CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 7 février 2013

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widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:10pt }     GRAND CHAMBER             CASE OF FABRIS v. FRANCE   (Application no. 16574/08)                 JUDGMENT (Merits)       STRASBOURG   7 February 2013       This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Fabris v. France, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of: Josep Casadevall, President , Françoise Tulkens,   Nina Vajić,   Lech Garlicki,   Karel Jungwiert,   Elisabeth Steiner, Alvina Gyulumyan,   Egbert Myjer,   Dragoljub Popović, George Nicolaou, András Sajó, Ledi Bianku, Nona Tsotsoria, Işil Karakaş,   Guido Raimondi, Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   André Potocki, judges, and Johan Callewaert, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 4 April and 24 October 2012, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last ‑ mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 16574/08) against the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a French national, Mr Henry Fabris (“the applicant”), on 1   April 2008. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr A. Ottan, a lawyer practising in Lunel. The French Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs E. Belliard, Director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3.     Relying on Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 8 of the Convention, the applicant, a child “born of adultery”, alleged that he had suffered discrimination on grounds of birth regarding the division of his mother’s estate. 4.     The application was allocated to the Fifth Section of the Court (Rule   52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 10 February 2010 the President of the Section decided to communicate it to the Government. As provided for by former Article 29 § 3 of the Convention (current Article 29 § 1) and Rule   54A, it decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility. On 21 July 2011 it was declared admissible by a Chamber of the Fifth Section composed of the following judges: Dean   Spielmann, President, Jean-Paul Costa, Boštjan M. Zupančič, Mark   Villiger, Isabelle Berro ‑ Lefèvre, Ann Power and Angelika Nußberger, judges, and also of Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar. It held, by five votes to two, that there had been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and unanimously that there was no need to examine separately the complaint based on Article 14 of the Convention taken together with Article 8. 5.     On 9 September 2011 the applicant requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber under Article 43 of the Convention and Rule 73. On 28   November 2011 a panel of the Grand Chamber granted the request. 6.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24. 7.     The applicant and the Government each filed a memorial before the Grand Chamber. 8.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 4 April 2012 (Rule 59 § 3).   There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Mrs   A.-F. T issier ,   Co-Agent , Mrs   E. T opin , Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, Mrs   M.-A. Recher , Ministry of Justice, Mrs   C. Azar , Ministry of Justice,   Advisers ; (b)     for the applicant Mr   A. Ottan , lawyer, Mrs   M. Ottan , lawyer,   Counsel.   The Court heard addresses by Mr Ottan and Mrs Tissier. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 9.     The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Orléans. A.     Background to the case 10.     The applicant was recognised by his father at birth. At the time of the applicant’s conception, his mother – Mrs M., née R. – was married and two children had been born of that marriage: A., born in 1923, and J.L., born in 1941. By a decree of 28 February 1967, the applicant’s mother and her husband, Mr M., were pronounced judicially separated. 11.     By a deed of 24 January 1970, Mr and Mrs M. divided their property inter vivos ( donation-partage ) between their two legitimate children. The deed, which was signed before a notary, provided for a life interest in their favour and for revocation of the gift in the event of a breach of its terms and conditions. When signing the deed Mr and Mrs M. declared that the two donees were their only offspring. 12.     In a judgment of 24 November 1983 the Montpellier tribunal de grande instance declared the applicant to be the “illegitimate” child of Mrs   M., after finding that his status of “illegitimate” child had been fully established. 13.     In 1984 the applicant expressed his intention to challenge the 1970 deed of inter vivos division. On that date his lawyer informed him that the deed could not be challenged during the donor’s lifetime and that his only option was to bring an action for abatement within five years of the donor’s death. 14.     The applicant’s mother died in July 1994. The notary administering the estate informed the applicant by letter of 7   September 1994 that, as a child “born of adultery”, he was entitled to only half the share he would have received if he had been a legitimate child (at that time the applicable law provided that a child “born of adultery” could inherit only half the share of a legitimate child – see paragraphs 26 and 27 below). He added that the applicant’s half-brother and half-sister were willing to pay him 298,311   French francs (FRF) (approximately 45,477 euros (EUR)) in cash, while specifying that “in the event of a reduction following the subsequent birth of a child, only a monetary abatement [was] possible and in no circumstances an abatement in kind”. No agreement was reached between the three children. B.     Action for abatement brought by the applicant 15.     By a writ of action dated 7 January 1998, the applicant brought proceedings against his half-brother J.L. and his half-sister A. seeking an abatement of the inter vivos division in accordance with Article 1077-1 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 25 below). He claimed a reserved portion equal to their share of his mother’s estate. 