CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 7 juillet 2011

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sA1D3DA2E { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sEC177689 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s967D43C6 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s87F05BA2 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s2ED81498 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sE0BAE19D { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:19.85pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-19.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid } .sE4306E80 { width:240.5pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s8698C878 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:19.85pt } .s8F05AF4C { width:234.7pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s61E420C2 { font-family:Arial; font-variant:small-caps } .s17F22A1 { width:8.71pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s5AB7FC91 { width:253.99pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s68740596 { width:6.7pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s5887C9C5 { width:195.97pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s3CA22BA { font-family:Arial; text-transform:uppercase } .sF6CEB6DA { width:276.65pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sAE3E7DCA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:19.85pt } .s7121C439 { width:212.66pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sE9B40630 { width:19.85pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s589F1A46 { width:25.5pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sAC9CE5D8 { width:39.7pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s61F2E564 { width:237.31pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s38664F19 { width:235.33pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sC443675D { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:30pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sD2857263 { margin-top:30pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s401C450A { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s684F2214 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:24pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s25BD2B45 { margin-top:24pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s1913A4C6 { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sC702907E { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sDACEC0AE { width:8pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sEC2CB098 { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA1CDB767 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s281358E1 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s8992FECB { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:right; font-size:10pt } .s7C7CF5 { width:6.95pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s63B06C77 { width:35.3pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s58E9A6F { width:14.05pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sD5DC9C10 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:right; font-size:10pt } .sF8C26FAF { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt } .s8590F619 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt } .sFD4D42B6 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s984A15CA { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s6477A72F { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s988F61DE { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s21F08A35 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s8F4EE4B8 { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s7EE1C8F0 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sB3E56D84 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s507703F { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s201858E1 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt } .s4B8D41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt } .sB853CD25 { font-family:Arial; font-size:9pt } .s91F6AE57 { font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt; font-weight:bold } .s8A9F351B { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:24pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .sC31874BD { margin-top:24pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:24pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .sD5DF731 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s804EF768 { margin-top:24pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sE7C30868 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s377EF8D6 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s8A4D3452 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:35.3pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .sAC00EC67 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:35.45pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s41377128 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:35.3pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .sB1BD30C0 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:24pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s57221CB1 { margin-top:24pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:30pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s3C0142D3 { margin-top:30pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sD107E55B { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt } .s71BC72F4 { margin-top:18pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; font-size:10pt } .s8FA53EDF { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:42pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .sD777C0A5 { margin-top:42pt; margin-bottom:30pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s11869A80 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s33C53B69 { margin-top:24pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s677DA8A { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s8C50CFA1 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:59.5pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sCA71A5BA { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:59.5pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s6EF3B654 