CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 19 juillet 2011

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margin-left:17.3pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify } .s48DB3670 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s7CB9076 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s507451D6 { width:4.53pt; display:inline-block } .s299839C6 { width:212.77pt; display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .sC1AC44A4 { width:228.11pt; display:inline-block }       FIRST SECTION             CASE OF KHASHUYEVA v. RUSSIA   (Application no. 25553/07)               JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   19 July 2011   FINAL   08/03/2012   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision . In the case of Khashuyeva v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Nina Vajić, President,   Anatoly Kovler,   Peer Lorenzen,   George Nicolaou,   Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,   Julia Laffranque,   Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos, judges, and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 28 June 2011, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 25553/07) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Kameta Khashuyeva (“the applicant”), on 17 May 2007. 2.     The applicant was represented by Ms O.A. Sadovskaya, a lawyer with the Committee Against Torture, a non-governmental organisation based in Nizhniy Novgorod. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, the Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights. 3.     On 8 September 2009 the Court decided to apply Rule   41 of the Rules of Court, to grant priority treatment to the application and to give notice of the application to the Government. Under the provisions of former Article   29   §   3 of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 4.     The applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Shali, Chechnya. She is the mother of Mamed Bagalayev (also spelled as Magomed Bogalayev), who was born in 1992.   A.     Killing of the applicant’s son 1.     Information submitted by the applicant 5.     At the material time the applicant and her family lived at 1 Kutuzova Street, Shali. 6.     At about 6 p.m. on 1 August 2003 the applicant’s three children, Mamed, his brother Malik and sister Rezida, were playing in the yard of their house. A group of military servicemen in camouflage uniforms and masks, armed with automatic weapons, arrived in an armoured personnel carrier (“APC”) and a GAZ-53 lorry at the house of Mr L.M. on Kurgannaya Street, situated next to the applicant’s house. The servicemen got out of the vehicles and opened fire at the buildings around. It appeared that they were conducting a special operation. 7.     Having heard the shooting, the children ran to hide in the summer house ( времянка ) situated in their yard. Inside the summer house, Mamed noticed that he was bleeding and fell unconscious. His sister Rezida, who was thirteen years old at the time, started calling for help. Next, a masked serviceman looked inside the summer house. Rezida told him that her brother had been wounded and that he needed medical help. The solder told her: “It is nothing, he can wait”. After that, several masked soldiers came into the summer house. They searched it and turned everything upside down. The soldiers did not help Mamed Bagalayev; they ordered the children to stay inside and left. 8.     For about an hour Mamed was unconscious; his sister and brother did not know whether he was alive. After the shooting stopped at about 7 p.m., a local policeman, Mr R.I., ran into the summer house and took Mamed to the Shali hospital, where it was established that the boy had died. 9.     Upon completion of the special operation, the servicemen got back in the APC and the GAZ-53 lorry and drove away in the direction of the former food factory in Shali, the “District Food Plant ( Райпищекомбинат – “the factory”)”. When the vehicles were driving away, the tailgate of the GAZ-53 fell off the lorry and was later found by the investigators at the crime scene. 10.     At some later point, it was established that the GAZ-53 lorry used by the servicemen belonged to the former food factory. The vehicle’s driver, Mr Sh.Sh. (in the documents submitted also referred to as Mr A.Sh. and Mr   R.Sh.), informed the applicant and her husband that the lorry had been taken from him by military servicemen prior to the events and that the tailgate which had been lost at the crime scene was returned to the vehicle about a month after the events. The driver had reported this incident to the factory’s director, Mr A.B. The latter informed the applicant that on 1   August 2003 he had provided the lorry to the Shali administration upon their request to this effect, and that after that the vehicle had disappeared and then reappeared about one-and-a-half months later. 11.     