CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 17 janvier 2012

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text-align:justify; font-size:11pt } .sA473EC54 { margin:5pt 19pt 10pt 21.3pt; text-align:justify; font-size:11pt } .sC7094836 { margin:10pt 19pt 5pt 21.3pt; font-size:8pt } .s2680E62 { margin-top:5pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify }     FOURTH SECTION           CASES OF VINTER AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM   (Applications nos. 66069/09 and 130/10 and 3896/10 )             JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   17 January 2012     THIS CASE WAS REFERRED TO THE GRAND CHAMBER WHICH DELIVERED JUDGMENT IN THE CASE ON 09/07/2013   This judgment may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom , The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Lech Garlicki, President,   David Thór Björgvinsson,   Nicolas Bratza,   Päivi Hirvelä,   George Nicolaou,   Ledi Bianku,   Vincent A. De Gaetano, judges, and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 13 December 2011, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in three applications (nos. 66069/09 and 130/10 and 3896/10) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 2.     The first applicant, Mr Douglas Gary Vinter, is a British national who was born in 1969 and is currently detained at HMP Frankland. He is represented before the Court by Mr S. Creighton, a lawyer practising in London with Bhatt Murphy Solicitors, assisted by Mr P. Weatherby, counsel, and Professor D. van Zyl Smit. 3.     The second applicant, Mr Jeremy Neville Bamber, is a British national who was born in 1961 and is currently detained at HMP Full Sutton. He is represented before the Court by Mr B. Woods, a lawyer practising in Leeds with Cousins Tyrer Solicitors, assisted by Mr   R.   Horwell QC and Mr L. Hindmarsh, counsel. 4.     The third applicant, Mr Peter Howard Moore, is a British national who was born in 1946 and is currently detained at HMP Wakefield. He is represented before the Court by Chivers Solicitors, Bingley, assisted by Mr   M. McKone, counsel. 5.     The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms L. Dauban of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 6.     The applicants alleged that the whole life orders which had been imposed on them violated Articles 3, 5 § 4, 6 and 7 of the Convention. 7.     On 1 February 2011, the Court decided to give notice of the applications to the Government. It also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the applications at the same time (Article 29 § 1). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASES A.     Introduction 8.     Since the abolition of the death penalty in England and Wales, the sentence for murder has been a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. When such a sentence is imposed, it is the current practice, in the majority of cases, for the trial judge to set a minimum term of imprisonment which must be served before the prisoner is eligible for release on licence. Exceptionally, however, “a whole life order” may be imposed by the trial judge instead of a minimum term. This has the effect that the prisoner cannot be released other than at the discretion of the Secretary of State. (The   power of the Secretary of State to release a prisoner is provided for in section 30(1) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997.) The Secretary of State will only exercise his discretion on compassionate grounds when the prisoner is terminally ill or seriously incapacitated (see Prison Service Order 4700 set out at paragraph 36 below). 9 .     Prior to the entry into force of the 2003 Act, it was the practice for the mandatory life sentence to be passed by the trial judge but for the Secretary of State, after receiving recommendations from the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice, to decide the minimum term of imprisonment which the prisoner would have to serve before he would be eligible for early release on licence. This was also referred to as the “tariff” part of the sentence and was taken to represent the minimum period which the prisoner was required to serve to satisfy the requirements of retribution and deterrence. It was open to the Secretary of State to impose a whole life tariff on a prisoner. In such a case, it was the practice of the Secretary of State to review a whole life tariff after twenty-five years’ imprisonment to determine whether it was still justified, particularly with reference to cases where the prisoner had made exceptional progress in prison (see Hindley at paragraph 39 below). With the entry into force of the 2003 Act (and, in particular, section 276 and schedule 22 to the Act), all prisoners whose tariffs were set by the Secretary of State have been able to apply to the High Court for review of that tariff. Upon such an application the High Court may set a minimum term of imprisonment or make a whole life order. 10.     This case concerns three applicants who, having been convicted of murder in separate criminal proceedings in England and Wales, are currently serving mandatory sentences of life imprisonment. All three applicants have been given whole life orders: in the first applicant’s case this order was made by the trial judge under the current practice; in the case of the second and third applicants, who were convicted and sentenced prior to the entry into force of the 2003 Act, the orders were made by the High Court. All three applicants maintain that these whole life orders, as they apply to their cases, are incompatible inter alia with Articles 3 and 5 § 4 of the Convention. The facts of the applications, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. B. Mr Vinter 11.     