CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 27 novembre 2012

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display:inline-block } .sB279CA55 { width:213.76pt; display:inline-block } .s9138CF0B { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-align:right } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sCA1147F8 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid }       FIRST SECTION             CASE OF V.K. v. CROATIA   (Application no. 38380/08)             JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   27 November 2012   FINAL   29/04/2013   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of V.K. v. Croatia, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, President,   Elisabeth Steiner,   Nina Vajić,   Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,   Julia Laffranque,   Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,   Erik Møse, judges, and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 6 November 2012, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 38380/08) against the Republic of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Croatian national, Mr V.K. (“the applicant”), on 11   July 2008. The Vice-President of the Section acceded to the applicant’s request not to have his name disclosed (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court). 2.     The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Ms   K. Tomašić, a lawyer practising in Zagreb. The Croatian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Š. Stažnik. 3.     On 9 February 2010 the complaints concerning the length of civil proceedings and an effective remedy in that respect, as well as the applicant’s right to respect for his private and family life and his right to marry, were communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article   29 § 1). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 4.     The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Zagreb. 5.     On 30 November 2002 the applicant married M., and on 22   September 2003 a child, K., was born of the marriage. 6.     On 14 April 2004 the applicant filed a petition for divorce with the Z. Municipal Court ( Općinski sud u Z. ). 7.     At a hearing on 14 December 2004 the applicant submitted his proposal concerning contact and child maintenance for K. At the same hearing the parties agreed that the marriage be dissolved. 8.     On 30 December 2004 M. informed the Z. Municipal Court that she did not agree with the applicant’s proposal as regards child maintenance and asked the court to set an appropriate amount. 9.     The applicant lodged a request for expedition of the proceedings with the Z. Municipal Court on 2 February 2005. 10.     On 2 August 2005 the applicant brought a separate action in the Z. Municipal Court, contesting his paternity of K. 11.     The applicant further lodged a request with the Supreme Court ( Vrhovni sud Republike Hrvatske ) on 25 August 2005 asking that the proceedings be transferred to another court. 12.     The Z. Municipal Court on 15 September 2005 ordered the parties to submit information concerning their incomes. On 22 September 2005 the applicant, and on 18 October 2005 M., complied with this order and submitted the requested information. 13.     At a hearing on 31 October 2005 M. failed to appear. At the same hearing the applicant requested the trial court to issue a partial judgment by which the marriage would be dissolved. The trial judge dismissed the applicant’s request and ordered him to submit further documents concerning his financial status. 14.     The applicant complied with the above order and submitted the requested documents on 2 November 2005. 15.     On 14 December 2005 the applicant again lodged a request for expedition of the proceedings with the Z. Municipal Court. 16.     The Z. Municipal Court on 13 March 2006 ordered M. to submit information concerning the child maintenance payments she had received from the applicant. On 19 April 2006 she complied with this order and submitted the requested information. 17.     Another hearing was scheduled for 3 May 2006 but it was adjourned since the applicant informed the trial court that he was ill and could not attend the hearing. 18.     At a hearing on 10 July 2006 the applicant asked the Z. Municipal Court to join the divorce proceedings with the proceedings in which he was contesting paternity of K. This request was granted, but further proceedings were stayed pending a Supreme Court decision on the applicant’s request for transfer of the proceedings to another court. 19.     On 10 November 2006 the applicant asked the Z. Municipal Court to adopt a partial judgment, in respect of the petition for divorce alone. 20.     The Supreme Court dismissed the applicant’s request for transfer of the proceedings to another court on 22 November 2006. 21.     M. informed the Z. Municipal Court on 8 December 2006 and 9   March 2007 that she and K. had been living in Switzerland and that the applicant had refused to give consent for K. to obtain a passport and to come to Croatia to take part in the paternity proceedings. 22.     On 30 March 2007 the applicant informed the Z. Municipal Court that he had given his consent for K. to obtain a passport. 23.     A hearing scheduled for 23 April 2007 was adjourned because the applicant had not been properly summoned. 24.     Another hearing scheduled for 12 June 2007 was adjourned because the applicant failed to appear. At the same hearing the Z. Municipal Court ordered a DNA test. 25.     