In support of her statements, the applicant submitted the following documents: a statement by the applicant’s husband Mr S.B., undated; a statement by the applicant’s neighbour Ms M.A., dated 5 March 2004; a statement by the applicant, dated 5 March 2004; a statement by the applicant’s daughter Rezida, dated 5 March 2004; a statement by the director of the former food factory Mr A.B., dated 22 September 2005; a statement by the deputy director of the former food factory Mr N.M., dated 22 September 2005; and a statement by a food factory’s driver Mr A.Sh., dated 19 June 2005. 2.     Information submitted by the Government 12.     The Government did not challenge the facts as presented by the applicant and did not provide a contrary version of the events. They denied any involvement of military servicemen in the death of the applicant’s son and stated that unidentified persons, possibly members of illegal armed groups, had been responsible for the killing of Mamed Bagalayev. B.     Official investigation of the incident 1.     Information submitted by the applicant 13.     At 6.30 p.m. on 1 August 2003 the Shali district department of the interior (“the ROVD”) was informed of the fatal shooting of Mamed Bagalayev. On the same date, the district prosecutor’s office conducted an examination of the crime scene. As a result, it was established that the walls of Mr L.M.’s house had numerous bullet holes and that its windows were shattered. The investigators collected from the scene two bullet cartridges of calibre 7.62 and the tailgate of the GAZ-53 lorry. At some later point, the tailgate disappeared from the evidence collected during the investigation. 14.     On 1 August 2003 the district prosecutor’s office carried out a preliminary inspection of Mamed Bagalayev’s body. It was established that he had received a perforating gunshot wound to the chest. 15.     On 1 August 2003 the ROVD questioned Ms M.A., who stated that at about 6 p.m. on 1 August 2003 a GAZ lorry, followed by an APC, with military servicemen in camouflage uniforms and masks had arrived at her yard whilst the children had been playing there. The witness had asked the men not to open fire but they had ordered her to shut up. After they had finished shooting, the servicemen had gotten back in the APC and the lorry and had driven away. 16.     On 2 August 2003 the district prosecutor’s office opened an investigation into Mamed Bagalayev’s killing under Article 105   §   1 of the Criminal Code (murder). The decision stated, inter alia , the following: “... at about 6.10 p.m. on 1 August 2003 unidentified men in camouflage uniforms and masks, armed with automatic weapons, accompanied by an APC and a GAZ-53 vehicle, opened fire at random at the houses located on Kutuzova Street in Shali. As a result, M.S. Bagalayev, who was in the yard of house no.   1 in Kutuzova Street, received a gunshot wound to the chest, from which he died on the spot. ...” The criminal case file was given the number 22112. 17.     On 28 August 2003 the investigators forwarded a number of requests to various prosecutors’ offices in Chechnya, asking them to provide information as to whether any special operations had been carried out by military units from their districts in the Shali area on 1 August 2003. 18.     On 2 October 2003 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 19.     On 18 January 2005 and then on unspecified dates in March and April 2005 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the district prosecutor that the investigation of the criminal case was ineffective and requested that the authorities take, inter alia , the following steps: questioning of certain witnesses; informing the applicant and her family of the progress of the investigation; questioning of the ROVD officers who had arrived at the crime scene shortly after the shooting; and questioning of the servicemen who had been stationed at the material time on the premises of the factory in Shali. No reply was given to any of these complaints. 20.     On 23 August 2005 the applicant’s lawyer complained about the investigation to the Chechnya prosecutor and asked the prosecutor to order the investigators to resume the proceedings, take a number of investigative measures and transfer the criminal case file to the military prosecutor’s office for investigation. 21.     On 27 September 2005 the district prosecutor informed the applicant’s lawyer that on 28 May 2005 he had found serious violations of the criminal procedure regulations on the part of the investigators and that, therefore, he had overruled the decision to suspend the proceedings. In addition, he stated that a number of witnesses had been questioned and that a number of other measures were under way. 22.     On 26 October 2005 the investigators again suspended the investigation for failure to identify the perpetrators. 23.     On 25 January 2006 the applicant’s lawyer asked the district prosecutor’s office to grant access to the investigation file. 24.     On 27 or 29 January and on 1 February 2006 the district prosecutor’s office replied to the lawyer that the decision of 26 October 2005 to suspend the investigation had been lawful and that he was entitled to access the criminal case file only after the completion of the proceedings. 25.     On 27 February 2006 the applicant’s lawyer again wrote to the district prosecutor’s office and asked for access to the investigation file. 26.     