CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 26 juin 2012

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GERMANY   (Application no. 9300/07)                     JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   26 June 2012       This judgment is final but may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Herrmann v. Germany, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   Nicolas Bratza, President,   Françoise Tulkens,   Josep Casadevall,   Nina Vajić,   Dean Spielmann,   Corneliu Bîrsan,   Boštjan M. Zupančič,   Khanlar Hajiyev,   Egbert Myjer,   David Thór Björgvinsson,   Nona Tsotsoria,   Nebojša Vučinić,   Angelika Nußberger,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,   Erik Møse,   André Potocki, judges, and Michael O’Boyle, Deputy Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 30 November 2011 and on 9 May 2012, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last ‑ mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 9300/07) against the Federal Republic of Germany lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a German national, Mr Günter Herrmann (“the applicant”), on 12 February 2007. 2.     The applicant, who is a lawyer and initially represented himself, was subsequently represented by Mr M. Kleine-Cosack, a lawyer practising in Freiburg. The German Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms A. Wittling-Vogel. 3.     The applicant alleged that his compulsory membership of a hunting association and the obligation for him to tolerate hunting on his property violated his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 9 of the Convention, both taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, and under Article 11 of the Convention. 4.     The application was allocated to the Fifth Section of the Court (Rule   52 §   1 of the Rules of Court). On 20 January 2011 a Chamber of that Section composed of the following judges: Peer Lorenzen, President, Renate Jaeger, Rait Maruste, Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, Zdravka Kalaydjieva and Ganna Yudkivska, and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar, declared the application admissible in so far as it concerned the complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14, and under Article 9 of the Convention, and declared the complaint under Article 11 of the Convention inadmissible. It delivered a judgment in which it held by four votes to three that there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 taken alone and in conjunction with Article   14 of the Convention. It further held, by six votes to one, that there had been no violation of Article 9 of the Convention. Judges Lorenzen, Berro-Lefèvre and Kalaydjieva expressed a joint dissenting opinion and Judge Kalaydjieva expressed a further separate dissenting opinion. Both opinions were annexed to the judgment. 5.     On 20 June 2011, following a request by the applicant dated 13 March 2011, a panel of the Grand Chamber decided to refer the case to the Grand Chamber under Article 43 of the Convention. 6.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24. 7.     The applicant and the Government each filed further written observations (Rule 59 § 1). In addition, third-party comments were received from the Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Jagdgenossenschaften und Eigenjagdbesitzer (BAGJE), the Deutscher Jagdschutz-Verband e.V . (DJV) and the European Centre for Law and Justice (ECLJ), all of which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the written procedure (Article   36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3). 8.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 30 November 2011 (Rule 59 § 3). There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Ms   A. Wittling-Vogel , Federal Ministry of Justice,   Agent , Ms   S. Schmahl , Professor of Public Law,   Counsel , Ms   S. Winkelmaier , Federal Ministry of Justice, Ms   D. Friedrich, Federal Ministry of Agriculture, Mr   A. Heider , Federal Ministry of Agriculture,   Advisers ; (b)     for the applicant Mr   M. Kleine-Cosack , lawyer,   Counsel , Mr   D. Storr , lawyer, Ms   H. Seppain ,   Advisers .   9.     The applicant was also present. The Grand Chamber heard addresses by Mr Kleine-Cosack and Ms Schmahl as well as their answers to questions put by the judges. Additional information was submitted by the Government and the applicant in writing. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 10.     The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Stutensee. A.     The applicant’s land 11.     Under the German Federal Hunting Act ( Bundesjagdgesetz ), owners of hunting grounds with a surface area of less than 75 hectares are de jure members of a hunting association ( Jagdgenossenschaft ), while owners of larger plots of land manage their own hunting district. The applicant owns two landholdings in Rhineland-Palatinate of less than 75 hectares each, which he inherited in 1993 from his late mother. He is thus a de jure member of a hunting association, in this case the hunting association of the municipality of Langsur. B.     The applicant’s claims before the administrative authorities and courts 12.     