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sF0D62E79 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:68.65pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-16.75pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s9F223FEE { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s8E011338 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s56E27C8 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:24pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sC1F0960A { margin-top:24pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-after:avoid } .sAB173E38 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .s127C7598 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .sD66C1369 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17.3pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s81CCF55C { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .s3B3A5DE9 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s31E56244 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s1FE9FFEF { width:181.22pt; display:inline-block } .s6AF6223A { width:196.9pt; display:inline-block } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s76CF415B { page-break-before:always; clear:both } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s85226119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 }     GRAND CHAMBER             CASE OF AL-SKEINI AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM   (Application no. 55721/07)                     JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   7 July 2011       In the case of Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom , The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   Jean-Paul Costa, President ,   Christos Rozakis,   Nicolas Bratza,   Françoise Tulkens,   Josep Casadevall,   Dean Spielmann,   Giovanni Bonello,   Elisabeth Steiner,   Lech Garlicki,   Ljiljana Mijović,   Davíd Thór Björgvinsson,   Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,   George Nicolaou,   Luis López Guerra,   Ledi Bianku,   Ann Power,   Mihai Poalelungi, judges , and Michael O’Boyle, Deputy Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 9 and 16 June 2010 and 15 June 2011, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 55721/07) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by six Iraqi nationals, Mr Mazin Jum’aa Gatteh Al-Skeini, Ms Fattema Zabun Dahesh, Mr Hameed Abdul Rida Awaid Kareem, Mr Fadil Fayay Muzban, Mr   Jabbar Kareem Ali and Colonel Daoud Mousa (“the applicants”), on 11   December 2007. 2.     The applicants, who had been granted legal aid, were represented by Public Interest Lawyers, solicitors based in Birmingham. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr D. Walton, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 3.     The applicants alleged that their relatives fell within United Kingdom jurisdiction when killed and that there had been no effective investigation into their deaths, in breach of Article 2 of the Convention. 4.     The application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule   52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 16 December 2008 the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It also decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility (Article 29 § 1 of the Convention). The parties took turns to file observations on the admissibility and merits of the case. On 19 January 2010 the Chamber decided to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72). 5.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2 and 3 of the Convention and Rule 24. Judge Peer Lorenzen, President of the Fifth Section, withdrew and was replaced by Judge Luis López Guerra, substitute judge. 6.     The applicants and the Government each filed a further memorial on the admissibility and merits, and joint third-party comments were received from the Bar Human Rights Committee, the European Human Rights Advocacy Centre, Human Rights Watch, Interights, the International Federation for Human Rights, the Law Society, and Liberty (“the third-party interveners”). 7.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 9 June 2010 (Rule 59 § 3). There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government   Mr   D. Walton , Agent , Mr   J. Eadie QC,   Ms   C. Ivimy , Mr   S. Wordsworth ,   Counsel , Ms   L. Dann ,   Ms   H. Akiwumi ,   Advisers ;       (b)     for the applicants Mr   R. Singh QC, Mr   R. Husain QC, Ms   S. Fatima , Ms   N. Patel , Mr   T. Tridimas , Ms   H. Law ,   Counsel , Mr   P. Shiner , Mr   D. Carey , Ms   T. Gregory , Mr   J. Duffy ,   Advisers .   The Court heard addresses by Mr Eadie and Mr Singh. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 8.     The facts of the case may be summarised as follows. A.     The occupation of Iraq from 1 May 2003 to 28 June 2004 1.     Background: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 9.     On 8 November 2002 the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted Resolution   1441. The Resolution decided, inter alia , that Iraq had been and remained in material breach of its obligations under previous United Nations Security Council resolutions to disarm and to cooperate with United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency weapons inspectors. Resolution 1441 decided to afford Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations and set up an enhanced inspection regime. It requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations immediately to notify Iraq of the Resolution and demanded that Iraq cooperate immediately, unconditionally, and actively with the inspectors. Resolution 1441 concluded by recalling that the Security Council had “repeatedly warned Iraq that it w[ould] face serious consequences as a result of its continued violations of its obligations”. The Security Council decided to remain seised of the matter. 2.     Major combat operations: 20 March to 1 May 2003   10.     On 20 March 2003 a Coalition of armed forces under unified command, led by the United States of America with a large force from the United Kingdom and small contingents from Australia, Denmark and Poland, commenced the invasion of Iraq. By 5 April 2003 the British had captured Basra and by 9 April 2003 United States troops had gained control of Baghdad. Major combat operations in Iraq were declared complete on 1   May 2003. Thereafter, other States sent personnel to help with the reconstruction effort. 