CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 10 juillet 2012

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margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .s127C7598 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .sD66C1369 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17.3pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s60723A49 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:39.7pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s81CCF55C { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .s48DB3670 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s7CB9076 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF8DCB537 { width:16.53pt; display:inline-block } .s30B52FCF { width:208.1pt; display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .sC1AC44A4 { width:228.11pt; display:inline-block }       FOURTH SECTION             CASE OF BJÖRK EIÐSDÓTTIR v. ICELAND   (Application no. 46443/09)           JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   10 July 2012     FINAL   10/10/2012   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Björk Eiðsd ó ttir v. Iceland , The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Lech Garlicki, President,   David Thór Björgvinsson,   Päivi Hirvelä,   George Nicolaou,   Ledi Bianku,   Nebojša Vučinić,   Vincent A. De Gaetano, judges, and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 19 June 2012, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 46443/09) against the Republic of Iceland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Icelandic national, Mrs Björk Eiðsdóttir (“the applicant”), on 20 August 2009. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr Hreinn Loftsson and Mr Gunnar Ingi Jóhannsson, both lawyers practising in Reykjavík. The Icelandic Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs   Ragnhildur Hjaltadóttir, of the Ministry of Interior. 3.     The applicant alleged a violation of Article 10 of the Convention on account of the unfavourable outcome of defamation proceedings brought against her by a person who had been portrayed in an article published by the Vikan magazine on 23 August 2007. 4.     On 18 October 2010 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1 of the Rules of Court). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE   5.     The applicant, Mrs Björk Eiðsdóttir, is an Icelandic national who was born in 1974 and lives in Reykjavík. At the material time she worked as a journalist for Vikan , a weekly magazine. 6.     In 2007 there was a public debate in the print and televised media in Iceland on whether the regulations pertaining to strip clubs should be made stricter or whether such clubs should be banned. In June 2007 a magazine named Ísafold published an article discussing the links between such clubs and prostitution. It maintained that the conditions of strip club dancers originating from eastern Europe could be compared to human trafficking as defined in the relevant United Nations instruments. 7.     Subsequently, Vikan published in its issue no. 31 interviews with three east European women who worked at a strip club called Goldfinger owned by Mr Y. They had stated that they were happy working for Mr Y and that the critical remarks made about strip clubs could only be explained by the envy of certain other women. In the same issue, Vikan published the interviews of two anonymous strip dancers who described negative aspects of their jobs, namely that it was accompanied by prostitution and drug addiction. 8.     Thereafter Vikan was contacted by a young Icelandic woman, Mrs Z, who offered to tell her story. She was a former strip dancer who had worked at several strip clubs and had worked for Mr Y. She said that she had felt offended at seeing strip dancing being portrayed as a glamorous career. Mrs   Z met the applicant for an interview, which the applicant tape recorded and then typed up on the basis of the recording. The applicant sent the typed version to Mrs Z by e-mail for confirmation and consent to publish the story. Mrs Z responded in the affirmative. 9.     On 23 August 2007 Vikan published in its issue no. 34 an article based on the interview conducted by the applicant with Mrs Z. An introduction referred to the above-mentioned coverage in issue no. 31. In the interview, Mrs Z described her work as a striptease dancer in various establishments, notably at Goldfinger owned Mr Y. The article, which had a number of sub-headings, comprised, inter alia, Mrs Z’s description of prostitution which she was reported to have said went on unhindered in these establishments, for example at Goldfinger ; her drug addiction after she had started working as a striptease dancer; and threats she had been subjected to in connection with her work. The front cover of the magazine displayed a photograph of Mrs Z, which was also found on the first inside page of the magazine next to an editorial by Mrs G.E.A., the magazine’s editor, dealing with the above-mentioned article. Photographs of Mrs Z also featured on the title page of the article, next to its main text and a photograph of Mr Y. 10.     