On 14 February 2003 the applicant, who is opposed to hunting on ethical grounds, filed a request with the hunting authority seeking to terminate his membership of the hunting association. The authority rejected his request on the grounds that his membership was prescribed by law and that there was no provision for the termination of membership. 13.     The applicant brought proceedings before the Trier Administrative Court. Relying in particular on the Court’s judgment in the case of Chassagnou and Others v. France ([GC], nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 28443/95, ECHR 1999 ‑ III), he requested the Administrative Court to find it established that he was not a member of the hunting association of the municipality of Langsur. 14.     On 14 January 2004 the Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s request. It considered that the Federal Hunting Act did not violate the applicant’s rights. With regard to the Chassagnou judgment, the Administrative Court took the view that the situation in Germany differed from that in France. It observed, in particular, that German owners of hunting grounds were able, by virtue of their membership of the hunting association, to influence the decision-making process as to how the relevant hunting rights should be exercised. Furthermore, they had the right to receive a share of the profits derived from the exercise of those hunting rights. All owners of plots which were too small to allow proper management of hunting rights joined a hunting association. The court further considered that the hunting associations not only served the leisure interests of those who exercised the hunting rights, but also imposed certain specific obligations on them which served the general interest, in particular a duty to manage game stocks with the aim of maintaining varied and healthy game populations and a duty to prevent damage caused by wild game. They were further obliged to comply with specific quotas set by the authorities for the hunting of game. These duties applied in the same way to the owners of hunting grounds of more than 75 hectares, notwithstanding the fact that these bigger plots were not grouped together in common hunting districts. 15.     On 13 July 2004 and 14 April 2005 the Rhineland-Palatinate Administrative Court of Appeal and the Federal Administrative Court dismissed the appeals lodged by the applicant, on the same grounds as the Administrative Court. C.     The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court 16.     On 13 December 2006 the Federal Constitutional Court (1   BvR   2084/05) refused to admit a constitutional complaint by the applicant for adjudication. It noted at the outset that the provisions of the Federal Hunting Act did not violate the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his property, but defined and limited the exercise of that right in a proportionate manner. The relevant provisions pursued legitimate aims, were necessary and did not impose an excessive burden on landowners. 17.     When defining the content and limits of property rights, the legislature had to weigh the landowners’ legitimate interests against the general interest. It had, in particular, to respect the principles of proportionality and equal treatment. The limitations imposed on the exercise of property rights must not infringe the core area of the protected right. The margin of appreciation allowed to the legislature depended on the specific context; the more important the social considerations, the wider the margin of appreciation. 18.     Applying these principles to the instant case, the Federal Constitutional Court considered that the applicant’s compulsory membership of a hunting association did not violate his property rights. The core area of that right had not been infringed. The Federal Hunting Act pursued the legitimate aims of preserving game in a manner adapted to the rural and cultural environment and ensuring healthy and varied wildlife, aims encompassed in the notion of “management and protection of game stocks” ( Hege ). Under the Federal Hunting Act, gamekeeping was a means not only of preventing damage caused by wildlife, but also of avoiding any impediment to the use of the land for agriculture, forestry and fishing. These aims served the general interest. 19.     Compulsory membership of a hunting association was an appropriate and necessary means of achieving those aims. Referring to paragraph 79 of the Chassagnou judgment, cited above, the Constitutional Court considered that the European Court of Human Rights had acknowledged that it was undoubtedly in the general interest to avoid unregulated hunting and encourage the rational management of game stocks. Compulsory membership of a hunting association was also a proportionate means. The impact on property rights was not particularly serious and did not outweigh the general interest in the rational management of game stocks. Furthermore, the Federal Hunting Act conferred on every member of the hunting association the right to participate in the decision ‑ making process within the association and to receive a share of the profits derived from the leasing of the hunting rights. 20.     