3.     Legal and political developments in May 2003 11.     On 8 May 2003 the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States of America at the United Nations addressed a joint letter to the President of the United Nations Security Council, which read as follows: “The United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Coalition partners continue to act together to ensure the complete disarmament of Iraq of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolutions. The States participating in the Coalition will strictly abide by their obligations under international law, including those relating to the essential humanitarian needs of the people of Iraq. We will act to ensure that Iraq’s oil is protected and used for the benefit of the Iraqi people. In order to meet these objectives and obligations in the post-conflict period in Iraq, the United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners, acting under existing command and control arrangements through the Commander of Coalition Forces, have created the Coalition Provisional Authority, which includes the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance, to exercise powers of government temporarily, and, as necessary, especially to provide security, to allow the delivery of humanitarian aid, and to eliminate weapons of mass destruction. The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners, working through the Coalition Provisional Authority, shall, inter alia , provide for security in and for the provisional administration of Iraq, including by: deterring hostilities; maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq and securing Iraq’s borders; securing, and removing, disabling, rendering harmless, eliminating or destroying (a) all of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and all other chemical, biological and nuclear delivery systems; and (b) all elements of Iraq’s programme to research, develop, design, manufacture, produce, support, assemble and employ such weapons and delivery systems and subsystems and components thereof, including but not limited to stocks of chemical and biological agents, nuclear-weapon-usable material, and other related materials, technology, equipment, facilities and intellectual property that have been used in or can materially contribute to these programmes; in consultation with relevant international organisations, facilitating the orderly and voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons; maintaining civil law and order, including through encouraging international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civilian police force; eliminating all terrorist infrastructure and resources within Iraq and working to ensure that terrorists and terrorist groups are denied safe haven; supporting and coordinating de-mining and related activities; promoting accountability for crimes and atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi regime; and assuming immediate control of Iraqi institutions responsible for military and security matters and providing, as appropriate, for the demilitarisation, demobilisation, control, command, reformation, disestablishment, or reorganisation of those institutions so that they no longer pose a threat to the Iraqi people or international peace and security but will be capable of defending Iraq’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners recognise the urgent need to create an environment in which the Iraqi people may freely determine their own political future. To this end, the United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners are facilitating the efforts of the Iraqi people to take the first steps towards forming a representative government, based on the rule of law, that affords fundamental freedoms and equal protection and justice under law to the people of Iraq without regard to ethnicity, religion or gender. The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners are facilitating the establishment of representative institutions of government, and providing for the responsible administration of the Iraqi financial sector, for humanitarian relief, for economic reconstruction, for the transparent operation and repair of Iraq’s infrastructure and natural resources, and for the progressive transfer of administrative responsibilities to such representative institutions of government, as appropriate. Our goal is to transfer responsibility for administration to representative Iraqi authorities as early as possible. The United Nations has a vital role to play in providing humanitarian relief, in supporting the reconstruction of Iraq, and in helping in the formation of an Iraqi interim authority. The United States, the United Kingdom and Coalition partners are ready to work closely with representatives of the United Nations and its specialised agencies and look forward to the appointment of a special coordinator by the Secretary-General. We also welcome the support and contributions of member States, international and regional organisations, and other entities, under appropriate coordination arrangements with the Coalition Provisional Authority. We would be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.             (Signed) Jeremy Greenstock       Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom             (Signed) John D. Negroponte           Permanent Representative of the United States” 12.     