Alongside the latter photograph it was stated that the magazine had contacted him and had asked his opinion about Mrs Z’s account that he “encourage[d] girls who work[ed] for him to engage in prostitution and act[ed] as an intermediary in this respect”. It was further stated: “[Mr Y] totally rejected this. ‘I can categorically state that not one of my girl employees is encouraged to engage in prostitution. But, on the other hand, I cannot prohibit acts by them in their free time.’ When it was put to him that prostitution reportedly took place within the walls of his club, his answer was that this was not, to his knowledge, true to fact. ‘This is simply a tremendous lie and it seems that those who are successful must always be slandered. I have always tried to act as fairly as I possibly can towards my girls. I have been active in this branch for nine years, and I would not have retained my employees if I had asked them to do something against their will, ... [Mr Y] also was of the view that Vikan ’s account of these matters was prompted by vicarious considerations, as Vikan was published by the same company as Mannlíf and Ísafold , against which he said that he had initiated legal proceedings. [Mr Y] was emphatic that no falsehood should be published about him or his business, and finally stated: ‘I hope to God that you will not have any troubles on account of what you publish in your magazine.’” 11.     On 5 and 6 September 2007 Mr Y lodged defamation proceedings against the applicant, the editor, Mrs G.E.A., and Mrs Z before the Reykjavík District Court. In his writ, in which he set out the four judicial claims described below, he requested that the following statements published by Vikan in the relevant issue, be declared null and void ( dauð og ómerk ): Judicial claim no. 1 [statements made by Mrs Z] A. “I ended up working for [Mr Y], but there was a lot of prostitution at his clubs, and huge pressure was placed upon the girls who worked for him to engage in such activities.” B. “[Mr Y] has always been strongly involved in prostitution which occurs inside his clubs. After dancing in private was banned, the prostitution has simply been carried out behind curtains allegedly used for the purpose of talking to the clients in private.” C. “It varies a lot whether the clients pay [Mr Y] himself for the service or deal directly with the girls...” D. “I have overcome my fear of those men, although I have certainly been threatened with death and for a while I was too afraid to leave the house.” E. “The girls he employs come here temporarily for three months at a time and are treated as if they were in prison.” F. “In between, they are really under house arrest in the building apart from a period of time during which they are permitted to go outside.” G. “The reason for this is that girls were discovered to have found clients for themselves outside the club without [Mr Y] receiving a share of the fee; he wants to control the prostitution himself.” Judicial claim no. 2 [concerning remarks made in sub-headings] A.   “Prostitution the rule rather than the exception.” B. “Threatened with death.” C. “Brought to Iceland without any suspicion of what was going to happen.” Judicial claim no. 3 A.   “Threatened with death if she told anyone.” [Published as a heading on the front page.] B. “[Mrs Z] worked as a stripper and tells the Vikan reporter all about the prostitution and the threats to her life.” [Published in a summary in the table of contents.] C. “[Mrs Z] says the prostitution is allowed to continue unhindered and that it is conspicuous inside the striptease clubs.” [Published in a summary in the table of contents.] Judicial claim no. 4 “[Mrs Z.] is incredibly brave to have the courage to step forward and tell her story despite having been threatened with death ... .” 12.     Mr Y argued that the responsibility for the statements in judicial claim no. 1 lay mainly with Mrs Z or, in the alternative, with the applicant as the author of the article. The latter was responsible for the remarks in judicial claim no. 2 and the defendant G.E.A., as the magazine’s editor, was responsible for the remarks in judicial claim no. 3. Alternatively, in the event that the court did not accept this claim, Mr Y requested that the applicant be held responsible as the author of the article referred to in the heading and summary in question. 13.     In addition, Mr Y requested an order that the respondents, jointly and severally, be ordered to pay him 5,000,000 Icelandic krónur (ISK) in respect of damages and ISK 800,000 to cover the cost of publishing the judgment in the case in three newspapers and also in the following issue of Vikan . 14.     