respectively. The former was delivered to the applicant company's lawyer on 19 March 2004, the latter on 24 March 2004. The application form containing complaints regarding the former decision was submitted to the Court by fax on 17   September 2004 and sent by regular mail on 20 September 2004. The application form containing complaints regarding the latter decision was submitted by fax on 23 September 2004 and subsequently sent by regular mail, which the Court received on 27 September 2004. 85.     The Court reiterates that the running of the six-month time-limit imposed by Article 35 § 1 of the Convention is, as a general rule, interrupted by the first letter from the applicants indicating an intention to lodge an application and giving some indication of the nature of the complaints made. The first letter can be sent by means of a fax provided that the original is then submitted by post (for example, Manitaras and Others v.   Turkey (dec.), no. 54591/00, § 35, 3 June 2008). The date of the submissions by fax must thus must be considered the date of introduction. Consequently, the applicant company complied with the six-month time-limit. 86.     Regarding application no. 7937/05 the Court observes that the Constitutional Court decision of 24 August 2004 was delivered to the applicant company's lawyer on 2 September 2004. The application was submitted by fax on 1 March 2005. Subsequently, the Court received the original application form sent by regular post on 2 March 2005. The Court thus concludes that this application was also submitted within the six-month time-limit. 87.     The Court notes that the complaints relating to the seizure of the bank accounts under Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 in all five applications are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3(a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 88.     The applicant company claimed in the present applications that the seizure of its assets deposited in its bank accounts had lasted an unreasonably long time, that there had been unreasonable delays in the investigation by the authorities and that the authorities had not presented any evidence justifying the seizure. 89.     The Government accepted that there had been an interference with the applicant company's property rights but maintained that it was necessary for an efficient fight against organised crime and was proportionate to that aim. The Government referred particularly to the opportunity the applicant company had at any time to make requests to the authorities and courts for the seizure to be terminated, and maintained that the length of the seizure had been necessitated by the complexity and extensiveness of the investigation. 90.     The Court reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which guarantees in substance the right to property, comprises three distinct rules. The first, which is expressed in the first sentence of the first paragraph and is of a general nature, lays down the principle of peaceful enjoyment of property. The second rule, in the second sentence of the same paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and makes it subject to certain conditions. The third, contained in the second paragraph, recognises that the Contracting States are entitled, among other things, to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. The second and third rules, which are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, must be construed in the light of the general principle laid down in the first rule (see Immobiliare Saffi v. Italy [GC], no. 22774/93, § 44, ECHR 1999 ‑ V). 91.     The applicant company did not specify which rule should be used. The Government maintained that the seizure was justified under the third rule. 92.     The Court notes that the seizure had the effect that the applicant company could not dispose of the relevant parts of its bank accounts. Consequently, the Court agrees with the Government that the seizure constituted control of the use of property and that paragraph 2 of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable (see Atanasov and Ovcharov v. Bulgaria , no.   61596/00, § 74, 17 January 2008). 93.     The Court reiterates that any control of the use of property by a public authority should be lawful (see Iatridis v. Greece [GC], no.   31107/96, § 58, ECHR 1999 ‑ II). 94.     The applicant company disputed the legality of the seizure, arguing that Czech law allowed the prosecuting authorities to seize only specified amounts of funds and thus the seizure orders of 25 April 2001 and 27 April 2001 were unlawful. The Government contested that argument, arguing that the original deficiency of the seizure orders had been remedied by the High Prosecutor on 28 November 2001, who was allowed to do so under Article   149 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The applicant company replied that the High Prosecutor could have used this method to seize only the funds on the accounts on 25 and 27 April 2001 respectively, and regarding the funds which had come in later, the prosecutor had been obliged to issue a new decision. 95.     Firstly, the Court notes that it is not called upon to examine the legality of the seizure before 28 November 2001, because the current applications arise from events which happened after this date. 96.     The Court observes that by virtue of Article 149 § 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the High Prosecutor was clearly entitled to remedy any deficiency of the original seizure order. The seizure of the bank accounts as they stood on 25 and 27 April 2001 was thus clearly in accordance with the law from 28 November 2001 at the latest. The question remains if the prosecutor, making its decision on 28 November 2001, was also entitled under Czech law to seize the additional funds that came in between 25 April and 28 November 2001. 97.     In this context, the Court reiterates that it has limited power to review compliance with domestic law, and it examines only whether it was applied manifestly erroneously or so as to reach arbitrary conclusions (see Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96, § 108, ECHR 2000 ‑ I). 98.     The Court firstly observes that under Article 79a of the Code of Criminal Procedure a prosecutor was empowered to seize assets at the pre-trial stage of criminal proceedings. Further, an appellate authority, in this case a superior prosecutor, decides on an appeal on the basis of the facts at the time of its decision, which means including new developments since the time of the challenged decision, and it has a full power of review. Under these circumstances the Court considers that the fact that the prosecutor did not issue a separate decision regarding the funds that came in between 25   April and 28 November 2001 but chose to amend the original seizure order by writing in the sums as they were on the date of its decision does not make that decision an arbitrary or manifestly erroneous application of domestic law. The Court is thus unable to conclude that the seizure of the applicant company's assets after 28 November 2001, that is the date when the Prague High Prosecutor amended the original seizure decisions, was contrary to the law. 99.     