As mentioned in the above letter, the occupying States, acting through the Commander of Coalition Forces, created the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to act as a “caretaker administration” until an Iraqi government could be established. It had power, inter alia , to issue legislation. On 13 May 2003 the US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, issued a memorandum formally appointing Ambassador Paul Bremer as Administrator of the CPA with responsibility for the temporary governance of Iraq. In CPA Regulation No. 1, dated 16 May 2003, Ambassador Bremer provided as follows: “Pursuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war, I hereby promulgate the following: Section 1 The Coalition Provisional Authority (1)     The CPA shall exercise powers of government temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq during the period of transitional administration, to restore conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future, including by advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance and facilitating economic recovery and sustainable reconstruction and development. (2)     The CPA is vested with all executive, legislative and judicial authority necessary to achieve its objectives, to be exercised under relevant UN Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of war. This authority shall be exercised by the CPA Administrator. (3)     As the Commander of Coalition Forces, the Commander of US Central Command shall directly support the CPA by deterring hostilities; maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity and security; searching for, securing and destroying weapons of mass destruction; and assisting in carrying out Coalition policy generally. Section 2 The Applicable Law Unless suspended or replaced by the CPA or superseded by legislation issued by democratic institutions of Iraq, laws in force in Iraq as of 16 April 2003 shall continue to apply in Iraq in so far as the laws do not prevent the CPA from exercising its rights and fulfilling its obligations, or conflict with the present or any other Regulation or Order issued by the CPA. ...” 13.     The CPA administration was divided into regional areas. CPA South was placed under United Kingdom responsibility and control, with a United Kingdom Regional Coordinator. It covered the southernmost four of Iraq’s eighteen provinces, each having a governorate coordinator. United Kingdom troops were deployed in the same area. The United Kingdom was represented at CPA headquarters through the Office of the United Kingdom Special Representative. According to the Government, although the United Kingdom Special Representative and his Office sought to influence CPA policy and decisions, United Kingdom personnel had no formal decision-making power within the Authority. All the CPA’s administrative and legislative decisions were taken by Ambassador Bremer. 14.     United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483 referred to by Ambassador Bremer in CPA Regulation No. 1 was actually adopted six days later, on 22 May 2003. It provided as follows: “ The Security Council , Recalling all its previous relevant resolutions, Reaffirming the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, Reaffirming also the importance of the disarmament of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and of eventual confirmation of the disarmament of Iraq, Stressing the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources, welcoming the commitment of all parties concerned to support the creation of an environment in which they may do so as soon as possible, and expressing resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly, Encouraging efforts by the people of Iraq to form a representative government based on the rule of law that affords equal rights and justice to all Iraqi citizens without regard to ethnicity, religion, or gender, and, in this connection, recalls Resolution 1325 (2000) of 31 October 2000, Welcoming the first steps of the Iraqi people in this regard, and noting in this connection the 15 April 2003 Nasiriyah statement and the 28 April 2003 Baghdad statement, Resolved that the United Nations should play a vital role in humanitarian relief, the reconstruction of Iraq, and the restoration and establishment of national and local institutions for representative governance, ... Noting the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the President of the Security Council (S/2003/538) and recognising the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these States as Occupying Powers under unified command (the ‘Authority’), Noting further that other States that are not Occupying Powers are working now or in the future may work under the Authority, Welcoming further the willingness of member States to contribute to stability and security in Iraq by contributing personnel, equipment, and other resources under the Authority, Concerned that many Kuwaitis and Third-State Nationals still are not accounted for since 2 August 1990, Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1.     Appeals to member States and concerned organisations to assist the people of Iraq in their efforts to reform their institutions and rebuild their country, and to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq in accordance with this Resolution; 2.     Calls upon all member States in a position to do so to respond immediately to the humanitarian appeals of the United Nations and other international organisations for Iraq and to help meet the humanitarian and other needs of the Iraqi people by providing food, medical supplies, and resources necessary for reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq’s economic infrastructure; 3.     Appeals to member States to deny safe haven to those members of the previous Iraqi regime who are alleged to be responsible for crimes and atrocities and to support actions to bring them to justice; 4.     Calls upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future; 5.     Calls upon all concerned to comply fully with their obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907; ... 8.     