In disputing the above claims, the applicant and the editor of Vikan argued inter alia: “Most people would agree that the plaintiff is a controversial individual because of the activities in which he has been involved in Reykjavík and Kópavogur. The debate relating to the connection between striptease dancing and prostitution is tenacious, not least because abroad such operations are often run side by side, openly and in a legal manner, but also because of the nature of these activities. As an example of the persistence of such rumours in Iceland, a report on human trafficking in Iceland (court document no. 7), by the US Embassy in Iceland, dating from 2006, could be mentioned. At page 3 of the report, it is stated that during its compilation, a member of the embassy staff was offered sexual services at the restaurant Goldfinger . It is an established fact that the operation of pole-dancing establishments comprises obtaining girls, for the most part foreign nationals, for the purpose of dancing scantily clad or nude in front of the clients of the establishment, or in private cubicles, and, as indicated by the term, it is hard to observe everything that goes on inside such closed ‑ off spaces. Furthermore, the plaintiff has admitted in public that there have been incidents at Goldfinger where clients were offered sexual services, cf. an interview with the plaintiff on Channel 2, 1 June 2007 (court document no. 6). Because of the mystique, among other things, which to most people, surrounds such activities as well as persistent rumours regarding prostitution and human trafficking, the defendants felt that a discussion of this matter would be of interest and relevance to the general public. The defendants refer, for example, to a news item contained in court document no. 9, which cites the Chief of Police in Reykjavík as stating in his report regarding a licence for Goldfinger that European research has shown striptease dancers to be subjected to various kinds of abuse and, in many cases, they become the victims of human trafficking or other crimes. The defendants feel that the plaintiff has to accept and tolerate controversial discussion with regard to the operation of Goldfinger .... The presentation of the plaintiff’s case, however, is characterised by the shortcoming that he appears to identify himself with the operation of all the pole ‑ dancing establishments in Iceland.” 15.     In the course of the oral proceedings before the District Court, Mr Y and Mrs Z concluded a judicial settlement agreement, whereby he withdrew his action against her. He maintained his claims against the applicant and the editor. 16.     By a judgment of 4 April 2008 the District Court found that several of the statements originating from Mrs Z had been defamatory and that she in principle could be held liable but the action against her had been withdrawn. In contrast, the applicant and the editor could not be held liable and so the District Court dismissed Mr Y’s action against them. 17.     Mr Y then appealed against the District Court’s judgment to the Supreme Court. 18.     The applicant and the editor referred to their arguments before the District Court and disputed that the allegations that had formed the subject ‑ matter of Mr Y’s defamation action had constituted defamatory statements and innuendos against him. In any event, with regard to judicial claim no. 1, according to section 15 of the Printing Act, the respondents could not be held responsible for the affirmations made by Mrs Z in the interview and who ought to be considered as their author. As to judicial claim no. 2, the disputed sub-headings had not contained innuendos directed against the appellant’s honour or allegations to the effect that he had organised prostitution or other illicit activities. The interview had been conducted with Mrs Z who had spoken unreservedly about her experience of working as a striptease dancer in a number of striptease establishments. In processing the interview the applicant had used sub-headings in order to divide the text into chapters for clarification and to highlight each topic separately. She had only referred to the interviewee’s words and had made no independent contribution. The same or similar considerations applied to judicial claims nos. 3 and 4. The conditions for liability under section 26 of the Damage Compensation Act no. 50/1993 had not been fulfilled. The respondents had not made any allegations that exceeded their constitutionally protected right to freedom of expression (Article 73 of the Icelandic Constitution). 19.     By a judgment of 5 March 2009 the Supreme Court rejected Mr Y’s appeal in so far as it concerned the editor. In so far as it concerned the applicant, it upheld judicial claim no. 1, items A to C and E to G, and judicial claim no. 2, item A. It ordered the applicant to pay the appellant ISK 500,000 (approximately 3,000 euros (EUR)) in compensation for non ‑ pecuniary damage and ISK 400,000, plus interest, for his costs before the District Court and the Supreme Court. Its judgment contained the following reasons: “The main issue in dispute in the present case is whether the respondents are liable on the basis of section 15 (2) and (3) of the Printing Act, No. 57/1956 for statements that [the applicant] had cited from the interviewee and whether headings and references which the respondents themselves had created, which they maintained was done in close connection with the words used by their interviewee, fell within the provision on freedom of expression in Article 73 of the Icelandic Constitution. The grounds of the case of each party are sufficiently described in the judgment which