On 2 March 2006 the district prosecutor’s office again refused to grant the lawyer’s request. 27.     On 28 March 2006 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Chechnya prosecutor about the lack of access to the documents concerning the criminal proceedings. The letter stated that the investigation was ineffective and that the investigators had consistently refused to provide the applicant with access to the case file. The lawyer requested that the prosecutor examine the investigators’ refusals and hold them responsible for violating the applicant’s rights. 28.     On 19 May 2006 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office forwarded the lawyer’s complaint to the district prosecutor’s office for examination. 29.     On 25 May 2006 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicant’s lawyer that the investigation had been suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 30.     On 19 June 2006 the Russian Prosecutor General’s office informed the lawyer that his complaint about the lack of access to the case file had been forwarded to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office. 31.     On 1 July 2006 the district prosecutor’s office partially allowed the lawyer’s complaint. The decision stated that the lawyer and the applicant’s husband, who had been granted victim status in the criminal case, were to be allowed to familiarise themselves with the documents reflecting the steps taken with the victims’ participation. 32.     On 4 September 2006 the Russian Prosecutor General’s office informed the applicant’s lawyer that his complaint of unlawful actions on the part of the investigators had been forwarded to the Chechnya prosecutor’s office. 33.     On 16 October 2006 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office forwarded the applicant’s complaints about the investigation and the lack of access to the case file to the district prosecutor’s office for examination. 34.     On 27 July 2007 the district prosecutor’s office informed the applicant’s husband that he could familiarise himself with the case file. 35.     On 22 September 2006 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office partially allowed the lawyer’s complaint concerning the ineffectiveness of the investigation and numerous procedural violations in the criminal proceedings. On 22 December 2006 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office informed the lawyer that they had conducted an inquiry into the investigation of criminal case no.   22112. As a result, a number of procedural violations had been found and the deputy district prosecutor had been penalised. 36.     On 27 March 2007 the district prosecutor’s office refused to grant the lawyer’s request for access to the criminal case file. 37.     On 11 December 2008 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 38.     On an unspecified date between December 2008 and March 2009 the investigation of the criminal case was resumed. 39.     On 10 March 2009 the criminal investigation was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was not informed of this decision. 40.     On 24 March 2009 the applicant’s lawyer requested that the investigators allowed him to access the investigation file. 41.     On 27 March 2009 district prosecutor’s office refused to grant the lawyer’s request. 42.     On 1 April 2009 the applicant complained about the investigation to the head of the Investigations Department of the district prosecutor’s office. In particular, she stated that the investigators had failed to take such indispensable steps as carrying out an expert examination of the bullet cartridges collected from the crime scene, identification of military units equipped with those bullets and requesting information about special operations from the law-enforcement agencies. 43.     On 2 April 2009 the investigation of the criminal case was resumed. 44.     On 3 April 2009 the investigators rejected the applicant’s complaint of 1 April 2009. 45.     On 1 May 2009 the criminal investigation was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was provided with a copy of this decision on 21 May 2009. 46.     On 3 June 2009 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision of 27 March 2009 as unlawful. The applicant was informed of this in the end of June 2009 during the judicial examination of her complaint against the investigators (see paragraph 121 below). 47.     On 7 August 2009 the applicant’s lawyer requested that the prosecutor’s office grant him access to the case file. 48.     On 23 September 2009 the applicant’s lawyer was informed that he could familiarise himself with the case file at the prosecutor’s office. 49.     On 21 January 2010 the applicant’s lawyer again requested that the prosecutor’s office grant him access to the criminal case file. 50.     On 4 February 2010 the investigators partially granted the lawyer’s request, stating that he was entitled to familiarise himself only with the documents reflecting the applicant’s participation in the criminal proceedings. 51.     On 11 February 2010 the investigation of the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 52.     