It further observes that any interference with property rights must pursue a legitimate aim in the general interest (see Immobiliare Saffi, cited above, § 48). The impugned measure was taken in the context of a criminal investigation, on the suspicion that the assets constituted profits from the criminal activities of the accused manager. The purpose of fighting crime undoubtedly falls within the general interest as envisaged in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Denisova and Moiseyeva v. Russia , no. 16903/03, § 58, 1 April 2010). 100.     Lastly, the Court reiterates that an interference must strike a “fair balance” between the demands of the general interest and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights. The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in the structure of Article 1 as a whole, and therefore also in its second paragraph. There must be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued. In determining whether this requirement is met, the Court recognises that the State enjoys a wide margin of appreciation with regard both to choosing the means of enforcement and to ascertaining whether the consequences of enforcement are justified in the general interest for the purpose of achieving the object of the law in question (see, for example, Immobiliare Saffi, cited above; Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden (no. 1) , 25   October 1989, § 55, Series A no. 163; and AGOSI v. the United Kingdom , 24 October 1986, § 52, Series A no. 108). 101.     In cases where there is a wide margin of appreciation the Court will respect the State authorities' judgment as to what is in the general interest, unless that judgment is manifestly without reasonable foundation (see Immobiliare Saffi, cited above, § 49, and Antonopoulou and Others v.   Greece , no. 49000/06, § 57, 16 April 2009), or unless it is devoid of reasonable foundation (see “Bulves” AD v. Bulgaria , no. 3991/03, § 63, 22   January 2009, and National & Provincial Building Society, Leeds   Permanent Building Society and Yorkshire Building Society v.   the   United Kingdom , 23 October 1997, § 80, Reports 1997 ‑ VII). 102.     The applicant company maintained that the seizure of its bank accounts was disproportionate because of its unreasonable duration. 103.     The Government maintained that the interference was necessary as there was a reasonable suspicion that the assets originated in criminal activities of the former manager of the applicant company and that it was proportionate even considering its length due to the importance of the general interest at stake and the very complex and extensive nature of the crime that had to be investigated. The Government further argued that a violation should be found only where the procedure was manifestly arbitrary or the duration of the seizure manifestly unreasonable. 104.     The Court notes that the interference had an origin in a measure taken by the prosecuting authorities in the context of investigating a serious crime in the area of customs duty and tax evasion involving millions of euros. The crux of the interference concerns the continuing assessment of a reasonable suspicion that the seized funds originated in criminal activities. The national authorities are clearly in a better position than the Court to evaluate these issues, because they have direct access to the available evidence, which in the present case included thousands of pages of documentary evidence, hundreds of witnesses and transactions of several companies including foreign and offshore companies. Faced with such a complex investigation it is up to the national authorities in the first place to decide whether, and if so what, further investigatory measures are necessary in order to effectively fight this type of serious and carefully premeditated crime. 105.     Thus, the Court considers that the above-mentioned principles in its case-law are fully applicable to the present case.   The State should in the present circumstances enjoy a wide margin of appreciation and the Court must respect its judgment as to what is necessary in the general interest unless that judgment is manifestly unreasonable. Consequently, it is not the Court's task to conduct anew a full analysis of whether the interference was proportionate, considering that the national authorities, especially the Constitutional Court itself, performed an analysis of proportionality. The nature and scope of the Court's supervision, mindful of its subsidiary role, is thus to assess whether the interference with the applicant company's property rights was manifestly unreasonable (see Benet Czech, spol. s r.o. v.   the Czech Republic , no. 31555/05, § 40, 21 October 2010). 106.     The Court notes in this regard that the accused was at the material time an acting manager of the applicant company and that the suspected crime happened in the context of its business activities. It was not thus prima facie unreasonable for the prosecutor to assume that the bank accounts of the applicant company would have contained funds from these activities, even in 2001. The Government argued that the investigation so far had led to a conclusion that the accused used the applicant company's bank accounts to save the funds generated by his criminal activities. In view of the submissions of the parties, the Court has no reason to hold that the prosecuting authorities' suspicion about the origin of the seized funds was manifestly unreasonable. 107.     The applicant company argued that once the customs authorities had ascertained that the applicant company had no customs or tax debt there had been no reason to continue the seizure. The Court, however, notes that the decisions on the seizure made clear that the funds had been seized on the suspicion that they came from the criminal activities of the former manager and other persons and not to secure payment of any custom or tax debt by the applicant company. Consequently, the seizure was made in the context of criminal proceedings and it was only in these proceedings that the continuing justification of the seizure should have been maintained. Any decision of administrative authorities concerning a debt of the applicant company was thus not directly relevant to the issue whether the funds originated in criminal activities of the applicant company's former manager, and in any case those decisions were not binding on the prosecuting authorities. The Court thus considers that the decisions of the administrative authorities could not have made the seizure ipso facto unjustified. 108.     However, a reasonable suspicion at the beginning of the investigation cannot justify an indefinite interference with the applicant company's rights. The Court agrees with the applicant company that the ensuing investigation must be sufficiently diligent and speedy, so that the interference lasts only a limited time. Thus it is the Court's task to evaluate whether in view of the conduc