is being challenged. As indicated therein, the plaintiff based his claim for the annulment of the remarks in judicial claim no. 1, items A to G, on the premise that they contained defamatory innuendos regarding his character, which are the responsibility of the [applicant] as the author of the article, see section 15 (2) of Act No. 57/1956. The title page of the article stated that its text had been prepared by [the applicant]. She confirmed at the court hearing that she had been the author of the article and had also formulated the sub-headings. She had determined the wording of the sub-headings, which, like the article, contained a near-verbatim rendering of [Mrs   Z]’s statements. This was indeed her ([Mrs Z]’s) account. [The applicant] stated that she had tape-recorded the interview, used the recording as a foundation for the article and had sent the result to [Mrs Z]. Subsequently [Mrs Z] had confirmed by email that this was an accurate rendering of her account. When comparing the manuscript of the interview and its tape-recording, on the one hand, and the article in question with its sub ‑ headings, on the other hand, it is however clear that this is not a verbatim rendering of the interviewee’s statements. However, it is also clear that the [applicant] in the main accurately rendered the substance of what her interviewee had said. As mentioned above, she had later confirmed that her story had been accurately rendered. Since the [applicant] is, as stated on the front page [...], the author of the text and has admitted to having written the article and its sub-headings, she is considered to be the author of the article and the sub-headings in the sense of section 15 (2) of Act No.   57/1956 and as such bears responsibility for this work. It is of no consequence whether [Mrs Z] may also be regarded as the author of the article in the sense of this provision of the law. By the remarks identified in items A, B, С and D of judicial claim no. 1 of his claim, the plaintiff [Mr Y] is alleged to be guilty of offences under Article 206 of the Penal Code [...], by organising for his own profit prostitution among the girls working for him on his premises and by exerting pressure on them for this purpose. The words in items Ε and F, however, convey the suggestion that Mr Y had deprived the girls who worked for him of their freedom, which constituted an offence under Article 226 of the Penal Code. The main text under the sub-heading ‘Prostitution the rule rather than the exception’ contained, inter alia, the words specified in items A and B of judicial claim no. 1, as well as other allegations relating to [Mr Y] and his striptease premises, Goldfinger . It is clear from the relationship between the main text and the heading, that the heading is directed against [Mr Y]. The same applies to this heading as to the remarks in judicial claim items A, B., С and G above. The remarks identified in items A, B, C, E, F and G of judicial claim no. 1 and the sub-heading referred to in item A of judicial claim no. 2 constitute a violation of Article 235 of the Penal Code. They do not comprise an expression of opinion or values but statements of fact that are not covered by Article 73 of the Icelandic Constitution with respect to freedom of expression. In accordance with Article   241 (1) of the Code they are declared null and void by the court. The words mentioned in item D of judicial claim no. 1 were directed against unspecified persons, not against the appellant [Mr Y]. The sub-headings in items B and C of judicial claim no. 2 were of a general nature; nor did the text below those headings appear to link them to [Mr Y]. Therefore, the [applicant] is acquitted with respect to those judicial claims. The words indicated in judicial claim nos. 3 and 4 of the claim, for which the respondent [editor, G.E.A.] bears responsibility according to section 15 (3) of Act No. 57/1956, are also of a general nature and she is therefore acquitted with respect to these judicial claims. The reasoning and conclusions of the present judgment are to be published in the first issue of Vikan that appears after its delivery. However, the claim in respect of expenses for further publication are rejected. Under section 26 (1)(b) of the Damage Compensation Act No. 50/1993, [Mr Y] is awarded compensation, to be paid by [the applicant] with respect to the above ‑ mentioned defamatory statements, in an amount of ISK 500,000, plus interest [...], which is deemed actionable. In accordance with this conclusion, the [applicant] is ordered to pay the appellant legal costs before the District Court and the Supreme Court [...]. In other respects, legal costs are not recoverable.” II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 20.     Article 73 of the Constitution of the Republic of Iceland, Act   No.   33/1944, read: Article 73 “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and belief. Everyone shall be free to express his thoughts, but shall also be liable to answer for them in court. The law may never provide for censorship or other similar limitations to freedom of expression. Freedom of expression may only be restricted by law in the interests of public order or the security of the State, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights or reputation of others, if such restrictions are deemed necessary and in agreement with democratic traditions.” 