CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 29 novembre 2011

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She was represented before the Court by Ms F. Murphy, a solicitor practising in London. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms L. Dauban, of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The application concerned the killing on 25 May 2000 of the applicant’s son, Troy Hurst, by a neighbour. A. Background and Mr Hurst’s death Both Troy Hurst and his neighbour, Mr Reid, were tenants of flats located near each other on an estate owned and run by the local Council. Mr Reid had a record of assault with violence. From 1997 to 1999 several complaints were made to the police and to the Council by tenants of the estate that Mr Reid had been violent, threatening and brandishing a knife. Troy Hurst first reported being threatened by Mr Reid in March 1999 and he was subsequently assaulted and threatened on numerous occasions by Mr Reid. Mr Reid was convicted of assault of, amongst others, Mr Hurst in June 1999 and served time in prison. On two occasions, a health service psychiatric Crisis Team found that Mr Reid did not need to be involuntarily committed. The Council also took an action to re-possess Mr Reid’s Council flat given his behaviour, in which action Troy Hurst had given a statement. On 25 May 2000 Mr Reid’s eviction was ordered. That evening Mr Reid violently threatened Mr Hurst on three occasions, the police being called each time. A little later that evening Mr Reid stabbed Troy Hurst six times and Mr Hurst was later pronounced dead in hospital. B. Criminal proceedings On 16 July 2001 Mr Reid was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. C.   The Inquest and related judicial review proceedings The Inquest was adjourned pending the criminal proceedings and the Coroner refused to re-convene it thereafter on the basis that all matters had been ascertained in the criminal trial. Since the applicant wished for an independent and effective public investigation into whether the police and/or the Council might reasonably have prevented her son’s death, she applied for leave to seek judicial review of the Coroner’s decision with a view to an Inquest being held which complied with Article 2 of the Convention. Leave was granted and, in July 2003, the High Court gave judgment in her favour finding that the Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”) applied to the Coroner’s decision because, while Troy Hurst’s death had occurred before the HRA came into force, the Coroner’s decision had been taken thereafter. It ordered the Coroner to resume the Inquest. However, on 11 March 2004 the House of Lords gave judgment in In re McKerr ([2004] 1 W.L.R. 807) finding that there was no obligation to conduct an inquiry compatible with Article 2 when the death had occurred before the HRA came into force. On the same day, in R (Middleton) ν West Somerset Coroner ([2004] 2 A.C. 182) the House of Lords reviewed the scope of the Jamieson Inquest ( R v Coroner for North Humberside and Scunthorpe, Ex p Jamieson [1995] QB 1) and found that, since a Jamieson Inquest could not examine whether the conduct of State agents might reasonably have prevented death, it was incompatible with Article 2. To comply with that Article, the Inquest had to consider “by what means” and “in what circumstances” the deceased came by his death. Since there had been no appeal or order to set aside the High Court judgment in the applicant’s case following the McKerr judgment, a new Coroner indicated that he should, at least, resume the Inquest. The police therefore appealed against the High Court judgment to the Court of Appeal. On 21 July 2005 the Court of Appeal gave judgment upholding the High Court’s decision and indicating that the resumed Inquest should be conducted in accordance with the evolved guidance set out in the Middleton judgment. However, on 28 March 2007 the House of Lords allowed the further appeal by the police. It applied its McKerr judgment and found that the HRA did not apply to the Coroner’s decision. Since a pre-HRA Jamieson Inquest would be unable to return a verdict providing a meaningful indication of whether the authorities might reasonably have prevented Mr Hurst’s death, the Coroner’s refusal to resume the Inquest could not be criticised. D. Civil Proceedings On 23 May 2003 the applicant issued civil proceedings against the police and the Council and the parties agreed to stay the action pending the outcome of the above-described Inquest proceedings. On 27 September 2007 the applicant’s legal advisers advised her in writing that, having regard to certain intervening domestic cases ( Brooks v. Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1495 and Van Colle v. Chief Constable of Hertfordshire [2007] 1 W.L.R. 1821), her civil proceedings had no reasonable prospects of success. On 26 September 2007 the defendants were notified of the applicant’s decision to withdraw those proceedings. E. Police and Council inquiries Further to a complaint by the Hurst family, the Directorate of Professional Standards of the police carried out an investigation. The Police Complaints Authority (“PCA”) refused to re-open the investigation. The successor to the PCA, the Independent Police Complaints Commission (“IPCC”), conducted a review of the original police investigation and into the circumstances leading to Mr Hurst’s death. In May 2005 the IPCC informed the applicant that that investigation was not satisfactory and that a further investigation would be carried out by another police force supervised by the IPCC. Terms of reference for that investigation were agreed with the applicant. In May 2007 a redacted report, and in November 2008 a report with less redaction, was published and forwarded to the applicant. The IPCC concluded that it was unlikely that the police could have prevented the death of Mr Hurst and it identified the lessons learned and measures to be taken to attempt to ensure that similar incidents were prevented in the future. On 19 February 2002 the Council disclosed to the applicant the conclusions of a confidential report of an internal and inter-departmental Inquiry Panel (social services and the Council). Those conclusions contained certain acknowledgements including that events might have been different had all information been available to the Crisis Team, that the housing department of the Council should have had an outlet for its concerns and that there was a need for better liaison between the relevant agencies. COMPLAINTS The applicant complained of a substantive violation of Article 2 of the Convention. She maintained that the police and the Council were aware or ought to have been aware of a real and immediate risk to the life of her son but that those authorities failed to take reasonable steps to prevent his death. She also complained of a breach of the procedural obligations of Article 2 of the Convention. Since her son was killed prior to the coming into force of the HRA, the House of Lords had decided that neither the provisions of the HRA nor Article 2 applied to require an investigation into her son’s death. As a result, the State has not promptly carried out an independent and effective public investigation into the death of Troy Hurst. The applicant further complained that domestic law did not enable her to sue the authorities for an arguable breach of Article 2 in violation of Article 13 of the Convention. She could not bring an action in negligence against the authorities for their failure to protect her son because of domestic case-law which made it clear that the police did not owe a private law duty of care to prevent a death in the circumstances of her son’s death. She could not take an action for damages under the HRA because her son had died before its entry into force. THE LAW Further to the communication of certain questions arising out of the present application under Articles 2, 6, 13 and 35 § 1 of the Convention, the Government’s observations were submitted and sent to the applicant’s representative. Subsequently, the applicant’s representative requested an extension of the time-limit for the submission of the observations in response to the Government as the applicant wished to explore the possibility of resolving the application with the Government. The time-limit was therefore suspended. By letter dated 7 October 2011 the applicant’s representative informed the Court that the applicant wished to withdraw her application since the matter had been resolved. The Court considers that, in these circumstances, the applicant may be regarded as no longer wishing to pursue her application, within the meaning of Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 37 § 1 in fine , the Court finds no special circumstances regarding respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its Protocols which require the continued examination of the case. In view of the above, it is appropriate to strike the case out of the list. For these reasons, the Court unanimously Decides to strike the application out of its list of cases.   Lawrence Early   Lech Garlicki   Registrar   President