Requests the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Representative for Iraq whose independent responsibilities shall involve reporting regularly to the Council on his activities under this Resolution, coordinating activities of the United Nations in post-conflict processes in Iraq, coordinating among United Nations and international agencies engaged in humanitarian assistance and reconstruction activities in Iraq, and, in coordination with the Authority, assisting the people of Iraq through: (a)     coordinating humanitarian and reconstruction assistance by United Nations agencies and between United Nations agencies and non-governmental organisations; (b)     promoting the safe, orderly, and voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons; (c)     working intensively with the Authority, the people of Iraq, and others concerned to advance efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance, including by working together to facilitate a process leading to an internationally recognised, representative government of Iraq; (d)     facilitating the reconstruction of key infrastructure, in cooperation with other international organisations; (e)     promoting economic reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development, including through coordination with national and regional organisations, as appropriate, civil society, donors, and the international financial institutions; (f)     encouraging international efforts to contribute to basic civilian administration functions; (g)     promoting the protection of human rights; (h)     encouraging international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civilian police force; and (i)     encouraging international efforts to promote legal and judicial reform; 9.     Supports the formation, by the people of Iraq with the help of the Authority and working with the Special Representative, of an Iraqi interim administration as a transitional administration run by Iraqis, until an internationally recognised, representative government is established by the people of Iraq and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority; ... 24.     Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the work of the Special Representative with respect to the implementation of this Resolution and on the work of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board and encourages the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America to inform the Council at regular intervals of their efforts under this Resolution; 25.     Decides to review the implementation of this Resolution within twelve months of adoption and to consider further steps that might be necessary. 26.     Calls upon member States and international and regional organisations to contribute to the implementation of this Resolution; 27.     Decides to remain seised of this matter.” 5.     Developments between July 2003 and June 2004 15.     In July 2003 the Governing Council of Iraq was established. The CPA was required to consult with it on all matters concerning the temporary governance of Iraq. 16.     On 16 October 2003 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1511, which provided, inter alia , as follows: “ The Security Council ... Underscoring that the sovereignty of Iraq resides in the State of Iraq, reaffirming the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources, reiterating its resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly, and recognising the importance of international support, particularly that of countries in the region, Iraq’s neighbours, and regional organisations, in taking forward this process expeditiously, Recognising that international support for restoration of conditions of stability and security is essential to the well-being of the people of Iraq as well as to the ability of all concerned to carry out their work on behalf of the people of Iraq, and welcoming member State contributions in this regard under Resolution 1483 (2003), Welcoming the decision of the Governing Council of Iraq to form a preparatory constitutional committee to prepare for a constitutional conference that will draft a Constitution to embody the aspirations of the Iraqi people, and urging it to complete this process quickly, ... Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security, Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1.     Reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq, and underscores , in that context, the temporary nature of the exercise by the Coalition Provisional Authority (Authority) of the specific responsibilities, authorities, and obligations under applicable international law recognised and set forth in Resolution 1483 (2003), which will cease when an internationally recognised, representative government established by the people of Iraq is sworn in and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority, inter alia , through steps envisaged in paragraphs 4 through 7 and 10 below; ... 4.     Determines that the Governing Council and its ministers are the principal bodies of the Iraqi interim administration, which, without prejudice to its further evolution, embodies the sovereignty of the State of Iraq during the transitional period until an internationally recognised, representative government is established and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority; 5.     Affirms that the administration of Iraq will be progressively undertaken by the evolving structures of the Iraqi interim administration; 6.     Calls upon the Authority, in this context, to return governing responsibilities and authorities to the people of Iraq as soon as practicable and requests the Authority, in cooperation as appropriate with the Governing Council and the Secretary-General, to report to the Council on the progress being made; 7.     Invites the Governing Council to provide to the Security Council, for its review, no later than 15 December 2003, in cooperation with the Authority and, as circumstances permit, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, a timetable and a programme for the drafting of a new Constitution for Iraq and for the holding of democratic elections under that Constitution; 8.     Resolves that the United Nations, acting through the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, should strengthen its vital role in Iraq, including by providing humanitarian relief, promoting the economic reconstruction of and conditions for sustainable development in Iraq, and advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative government; ... 13.     