21.     The Penal Code No. 19/1940 contained in Chapter XXV, entitled “Defamation of character and violations of privacy’, the following relevant provisions: Article 234 “Any person who harms the reputation of another person by an insult in words or in deed, and any person spreading such insults shall be subject to fines or to imprisonment of up to one year.” Article 235 “If a person alleges against another person anything that might be harmful to his or her honour or spreads such allegations, he shall be subject to fines or to imprisonment of up to one years.” Article 236 “The making or spreading of an injurious allegation against a person’s better knowledge, this shall be subject to up to 2 years imprisonment. If an allegation is published or spread in a public manner, even where the person spreading the allegation did not have a probable reason to believe it to be correct, this shall be subject to fines or up to 2 years’ imprisonment.” Article 241 “In a defamation action, defamatory remarks may be declared null and void at the demand of the injured party. A person who is found guilty of a defamatory allegation may be ordered to pay to the injured person, on the latter’s demand, a reasonable amount to cover the cost of the publication of a judgment, its main contents or reasoning, as circumstances may warrant in one or more public newspapers or publications.” 22.     Section 26(1) of the Tort Liability Act No. 50/1993 provided: “A person who a. deliberately or through gross negligence causes physical injury or b. is responsible for an unlawful injury against the freedom, peace, honour or person of another party may be ordered to pay non-pecuniary damages to the injured party.” 23.     The Printing Act No. 57/1956, Chapter V on the liability for the contents of publications, contained the following relevant provisions. Section 13 “Any person who publishes, distributes, or is involved in the publishing or distribution, of any publication other than a newspaper or periodical shall bear criminal liability and liability for damages pursuant to the general rules of law if the substance of the publication violates the law.” Section 15 “As regards liability for newspapers or magazines other than those listed in section 14, the following rules shall apply: The author is subject to criminal liability and liability for damages if he or she is identified and either resident in Iceland when the publication is published or within Icelandic jurisdiction at the time proceedings are initiated. If no such author is identified, the publisher or editor are liable, thereafter the party selling or distributing the publication, and finally the party responsible for its printing or lettering.” 24.     The Code of Ethics of the Icelandic Journalists Association included the following provisions: Article 1 “A journalist will endeavour to do nothing which will bring discredit upon his or her profession or professional association, paper or newsroom. A journalist shall avoid any actions which could undermine the public opinion of journalists’ work or damage the interests of the profession. A journalist shall always exhibit fairness in dealings with colleagues.” Article 2 “A journalist is aware of his or her personal responsibility for what he or she writes. He or she shall bear in mind that he or she will generally be regarded as a journalist in his or her writings and speech, even when he or she is acting outside his or her profession. A journalist will respect the confidentiality of his or her sources.” Article 3 “A journalist will exercise care in his or her gathering of material, the use of the material and presentation to the extent possible, and show due consideration in sensitive matters. A journalist shall avoid any actions which could cause unnecessary distress or dishonour.” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 25.     The applicant complained that the Icelandic Supreme Court’s judgment of 28 July 2008 amounted to an interference with her right to freedom of expression that was not “necessary in a democratic society” and thus violated Article 10 of the Convention, which reads: “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent states from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” 26.     The Government contested that argument. A.     Admissibility 27.     The Court finds that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 28.     The Court considers that the impugned measure constituted an “interference by [a] public authority” with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression as guaranteed under the first paragraph of Article 10. 29.     That interference had a legal basis in Articles 235 and 241(1) of the Penal Code, section 15(2) of the Printing Act and section 26(1) of the Tort Liability Act and was in this sense “prescribed by law” for the purposes of the second paragraph of Article 10. 30.     