On 20 May 1996, the first applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder of a work colleague, with a minimum term of 10 years. He was released on licence on 4 August 2005. 12.     He began living with a woman who was to become the victim of his second murder offence. The couple married on 27 June 2006. On 31   December 2006 the first applicant was involved in a fight in a public house and charged with affray (using or threatening unlawful violence). His licence was revoked and he was recalled to prison. In July 2007, having pleaded guilty to the charge of affray, he was sentenced to 6 months’ imprisonment. He was released on licence again in December 2007 and returned to live with his wife and her four children. The couple became estranged and the first applicant left the marital home. 13.     On 5 February 2008, the first applicant followed his wife to a public house. He had been drinking and had taken cocaine. The couple argued and the wife’s daughter, who was present, telephoned the police to alert them to the dispute. The first applicant ordered his wife to get into a car. When the daughter tried to get into the car to protect her mother, the first applicant forcibly removed her. He then drove off with his wife. When the police telephoned her to ascertain if she was safe, the first applicant forced his wife to tell them that she was fine. The first applicant also telephoned the police to tell them that his wife was safe and well. Some hours later he gave himself up to the police, telling them that he had killed her. A post-mortem examination revealed that the deceased had a broken nose, deep and extensive bruising to her neck (which was consistent with attempted strangulation), and four stab wounds to the chest. Two knives were found at the scene, one of which had a broken blade. 14.     The first applicant pleaded guilty to murder and instructed his counsel not to make any submissions in mitigation lest it add to the grief of the victim’s family. The trial judge considered that the first applicant fell into that small category of people who should be deprived permanently of their liberty. He passed the mandatory life sentence and made a whole life order. 15.     The Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal on 25 June 2009. It considered the general principles for determining the minimum term of a mandatory life sentence (as set out in schedule 21 to the 2003 Act: see relevant domestic law and practice below). It found that, given the circumstances of the offence, there was no reason whatever to depart from the normal principle enshrined in schedule 21 to the 2003 Act that, where murder was committed by someone who was already a convicted murderer, a whole life order was appropriate for punishment and deterrence. C. Mr Bamber 16.     On 7 August 1985, the second applicant’s parents, his adoptive sister and her two young children were shot and killed. The second applicant was subsequently charged and, on 28 October 1986, convicted of the murders. The prosecution’s case was that the murders were premeditated and planned and had been committed for financial gain. It was also alleged that the second applicant had arranged the crime scene so as to mislead the police by making it appear as if his adoptive sister had killed the family and then herself. 17 .     The trial judge recommended to the Secretary of State that the second applicant serve twenty-five years’ imprisonment “as a minimum ” (his underlining). On the trial judge’s letter to the Secretary of State, the Lord Chief Justice added the comment “for my part I would never release him”. In 1988, the Secretary of State imposed a whole life tariff. The practice at the time was not to inform the prisoner of this decision. By letter dated 15 December 1994, the applicant was informed that the Secretary of State had concluded that the requirements of retribution and deterrence could only be satisfied by the second applicant remaining in prison for the whole of his life. 18.     In 2008, following the entry into force of section 276 and schedule 22 to the 2003 Act, the second applicant applied to the High Court for review of the whole life tariff. Having regard to schedule 21 to the Act, the High Court concluded that, given the number of murders involved and the presence of premeditation by the second applicant, the offence plainly fell within that category of cases where the appropriate starting point was a whole life order. Having further regard to statements submitted by the victims’ next-of-kin and submissions by the second applicant, including reports as to the behaviour and progress he had made in prison, the High Court found that there was no reason to depart from the views of the Lord Chief Justice and the Secretary of State. It therefore imposed a whole life order. 19.     