The Z. Municipal Court ordered the applicant to pay a sum of 10,000   Croatian kunas (HRK) for the DNA test on 26 June 2007. 26.     In the period between 12 September and 21 November 2007 the applicant made four payments in instalments for the DNA test. He also asked the Z. Municipal Court to extend the time-limit for payment. The Z. Municipal Court granted the applicant’s request and extended the time-limit for a further thirty days. On 26 November 2007 he informed the Z. Municipal Court of the amount he had managed to pay for the DNA test. 27.     On 27 November 2007 the applicant lodged a complaint about the length of the proceedings with the Constitutional Court ( Ustavni sud Republike Hrvatske ) which was forwarded to the Z. County Court ( Županijski sud u Z. ) for further examination. In his submissions the applicant complained that the Z. Municipal Court had dismissed his request for the partial judgment by which his marriage could be dissolved. He submitted that the lengthy divorce proceedings had had an adverse effect on his private life and his dignity and that the delay could prevent his marriage to another woman, planned for June 2008. The applicant also asked that the Z. Municipal Court be ordered to adopt a partial judgment by which his marriage with M. would be dissolved. 28.     At a hearing on 11 February 2008 the Z. Municipal Court found that the applicant had failed to pay the full amount required for the DNA test, and adjourned the hearing. 29.     Another hearing scheduled for 10 March 2008 was adjourned because the applicant informed the trial court that he could not attend the hearing. 30.     On 15 May 2008 the applicant asked the Z. Municipal Court to exempt him from the duty to pay for the DNA test, relying on war veterans’ rights, but on 13 June 2008 that court dismissed his request. 31.     Another hearing was held on 9 July 2008; the applicant failed to appear. 32.     On 25 September 2008 the applicant submitted further complaints to the Z. County Court about the length of the proceedings: he argued that he was a practising Christian and would therefore like to marry again, but had been unable to do so because the Z. Municipal Court had refused to issue a partial judgment by which he could be divorced. He also stressed that he would be humiliated if he had to cancel the planned marriage because he had been unable to divorce. 33.     On 26 September 2008 the applicant informed the Z. Municipal Court that he had made a further payment for the DNA test. 34.     At a hearing on 15 October 2008 the Z. Municipal Court found that the amount necessary for the DNA blood test had been almost fully paid, and requested the parties to make an arrangement to have DNA samples taken. 35.     On 27 October 2008 the applicant, relying on the Court’s case-law, complained before the Z. County Court about the manner in which the paternity proceedings and the DNA blood test had been conducted by the Z. Municipal Court. He pointed out that M. had refused to come to Croatia to have a sample of K.’s DNA taken. He again requested the Z. County Court to order the Z. Municipal Court to adopt a partial judgment concerning the divorce. 36.     The Z. County Court accepted the applicant’s complaint about the length of the proceedings on 31 October 2008. It found a violation of the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time, awarded him HRK 5,000 in compensation and ordered the Z. Municipal Court to adopt a decision as soon as possible, and within six months at the latest. The relevant part of the decision reads: “ ... the overall length of these civil proceedings cannot be said to have complied with the reasonable time requirement. ... Everything suggests that the court has failed to conduct the proceedings in compliance with the principle of efficiency, since over a period of longer than four years the case has still not been decided by the first-instance court ... The applicant, as a plaintiff in the proceedings, has contributed to the length of the proceedings, since the court’s summons to some hearings could not be served on him and he failed to appear at these hearings. His contribution to the length of the proceedings can also be observed through the fact that he has failed to comply with the court’s orders in time (for example to pay for the DNA test).” 37.   On the same day the applicant informed the Z. Municipal Court that he was insisting on a DNA test, although in the meantime he had been informed by M. that she and K. would not attend to have a DNA sample taken. 38.     On 20 November 2008 the applicant lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court against the Z. County Court decision of 31 October 2008 in the part concerning the amount of the awarded compensation. He also complained that the Z. County Court had ignored his request that the Z. Municipal Court be ordered to adopt an interim judgment on his divorce. 39.     On 26 January 2009 the applicant submitted to the Z. Municipal Court a written statement from the Employment Service ( Hrvatski zavod za zapošljavanje ) confirming that he was unemployed. 40.     Another hearing scheduled for 2 April 2009 was adjourned because the applicant informed the trial court that he could not attend this hearing and M. had failed to inform the court when she and K. would be able to attend to have a DNA sample taken. 41.     