Determines that the provision of security and stability is essential to the successful completion of the political process as outlined in paragraph 7 above and to the ability of the United Nations to contribute effectively to that process and the implementation of Resolution 1483 (2003), and authorises a Multinational Force under unified command to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for the implementation of the timetable and programme as well as to contribute to the security of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, the Governing Council of Iraq and other institutions of the Iraqi interim administration, and key humanitarian and economic infrastructure; 14.     Urges member States to contribute assistance under this United Nations mandate, including military forces, to the Multinational Force referred to in paragraph   13 above; 15.     Decides that the Council shall review the requirements and mission of the Multinational Force referred to in paragraph 13 above not later than one year from the date of this Resolution, and that in any case the mandate of the Force shall expire upon the completion of the political process as described in paragraphs 4 through 7 and 10 above, and expresses readiness to consider on that occasion any future need for the continuation of the Multinational Force, taking into account the views of an internationally recognised, representative government of Iraq; ... 25.     Requests that the United States, on behalf of the Multinational Force as outlined in paragraph 13 above, report to the Security Council on the efforts and progress of this Force as appropriate and not less than every six months; 26 .     Decides to remain seised of the matter.” 17.     On 8 March 2004 the Governing Council of Iraq promulgated the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period (known as the “Transitional Administrative Law”). This provided a temporary legal framework for the administration of Iraq for the transitional period which was due to commence by 30 June 2004 with the establishment of an interim Iraqi government and the dissolution of the CPA. 18.     Provision for the new regime was made in United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, adopted on 8 June 2004, which provided, inter alia , that the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations: “1.     Endorses the formation of a sovereign interim government of Iraq, as presented on 1 June 2004, which will assume full responsibility and authority by 30 June 2004 for governing Iraq while refraining from taking any actions affecting Iraq’s destiny beyond the limited interim period until an elected transitional government of Iraq assumes office as envisaged in paragraph 4 below; 2.     Welcomes that, also by 30 June 2004, the occupation will end and the Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to exist, and that Iraq will reassert its full sovereignty; ... 8.     Welcomes ongoing efforts by the incoming interim government of Iraq to develop Iraqi security forces including the Iraqi armed forces (hereinafter referred to as ‘Iraqi security forces’), operating under the authority of the interim government of Iraq and its successors, which will progressively play a greater role and ultimately assume full responsibility for the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq; 9.     Notes that the presence of the Multinational Force in Iraq is at the request of the incoming interim government of Iraq and therefore reaffirms the authorisation for the Multinational Force under unified command established under Resolution 1511 (2003), having regard to the letters annexed to this Resolution; 10.     Decides that the Multinational Force shall have the authority to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters annexed to this Resolution expressing, inter alia , the Iraqi request for the continued presence of the Multinational Force and setting out its tasks, including by preventing and deterring terrorism, so that, inter alia , the United Nations can fulfil its role in assisting the Iraqi people as outlined in paragraph 7 above and the Iraqi people can implement freely and without intimidation the timetable and programme for the political process and benefit from reconstruction and rehabilitation activities; ...” 6.     The transfer of authority to the Iraqi interim government 19.     On 28 June 2004 full authority was transferred from the CPA to the Iraqi interim government and the CPA ceased to exist. Subsequently, the Multinational Force, including the British forces forming part of it, remained in Iraq pursuant to requests by the Iraqi government and authorisations from the United Nations Security Council. B.     United Kingdom armed forces in Iraq from May 2003 to June   2004 20.     During this period, the Coalition Forces consisted of six divisions that were under the overall command of US generals. Four were US divisions and two were multinational. Each division was given responsibility for a particular geographical area of Iraq. The United Kingdom was given command of the Multinational Division (South-East), which comprised the provinces of Basra, Maysan, Thi Qar and Al ‑ Muthanna, an area of 96,000 square kilometres with a population of 4.6   million. There were 14,500 Coalition troops, including 8,150 United Kingdom troops, stationed in the Multinational Division (South-East). The main theatre for operations by United Kingdom forces in the Multinational Division (South-East) were the Basra and Maysan provinces, with a total population of about 2.75 million people. Just over 8,000 British troops were deployed there, of whom just over 5,000 had operational responsibilities. 21.     From 1 May 2003 onwards British forces in Iraq carried out two main functions. The first was to maintain security in the Multinational Division (South-East) area, in particular in the Basra and Maysan provinces. The principal security task was the effort to re-establish the Iraqi security forces, including the Iraqi police. Other tasks included patrols, arrests, anti-terrorist operations, policing of civil demonstrations, protection of essential utilities and infrastructure and protecting police stations. The second main function of the British troops was the support of the civil administration in Iraq in a variety of ways, from liaison with the CPA and Governing Council of Iraq and local government, to assisting with the rebuilding of the infrastructure. 