The second applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal on 14 May 2009. The court found that, when the Secretary of State had set a whole life tariff in 1988, he had been provided with two different judicial recommendations: one from the trial judge recommending a minimum term of twenty-five years and one from the Lord   Chief Justice recommending that the second applicant should never be released. The Secretary of State had been entitled to choose between those recommendations or to adopt neither of them. The Court of Appeal also found that the whole life order imposed by the High Court was not only correct but, for the purposes of punishment and retribution, fully justified. 20.     Relying on its previous judgment in R v. Bieber (see paragraph 40 below), it found that no issue arose under Article 3 of the Convention as the whole life order was not an irreducible life sentence as that term had been used in Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], no. 21906/04, ECHR 2008 ‑ ... Finally, following its ruling in R v. Pitchfork (see paragraph 41 below) it found that the review procedure created by the 2003 Act was compatible with Article 7 of the Convention as, properly construed, the relevant statutory provisions meant a prisoner could not be disadvantaged by the outcome of the review: the term to be served could be reduced, or maintained, but it could not be increased or extended. 21.     The second applicant applied to the Court of Appeal to certify that its judgment concerned a point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the House of Lords. That application was refused on 23 June 2009. D. Mr Moore 22.     On 29 November 1996 the third applicant was convicted after trial in the Crown Court at Chester of four counts of murder. The victims were homosexual men and the applicant, himself a homosexual, was alleged to have committed the murders for his own sexual gratification. Each victim was stabbed many times with a large combat knife which the third applicant had bought for that purpose. The first victim was attacked in his home on 23   September 1995. Soon after, on the weekend of 7 October 1995, the third applicant met his second victim in a bar and arranged to take him home for sex; he instead took him to a forest, stabbed him to death and left the body there. The third victim was stabbed in the caravan where he lived on 30   November 1995. Finally, shortly before Christmas 1995, the third applicant went to a beach which was well-known for homosexual trysts. He   met the fourth victim on the beach and stabbed him there. 23.     Blood from the first and third victims was found on the third applicant’s jacket and on the knife. Property from the first, second and fourth victims was found in his possession. He made extensive admissions about all four murders to the police. The police had been unaware of the second victim until the third applicant mentioned him to them. The body was recovered from the forest with his assistance. At trial, the applicant’s defence was that the murders had been committed by someone else, though he admitted to having been present at all the murders save for that of the second victim. 24.     After the third applicant was convicted, the trial judge passed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment and recommended to the Secretary of State for the Home Department that, in his view, the applicant should never be released. Upon review, the Lord Chief Justice reported that he thought the minimum period before eligibility for release should be set at thirty years. On 27 September 2002, the Secretary of State decided to set a whole life tariff. 25.     In 2008, pursuant to section 276 and schedule 22 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the third applicant applied to the High Court for review of the whole life tariff set by the Secretary of State. In its judgment of 12   June 2008 the High Court rejected the third applicant’s submission that it should accept the Lord Chief Justice’s recommendation of a minimum term of thirty years. It found that, while weight should be accorded to that recommendation, the Lord Chief Justice did not have regard to the principles set out in schedule 21 as the High Court was required to do. It also rejected the submission that an issue arose under Article 6 given that a whole life tariff had been set by the Secretary of State. The High Court found that the procedure for applying to the High Court under section   276 and schedule 22 of the Act provided the necessary independent review as to whether a prisoner should be released. The court also found that a whole life order would be compatible with Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. Having regard to the general principles for determining the minimum term of a mandatory life sentence (as set out in schedule 21 to the Act), no issue of arbitrariness arose and whether such a sentence was disproportionate depended on the facts of each case. 26.     The High Court found that, since the case involved the murder of two or more persons, sexual or sadistic conduct and a substantial degree of premeditation, under schedule 21 the starting point was a whole life order. There were no mitigating features and even the Lord Chief Justice, in recommending a minimum term of thirty years, had shared the trial judge’s view that it might never be safe to release the third applicant. There were no reasons, therefore, to mitigate the starting point of a whole life order. The High Court added that, even if the starting point were a minimum term of thirty years, the aggravating features of the murders were such as to make a whole life order appropriate. 