On 12 February 2010 the applicant’s lawyer asked the prosecutor’s office to provide him with copies of the last procedural decisions taken by the investigators in the criminal case. No reply was given to this request. 2.     Information submitted by the Government 53.     On 1 August 2003 the investigators from the district prosecutor’s office examined the crime scene. Two bullet cartridges of calibre 9 mm. along with two bullet cartridge of calibre 7.62 and a tailgate from a GAZ-53 lorry were collected from the scene as evidence. 54.     On 1 August 2003 the investigators conducted a preliminary examination of Mamed Bagalayev’s body and found two gunshot wounds to the chest. 55.     On the same date, 1 August 2003, the investigators questioned the applicant’s neighbour, Ms M.A., who stated that a group of armed military servicemen in camouflage uniforms and masks had arrived at her house in a GAZ-53 lorry and in an APC and without any warning had opened fire. She had asked the servicemen to stop the shooting, but they had ordered her to shut up. After the servicemen had left, the witness, together with other residents, had followed their GAZ-53 lorry. The vehicle had driven into the premises of the former food factory . 56.     On the same date, 1 August 2003, the investigators also questioned another of the applicant’s neighbours, Ms Z.Kh., who stated that a group of military servicemen had arrived in her street in a GAZ-53 lorry and had opened fire. Meanwhile, an APC with armed men had pulled over from another street. The witness and her neighbours had asked the servicemen to allow them to approach the children in the summer house; in response the servicemen had sworn at them. 57.     On 2 August 2003 the district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no.   22122 in connection with the murder of Mamed Bagalayev. 58.     On 4 August 2003 the investigators granted the applicant’s husband victim status in the criminal case. 59.     On 18 August 2003 the district prosecutor requested that the military prosecutor of military unit no.   20116 provide him with an officer to assist in the investigation of the criminal case. The text of the letter included the following: “... taking into account that there are sufficient grounds to believe that the crime [against Mamed Bagalayev] was committed by military servicemen, we are creating a group of investigators and, therefore, you are requested to provide an officer for participation in the investigation of the criminal case ...” 60.     On 28 August 2003 the investigators forwarded requests to various district prosecutors’ offices in Chechnya, asking to be informed whether these bureaus had conducted any special operations in Shali on 1   August 2003. 61.     On 2 October 2003 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 62.     On 18 January 2005 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the district prosecutor that the investigation of Mamed Bagalayev’s murder was ineffective. In particular, he stated that the investigators had not questioned the applicant’s husband, the brother and sister of Mamed Bagalayev with whom he had hidden in the summer house, that they had not established the reasons for either the servicemen’s failure to provide Mamed with medical assistance or for their actions preventing the locals from helping him. The lawyer requested that the authorities resume the investigation, take a number of steps and inform the applicant of the progress of the proceedings. 63.     On 20 May 2005 the applicant’s lawyer complained about the investigation to the district prosecutor, stating that a number of crucial steps (such as questioning of eyewitnesses and military servicemen) had not been taken and that the proceedings had been suspended unlawfully. 64.     On 19 June 2005 the driver of the GAZ-53 lorry gave a statement to the applicant’s lawyer. According to him, the lorry belonged to the factory. In the summer of 2003 he had been ordered by military servicemen to hand the lorry over to them. He had later been told that this vehicle had been used by the military at the place of Mamed Bagalayev’s murder. This statement was submitted to the investigators and included in the case file. 65.     On 22 July 2005 the applicant’s lawyer wrote to the district prosecutor and requested that the prosecutor reply to the following questions: “... on the day of Mamed Bagalayev’s murder you ordered that the lorry with its driver was to be taken to the Shali administration and then handed over to the military servicemen stationed on the premises of [the factory] . It is necessary to find out who the military serviceman were that received the vehicle (without its registration numbers) from the driver. About one month later, the GAZ-53 lorry was returned to [the factory] . It is currently being driven by another driver. ... I request that you submit to the investigation your statement concerning the circumstances which are known to you and that you officially reply to my questions: Who is currently driving the GAZ-53 lorry and where it is being stationed? When was the vehicle’s tailgate taken away from the Shali ROVD? [...]” 