The Constitutional Court further considered that there had been no violation of the applicant’s right to freedom of conscience. It noted that in paragraph   114 of the Chassagnou judgment the European Court of Human Rights had accepted that the convictions of the applicants in that case attained a certain level of cogency, cohesion and importance and were therefore worthy of respect in a democratic society. The Constitutional Court left open the question whether this assessment was correct in Mr   Herrmann’s case. It agreed, however, to take this assumption as a starting point as it considered that in any case there had been no violation of Article 4 of the Basic Law (see paragraph 25 below). It was doubtful whether there had been any interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of conscience. Even assuming that there had been, it was, in any event, not of a serious nature. As the applicant was not forced to participate in hunting himself and did not have to take any decision in that respect, the court considered that he had not been placed in a position of conflict of conscience. It further observed that the right to freedom of conscience did not encompass a right to have the entire legal order made subject to one’s own ethical standards. If the legal order distributed the right to make use of a certain property among several stakeholders, the owner’s conscience did not necessarily outweigh the other stakeholders’ constitutional rights. If the applicant’s landholding – and those of other owners who were opposed to hunting – were taken out of the common hunting districts because of the landowners’ convictions, the whole system of property ownership and management of game stocks would be jeopardised. The right to freedom of conscience did not outweigh the general interest in the instant case. 21.     According to the Federal Constitutional Court, the applicant’s complaint did not come within the scope of the right to freedom of association because German hunting associations were of a public nature. They were vested with administrative, rule-making and disciplinary prerogatives and remained integrated within State structures. There was thus no doubt that the association was not characterised as “public” simply in order to remove it from the scope of Article 11 of the Convention. 22.     The Federal Constitutional Court further considered that the applicant’s right to equal treatment had not been breached. The administrative courts had put forward relevant reasons for drawing a distinction between the owners of landholdings of less than 75 hectares and those of more than 75 hectares (see paragraph 11 above). Contrary to the situation in France, which had been examined by the Court in the Chassagnou judgment, the Federal Hunting Act applied to the whole of Germany and was binding on all landowners. The owners of land of more than 75 hectares had the same duties with regard to gamekeeping as those who belonged to hunting associations. 23.     Finally, the Federal Constitutional Court observed that the administrative courts had considered the Chassagnou judgment and had emphasised the differences between German and French law as applicable at the relevant time. D.     The use of the applicant’s land 24.     Having been invited by the President of the Grand Chamber to provide the Court with additional information regarding the actual use of the applicant’s land, the Government submitted a declaration by the farmer who had taken out a lease on the agricultural land to which the applicant’s plots belonged. The farmer submitted that she regularly used the land to raise cattle destined for slaughter. This was confirmed in a written statement by the mayor of the municipality of Langsur. The applicant submitted that he had visited the plots several times over the previous years without ever seeing any cattle. He had never given permission for his land to be used in that way and would take legal action against any possible abuse. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW A.     The Basic Law 25.     The Basic Law provides: Article 4 [Freedom of faith and conscience] “(1) Freedom of faith and conscience and freedom to profess a religious or philosophical creed shall be inviolable.” Article 14 [Property – Inheritance – Expropriation] “(1) Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their content and limits shall be defined by the law. (2) Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.” Article 20a (as in force since 1 August 2002) [Protection of the natural foundations of life and animals] “Mindful also of its responsibility toward future generations, the State shall protect the natural foundations of life and animals through legislation and, in accordance with law and justice, through executive and judicial measures, all within the framework of the constitutional order.” Article 72 (as in force since 1 September 2006) [Concurrent legislative powers] “(1) On matters falling within the scope of concurrent legislative powers, the Länder shall have power to legislate so long as and to the extent that the Federation has not exercised its legislative powers by enacting a law. (2) ... (3) If the Federation has made use of its power to legislate, the Länder may enact laws at variance with this legislation with respect to: 1. hunting (except for the law on hunting licenses); ... Federal laws on these matters shall enter into force no earlier than six months following their promulgation unless otherwise provided with the consent of the Bundesrat . As regards the relationship between Federal law and the laws of the Länder , the more recent law shall take precedence in respect of matters coming within the scope of the first sentence.” B.     