27.     On 26 February 2009, the Court of Appeal dismissed the third applicant’s appeal, finding that the High Court was not only entitled, but clearly right, to conclude that a whole life order was appropriate. 28.     It appears that the third applicant, in order to allow him to appeal to the House of Lords, then applied to the Court of Appeal to certify that its judgment concerned a point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the House of Lords. On 14 August 2009, he was informed by the Court of Appeal’s Criminal Appeal Office that, because the Court of Appeal had refused his application for permission to appeal against sentence (as opposed to granting permission to appeal against sentence and then dismissing the appeal), an application to certify a point of law for the House of Lords could not be made. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A. Statutory provisions on mandatory life sentences 29.     In England and Wales, the mandatory life sentence for murder is contained in section 1(1) of the Murder (Abolition of the Death Penalty) Act 1965. 30.     The power of the Secretary of State to set tariff periods for mandatory life sentence prisoners, as contained in section 29 of the Crime Sentences Act 1997, was found by the House of Lords to be incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention in R (Anderson) v. the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] 1 AC 837. This led to the enactment of Chapter 7 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and schedules 21 and 22 to that Act. 31.     Section 269 of the 2003 Act directs a trial judge, in passing a mandatory life sentence, to determine the minimum term which the prisoner must serve before he or she is eligible for early release on licence. By section 269(3), this minimum term must take into account the seriousness of the offence. Section 269(4) allows the trial judge to decide that, because of the seriousness of the offence, the prisoner should not be eligible for early release (in effect, to make a “whole life order”). Section 269(4) only applies to an offender who is 21 years of age or over when he committed the offence. Section 269(5) directs the trial judge, in considering the seriousness of the offence, to have regard inter alia to the principles set out in schedule 21 to the Act. 1. Schedule 21 to the 2003 Act 32.     Schedule 21 provides for three different “starting points” which may be increased or decreased depending on the presence of aggravating or mitigating features in the offence: a whole life order, a minimum term of thirty years’ imprisonment and a minimum term of fifteen years’ imprisonment. 33.     By paragraph 4(1) of the schedule, if the seriousness of the offence is “exceptionally high” the appropriate starting point is a whole life order. Paragraph 4(2) provides that the following cases would normally fall within this category: (a) the murder of two or more persons, where each murder involves any of the following— (i) a substantial degree of premeditation or planning, (ii) the abduction of the victim, or (iii) sexual or sadistic conduct, (b) the murder of a child if involving the abduction of the child or sexual or sadistic motivation, (c) a murder done for the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause, or (d) a murder by an offender previously convicted of murder. By paragraph 5(1), if the seriousness of the offence does not fall within paragraph 4(1) but is “particularly high”, the appropriate starting point in determining the minimum term is thirty years’ imprisonment. Paragraph 5(2) provides that the following cases would normally fall within this category: (a) the murder of a police officer or prison officer in the course of his duty, (b) a murder involving the use of a firearm or explosive, (c) a murder done for gain (such as a murder done in the course or furtherance of robbery or burglary, done for payment or done in the expectation of gain as a result of the death), (d) a murder intended to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice, (e) a murder involving sexual or sadistic conduct, (f) the murder of two or more persons, (g) a murder that is racially or religiously aggravated or aggravated by sexual orientation, or (h) a murder falling within paragraph 4(2) committed by an offender who was aged under 21 when he committed the offence.” Paragraphs 6 and 7 provide that, in all other cases, the appropriate starting point in determining the minimum term is fifteen years’ imprisonment (twelve years for those less than eighteen years of age). Paragraphs 8 and 9 provide that, having chosen a starting point, the trial judge should take into account any aggravating or mitigating factors which may result in a minimum term of any length (whatever the starting point), or in the making of a whole life order. Paragraph 10 provides that aggravating factors include: “(a) a significant degree of planning or premeditation, (b) the fact that the victim was particularly vulnerable because of age or disability, (c) mental or physical suffering inflicted on the victim before death, (d) the abuse of a position of trust, (e) the use of duress or threats against another person to facilitate the commission of the offence, (f) the fact that the victim was providing a public service or performing a public duty, and (g) concealment, destruction or dismemberment of the body.” Paragraph 11 provides that mitigating factors include: (a) an intention to cause serious bodily harm rather than to kill, (b) lack of premeditation, (c) the fact that the offender suffered from any mental disorder or mental disability which (although not falling within section 2(1) of the Homicide Act 1957 (c. 11)), lowered his degree of culpability, (d) the fact that the offender was provoked (for example, by prolonged stress) in a way not amounting to a defence of provocation, (e) the fact that the offender acted to any extent in self-defence, (f) a belief by the offender that the murder was an act of mercy, and (g) the age of the offender.” 