On 23 April 2009 the Supreme Court awarded the applicant further compensation of HRK 3,000 in respect of the length of the proceedings. The relevant part of the decision reads: “... This court considers that the conduct of the applicant had no influence on the length of the proceedings. On the contrary, the case file reveals that the applicant has demonstrated a strong resolve to have the proceedings concluded as soon as possible and within a reasonable time; this can be seen by his numerous requests that [the court] decide on his petition for divorce, to which the defendant also agreed at the hearing of 14 December 2004 ... Although the first-instance court pointed out that the applicant had contributed to the length of the proceedings by not complying with the summons to appear at the hearings, it is to be noted that it was only the hearing of 12   June 2007 at which he failed to appear despite having been properly summoned. As regards the hearing of 11 February 2008, the applicant was not properly summoned, since the court summons was returned with the notice “informed, did not collect”. As to the applicant’s failure to pay for the DNA test, it is to be noted that he requested that the time-limit for this payment be extended since it concerned a significant amount, given his income and his social circumstances, and the fact that he paid certain amounts in instalments on more than one occasion, in accordance with his financial means. This demonstrated his resolve to comply with the court order.” 42.     The applicant further lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court on 22 May 2009 against the above decision of the Supreme Court. 43.     At a hearing on 7 July 2009 the Z. Municipal Court commissioned a DNA paternity report from Clinical Hospital Š. ( Klinička bolnica Š. ). 44.     M. informed the Z. Municipal Court on 21 July 2009 that she refused to come to Zagreb to have a DNA sample taken. 45.     On 6 August 2009 the applicant lodged a request for disqualification of the trial judge, president and all judges of the Z. Municipal Court. 46.     On 10 September 2009 the Constitutional Court dismissed the applicant’s constitutional complaint in respect of the length of the proceedings as ill-founded, on the ground that his complaints had been properly addressed by the lower courts. 47.     The Clinical Hospital Š. on 21 September 2009 informed the Z. Municipal Court that the parties had failed to appear to have DNA samples taken. 48.     The Z. Municipal Court rejected the applicant’s request for disqualification of the judges of that court on 23 September 2009. 49.     On 28 September 2009 the applicant again requested the Z. Municipal Court to commission a DNA report. 50.     The president of the Z. County Court rejected the applicant’s request for disqualification of the president of the Z. Municipal Court on 2 October 2009. 51.     On 7 October 2009 the applicant again requested the Z. Municipal Court to adopt a partial judgment in respect of the divorce alone. 52.     The president of the Z. Municipal Court dismissed the applicant’s request for disqualification of the trial judge on 29 October 2009. 53.     The Z. Municipal Court on 13 November 2009 again summoned the parties to have DNA samples taken. 54.     On 30 November and 1 December 2009 the applicant informed the Z. Municipal Court that he was withdrawing his action concerning his paternity of K., on the ground that the payment of the requested sum for the DNA test had created an intolerable financial burden for him since he was unemployed and without any source of income. He also asked that the marriage be dissolved as soon as possible since his social benefits depended on his marital status. 55.     At a hearing on 14 January 2010 the parties reached an agreement on child maintenance and contact between the applicant and K. On the same day the Z. Municipal Court dissolved the marriage of the applicant and M. and decided on the amount of the child maintenance and contact between the applicant and his child. The parties also declared that they would not lodge appeals and the judgment thus became final. 56.     On 11 September 2010 the applicant married J.V. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 57.     The relevant provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia ( Ustav Republike Hrvatske , Official Gazette no. 56/1990, 135/1997, 113/2000, 28/2001) read as follows: Article 29 “In the determination of his rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial court established by law.” Article 61 “Family is under the special protection of the State. Marriage and legal relations in marriage, extra-marital relationship and family shall be governed by law.” 58.     The relevant provisions of the Family Act ( Obiteljski zakon , Official Gazette nos. 116/2003, 17/2004, 136/2004, 107/2007) read as follows: Section 29 “Marriage cannot be concluded by a person who is already married.” Section 34 “(1) Irrespective of the form in which it was contracted, a marriage ceases upon: the death of a spouse, the pronouncement that a missing spouse is deceased, annulment or divorce. (2) A marriage ceases by annulment or divorce when the judgement of a court concerning the annulment or divorce becomes final ...“ Section 263 “(1) This Act governs special civil proceedings, non-contentious proceedings and special enforcement proceedings concerning the marital and family affairs under this Act. (2) Proceedings as in paragraph 1 are urgent.” Section 264 “The provisions of the Civil Procedure Act and the Enforcement Act shall be applicable to proceedings under section 263 of this Act, unless otherwise provided under this Act.” 59.     