The Civil Code 26.     Section 960(1)(1) of the Civil Code provides: “Wild animals shall be ownerless as long as they are not in captivity. ...” C.     The Federal Hunting Act 27.     Section 1 of the Federal Hunting Act (Bundesjagdgesetz) reads as follows: “(1) Hunting rights shall comprise the exclusive rights to protect, hunt and acquire ownership of wild game in a specific area. Hunting rights shall be linked to a duty to manage and protect game stocks ( Pflicht zur Hege ). (2) The management of game stocks shall be aimed at maintaining varied and healthy game populations at a level compatible with care of the land and with the prevailing cultural conditions and at preventing damage caused by game ... (3) Persons engaging in hunting shall abide by the commonly accepted standards of the German ethical principles governing hunting ( deutsche Weidgerechtigkeit ). (4) Hunting shall encompass the search for, pursuit, killing and catching of wild game. ...” 28.     The Federal Hunting Act distinguishes between hunting rights ( Jagdrecht ) and the exercise of hunting rights ( Ausübung des Jagdrechts ). The landowner has hunting rights over his or her property. The exercise of hunting rights is regulated by the following sections of the Hunting Act: Section 4 “Hunting rights may be exercised either in private hunting districts (section 7) or in common hunting districts (section 8).” Section 6 (Enclosed properties, suspension of the hunt) “The hunt shall be suspended on land which does not belong to a hunting district, and on enclosed properties ( befriedete Bezirke ). Limited exercise of hunting rights may be permitted. This law does not apply to zoological gardens.” 29.     Section 7 provides, inter alia , that plots of at least 75 hectares which can be used for agriculture, forestry or fishing and which belong to a single owner constitute private hunting districts. 30.     Section 8 provides that all land which does not belong to a private hunting district constitutes a common hunting district if it has an overall surface area of at least 150 hectares. The owners of land belonging to a common hunting district are de jure members of a hunting association according to the following provisions: Section 9(1) “The owners of land belonging to a common hunting district shall form a hunting association. The owners of land on which hunting is prohibited shall not belong to the hunting association.” Section 10 “(1) The hunting association shall as a rule operate the hunt on a leasehold basis. The lease may be limited to the members of the association. (2) The hunting association shall be allowed to lease out the hunting rights on its own account. With the agreement of the competent authority, it may decide to suspend the hunt ( Ruhen der Jagd ) . (3) The association shall decide on the use to be made of the net profits from the hunt. If the association decides not to distribute them among the owners of the hunting grounds according to the amount of land they own, each owner who contests this decision shall be allowed to claim his or her share. ...” 31.     The practice of hunting is regulated as follows: Section 20 “(1) Hunting shall be prohibited in areas where it would, in the specific circumstances, disturb public peace, order or safety or endanger human life. (2) Hunting in nature and wildlife conservation areas and in national and wildlife parks shall be regulated by the Länder .” Section 21(1) “The shooting of game is to be regulated in a manner which fully safeguards the legitimate interest of agriculture, fishery and forestry in being protected from damage caused by wild game, and which takes into account the requirements of the conservation of nature and the landscape. Subject to these restrictions, the regulation of game shooting shall contribute to maintaining a healthy population of all domestic game in adequate numbers and, in particular, to ensuring the protection of endangered species.” 32.     Liability for damage caused by game is regulated as follows: Section 29(1) “If a plot belonging to a common hunting district or being incorporated in a common hunting district is damaged by cloven-hoofed game, wild rabbits or pheasants, the hunting association shall compensate the landowner for the damage. The cost of compensation shall be borne by the members of the association in proportion to the size of their respective plots. If the leaseholder of the hunt has assumed partial or full liability for compensation in respect of game damage, he or she shall be liable. The hunting association shall remain liable if the person who sustained the damage is unable to obtain compensation from the leaseholder.” D.     The Hunting Act of Rhineland-Palatinate 33.     