2. Schedule 22 to the 2003 Act 34.     Schedule 22 enacts a series of transitional measures for those prisoners who were given mandatory life sentences prior to the entry into force of section 269 of the Act and whose minimum terms of imprisonment were set by the Secretary of State. It also applies to those prisoners whom the Secretary of State directed should never be eligible for early release on licence (that is, those prisoners for whom a whole life tariff had been set). Paragraph 3 of the schedule allows both categories of prisoners to apply to the High Court. Upon such an application the High Court must, in the case of a prisoner who is subject to a minimum term of imprisonment set by the Secretary of State, make an order specifying the minimum term that prisoner must serve before he or she is eligible for early release. Under paragraph 3(1)(b), where the Secretary of State notified the prisoner that a whole life tariff had been set, the High Court may make an order that the prisoner should not be eligible for release (“a whole life order”). The minimum term set by the High Court must not be greater than that previously set by the Secretary of State (paragraph 3(1)(a)). Similar provisions apply to sentences passed after the commencement of the Act in respect of murders committed before commencement. Paragraph 10 provides that the court may not make an order which, in its opinion, is greater than that which the Secretary of State would have been likely to have made under the previous practice. 35.     In determining an application under paragraph 3, the High Court must have regard inter alia to the seriousness of the offence and, in so doing, must also have regard to the general principles set out in schedule 21 and any recommendations to the Secretary of State by the trial judge or the Lord Chief Justice as to the minimum term to be served by the offender before release on licence (paragraphs 4 and 5 of schedule 22). The offender may also make representations to the High Court, including representations as to his or her behaviour and progress in prison since the offence, before the High Court determines the application. Representations can also be made by the victim or victims’ families. The High Court may also hold an oral hearing in rare cases. B. The Secretary of State’s discretion to release 36 .     Section 30(1) of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 provides that the Secretary of State may at any time release a life prisoner on licence if he is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist which justify the prisoner’s release on compassionate grounds. The criteria for the exercise of that discretion are set out in Prison Service Order 4700 chapter 12, which, where relevant, provides: “• the prisoner is suffering from a terminal illness and death is likely to occur very shortly (although there are no set time limits, 3 months may be considered to be an appropriate period for an application to be made to Public Protection Casework Section [PPCS]), or the ISP (Indeterminate Sentenced Prisoner) is bedridden or similarly incapacitated, for example, those paralysed or suffering from a severe stoke; and • the risk of re-offending (particularly of a sexual or violent nature) is minimal; and • further imprisonment would reduce the prisoner’s life expectancy; and • there are adequate arrangements for the prisoner’s care and treatment outside prison; and • early release will bring some significant benefit to the prisoner or his/her family.” 37.     According to the Government, as of 28 April 2011, 4,900 prisoners were serving mandatory life sentences for murder in England and Wales. Forty-one prisoners were subject to whole life orders (including those held in secure hospitals). Since 1 January 2000, thirty-seven whole life orders had been imposed, eight of which were subsequently reduced by the Court of Appeal. Since 2000, no prisoner serving a whole life term had been released on compassionate grounds. In response to a freedom of information request by the first applicant, the Ministry of Justice indicated that, as of 30   November 2009, thirteen life-sentence prisoners who had not been given whole life terms had been released on compassionate grounds. C. Relevant domestic case-law on mandatory life sentences and the Convention 1. Case-law on the pre-2003 Act system 38 .     