The relevant provisions of the Civil Procedure Act ( Zakon o parničnom postupku , Official Gazette of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia nos. 4/1977, 36/1977 (corrigendum), 36/1980, 69/1982, 58/1984, 74/1987, 57/1989, 20/1990, 27/1990 and 35/1991, and the Official Gazette of the Republic of Croatia nos. 53/1991, 91/1992, 58/1993, 112/1999, 88/2001, 117/2003, 88/2005, 2/2007, 84/2008, and 123/2008), read as follows: Partial Judgment Section 329 “(1) If only some of a number of claims are ready for a final decision on the basis of the litigation, or if only part of one claim is ready for a final decision, the court may conclude the trial and adopt a judgment (partial judgment) in respect of the claims or the part of the claim that are ready. (2) The court is obliged to adopt a partial judgment without delay if, on the basis of admission or waiver of several claims put forward only some become ready for a final decision, or if only part of one claim is ready for this decision ...“ 60.     The relevant provisions of the Courts Act ( Zakon o sudovima , Official Gazette nos. 150/2005, 16/2007 and 113/2008), as in force at the material time, read as follows: III.     PROTECTION OF THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME Section 27 “(1) A party to court proceedings who considers that the court has failed to decide within a reasonable time on his or her rights or obligations or a criminal charge against him or her, may lodge a request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time with a court at the next higher level of jurisdiction. (2) If the request concerns proceedings pending before the High Commercial Court of the Republic of Croatia, the High Court for Administrative Offences of the Republic of Croatia or the Administrative Court of the Republic of Croatia, the request shall be decided by the Supreme Court of the Republic of Croatia. (3) Proceedings for deciding on a request as in sub-section 1 of this section shall be urgent. The rules of non-contentious procedure shall apply mutatis mutandis in those proceedings and, in principle, no hearing shall be held. Section 28   (1) If the court referred to in section 27 of this Act finds the request well founded, it shall set a time-limit within which the court before which the proceedings are pending must decide on a right or obligation of, or a criminal charge against, the person who lodged the request, and may award him or her appropriate compensation for a violation of his or her right to a hearing within a reasonable time. (2) The compensation shall be paid out of the State budget within three months of the date on which the party’s request for payment is lodged. (3) An appeal, to be lodged with the Supreme Court within fifteen days, lies against a decision on the request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. No appeal lies against a Supreme Court decision, but a constitutional complaint may be lodged.” 61.     Amendments to the Courts Act in connection with the length-of-proceedings complaint procedure, enacted on 11 December 2009 ( Zakon o izmjenama i dopunama Zakona o sudovima , Official Gazette, no. 153/2009), read as follows: Section 7 “Section 28 [of the Courts Act] now reads: ... (5) An appeal, to be lodged with the Supreme Court within fifteen days, lies against a decision on the request for the protection of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time. A further appeal, to be lodged with a panel of judges of the Supreme Court, lies against the decision of the Supreme Court. The panel shall adopt its decision within three months. (6) The panel of judges referred to in paragraph 5 shall be composed of three Supreme Court’s judges. They shall be elected by a plenary session of the Supreme Court. ... “ THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION 62.     The applicant complained about the length of the civil proceedings before the Z. Municipal Court. He relied on Article 6 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ... “ A.     Admissibility 1.     The applicant’s victim status 63.     The Government argued that the domestic authorities, relying on the principles established in the Court’s case-law, had examined the applicant’s complaint about the length of the proceedings, expressly acknowledged that there had been a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time, and awarded him appropriate compensation. Therefore, in their view the applicant could not claim to be a victim of a violation of his rights under the Convention. 64.     The applicant contested that view. He considered that the domestic authorities had failed to examine all relevant facts concerning the length of the proceedings, and pointed out that the first-instance court had failed to adopt a decision within the time-limit set out by the higher courts. Therefore, he considered that he could still claim to be a victim of a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time under the Convention. 65.     The Court notes that the last decision at the domestic level concerning the applicant’s complaint about the length of the proceedings at issue was adopted by the Constitutional Court on 10 September 2009. At that time the proceedings had been pending for more than five years and four months . For this whole period, just satisfaction was awarded by the Z. County Court and the Supreme Court in the total amount of HRK 8,000. It does not correspond to what the Court would have been likely to award under Article 41 of the Convention in respect of the same period. Furthermore, although the County Court ordered the Municipal Court to adopt a decision within six months at the latest, the Municipal Court failed to comply with that order and the decision was adopted more than a year after the County Court’s order. 