In so far as relevant, the Hunting Act of Rhineland-Palatinate – the Land where the applicant’s plots are located – provides as follows: Section 7 “(1) Hunting association are public-law corporations. They are subject to State supervision, exercised by the local hunting authority ... Each hunting association shall create its own statutes ( Satzung ). The statutes must be approved by the supervisory authority unless they are in accordance with the model statutes issued by the highest hunting authority; in this case, notice of the statutes shall be given to the local hunting authority. If the hunting association fails to create statutes within one year after the issue of the model statutes, the supervisory authority shall create and publish them ... at the association’s expense. ... (4) Cost orders ( Umlageforderungen ) shall be enforced in accordance with the provisions of the law on the enforcement of administrative acts. The powers of enforcement shall be exercised by the treasury office responsible for enforcing the claims of the municipality in which the association is situated ...” III.     COMPARATIVE LAW 34.     The research undertaken by the Court in relation to forty Council of Europe member States shows that membership of a hunting association is not compulsory in thirty-four countries (Albania, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom). In Austria, France and Sweden membership of a hunting association is obligatory in principle. The legislation in Georgia and in Switzerland makes no provision for hunting associations. Lastly, hunting is not practised in Monaco. 35.     Considerable differences exist between these member States’ laws as regards the obligation for landowners to tolerate hunting on their land. Of the thirty-nine member States in which hunting is practised, eighteen (Albania, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, the Netherlands, Portugal, “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, the United Kingdom and Ukraine) do not oblige landowners to tolerate hunting, while eighteen others (Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Russia, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and Turkey) do. However, both groups provide for exceptions of varying degrees to their respective rules. In France and the Czech Republic, the obligation to tolerate hunting depends on the specific situation regarding the plot of land and on administrative decisions. In Switzerland, there is no legislation governing the obligation to tolerate hunting. 36.     In four member States the legislation or case-law has been amended following the Court’s judgment in the case of Chassagnou and Others , cited above. In France, under the Loi Voynet of 26 July 2000, owners of land who are opposed to hunting for ethical reasons may, under certain conditions, request the termination of their membership of a hunting association. In Lithuania, following a ruling by the Constitutional Court, section 13(2) of the Hunting Act ceased to apply on 19 May 2005. Under this provision, landowners could object to hunting on their land only in cases where it might cause damage to their crops or forest land. In Luxembourg, in the wake of the judgments in Schneider v. Luxembourg (no. 2113/04, 10 July 2007) and Chassagnou and Others , cited above, the Hunting Act of 20 July 1929 was repealed and a new Act entered into force on 31 May 2011. It provides that landowners opposed to hunting on their land may, under certain conditions, request termination of their membership of a hunting association. Lastly, in the Czech Republic, the Constitutional Court ruled on 13 December 2006 that the administrative authority had to decide whether land could be included in a hunting district by weighing the different interests at stake in the light of the principles set out in the Chassagnou judgment. THE LAW I.     THE SCOPE OF THE CASE BEFORE THE GRAND CHAMBER 37.     In his submissions before the Grand Chamber, the applicant reiterated his complaint under Article 11 taken separately and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention. In the alternative, he complained under Article 8 of the Convention about his compulsory membership of the hunting association. 38.     The Court reiterates that the “case” referred to the Grand Chamber is the application as it has been declared admissible by the Chamber (compare, among many other authorities, K.   and T. v. Finland [GC], no.   25702/94, §§   140-141, ECHR 2001-VII; D.H. and Others v. the Czech Republic [GC], no.   57325/00, § 109, ECHR-2007-IV; and Taxquet v. Belgium [GC], no.   926/05, § 61, ECHR 2010). This means that the Grand Chamber may examine the case in its entirety in so far as it has been declared admissible; it cannot, however, examine those parts of the application which have been declared inadmissible by the Chamber (see Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], no. 60654/00, §§ 59-62 ECHR 2007 ‑ I, and Kurić and Others v. Slovenia [GC], no. 26828/06, § 235, 26 June 2012). 39.     It follows that in the context of the present case, the Court no longer has jurisdiction to examine the complaints under Article 11, taken alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, which were declared inadmissible by the Chamber (see paragraph 4 above). The same applies to the complaint under Article 8 of the Convention, a provision which was not relied upon by the applicant before the Chamber. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 40.     The applicant complained that the obligation to tolerate the exercise of hunting rights on his property violated his right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” A.     The Chamber judgment 41.     