66.     On the same date the applicant’s lawyer complained to the military prosecutor of the United Group Alignment (“the UGA”) and the district prosecutor that the investigation of the criminal case was ineffective. In particular, he pointed out the following: “... The investigation is being conducted in a slipshod manner. It is obvious that the death of Mamed Bagalayev was caused by a gunshot from a military serviceman’s automatic weapon ... ... For your information, as of 21 June 2005 neither eyewitnesses to the events, nor the parents of the murdered boy have been questioned by the investigators. The investigators have not questioned any of the servicemen stationed on the premises of [the factory] either ... The investigation has failed to establish the circumstances under which the lorry’s tailgate was put back on the vehicle in spite of the fact that, according to the crime scene examination report, it had been collected as evidence and taken to the Shali ROVD ...” 67.     On 16 August 2005 the applicant’s lawyer lodged complaints with the district prosecutor’s office and the Chechnya prosecutor’s office. He stated that the investigation of Mamed Bagalayev’s murder was ineffective and pointed out, amongst other things, the following failures of the investigative authorities: “... on 2 October 2003 the investigators suspended the investigation without even having taken the most basic steps ... such as: (a)     [The applicant’s husband] S.M. Bagalayev ... was not questioned, in spite of the fact that he regularly keeps seeing the GAZ-53 lorry in which the military servicemen had arrived at the crime scene ...; he had spoken with the lorry’s driver and found out why it had arrived at the scene ... this vehicle belongs to [the factory], on the premises of which military units have been stationed ... The tailgate which had fallen off the vehicle was collected as evidence from the crime scene, but at a later date the lorry was seen driving around with this very tailgate - who took this evidence out of the investigation file? Why had the lorry belonging to [the factory] been used by the military servicemen? Who drove this vehicle on the day of the events? ... The investigators left these questions without examination ... (b)     [The applicant’s relatives] who had witnessed the events have not been questioned, in spite of the fact that they could assist in establishing the factual circumstances of the events; (c)     The investigators failed to examine the circumstances surrounding the [disappearance] of the GAZ-53’s tailgate, which, according to the witnesses, had fallen off the lorry after the military servicemen had finished the special operation and had been driving away; (d)     The investigators failed to request information from the Shali military commander’s office concerning any special operations conducted on 1   August 2003 with the participation of the servicemen stationed on the premises of [the factory]; (e)     The investigators failed to question the officers from the Shali ROVD who had arrived at the crime scene after they had heard the shooting (for example, officer Sh.Sh.); (f)     The investigators failed to question witness Mr R.I. and the director of [the factory], whose firm owned the GAZ-53 lorry used by the military servicemen at the crime scene; (g)     The investigators failed to obtain information from the military command concerning the military units used for the pin-point military operation ... (h)     The investigators failed to establish why, for one hour, no medical assistance was provided to Mamed Bagalayev and why those who had wanted to provide it to him had been threatened [and precluded from doing it] by the military servicemen. ...” 68.     On 22 August 2005 the Chechnya prosecutor’s office asked the district prosecutor to inform them of the reasons for their failure to react to the applicant’s lawyer’s numerous complaints about the investigation lodged on 15 and 18 January, 20 May, 27 July and 19 August 2005. 69.     On 25 August 2005 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the criminal investigation as premature and unsubstantiated and ordered that the investigators take, amongst others, the following steps: “... -     granting relatives of Mamed Bagalayev victim status in the criminal case and questioning them; -     questioning of other relatives of Mamed Bagalayev; -     identification and questioning of witnesses to the crime; -     ordering and conducting a forensic examination of Mamed Bagalayev’s body; -     requesting information from the Shali military commander’s office, the military commander’s office of military unit no.   20116, the command of the United Group Alignment (“the UGA”), the Chechnya Department of the Federal Security Service (the FSB) and finding out whether these agencies conducted a special operation in Shali in the beginning of August 2003 ...” 70.     On 26 August 2005 the investigation of the criminal case was resumed. 71.     