22.     In the Aitken Report (see paragraph 69 below), prepared on behalf of the Army Chief of General Staff, the post-conflict situation in Iraq was described as follows: “The context in which operations have been conducted in Iraq has been exceptionally complex. It is not for this report to comment on the jus ad bellum aspects of the operation, nor of the public’s opinions of the invasion. It is, however, important to note that the Alliance’s post-invasion plans concentrated more on the relief of a humanitarian disaster (which did not, in the event, occur on anything like the scale that had been anticipated), and less on the criminal activity and subsequent insurgency that actually took place. One consequence of that was that we had insufficient troops in theatre to deal effectively with the situation in which we found ourselves. Peace support operations require significantly larger numbers of troops to impose law and order than are required for prosecuting a war: ours were very thinly spread on the ground. In his investigation (in April 2005) of the Breadbasket incident [alleged abuse of Iraqis detained on suspicion of looting humanitarian aid stores], Brigadier Carter described conditions in Iraq thus: ‘... May 2003, some four weeks or so after British forces had started to begin the transition from offensive operations to stabilisation. The situation was fluid. Battlegroups had been given geographic areas of responsibility based generally around their initial tactical objectives. Combat operations had officially ended, and [the] rules of engagement had changed to reflect this, but there was a rising trend of shooting incidents. Although these were principally between Iraqis, seeking to settle old scores or involved in criminal activity, there were early indications that the threat to British soldiers was developing ... The structure of the British forces was changing. Many of the heavier capabilities that had been required for the invasion were now being sent home. Some force elements were required for operations elsewhere, and there was pressure from the UK to downsize quickly to more sustainable numbers ... Local attitudes were also changing. Initially ecstatic with happiness, the formerly downtrodden Shia population in and around Basra had become suspicious, and by the middle of May people were frustrated. Aspirations and expectations were not being met. There was no Iraqi administration or governance. Fuel and potable water were in short supply, electricity was intermittent, and the hospitals were full of wounded from the combat operations phase. Bridges and key routes had been destroyed by Coalition bombing. Law and order had completely collapsed. The Iraqi police service had melted away; the few security guards who remained were old and incapable; and the Iraqi armed forces had been captured, disbanded or deserted. Criminals had been turned out onto the streets and the prisons had been stripped. The judiciary were in hiding. Every government facility had been raided and all loose items had been removed. Insecure buildings had been occupied by squatters. Crime was endemic and in parts of Basra a state of virtual anarchy prevailed. Hijackings, child kidnappings, revenge killings, car theft and burglary were rife. In a very short space of time wealth was being comprehensively redistributed.’ In this environment, the British army was the sole agent of law and order within its area of operations. When the Association of Chief Police Officers’ Lead for International Affairs, Mr Paul Kernaghan, visited Iraq in May 2003, he said that he would not recommend the deployment of civilian police officers to the theatre of operations due to the poor security situation. The last time the army had exercised the powers of an army of occupation was in 1945 – and it had spent many months preparing for that role; in May 2003, the same soldiers who had just fought a high ‑ intensity, conventional war were expected to convert, almost overnight, into the only people capable of providing the agencies of government and humanitarian relief for the people of southern Iraq. Battlegroups (comprising a Lieutenant Colonel and about 500 soldiers) were allocated areas of responsibilities comprising hundreds of square miles; companies (a Major with about 100 men under command) were given whole towns to run. The British invasion plans had wisely limited damaging as much of the physical infrastructure as possible; but with only military personnel available to run that infrastructure, and very limited local staff support, the task placed huge strains on the army. One of the effects of this lack of civil infrastructure was the conundrum British soldiers faced when dealing with routine crime. Our experience in Northern Ireland, and in peace support operations around the world, has inculcated the clear principle of police primacy when dealing with criminals in operational environments. Soldiers accept that they will encounter crime, and that they will occasionally be required to arrest those criminals; but (despite some experience of this syndrome in Kosovo in   1999) our doctrine and practice had not prepared us for dealing with those criminals when there was no civil police force, no judicial system to deal with offenders, and no prisons to detain them in. Even when a nascent Iraqi police force was re-established in   2003, troops on the ground had little confidence in its ability to deal fairly or reasonably with any criminals handed over to it. In hindsight, we now know that some soldiers acted outside the law in the way they dealt with local criminals. However diligent they were, commanders were unable to be everywhere, and so were physically unable to supervise their troops to the extent that they should; as a result, when those instances did occur, they were less likely to be spotted and prevented.” 23.     United Kingdom military records show that, as at 30 June 2004, there had been approximately 178 demonstrations and 1,050 violent attacks against Coalition Forces in the Multinational Division (South-East) since 1   May 2003. The violent attacks con