The Chamber found that the obligation to allow hunting on his property interfered with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his property but was justified under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. The Chamber noted at the outset that the Federal Hunting Act was aimed at maintaining varied and healthy game populations at a level compatible with care of the land and with cultural conditions, and at avoiding game damage. The Chamber accepted that these aims were in the general interest. 42.     With regard to the proportionality of the interference, the Chamber took note of the emphasis the relevant law placed on the maintenance of healthy fauna in accordance with ecological and economic conditions. Even though it appeared that hunting was primarily practised by individuals during their spare time, the Chamber considered that the purpose of the Hunting Act could not be reduced to merely enabling certain individuals to exercise a leisure activity. 43.     With regard to the necessity of the measure at issue, the Chamber further considered that the German law, in contrast to the legislation examined in the cases of Chassagnou and Schneider , cited above, applied nationwide and did not exempt the public or private owners of any property that was a priori suitable for hunting from the obligation to tolerate hunting on their property. Lastly, it considered that any exceptions to the rule of area-wide hunting were sufficiently justified by general and hunting-related interests and thus did not call into question the principle of area-wide hunting as such. 44.     The Chamber further noted that the applicant was entitled to a share of the profits from the lease in proportion to the size of his property. Even though the sum he could claim did not appear to be substantial, the Chamber considered that the relevant provisions prevented other individuals from deriving financial profit from the use of the applicant’s land. 45.     Having regard to the wide margin of appreciation afforded to the Contracting States in this area, allowing them to take into account the specific circumstances prevailing in their country, the Chamber concluded that there had been no violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraphs 45-56 of the Chamber judgment). B.     The parties’ submissions 1.     The applicant 46.     The applicant submitted that the limitations imposed on the use of his land by the Federal Hunting Act were disproportionate. The German legislature had failed to strike a fair balance between his interest in enjoying the use of his property and the alleged general interest in the practice of hunting. As he was the only landowner within the hunting association who was opposed to the practice of hunting, he was materially unable to prevent the leasing of the hunting rights. 47.     The circumstances of the case resembled those examined by the Court in the cases of Chassagnou and Schneider , cited above, and thus should lead to the same conclusions. The aims pursued by the German legislature were largely similar to those that had been pursued in France and Luxembourg. 48.     The concept of “ Hege” (the management and protection of game stocks) dated back to the Third Reich and did not serve the protection of game. Recent scientific research had demonstrated that wild game was able to self ‑ regulate and that excessive hunting even increased the numbers of certain species. Road accidents involving wild game were in the majority of cases caused by hunting. Furthermore, hunting did not in any way respect the need to protect rare and endangered species. 49.     In Germany, the hunt was in practice exercised as a leisure activity. Many species such as birds of prey were hunted without any ecological or economical necessity. Hunting could not be regarded as having a positive impact on issues of general interest. The ethical protection of animals was guaranteed by Article 20a of the Basic Law (see paragraph 25 above), while the right to hunt was not protected either by the Basic Law or by the Convention. 50.     The statutory measures laid down by the hunting legislation were by no means necessary for the control of property in accordance with the general interest. This was demonstrated by the fact that the Federal Hunting Act contained numerous exemptions from the obligation to tolerate hunting, in particular regarding areas which did not belong to a hunting district (for example, enclaves within a private hunting district). Furthermore, the hunting authority could authorise suspension of the hunt. The Länder were entitled to create areas which were not subject to hunting rights and had done so, in particular by creating vast nature reserves in which hunting was prohibited or only permitted under very exceptional circumstances. 51.     As the total number of hunters amounted to 358,000 and these hunted only occasionally in their spare time, it was materially impossible to subject the whole of German territory to the hunt. Furthermore, since the reform of the Federal system in Germany in 2006, the Länder were free to regulate hunting on their own initiative or even to abolish hunting altogether. 52.     