In this connection the Court observes that in the course of the proceedings before it the applicant in addition maintained, with reference to the above-mentioned criterion – “prescribed by law” – that by having held her responsible of the impugned statements as an “author” under section 15(2) of the Printing Act, the Supreme Court had applied national law in a manner that had not been foreseeable. In other words, whilst she did not argue that the interference had lacked a legal basis in Icelandic law, she disputed the quality of the law with reference to the requirement of foreseeability stemming from the Court’s autonomous interpretation of the lawfulness requirement in its case-law. However, the Court does not find it necessary to pronounce on this issue which appears to concern a separate matter raised by the applicant for the first time in her observations of 8 April 2011 in reply to those of the Government of 16 February 2011. 31.     The Court is further satisfied that the interference pursued the legitimate aim of protecting “the reputation or rights of others”. 32.     It remains to consider whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. 1.     Arguments of the parties (a)     The applicant 33.     The applicant maintained that although it could be argued that some of the remarks published were statements of fact rather than value judgments, it was clear that this was not a sufficient reason for restricting her freedom of expression as a journalist under Article 10 of the Convention. She had acted in good faith and her intention had not been to damage Mr Y’s reputation but to contribute to an on-going social debate on the operation of strip clubs. The article had concerned a matter of serious public concern. By prohibiting dissemination of the information in question, the Supreme Court’s judgment had entailed an unreasonable restriction on the applicant’s journalistic freedom as protected by Article 10 that could not be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society”. By having been required to adduce solid evidence as proof of Mrs Z’s statements, the applicant had been faced with an unreasonable, if not an impossible, task ( Thorgeir   Thorgeirson v. Iceland , 25 June 1992, § 65, Series A no. 239). 34.     In the applicant’s view, there was ample factual basis for allowing the publication of the impugned allegations made by Mrs Z in her interview. 35.     In the first place, the applicant referred to the fact that the interview related to a public discussion on whether prostitution occurred in the strip club Goldfinger , owned and operated by Mr Y, and whether he was directly involved in that activity. The story had been based on an interview with a woman, Mrs Z, who had worked for Mr Y and who over a long period had had first-hand experience of the situation in strip clubs, including Goldfinger . In addition, it ought to be borne in mind that a few weeks before, Vikan had published an interview with three east European women who had given a glamorous picture of strip dancing. Also, in the same magazine, two Icelandic women who had experience of strip dancing had been interviewed anonymously, both of whom shared Mrs Z’s experience regarding prostitution in strip clubs. Thirdly, in the course of the domestic proceedings, the applicant had filed with the District Court, a report by the Embassy of the United States of America (USA) on sex crimes in Iceland, describing one incident where one of its employees had been offered sex for money when visiting the strip club Goldfinger for research. Fourthly, the applicant had referred to a report by the Chief of Police in Reykjavík, who had objected to Goldfinger’ s request for renewal of its licence to serve alcoholic beverages, with reference to the police’s suspicion of illegal activities associated with the establishment. The report affirmed that research had shown that there was a connection between prostitution and strip clubs and that the police objected to the renewal of Goldfinger ’s licence to serve alcoholic beverages. 36.     In addition, the applicant referred to another defamation case (Supreme Court judgment (no. 475/2008) of 30 April 2009), instituted by Mr Y against another magazine before the District Court almost simultaneously with the present case. In that case, a former head doorman of Goldfinger (for several years) and its co-manager, had testified before the Reykjavík District Court claiming that Mr Y had allowed prostitution to go on unhindered in the establishment. According to this testimony, Mr Y had received half of the revenue derived from this activity. In that case, which the Supreme Court decided on 30 April 2009, Mr Y had called for the annulment of eight statements containing allegations that prostitution occurred frequently in Goldfinger . The Supreme Court rejected Mr Y’s request to have all the remarks relating to prostitution in Goldfinger declared null and void. This was because it could be established that prostitution went on inside Goldfinger , although it had not been claimed in the magazine that Mr Y personally gained from that activity. 37.     