66.     The compensation awarded cannot therefore be regarded as adequate in the circumstances of the case (see the principles established in the Court’s case-law in Cocchiarella v.   Italy [GC], no.   64886/01, §§   65-107, ECHR 2006-V, or Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no.   36813/97, §§ 178-213, ECHR 2006-V). In these circumstances the applicant has not lost his status as a victim within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention. 2.     Exhaustion of domestic remedies 67.     The Government submitted, relying on the Court’s case-law in Lazić v. Croatia (dec.), no. 55507/07, 22 April 2010, that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies, since he had not lodged a new length-of-proceedings complaint concerning the period after the Z. County Court had found a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time. 68.     The applicant argued that the case-law relied upon by the Government could not be applied when the complaints concerned the overall length of proceedings, which was the situation in the present case. In his view the principles from the Lazić case were applicable only in respect of the complaints concerning a new violation of the right to a hearing within reasonable time which had taken place in the period after the first domestic court’s decision on that matter. Therefore, he considered that, by lodging his complaint about the overall length of proceedings with the Constitutional Court, he had exhausted domestic remedies. 69.     The Court notes that in the course of exhaustion of domestic remedies concerning his length-of-proceedings complaint, the applicant brought his complaint before the Z. County Court and an appeal, against the decision of that court, to the Supreme Court. Against the decision of the Supreme Court, the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Constitutional Court. On 10 September 2009 the Constitutional Court examined his complaint on merits and dismissed it as ill-founded endorsing the decisions of the lower courts. 70.     The Court observes that the relevant legislation in Croatia, namely the Courts Act, was amended in December 2009 after the Constitutional Court adopted its decision in the applicant’s case. The domestic law has been amended to the effect that a further appeal lies against the second-instance decision of the Supreme Court. The examination of this further appeal is no longer within the competence of the Constitutional Court, but of a panel of judges of the Supreme Court which in this case acts as a court of third-instance (see paragraph 61). Having regard to the fact that the above amendments were introduced subsequent to the facts of the present case, the Court will base its decision on its case-law related to the previous legislation. 71.     In this respect the Court has held that a constitutional complaint was an effective remedy in Croatia as regards complaints about length of proceedings (see Slaviček v. Croatia (dec.), no. 20862/02, ECHR 2002 ‑ VII). In view of that conclusion, the Court has found that if findings of a violation of the applicant’s right to a hearing within a reasonable time and award of just satisfaction by the domestic courts are in compliance with Convention standards and if the applicant cannot claim to be a victim for the period prior to the final domestic courts’ decision, the applicant was obliged to use available domestic remedies in respect of the length of the proceedings, including a fresh constitutional complaint if applicable as regards the period after such decision (see Juravić v. Croatia (dec.), no.   3806/03, 24 October 2006; Becová v.   Slovakia (dec.), no.   3788/06, 18   September 2007; Lazić cited above, and Hrivňák v. Slovakia (dec.), no. 35170/05, 14 December 2010). 72.     The Court notes, however, that in the present case the applicant could still claim to be a victim of a violation of the right to a hearing within a reasonable time for the period examined by the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 66). In these circumstances, to ask the applicant to lodge a second constitutional complaint would overstretch his duties under Article   35 § 1 of the Convention (see Antonić-Tomasović v. Croatia , no.   5208/03, §§   25-34, 10   November 2005, and Sukobljević v. Croatia , no. 5129/03, § 52, 2   November 2006). 73.     Therefore, the Court considers that the Government’s arguments concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies must be rejected. 3.     Conclusion 74.     Having regard to the above, the Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ arguments 75.     The applicant submitted that the civil proceedings concerning his paternity and his marital status had lasted an excessively long time. He argued that the divorce should have been resolved five years earlier, when the parties reached agreement on it, and that paternity would have been resolved earlier had the Z. Municipal Court prevented the other party from obstructing the course of the proceedings. As to his conduct during the proceedings, he pointed out that he had not provided a DNA sample because M. had expressly refused to have a sample taken from the child. He also claimed that he had had problems with delivery of mail to his address, which was the reason for his absence from some hearings. Finally, he argued that the proceedings had been concluded not due to the diligence of the Z. Municipal Court but because he had withdrawn his action concerning paternity, which he had done just so as to be able to get the divorce, although this would leave him in eternal doubt about his paternity of the child. 