In R. v. Lichniak and R. v. Pyrah [2003] 1 AC 903, the House of Lords considered that, in its operation at that time, a mandatory life sentence was not incompatible with either Articles 3 or 5 of the Convention. Such a sentence was partly punitive, partly preventative. The punitive element was represented by the tariff term, imposed as punishment for the serious crime which the convicted murderer had committed. The preventative element was represented by the power to continue to detain the convicted murderer in prison unless and until the Parole Board, an independent body, considered it safe to release him, and also by the power to recall to prison a convicted murderer who had been released if it was judged necessary to recall him for the protection of the public (Lord   Bingham of Cornhill at paragraph 8 of the judgment). The House of Lords therefore held firstly, that the appellant’s complaints were not of sufficient gravity to engage Article 3 of the Convention and secondly, that the life sentence was not arbitrary or otherwise contrary to Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. Lord Bingham added: “If the House had concluded that on imposition of a mandatory life sentence for murder the convicted murderer forfeited his liberty to the state for the rest of his days, to remain in custody until (if ever) the Home Secretary concluded that the public interest would be better served by his release than by his continued detention, I would have little doubt that such a sentence would be found to violate articles 3 and 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights ... as being arbitrary and disproportionate.” 39 .     In R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Hindley [2001] 1 AC 410, HL and R. v. Anderson [2003] 1 AC 837, HL, the House of Lords found that, under the tariff system then in operation, there was “no reason, in principle, why a crime or crimes, if sufficiently heinous should not be regarded as deserving lifelong incarceration for purposes of pure punishment” (per Lord Steyn at pp. 416H). Lord Steyn also observed: “there is nothing logically inconsistent with the concept of a tariff by saying that there are cases were the crimes are so wicked that even if the prisoner is detained until he or she dies it will not exhaust the requirements of retribution and deterrence” (p. 417H). The House of Lords also found that the Secretary of State had not unlawfully fettered his discretion in reviewing the cases of prisoners where a whole life tariff was in place after the prisoner had served twenty-five years’ imprisonment and reducing the tariff in appropriate cases.). The judgment records the Secretary of State’s policy statement of 10 November 1997, in which the Secretary of State indicated that he was: “open to the possibility that, in exceptional circumstances, including for example, exceptional progress by the prisoner whilst in custody, a review and reduction of the tariff may be appropriate.” The Secretary of State indicated that he would have this possibility in mind when reviewing at the 25 year point the cases of prisoners given a whole life tariff and in that respect would consider issues beyond the sole criteria of retribution and deterrence (p. 417A-C). 2. Case-law on the 2003 Act system 40 .     In R v. Bieber [2009] 1 WLR 223 the Court of Appeal considered the compatibility of the 2003 Act with Article 3 of the Convention in the light of Kafkaris v. Cyprus [GC], no. 21906/04, ECHR 2008 ‑ ... It found that a whole life order did not contravene Article 3 of the Convention because of the possibility of compassionate release by the Secretary of State. It also found that the imposition of an irreducible life sentence would not itself constitute a violation of Article 3 but rather that a potential violation would only occur once the offender had been detained beyond the period that could be justified on the ground of punishment and deterrence. The court observed: “45. While under English law the offence of murder attracts a mandatory life sentence, this is not normally an irreducible sentence. The judge specifies the minimum term to be served by way of punishment and deterrence before the offender’s release on licence can be considered. Where a whole life term is specified this is because the judge considers that the offence is so serious that, for purposes of punishment and deterrence, the offender must remain in prison for the rest of his days. For the reasons that we have given, we do not consider that the Strasbourg court has ruled that an irreducible life sentence, deliberately imposed by a judge in such circumstances, will result in detention that violates article 3. Nor do we consider that it will do so. 46. It may be that the approach of the Strasbourg court will change. There seems to be a tide in Europe that is setting against the imposition of very lengthy terms of imprisonment that are irreducible. Thus it may become necessary to consider whether whole life terms imposed in this jurisdiction are, in fact irreducible. ... Under the regime that predated the 2003 Act it was the practice of the Secretary of State to review the position of prisoners serving a whole life tariff after they had served 25 years with a view to reducing the tariff in exceptional circumstances, such as where the prisoner had made exceptional progress whilst in custody. No suggestion was then made that the imposition of a whole life tariff infringed article 3. ... Under the current regime the Secretary of State has a limited power to release a life prisoner under section 30 of the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. ... At present it is the practice of the Secretary of State to use this power sparingly, in circumstances where, for instance, a prisoner is suffering from a terminal illness or is bedridden or similarly incapacitated. If, however, the position is reached where the continued imprisonment of a prisoner is held to amount to inhuman or degrading treatment, we can see no reason why, having particular regard to the requirement to comply with the Convention, the Secretary of State should not use his statutory power to release the prisoner. 