On 29 August 2005 the investigators granted the applicant victim status in the criminal case and questioned her. The applicant stated that on 1   August 2003 she and her husband had been away from their house. In the evening they had been on their way home, when at about 6.40 p.m. her neighbour had informed her that a special operation was being conducted in their street by military servicemen. When she had arrived at the crime scene, she had been told that her son had been shot, wounded and taken to the Shali hospital. After that, the applicant and her husband had gone to the hospital, where they had been told that their son had been sent back home. The applicant and her husband had gone home where they had found out that their son had died. 72.     On 29 August 2005 the applicant’s lawyer again complained about the investigation to the Chechnya prosecutor and asked to be granted access to the investigation file. 73.     On 30 August 2005 the investigators requested that the Shali military commander’s office, the Shali ROVD and the head of the UGA inform them whether these agencies had conducted any special operations in Shali on 1   August 2003. 74.     On various dates in September 2005 the investigators asked military unit no.   20116, the UGA and the Chechnya FSB to inform them whether they had conducted any special military operations in Shali on 1   August 2003. According to the replies received, none of the agencies had conducted such operations on the specified date. 75.     Based on the contents of the investigation file, on 15   September 2005 the investigators ordered a forensic examination of Mamed Bagalayev’s body. 76.     On the same date, 15 September 2005, the Chechnya Forensics Bureau concluded that the cause of Mamed Bagalayev’s death could have been the perforating wound to the right side of his chest. 77.     On 19 September 2005 the investigators questioned the applicant’s husband, who stated that he had arrived at his house at about 7 p.m. on 1   August 2003. His neighbours had told him that his son Mamed Bagalayev had been shot and wounded by military servicemen and that the boy had been taken to hospital, but to no avail. 78.     On the same date, 19 September 2005, the investigators questioned the applicant’s relative Mr S.-M.B., who stated that on 1 August 2003 he had been at home when his daughter had told him that his nephew Mamed Bagalayev had been shot by military servicemen. The witness had immediately gone to the hospital, where he had found out that Mamed had died from his wounds. 79.     On 3 October 2005 the investigators questioned the director of the factory, Mr A.B., who stated that on 1 August 2003 the head of the Shali administration, Mr M.D., had asked his permission to use his company’s lorry. The witness had authorised the driver, Mr Sh.Sh., to go with his GAZ-53 lorry to assist the administration. At some point later on the same date, the driver had informed the witness that military servicemen had taken the lorry away from him at the administration’s premises. After that, the lorry had disappeared but was returned one-and-a-half months later to the factory by unidentified persons. 80.     On 7 October 2005 the investigators questioned a police officer of the Shali ROVD, Mr R.I., who stated that on 1 August 2003 he had been informed by his friends that, on the road next to Shali, military servicemen had conducted a special operation, as a result of which a boy had been killed. He had immediately rushed to the scene. The area had been cordoned off by armed masked men, who had refused to answer questions. He had followed two of these men to the yard of the Bagalayev family, where he had heard children crying. The witness had rushed to the summer house, where he had found Mamed Bagalayev bleeding and with a weak pulse, and his brother and sister next to him. The witness had carried Mamed outside and had taken him to the Shali hospital, where Mamed had died. When the witness had been leaving the yard, he had seen an APC and a GAZ-53 lorry, both full of armed servicemen in camouflage uniforms, leaving the scene. He had immediately recognised the GAZ-53 lorry, as it had belonged to the factory. According to the witness, the military servicemen had not prevented him from accessing the summer house and taking the boy to the hospital. Having taken Mamed Bagalayev to the hospital, the witness had returned to the scene, where he and his colleagues had found the tailgate of the GAZ-53 lorry and had taken it to the Shali ROVD. 81.     On 20 October 2005 the investigators questioned Mr R.Sh., who stated that in 2003 he had worked as a driver of a GAZ-53 lorry for the factory. In August 2003 he had learnt that his vehicle had been used by criminals who had committed the murder of Mamed Bagalayev. 82.     On 26 October 2005 the investigation of the criminal case was suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was informed of this on the same date. 83.     On 7 December 2005 the applicant’s lawyer requested that the investigators resume the investigation of the criminal case. 84.     On 25 January 2006 the applicant’s lawyer requested that the investigators resume the proceedings, establish which military unit had carried out the special operation on 1 August 2003 and question military servicemen stationed in the Shali area. He also requested that the victims in the criminal case be provided with access to the investigation file. 85.     