The applicant stressed that Mr Y himself had admitted during a television interview, around the same time as the publication of the disputed article, that there had been incidents of prostitution which he had dealt with although he would not elaborate on how. A transcript of the interview had been submitted in the national proceedings. In that same interview Mr Y had also admitted that the strip dancers had been deprived of their freedom whilst pointing out that this had been necessary to protect them from customers wanting something more than dances in private. It was also revealed in the case that the Ministry for Social Affairs had requested the police to open an investigation into whether workers at strip clubs had been deprived of their liberty. The applicant added that Mr Y, who ran the club’s day-to-day activities and who had an office on its premises, could not have been ignorant of any illegal activities taking place there. 38.     The applicant found peculiar the Government’s comment that “ Goldfinger [was] still doing business”, whilst in actual fact strip dancing had been banned in Iceland. 39.     The applicant believed that the aforementioned facts provided ample reason to discuss the issue of alleged prostitution in strip clubs freely and openly. 40.     The applicant stressed that the reporting in question had been based on a reliable source, namely a first-hand witness account from a woman who had contacted the magazine Vikan and had wished to tell her story. This was after the women had read an interview in the same magazine, published three weeks before, with three east European women all working for Mr Y at Goldfinger , in which they had glamorised the profession. Mrs Z had felt offended by their description of the profession. There was no   indication that the applicant had acted in bad faith or that the ethics of good journalism had been violated and she objected to the Government’s contention that she had been careless. The case had not been brought before the Ethics Committee of the Icelandic Press Association (“IPA”). In fact, the IPA had openly expressed its outrage over the Supreme Court’s judgment. The applicant stressed that the interview had been part of an on ‑ going public debate in Iceland on whether to ban strip clubs. Mr Y had been given an opportunity to comment on the article, of which he had availed himself, and in so doing had denied all the accusations. 41.     The applicant, relying on Selistö v. Finland (no. 56767/00, 16   November 2004), invited the Court to consider whether Mr Y, who was a highly controversial figure and who owned and ran a highly controversial business, had such undoubted interest in protecting his reputation as could outweigh the interest in discussion on an important matter of legitimate public concern. 42.     The applicant had no reason to believe that the information might not be truthful and she in fact considered it to be accurate and correct. It was undisputed that the interviewee had worked for many years as a strip dancer, including for Mr Y at his clubs, notably at Goldfinger . She had no reason to defame Mr Y. In her statement to the District Court she had argued that since her affirmations to the magazine were true, they could not have been defamatory. She also testified to that effect before the District Court. However, in the course of the first instance hearing, Mr Y opted to reach a judicial settlement agreement with the interviewee, whereby he withdrew his action against her and settled all her expenses, leaving it to the applicant alone to respond to his claim that the story was false and therefore defamatory. 43.     To hold the applicant liable for defamation simply because she could not provide solid evidence for all the statements of the interviewee deprived her of her right as a person and a journalist to disseminate important information of public concern. The Supreme Court’s judgment offered no clues on how a journalist could avoid liability when reporting or presenting an article on the darker side of society. It failed to strike a fair balance between the applicant’s freedom of expression, on the one hand, and Mr Y’s interest in protection of his reputation, on the other hand. 44.     Finally, the applicant maintained that the amount of compensation which the Supreme Court had ordered her to pay to Mr Y – ISK 1,102,599, inclusive of two years’ default interest, which according to the 2007 exchange rate had amounted to approximately EUR 12,500 – had corresponded to five times her monthly salary (EUR 2,600), not counting her own legal expenses before the District Court and the Supreme Court. In her view, the size of the award had been disproportionate to the aim pursued. (b)     The Government 45.     The Government emphasised at the outset that in their interpretation of Article 73 of the Icelandic Constitution, the Icelandic courts had traditionally relied heavily on standards similar to those applied by the European Court in interpreting Article 10 of the Convention and had also considered such factors in their examination of the present case. 46.     