16.     After the Court had found against France in the case of Mazurek v.   France (no. 34406/97, 1 February 2000, ECHR 2000 ‑ II), France passed Law no. 2001-1135 of 3 December 2001 (hereafter “the 2001 Law”), amending its legislation and granting children “born of adultery” identical inheritance rights to those of legitimate children (see paragraph 28 below). That new Law came into force before judgment was given in the proceedings instituted by the applicant. Its transitional provisions provided that, subject to any prior agreement between the parties or final court decision, the provisions relating to the new inheritance rights of children born outside marriage whose father or mother was, at the time of their conception, bound by marriage to another person were applicable to successions that were already open on the date of publication of the Law in the Official Gazette (4 December 2001) and had not given rise to division prior to that date (section 25(2) of the 2001 Law, see paragraph 30 below). 17.     In his recapitulatory pleading of 20 February 2003, the applicant relied on the provisions of the 2001 Law. In his submission, that Law repealed section 14 of the Filiation Law of 3 January 1972 (hereafter “the 1972 Law”, see paragraphs 27 and 29 below), a transitional provision stipulating that the rights of heirs entitled under that Law to a reserved portion of the estate could not be exercised to the detriment of inter vivos gifts granted prior to the date on which it came into force. The applicant argued that as that provision had been repealed, he was entitled to bring an action for abatement under Article 1077-1 of the Civil Code even though the deed of inter vivos division had been signed on 24 January 1970. 1.     Judgment at first instance 18.     In a judgment of 6 September 2004, the Béziers tribunal de grande instance upheld the applicant’s claim. It found that section 14 of the 1972 Law was contrary to Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. The court referred in that connection to the Marckx v. Belgium judgment (13 June 1979, Series   A no. 31) which recognised “that family life also comprise[d] interests of a material kind”, and to several judgments of the Court “which ha[d] continued to rule that differences of treatment in inheritance matters between children born within and children born outside marriage were discriminatory ( Mazurek , Inze and Vermeire )”. It also found that the provision was contrary to the new 2001 Law. It held that the applicant had the same inheritance rights in respect of the estate as his half-brother and half-sister, for the following reasons:- “Section 25(1) of the Law of 3 December 2001 provides that this Law is applicable from the date on which it comes into force to successions that are already open; subject to any prior agreement between the parties or final court decision, the provisions of this Law are applicable to successions already open on the date of publication of the Law in the Official Gazette of the French Republic where these have not given rise to division prior to that date. In the present case there has not yet been division of Mrs M.’s estate; accordingly, the provisions relating to the new inheritance rights of children born outside marriage whose father or mother was, at the time of their conception, bound by marriage to another person will apply. ... Indeed, it cannot reasonably be argued that the legislature, in enacting the Law of 3   December 2001, intended to maintain a provision contrary to the spirit and aim of the new Law.” 2.     Judgment on appeal 19.     In October and December 2004 J.L. and the heirs of A., who had died during the proceedings, appealed against the judgment. 20.     In a judgment of 14 February 2006, the Montpellier Court of Appeal set aside the lower court’s judgment and declared that, under section 14(2) of the Law of 1972, the applicant was not entitled to bring an action for abatement of the inter vivos division. It held that “... under [that section], the rights acquired to a reserved portion of the estate under the present Law or arising from the new rules regarding the establishment of filiation cannot be exercised to the detriment of inter vivos gifts granted before that Law came into force. This provision, which lays down a general rule regarding, among other things, the retroactive effects of the new rules relating to the establishment of filiation deriving from the Law of 3 January 1972, has not been expressly repealed by the Law of 3   December 2001; neither can it be deduced from the terms of the later Law that it has been tacitly repealed, firstly because its provisions do not conflict with the later Law and secondly because it was not limited solely to application of Article 915 of the Civil Code, which was repealed by that Law.” According to the Court of Appeal, that conclusion did not conflict with the general principle of equality of rights regardless of birth, as guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention: “Firstly, the sole purpose of the provisions of section 14 of the Law of 1972 is to prohibit heirs who have acquired rights to a reserved portion of the estate under that Law – and extended by the Law of 3 December 2001 – from exercising them to the detriment of inter vivos gifts granted prior to 1 August 1972, without depriving the said heirs of their inheritance rights. Next, there is objective and reasonable justification for section 14 of the Law of 1972 in the light of the legitimate aim pursued, namely, ensuring peaceful family relations by securing rights acquired in that context – sometimes long-standing ones – without at the same time creating an excessive imbalance between heirs, it being observed that [these provisions] are of limited scope both in terms of time and the type of voluntary disposition concerned.” 3.     Judgment of the Court of Cassation 21.     