On 29 January 2006 the investigators rejected his request, stating that the proceedings were still pending and that the victims were allowed to familiarise themselves with the contents of the file only upon completion of the investigation. 86.     On 27 February 2006 the applicant’s lawyer again asked to be provided with access to the investigation file. 87.     On 2 March 2006 the deputy district prosecutor rejected his request. 88.     On 2 May 2006 the investigators again refused to allow the applicant’s lawyer to access the investigation file. 89.     On 17 May 2006 the applicant’s lawyer again complained about the investigation to the Chechnya prosecutor and requested that the suspended criminal proceedings be resumed. 90.     On 25 May 2006 the deputy district prosecutor rejected his request. 91.     On 8 June 2006 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as premature and unsubstantiated and ordered that it be resumed. He ordered that the investigators take a number of steps, including conducting a ballistic expert evaluation of the bullet cartridges collected from the crime scene and questioning of a number of witnesses to the crime. 92.     On 22 June 2006 the investigators questioned Mamed Bagalayev’s sister Rezida, who stated that on 1 August 2003 she had been playing in the yard with her brothers Mamed and Malik. At about 5.30 p.m. they had heard gunfire and then she had noticed that her brother Mamed was bleeding. They had run into the summer house. Three armed men in camouflage uniforms had entered the summer house, had pointed their guns at the witness and her brothers and had searched the place. She had asked the men to help Mamed, who was bleeding, but the men had neither helped nor had allowed anyone else to approach him. They had told her that “nothing will happen to your brother”. Then the police officer from the Shali ROVD, Mr   R.I., had taken Mamed to hospital, but her brother had died on the way there. The witness further stated that due to the passage of time she would not be able to identify the armed men. 93.     On the same date, 22 June 2006, the investigators questioned Mamed Bagalayev’s brother Malik, whose statement about the events was similar to the one given by his sister Rezida. 94.     On 1 July 2006 the deputy Chechnya prosecutor partially upheld the complaint brought by the applicant’s lawyer and allowed him to examine those contents of the investigation file which reflected the victims’ participation in the criminal proceedings. 95.     On 15 July 2006 the investigation of the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was not informed of this decision. 96.     On 31 August 2006 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Department of the Prosecutor General’s office in the Southern Federal Circuit about unlawful refusals on the part of the Chechnya prosecutor to allow him and the victims to access the contents of the investigation file. 97.     On 22 September 2006 the deputy Chechnya prosecutor ordered an inquiry in connection with the lawyer’s complaint about the lack of reply to his requests pertaining to the investigation of Mamed Bagalayev’s death. 98.     On 22 September 2006 the Chechnya prosecutor informed the applicant’s lawyer that they had established violations of criminal procedure regulations by the investigators of the criminal case. 99.     On 27 March 2007 the deputy district prosecutor rejected the applicant’s lawyer’s request for access to the investigation file. 100.     On 8 July 2006 the investigation of the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was not informed of this decision. 101.     On 8 November 2008 the investigation of the criminal case was resumed upon a complaint brought by the applicant’s lawyer on 5   November 2008 of the investigators’ failure to comply with the Town Court’s decision of 24 July 2008 (see paragraph 119 below). 102.     On various dates in November 2008 the investigators forwarded requests to a number of military and law-enforcement agencies, asking them to provide information as to whether any special operations had been conducted by them on 1 August 2003. It does not appear that any replies were received to these requests. 103.     On 11 December 2008 the investigation of the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. The applicant was not informed of this decision. 104.     On 16 February 2009 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as premature and unsubstantiated and ordered that a number of measures be taken. The investigators were to take, amongst others, the following steps: ordering a ballistic expert examination of the bullet cartridges collected from the crime scene; questioning of witnesses; establishing which military unit had been stationed on the premises of the factory at the material time; and establishing the circumstances under which the GAZ-53 lorry had been taken away from its driver by military servicemen. The supervising prosecutor’s orders were not complied with. 105.     On 10 March 2009 the investigation of the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 106.     