The applicant contested the Government’s argument that the situation in Germany differed from that encountered in France, Luxembourg or other member States. In Germany, the average population density per square kilometre was 230 inhabitants; in many Länder , it was far below this figure. The population density in the Land of Rhineland-Palatinate, in which the applicant’s plots were situated, was 203 inhabitants per square kilometre and was thus very close to the population density in Luxembourg (189   inhabitants per square kilometre). The applicant’s land was only two kilometres from the Luxembourg border. Numerous States Parties to the Convention did not have hunting associations and yet did not encounter problems deriving from excessive numbers of wild animals. 53.     The measure was also disproportionate. The applicant had no effective means available to him by which to prevent hunting on his land. Furthermore, he had not received any financial compensation for the obligation to tolerate hunting on his property. In view of his ethical convictions, the psychological stress he suffered as a result of the hunt could not be made good by financial compensation, which in any event would only be minor. The applicant further relied on the Court’s argument concerning the irreconcilability of financial compensation with the ethical motives invoked by him (the applicant referred to Schneider , cited above, §   49). 2.     The Government 54.     The Government conceded that the obligation to tolerate hunting, which ran counter to the applicant’s convictions, had interfered with his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Nevertheless, they pointed out that in Germany – in contrast to the situation in France and Luxembourg, where hunting rights were transferred completely to the hunting associations – the landowner remained the holder of the hunting rights and was thus not deprived of any possessions. He merely had to cede the right to practise hunting. Privately owned land, which was limited in quantity, had a particular social relevance which entitled the legislature to limit its use in the general interest. 55.     Unlike the French Loi Verdeille , the German Federal Hunting Act did not pursue the goal of furthering the leisure activities of individual hunters or even of giving individuals the possibility of participating in hunting as a group, but pursued exclusively aims in the public interest. The German hunting legislation differed substantially from the French and Luxembourg laws. This was evident in the notion of “ Hege ”, which transcended the simple management of orderly hunting and encompassed general protection of game stocks. Hunting rights entailed an obligation to preserve varied and healthy game stocks while at the same time regulating the numbers of game in order to prevent game damage in agricultural and forest areas. Regulation of the quantity of wild game was particularly important in a densely populated country like Germany, for example in order to avoid the spread of animal diseases or damage caused by wild game on other property. 56.     The system of hunting associations in Germany covered all areas, including State-owned property, and was internally consistent. In contrast to the situation in France, in Germany the principle of area-wide hunting applied across the entire Federal territory. It was essential that hunting be carried out in all suitable areas, as game did not stop at district borders and would retreat into areas which were exempt from hunting. Exempting individual areas from the hunting system would lead to hunting districts being fragmented into numerous smaller areas; this ran counter to the principle of uniform maintenance and protection of game stocks. 57.     In contrast to the situation under Luxembourg law, a duty to practise hunting also existed on larger plots of land. Even though the owners of plots of more than 75 hectares were not de jure members of a hunting association, they were obliged to regulate game stocks and thus to practise hunting in the same way as the owners of plots belonging to a common hunting district. 58.     There were only a few exceptions to this rule, all of which were based on overriding general interests. It was true that the hunt was suspended in those areas which did not belong to a hunting district. However, only a few areas fell within the scope of that provision and they were generally incorporated into other hunting districts. The hunting authority only granted a suspension of the hunt in exceptional cases and for reasons relating to the management and protection of game stocks. Even in nature reserves hunting was not generally excluded; the regulation of the hunt depended on specific conservation aims. The reform of the Federal system had not changed this situation, as all the Länder had opted to maintain the system of area-wide hunting. 59.     The fact that other countries did not have hunting associations did not mean that landowners in those countries did not have to tolerate hunting on their properties, as other States also needed to find ways of fulfilling their international treaty obligations to protect species and animals. The natural system of self-regulation of wild game had ceased to function in the densely populated and heavily exploited regions of Central Europe. 60.     