76.     The Government accepted the domestic courts’ findings that the length of the proceedings at issue had exceeded the “reasonable time” requirement, but they did not agree that the delays which occurred after the decision of the Supreme Court had been attributable to the national courts. They argued that the case at issue had been very complex, since it dealt with three closely interrelated legal issues (divorce, paternity, and child maintenance) and that the Z. Municipal Court had conducted the proceedings diligently, particularly having in mind that one of the parties lived outside Croatia. They also pointed out that the Z. Municipal Court had adopted its judgment with a minimum delay from the time-limit ordered by the higher courts. 77.     As to the conduct of the applicant, the Government argued that by his absence from the hearings, not complying with orders for DNA samples to be taken, and unfounded requests for disqualification of the Z. Municipal Court judges, the applicant, together with the other party, had caused the delays in the proceedings. They also pointed out that after he had lodged his paternity petition in 2005 the applicant had withdrawn it in 2009, which had significantly contributed to the overall length of the proceedings. 2.     The Court’s assessment (a)     General prinicples 78.     The Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities, and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). 79.     The Court would also reiterate that particular diligence is required in cases concerning civil status and capacity (see Bock v. Germany , judgment of 29   March 1989, Series A no. 150, p. 23, § 49) and that the competent national authorities are required by Article 6 § 1 to act with particular diligence in ensuring the progress of the proceedings (see Mikulić v. Croatia , no. 53176/99, § 44, ECHR 2002 ‑ I). In such cases, what is at stake for the applicant is also a relevant consideration, and special diligence is required in view of the possible consequences which the excessive length of proceedings may have, notably on enjoyment of the right to respect for family life (see Laino v. Italy [GC], no.   3158/96, § 18, ECHR 1999-I). (b)     Application of these principles to the present case 80.     The Court considers that the period to be taken into account started on 14 April 2004, when the applicant lodged his petition for divorce with the Z. Municipal Court, and ended on 14 January 2010, when the judgment of the Z. Municipal Court was adopted and became final. Thus, the period to be taken into account amounted to five years and eight months at one level of jurisdiction. 81.     The Court considers that the overall length of the proceedings concerning the applicant’s civil status and his paternity could be justified only under exceptional circumstances which must be convincingly demonstrated. In this connection, the Court firstly notes that, contrary to the Government’s submissions, the Supreme Court had not attributed any delays to the applicant but to inefficiency on the part of the Municipal Court. Therefore the Court cannot accept the explanations given by the Government for the length of proceedings, particularly in view of the refusal of the other party to have the DNA test and lack of appropriate response by the trial court in that respect. 82.     As to the applicant’s conduct during the proceedings, the Court notes that the applicant had on more than one occasion requested the expedition of the proceedings and complained about the manner in which the proceedings before the first-instance court had been conducted, asking that they be terminated as soon as possible, which is itself incompatible with the argument that, by using his procedural rights and seeking disqualification of the judges who in his view had not conducted the proceedings properly, the delays in the proceedings can be attributed to him. In this respect the Court would reiterate that an applicant cannot be blamed for taking full advantage of the remedies afforded by national law in the defence of his interests (see Nankov v. “the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” , no. 26541/02, §   47, 29 November 2007). 83.     As regards the applicant’s absence from the hearings, the Court notes that the applicant had claimed certain problems with delivery of court summons to hearings, which had also been recognised and accepted by the Supreme Court. In this respect the Court also notes that the applicant had failed to appear only at three hearings without previously having given an appropriate reason, which cannot in any respect justify the delay in the proceedings of more than five years. As to the applicant’s withdrawal of the paternity petition, the Court considers that it has to be viewed in the light of all the circumstances of the present case, and in particular of the fact that the applicant had wanted to have the proceedings before the Z. Municipal Court concluded as soon as possible, because he had an interest in obtaining a divorce on account of his marriage plans. In any event the Court considers that it cannot justify the overall length of the proceedings as the Government suggested, since Article 6 § 1 of the Convention imposes on the Contracting States the duty to organise their legal systems in such a way that their courts can meet each of the requirements of that provision, including the obligation to hear cases brought by the applicants within a reasonable time (see Sürmeli v. Germany [GC], no. 75529/01, § 129, ECHR 2006 ‑ VII). 84.     