The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law. In his grounds of appeal based on a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 14 of the Convention, he argued that peaceful family relations could not take precedence over equality, in terms of civil rights, between children born within marriage and children born outside marriage. 22.     In his opinion, which was communicated to the parties, the advocate ‑ general at the Court of Cassation recommended dismissing the appeal. He made the following submissions to the judges of the First Civil Division of the Court of Cassation: “... should the court not consider that the succession that had been opened did not give rise to division before the date of publication of the Law, seeing that an action for abatement was pending on that date? The difficulty submitted for your examination does indeed arise from the different approach proposed by the transitional provisions of the 1972 and 2001 Laws. Whilst neither successions already open, nor inter vivos gifts granted prior to the coming into force of the Law of 1972, could be challenged under that Law, the Law of 2001 allows children born outside marriage whose father or mother was, at the time of conception, bound by marriage to another person to assert inheritance rights in respect of successions already open prior to publication of that Law. That difference justifies a non-restrictive application of the provisions of the Law of 2001. Only where there has been actual division, or an agreement has been reached between the parties or a final court decision delivered can the new inheritance rights of such children be excluded where the succession has already been opened. On account of the action for an abatement, the succession already open on the date of publication of the Law of 2001 cannot have “given rise to division” on the date of publication of that Law. I therefore find the submission that the Law of 3 December 2001 is not applicable difficult to sustain. The terms of section 14 of the Law of 3 January 1972, however, are entirely unambiguous. Heirs who have acquired rights under this Law to the reserved portion of the estate cannot exercise those rights “ to the detriment of inter vivos gifts granted before the Law came into force” . Should, then, these provisions be deemed to have been tacitly repealed? Without having regard to the time factor, the applicant maintains in his supplementary pleadings that it must be concluded from the clear contradiction between the transitional provisions of the two Laws that those governing the Law of 1972 have been tacitly repealed. Whilst the approach is different between the transitional provisions enacted in 1972 and those enacted in 2001, they do not, however, appear to me to conflict. By excluding any challenge to inter vivos gifts granted prior to the coming into force of the Law of 1972, the legislature intended to guarantee the legal security required by such gifts. There is nothing to justify calling that legal security into question in 2002, since the earlier transitional provisions complement those laid down by the 2001 Law. It is on those grounds that I invite you to dismiss the first ground of the appeal: the inter vivos gift made on 24 January 1970 cannot be called into question on account of inheritance rights arising from new rules concerning the establishment of filiation. In that connection, whilst it remains debatable whether there had actually been division prior to publication of the Law of 3   December 2001, the existence of an inter vivos gift granted prior to the coming into force of the Law of 3 January 1972 is not in dispute. ...” 23.     The Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal in a judgment of 14   November 2007, substituting of its own motion a new legal ground. It found that the effect of the transitional provisions of the 2001 Law was that, subject to any prior agreement between the parties or a final court decision, the provisions relating to the new inheritance rights of children born outside marriage whose father or mother was, at the time of conception, bound by marriage to another person were applicable only to successions that were already open on 4 December 2001 and had not given rise to division before that date (see paragraph 16 above). It found that as division had been triggered by Mrs M.’s death – in July 1994, and thus prior to 4 December 2001 – the above-mentioned provisions were not applicable. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Inter vivos division of property and action for abatement 24.     Under French law, estate-owners can divide their estate themselves between their heirs. An inter vivos division ( donation-partage ) is a deed by which the donor divides his or her property immediately among his or her heirs ( inter vivos transfer). It is an anticipated, definitive and negotiated division. Title to the property is transferred at the time of the donation, which is also the first (anticipated) step in a succession that will be opened later. According to the case-law of the Court of Cassation, an inter vivos division becomes a division for the purposes of inheritance on the donor’s death. The succession is both opened and definitively liquidated or divided on the date of the ascendant’s death (Court of Cassation, 7 March 1876; First Civil Division, 5 October 1994, Bull. 1994, I, no. 27). 25.     A descendant who has not received a share of the estate may claim his or her reserved portion from the assets existing when the succession is opened. If there are insufficient assets in the estate, he can bring an action for abatement within five years of the donor’s death. This was the remedy used by the applicant in accordance with Articles 1077-1 and 1077-2 of the Civil Code, which read as follows at the material time:- Article 1077-1 “A descendant who has not participated in the inter vivos division of the estate, or has received a lower share than his or her reserved portion, may bring an action for abatement if, when the succession is opened, there are insufficient assets not included in the division of the estate to constitute or complete his or her reserved portion, regard being had to any voluntary dispositions from which he may have benefited.” Article 1077-2 “ Inter vivos divisions are subject to the rules governing inter vivos gifts as regards determination of the amount, calculation of the reserved portion and reductions. An action for abatement cannot be brought until after the death of the ascendant who has made the division or the surviving ascendant in the event of a division by the mother and father of their estate among all their issue. Such an action shall become time-barred five years after the death. A child not yet conceived at the time of the inter vivos division may bring a similar action for the purpose of constituting or supplementing his or her reserved portion.” 