The regulations set out in German law were necessary as there was no less intrusive means that would have been equally suited to achieving the legislature’s aims. A system based on voluntary participation could not ensure a solution covering the whole area. Furthermore, compulsory membership ensured that none of the persons concerned were excluded from the system. A State-run administrative hunt was likewise not an efficient system, since without the self-administering hunting associations the State would have to undertake considerably more – and more expensive – regulation and monitoring in order to achieve the objectives of hunting. 61.     Even though the applicant had no realistic means of preventing hunting on his land, this did not impose a disproportionate burden on him. The obligation to tolerate hunting was only of relevance during the hunting season. In addition, German law provided for a number of different forms of compensation which entirely made up for the interference with the applicant’s property rights. 62.     Firstly, unlike in France, the landowners were entitled to a share of the profits derived from the leasing of the hunting rights. However, the applicant had never claimed his share from the hunting association. The Government did not subscribe to the view expressed by the Court in the Schneider judgment that ethical convictions could not be balanced against financial compensation (see Schneider , cited above, § 49). Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 protected the enjoyment of property without being subjected to external limitations. It did not, however, in any sense protect ethical convictions, still less authorise property owners to use their rights to political ends as envisaged by the applicant. 63.     Secondly, the applicant had the possibility of participating in the decision-making process within the hunting association with the aim of convincing the majority of members of his personal point of view and having this incorporated within the framework of the applicable law. 64.     Furthermore, the interests of landowners were safeguarded to the greatest extent possible by the Federal Hunting Act, which imposed on persons participating in the hunt the duty to respect the legitimate interests of landowners and made them liable for any damage caused by the hunt. 65.     The limitations imposed on hunting took into account ethical considerations, for example by prohibiting the use of certain kinds of ammunition. The applicant remained free to take measures to protect wildlife on his property. Furthermore, it was appropriate to impose on persons engaging in hunting the duty to catch, take care of and, if necessary, kill seriously injured game because only hunters had the necessary training allowing them to assess the situation and to take the necessary measures. 3.     The third-party interveners (a)     German association for the protection of hunting ( Deutscher Jagdschutz ‑ Verband e. V. , DJV) 66.     The DJV – a private association representing the interests of hunters in Germany – emphasised the significance of the outcome of the instant proceedings both for the entire hunting system and for hunters’ interests. In order to be allowed to hunt, hunters had to prove extensive knowledge in the relevant spheres and had to adhere to the highest ethical standards regarding the protection of animals and nature conservation. The specific situation in Germany, in particular its dense population and the intensive cultivation of its land, made it extremely difficult to regulate game populations. 67.     The principle of area-wide hunting was implemented consistently in Germany. Areas excluded from hunting districts under section 6(1) of the Federal Hunting Act comprised less than 0.01 % of all land. Exclusion was only temporary and the hunting authorities were required to incorporate such areas rapidly into neighbouring hunting districts. There was currently no known case in which an application to suspend the hunt temporarily had been approved by the higher hunting authority of the Land of Rhineland ‑ Palatinate, where the applicant’s property was situated. 68.     If certain areas were excluded from the hunt, there would inevitably be considerable concentrations of wild animals on those properties where hunting was not permitted. Fleeing and injured animals could not be followed into these areas, and it would become virtually impossible to practise hunting effectively and provide relief to suffering animals. Summing up, the DJV considered that it would no longer be possible to ensure the proper regulation of game populations, resulting in severe disruption to the ecological balance. Furthermore, hunters would no longer be prepared to assume liability for damage caused by wild game. (b)     Federation of hunting associations and owners of private hunting districts ( Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Jagdgenossenschaften und Eigenjagdbesitzer, BAGJE) 69.     The BAGJE – a federation of all State/regional associations and State-sponsored committees of property owners possessing hunting rights – emphasised the significance of the Court’s ruling in the instant case for the thousands of landowners they represented. In Germany, the system of hunting associations was a successful model of self-government and conflict prevention by landowners. 70.     The question whether or not hunting was allowed had never been part of the definition of property. The legislature, by regulating the ex