On 24 March 2009 the applicant’s lawyer again asked the investigators to provide him with access to the investigation file. On 27   March 2009 his request was rejected. 107.     On 1 April 2009 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the district prosecutor’s office of the investigators’ failure to comply with the court decision of 24 July 2008 (see paragraph 119 below) and requested that he be informed whether, amongst other things, the ballistic expert examination of the cartridges collected from the crime scene had been carried out. His complaint was rejected on 3 April 2009. 108.     On 2 April 2009 the investigators resumed the proceedings in the criminal case. 109.     On 1 May 2009 the investigation of the criminal case was again suspended for failure to identify the perpetrators. 110.     On 3 June 2009 the supervising prosecutor ordered that the applicant’s lawyer be provided with access to those contents of the case file which reflected the victims’ participation in the criminal proceedings. 111.     On 18 September 2009 the investigators informed the lawyer that he was allowed to familiarise himself with selected contents of the investigation file. 112.     On 9 November 2009 the supervising prosecutor overruled the decision to suspend the investigation as premature and the proceedings were resumed. 113.     According to the documents submitted by the Government, the investigation was suspended and resumed on several occasions, but it has so far failed to identify the perpetrators of Mamed Bagalayev’s murder. On a number of occasions the supervising prosecutors criticised the progress of the proceedings and stated that a number of important investigative steps should be taken without delay, but their orders were not complied with. 114.     Upon a request by the Court, the Government, referring to Article   161 of the Russian Criminal Procedure Code, disclosed a number of documents from criminal case no.   22112 running to 266 pages. C.     Proceedings against the investigators 115.     On 23 September 2005 the applicant’s lawyer complained to the Shali District Court (“the District Court”) of the ineffectiveness of the criminal investigation. He requested that the court order the investigators to question certain witnesses, request information from the military commander about the servicemen who had participated in the special operation on 1 August 2003 and clarify the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the lorry whose tailgate had been found at the crime scene. 116.     On 25 September 2005 the District Court fully allowed the complaint and stated that the investigators’ actions had been unlawful. 117.     On an unspecified date between October 2005 and April 2006 the applicant complained to the Shali Town Court (“the Town Court”) of ineffective investigation of the criminal case and the lack of access to the case file. 118.     On 3 April 2006 the Shali Town Court partially allowed the complaint and instructed the prosecutor’s office to provide the applicant’s lawyer with access to the criminal case file, with the exception of documents containing state secrets. The decision stated, inter alia , the following: “... at about 6.10 p.m. on 1 August 2003 unidentified masked men in camouflage uniforms, armed with automatic weapons, with the support of armoured vehicles and a GAZ-53 automobile arrived at the crime scene and opened fire at random at the houses in Kutuzova Street ... as a result, M. Bagalayev ... was wounded in the chest ... and died on the spot ... On 2 August 2003 the district prosecutor’s office opened criminal case no.   22112   ... the investigation of the criminal case, without taking necessary investigative measures ... was suspended on 2 October 2003. [The applicant’s lawyer] forwarded a number of requests and complaints to the district prosecutor’s office: -     on 15 January 2005 he lodged a request that Mr S. Bagalayev, Ms Z. Bagalayeva and Ms R.B. be questioned and that other necessary investigative measures be taken ... -     on 20 May 2005 he lodged a request that the circumstances surrounding the disappearance of the tailgate of the lorry be investigated ... -     [he asked the investigators] to find out whether the Shali military commander had given his approval to this operation involving military servicemen (on 1   August 2003 the servicemen had been stationed on the premises of the [factory] and the GAZ-53 vehicle [still] belongs to this organisation); -     [he asked the investigators] to question those officers of the Shali ROVD who had arrived at the scene of the shooting, for example, to question officer Sh.Sh., as well as the director of [the factory] and other individuals; ... On 30 September 2005 the Shali district court found the actions of the Shali district prosecutor’s office to be unlawful. However, in spite of this, a number of investigative steps have not been taken [by the investigators]: -     it has not been established which military units stationed on the premises of [the factory] participated in this operation; -     it has not been established which officer was in charge of the military unit and under whose order