26.     Articles 913 and 915 of the Civil Code on “the disposable portion of assets” in inter vivos gifts and wills, which have since been repealed, provided as follows: Article 913 “Voluntary dispositions, whether granted inter vivos or by will, shall not exceed half of the donor’s assets where he leaves only one child on his death; one third where he leaves two children; and one quarter where he leaves three or more children; no distinction shall be made between legitimate children and children born outside marriage, save in the case provided for in Article 915.” Article 915 “A child born outside marriage whose father or mother was, at the time of his conception, bound by marriage to another person is entitled to inherit under his parent’s estate in competition with the legitimate children born of the marriage; account shall be taken of his presence when calculating the disposable portion; however, he shall receive only half the share to which he would have been entitled if all the children, including himself, had been legitimate. The children born of the marriage injured by the adultery shall inherit in equal shares the portion by which the adulterine child’s share of the estate is thus reduced.” B.     Development of the law relating to children “born of adultery” 27.     The inheritance laws relating to children born outside marriage were amended by the Filiation Law of 1972, which conferred equal status on them for inheritance purposes save for the case of children “born of adultery” (see Mazurek , cited above, § 17), whose rights were limited to “half the share to which they would have been entitled if all the children of the deceased, including themselves, had been legitimate” (see former Articles 757 and 760 of the Civil Code, ibid; see also, regarding gifts, paragraph 26 above ) . 28.     The 2001 Law, which was enacted following the Court’s judgment in the case of Mazurek , eliminated the restrictions on inheritance rights of children “born of adultery” and conferred equal status for inheritance purposes on all children, be they legitimate, born to unmarried parents or “born of adultery”. Section 1 provides that “no distinction shall be made between birth within or birth outside marriage when determining which relatives are entitled to inherit” (Article 733 of the Civil Code) and that “children or their issue shall inherit from their father and mother or other ascendants, irrespective of sex or primogeniture, and even if they are born of different unions” (Article 735 of the Civil Code). The provisions governing the restriction on the reserved portion of children “born of adultery” and their ability to receive gifts have been repealed. Lastly, order no. 2005-759 of 4   July 2005 reforming the filiation rules establishes the principle of equal status regardless of birth, thus eliminating the very concepts of legitimate children and children born outside marriage. C.     Transitional provisions 1.     Transitional provisions of the 1972 Law 29.     These provisions limited the scope of the reform introduced by the 1972 Law. Section 14 had excluded any immediate application of the new inheritance rights of children born to unmarried parents or “of adultery”, in successions opened before it came into force, and had precluded such children from challenging inter vivos gifts granted before the Law came into force on 1 August 1972. It was on the basis of that provision that the Montpellier Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s action (see paragraph   20 above). 2.     Section 25 of the 2001 Law 30.     Under section 25(1) of the 2001 Law, entry into force of that Law was in principle deferred until 1 July 2002. However, regarding the repeal of the provisions of the Civil Code concerning the rights of children “born of adultery”, the legislature decided, exceptionally, that the Law would come into force immediately on the date of publication of the Law in the Official Gazette, that is, on 4 December 2001. Accordingly, section 25(2) provides: “The present Law shall apply to successions that are already open from [1 July 2002], subject to the following exceptions: ... (2)     Subject to any prior agreement between the parties or final court decision, the following shall apply to successions already open on the date of publication of the present Law in the Official Gazette of the French Republic and not having given rise to division prior to that date: (a)     the provisions relating to the new inheritance rights of children born outside marriage whose father or mother was, at the time of conception, bound by marriage to another person; ...” 31.     In so far as it concerns the rights of children “born of adultery”, the 2001 Law is therefore applicable to all successions open on 4 December 2001, on condition that there has been no division prior to that date. 3.     Law of 23 June 2006 reforming successions and voluntary dispositions 32.     This Law amended section 25(2) of the 2001 Law by repealing the terms “whose father or mother was, at the time of their conception, bound by marriage to another person”. Section 25(2)(2) no longer mentions whether a child was born of adultery or not. 4.     Relevant case-law of the Court of Cassation 33.     