The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising similar issues to the present one (see, for example, Mikulić , cited above, § 46; Szarapo v. Poland , no. 40835/98, § 45, 23 May 2002; and Kwiatkowski v. Poland , no. 4560/04, § 22, 17 October 2006). It holds that in the period which was subject to the scrutiny of the national courts the length of the proceedings was already excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. 85.   In the light of the criteria laid down in its case-law and having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings complained of failed to satisfy the reasonable time requirement. There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 86.     The applicant complained that the prolonged uncertainty as to whether he was the father of K. had violated his right to respect for his private and family life. He relied on Article 8 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” Admissibility 87.     The applicant contended that he had lodged the paternity petition after he had learned from M. that he had not been the father of their child. However, the lack of diligence of the domestic courts during the divorce proceedings had left him in a position to choose between two possibilities; to remain married for an uncertain period of time or to withdraw the paternity petition. He had therefore withdrawn the paternity petition in order to get the decision on divorce although that had left him without the possibility to determine his legal and biological relations with the child. 88.     The Government submitted that there had never been any uncertainty concerning the applicant’s paternity of K. in view of the fact that the domestic law provided a legal presumption that the mother’s husband was also the father of any child born to her during the marriage. They stressed that by withdrawing his paternity petition the applicant had waived his right to rebut this presumption. 89.     The Court reiterates that Article 8 of the Convention, for its part, protects not only “family” but also “private” life and therefore even though the paternity proceedings which the applicant wished to institute were aimed at the dissolution in law of existing family ties, the determination of his legal and biological relations with his child undoubtedly concerned his private life under Article 8 of the Convention (see Rasmussen v. Denmark , 28 November 1984, § 33, Series A no. 87; Yildirim v. Austria (dec.), no.   34308/96, 19   October 1999; Shofman v. Russia , no. 74826/01, § 31, 24   November 2005; Tavlı v. Turkey , no. 11449/02, § 26, 9 November 2006; and I.L.V. v.   Rumania (dec.), no. 4901/04, § 33, 24 August 2010). 90.     Private life, in the Court’s view, includes a person’s physical and psychological integrity, and can sometimes embrace aspects of an individual’s physical and social identity. Respect for “private life” must also comprise to a certain degree the right to establish relationships with other human beings (see, mutatis mutandis , Niemietz v. Germany , judgment of 16   December 1992, Series A no. 251-B, pp. 33-34, § 29). 91.     In the present case the Court notes that the applicant first lodged his divorce petition with the domestic courts; as part of those proceedings he sought, inter alia , to have child maintenance and contact with K. regulated. Only more than a year later did the applicant lodge another, separate action by which he sought to contest the paternity of K. 92.     The Court notes however that, unlike in the other similar cases already dealt with by the Court, as cited above, the applicant failed to pursue his paternity action and moreover, when the judgment concerning child maintenance and contact with K. had been passed, the applicant explicitly waived his right to appeal against that judgment. The Court is aware of the applicant’s desire for the proceedings at issue to be concluded as soon as possible but, disregarding the particular motives, the Court considers that the importance of the legal and biological relations between a parent and a child required the applicant to pursue his paternity action, having in mind the importance and prominence of the concept of respect for family and private life. 93.     Therefore, since the applicant failed to pursue his action contesting his paternity of K., the Court considers that that this complaint must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. III.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 12 OF THE CONVENTION 94.     The applicant complained that the lengthy divorce proceedings had impaired his right to marry again. He relied on Article 12 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.” A.     Admissibility 95.     The Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It also notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ arguments 96.     The applicant submitted that since September 2005 he had been in a serious relationship with J.V., whom he married as soon as the judgment on his divorce became final. This could have been verified by calling as a witness and questioning J.V. herself and a number of other witnesses. He stressed that he was a practising Christian and that it was of the outmost importance for him to marry J.V. as soon as possible, which the domestic authorities had prevented by not deciding on his divorce within a reasonable time. 97.     The Government argued that there is no right to divorce under Article 12 of the Convention. In any event, the applicant had failed to substantiate his arguments, both before the Court and before the domestic authorities, that he had ever seri