49. For these reasons, applying the approach of the Strasbourg court in Kafkaris v   Cyprus 12 February 2008, we do not consider that a whole life term should be considered as a sentence that is irreducible. Any article 3 challenge where a whole life term has been imposed should therefore be made, not at the time of the imposition of the sentence, but at the stage when the prisoner contends that, having regard to all the material circumstances, including the time that he has served and the progress made in prison, any further detention will constitute degrading or inhuman treatment. 50. For these reasons we reject the challenge made to the defendant’s sentence that is founded on article 3. 51 We would add, for the avoidance of doubt, that we have not been asked to consider, nor have we, whether the decision under section 30 of the 1997 Act is one that should properly be taken by a judge rather than by a minister.” 41 .     The transitional measures set out in schedule 22 were found by the Court of Appeal to be compatible with Articles 6 and 7 of the Convention in R v. Pitchfork [2009] EWCA Crim 963. The schedule expressly provided that the outcome of the High Court review could not be an increase in the minimum period set by the Secretary of State. It was not in breach of Article   7 to direct the High Court to consider the general principles set out in schedule 21: neither those principles nor the original recommendations by the trial judge and the Lord Chief Justice were to enjoy primacy over the other. Instead, the High Court was conducting a fresh review, taking account of both the judicial recommendations and schedule 21. 42 .     In R v. Neil Jones and Others [2006] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 19 the Court of Appeal held that protection of the public was not a relevant factor in fixing the minimum term, since it was the task of the Parole Board to ensure that the offender was not released after serving the minimum term unless this presented no danger to the public. The court also held: “A whole life order should be imposed where the seriousness of the offending is so exceptionally high that just punishment requires the offender to be kept in prison for the rest of his or her life. Often, perhaps usually, where such an order is called for the case will not be on the borderline. The facts of the case, considered as a whole, will leave the judge in no doubt that the offender must be kept in prison for the rest of his or her life. Indeed if the judge is in doubt this may well be an indication that a finite minimum term which leaves open the possibility that the offender may be released for the final years of his or her life is the appropriate disposal. To be imprisoned for a finite period of 30 years or more is a very severe penalty. If the case includes one or more of the factors set out in para.4(2) it is likely to be a case that calls for a whole life order, but the judge must consider all the material facts before concluding that a very lengthy finite term will not be a sufficiently severe penalty.” 43 .     In Attorney-General’s Reference No 38 of 2008 (also known as R   v.   Wilson ) [2008] EWCA Crim 2122, the offender had been convicted of murder in 1991, and was notified of the decision of the Secretary of State to set a whole life tariff in 1994. Upon an application to the High Court, the whole life tariff was substituted by a minimum term of eighteen years’ imprisonment. That decision was reviewed by the Court of Appeal, which increased the minimum term to thirty years’ imprisonment. The Court of Appeal also observed that it remained open to the High Court to consider the recommendation of the trial judge and Lord Chief Justice in their contemporaneous context but, as in any case, the findings and views of the trial judge represented a critical element in any sentencing decision. The recommendations were not subsidiary to the provisions in schedule 21 and paragraph 4(2) of schedule 22 made it clear that proper weight should be given to these recommendations in the review process. The Court of Appeal accepted that the recommendations in the case before it, and in many cases like it, would be “likely to have been made in a sentencing environment in which the term to be served would be likely to be shorter than it is now”. 44 .     In R v. Leigers [2005] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 104 the Court of Appeal stated that schedule 21 provided an even more rigorous approach to the determination of the minimum term than had applied previously and, when followed, would in some cases lead to longer minimum terms. However, in that case, which concerned a sentence passed after the commencement of the 2003 Act in respect of a murder committed before its commencement, the court went on to state that the scheme was compatible with Articles 5 and 7 of the Convention, given the transitional measures contained in paragraph 10 of schedule 22. 