The Government pointed out that, as could be seen from the Supreme Court’s judgment, the remarks which were found to violate Mr Y rights were deemed to constitute statements of fact rather than value judgments. This approach was fully consistent with the European Court’s case-law. 47.     Since the allegations that Mr Y was guilty of serious criminal offences had been presented as facts, the Icelandic courts enjoyed a greater margin of appreciation in restricting her freedom of expression than would have been the case had the statements consisted of value judgments. 48.     The remarks published in the applicant’s article must be considered in the context in which they had appeared and with regard to the way they had been presented in the magazine in question. The article had been the main story in the magazine and had featured as a headline on the front cover, in addition to being the main topic of the magazine’s editorial column. Of the sub-headings in the article authored by the applicant which she had indisputably selected from her interviewee’s account, the phrases “Prostitution the rule rather than the exception”, “Threatened with death” and “Brought to Iceland without any suspicion of what was going to happen” were particularly shocking and injurious to Mr Y’s character, whose name was repeatedly mentioned in the article. Even though the applicant was not responsible for remarks that had appeared on the front cover or in the editorial, the entire context and presentation of the article and its sub-headings were such as to constitute serious allegations against Mr Y. 49.     The Government accepted that prostitution and other related criminal activities were important social matters and that it was of great consequence for such matters to be freely discussed in the public sphere. It was clearly a social problem of great public concern in Iceland as in other European States and had been discussed openly in Icelandic media both in newspapers and on radio and television. Amendments had been called for to Icelandic criminal law providing for heavier punishment and criminalising the act of buying the services of prostitutes and called for special action plans within the law enforcement system as well as more emphasis in international police co-operation. There had been prosecutions and convictions in criminal cases before the Icelandic courts in the last years involving both prostitution and trafficking crimes. These cases had attracted a lot of media attention. Neither Mr Y nor his club had any connection with these cases. 50.     This state of affairs did not confer on the applicant a right to publish false allegations to the effect that particular individuals had committed crimes connected to such activities. Thus, Mr Y was not required to endure a declaration of his guilt and assertions that he had derived income from prostitution, had deprived women of their freedom and had forced them to engage in prostitution. In other words, the fact that a public debate had taken place concerning the issue of prostitution in clubs comparable to the ones operated by Mr Y did not of itself provide a factual basis for statements that he was guilty of such crimes. The remarks regarding Mr Y in the article written by the applicant and their context were clearly not a necessary contribution to the said public debate. Indeed, in its judgment the Supreme Court distinguished between general statements on the subject and specific remarks directed against Mr Y’s person, the latter not being considered a necessary contribution to public debate. 51.     The applicant’s argument that the police had refused to extend Mr   Y’s licence to serve alcohol for reasons relating to prostitution is also without any foundation or merit; even if this had been the case, it is clear that no evidence has been provided to support this allegation. Mr Y has neither been charged nor convicted of any of the offences described in the applicant’s article and his restaurant, Goldfinger , was still doing business. 52.     It should also be borne in mind that Mr Y had not been in a position where he might expect to endure harsher criticism or allegations in connection with a public debate on social issues. He had not engaged in politics or held public office. Moreover, his restaurant business had not been of such a nature as to justify subjecting him to harsher condemnation than any other person. He had not been convicted of any crime, as suggested in the newspaper article written by the applicant, and should be afforded the same protection of his private life as other private individuals. 53.     The Government objected strongly to the applicant’s argument that since, in her view, Mr Y was already a highly controversial character with ties to various controversial people, she enjoyed a wider freedom as a journalist in publishing statements concerning his guilt than in the case of other private individuals. No principles of that kind could be deduced from the Court’s case-law. Nor did “highly controversial characters” correspond to any category of individuals for whom private life and reputation deserved less protection against violations by the media. 54.     The applicant’s attitude towards Mr Y made it seem doubtful that she had acted in good faith and as a r