3. R (Wellington) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 72 45 .     The United States requested the extradition of Ralston Wellington from the United Kingdom to stand trial in Missouri on two counts of murder in the first degree. In his appeal against extradition, Mr Wellington argued that his surrender would violate Article 3 of the Convention, on the basis that there was a real risk that he would be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment in the form of a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. 46 .     In giving judgment in the High Court ([2007] EWHC 1109 (Admin)), Lord Justice Laws found that there were “powerful arguments of penal philosophy” which suggested that risk of a whole-life sentence without parole intrinsically violated Article 3 of the Convention. He   observed: “The abolition of the death penalty has been lauded, and justified, in many ways; but it must have been founded at least on the premise that the life of every person, however depraved, has an inalienable value. The destruction of a life may be accepted in some special circumstances, such as self-defence or just war; but retributive punishment is never enough to justify it. Yet a prisoner’s incarceration without hope of release is in many respects in like case to a sentence of death. He can never atone for his offence. However he may use his incarceration as time for amendment of life, his punishment is only exhausted by his last breath. Like the death sentence the whole-life tariff is lex talionis . But its notional or actual symmetry with the crime for which it is visited on the prisoner (the only virtue of the lex talionis ) is a poor guarantee of proportionate punishment, for the whole-life tariff is arbitrary: it may be measured in days or decades according to how long the prisoner has to live. It is therefore liable to be disproportionate – the very vice which is condemned on Article 3 grounds – unless, of course, the death penalty’s logic applies: the crime is so heinous it can never be atoned for. But in that case the supposed inalienable value of the prisoner’s life is reduced, merely, to his survival: to nothing more than his drawing breath and being kept, no doubt, confined in decent circumstances. That is to pay lip-service to the value of life; not to vouchsafe it.” However, and “not without misgivings”, he considered that the relevant authorities, including those of this Court, suggested an irreducible life sentence would not always raise an Article 3 issue. 47.     On Wellington’s appeal to the House of Lords, a majority of their Lordships found that Article 3, insofar as it applied to inhuman and degrading treatment and not to torture, was applicable only in attenuated form to extradition cases. In any event, all five Law Lords found that the sentence likely to be imposed on the appellant would not be irreducible; having regard to the powers of clemency and commutation of the Governor of Missouri, it would be just as reducible as the sentence at issue in Kafkaris . 48.     All five Law Lords also noted that, in Kafkaris , the Court had only said that the imposition of an irreducible life sentence may raise an issue under Article 3. They found that the imposition of a whole life sentence would not constitute inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 per se , unless it were grossly or clearly disproportionate. Lord   Brown in particular noted: “Having puzzled long over this question, I have finally concluded that the majority of the Grand Chamber [in Kafkaris ] would not regard even an irreducible life sentence—by which, as explained, I understand the majority to mean a mandatory life sentence to be served in full without there ever being proper consideration of the individual circumstances of the defendant’s case—as violating article 3 unless and until the time comes when further imprisonment would no longer be justified on any ground—whether for reasons of punishment, deterrence or public protection. It is for that reason that the majority say only that article 3 may be engaged.” 49.     Moreover, Lord Hoffmann, Lord Scott, Baroness Hale and Lord Brown all doubted Lord Justice Laws’ view (endorsed by the Privy Council in de Boucherville – see section 3 below) that life imprisonment without parole was lex talionis . Lord Hoffmann, Baroness Hale and Lord Brown did not accept his premise that the abolition of the death penalty had been founded on the idea that the life of every person had an inalienable value; there were other, more pragmatic reasons for abolition such as its irreversibility and lack of deterrent effect. Lord Scott rejected the view that an irreducible life sentence was inhuman and degrading because it denied a prisoner the possibility of atonement; once it was accepted that a whole life sentence could be a just punishment, atonement was achieved by the prisoner serving his sentence. 50 .     Wellington’s application to this Court was struck out on 5 October 2010, the applicant having indicated his wish to withdraw it; Wellington v.   the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 60682/08. III. RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW ON LIFE SENTENCES AND “GROSSLY DISPROPORTIONATE” SENTENCES 51 .     The relevant texts of the Council of Europe, the Europe