In a judgment of 6 January 2004 (Court of Cassation, First Civil Division, Bull. 2004, I, no. 10) the Court of Cassation applied the transitional provisions of the 2001 Law, without referring to the provisions of the Convention, in quashing an appeal judgment of 2002 which had set aside gifts granted to a child “born of adultery” under the old provisions whereas there had not yet been division of the estate. In a judgment of 7   June 2006 ( Court of Cassation, First Civil Division, Bull . 2006, I, no.   297), also applying the transitional provisions, the Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal by a child “born of adultery” who had received half the share that he would have received if he had been a legitimate child as division had been made before 4   December 2001 (on 13 March 1996 in that case). In a judgment of 15 May 2008, the Court of Cassation held that the provisions of the 2001 Law relating to the new rights of children “born of adultery” were applicable to a succession opened before 1 August 1972 (in 1962 in that case) where this had not given rise to a division prior to 4   December 2001 (Court of Cassation, First Civil Division, Bull. 2008, I, no. 139). III.     ELEMENTS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 34.     In the great majority of the countries studied (forty States out of forty-two) a child’s status for inheritance purposes is independent of the marital status of their parents. Twenty-one countries confer equal status on all children, while nineteen others (Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus, Spain, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, Republic of Moldova, Monaco, Montenegro, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, the United Kingdom, Turkey and Ukraine) make a distinction between legitimate children and children born to unmarried parents/of adultery, but expressly grant them equal status for inheritance purposes. The concept of a child “born of adultery” is not at all common, such children generally being put in the same category as children born outside marriage. Some differences between legitimate children and children born outside marriage/ “of adultery” still exist, for inheritance purposes, in Malta. The only State Party that still makes a clear distinction, for inheritance purposes, regarding children born outside marriage is Andorra, where the latter are treated less favourably than legitimate children. IV.     RELEVANT DOCUMENTS AND EUROPEAN CASE-LAW 35.     The Committee of Ministers Rapporteur Group (GR-J) is still examining the draft recommendation [CM/Rec (2012)] to member states on the rights and legal status of children and parental responsibilities (with the explanatory memorandum) which has been presented to the Committee of Ministers. The draft recommendation seeks to replace the obsolete standards of the European Convention of 1975 on the Legal Status of Children Born out of Wedlock (Convention which France has not ratified), which are no longer in conformity with the Court’s case-law. The text, as currently drafted, contains a central element which is the principle of non-discrimination laid down in Principle 1, which provides: “Children should not be discriminated against on grounds such as ... birth ... In particular, children should not be discriminated against on the basis of the civil status of their parents.” Principle 5 – “Rights of succession” – provides that subject to the definition of parents given in Principle 2 and Principle 17(2) (posthumous conception), “children should regardless of the circumstances of their birth have equal rights of succession to the estate of each of their parents and of those parents’ family.” The relevant paragraph of the explanatory memorandum is worded as follows: “22.     Having regard to the general principle of non-discrimination as set out in Principle 1 and to the Court’s rulings in Mazurek v. France, Camp and Bourimi v.   the   Netherlands and Marckx v. Belgium, that ruled respectively that discrimination against children of adulterous relationships and children born out of wedlock with regard to inheritance rights violated Article 14 of the ECHR, taken in conjunction with Article 1 of the first Protocol in the former case, and Article 8 in the latter case, Principle 5 states in broad terms that children should have equal rights of succession regardless of the circumstances of their birth. In this respect, it has a wider application than Article 9 of the 1975 European Convention on the Legal Status of Children born out of Wedlock which gives such children the same rights of succession as children born in wedlock. Principle 5 is subject to the definition of parents given in Principle   2.” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL   NO.   1 36.     The applicant complained that, as a child “born of adultery”, he was unable to assert his inheritance rights and that such unjustified discrimination persisted after the Court’s judgment in Mazurek and despite the enactment of the 2001 Law. He alleged that there had been a violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which read respectively as follows: Article 14 “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as ... birth ...” Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” A.     The Chamber judgment 37.     In its judgment of 21 July 2011 the Chamber held that the applicant’s complaint fell within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which sufficed to render Article 14 of the Convention applicable. As his maternal filiation had been recognised in 1983, the applicant had an interest, enforceable in the domestic courts, in asserting his right to receive a share of his mother’s estate in a manner compatible with Article 14 of the Convention (see paragraphs 38-42 of the Chamber judgment). 38.     The Chamber observed, on the merits, that the 1972 and 2001 Laws had put in place specific transitional provisions in respect of the new inheritance rights enshrined in those Laws. It noted that the domestic courts had considered that the applicant could not benefit from those provisions at the time of lodging his action for abatement of the inter vivos gift of 1970. According to the Court of Appeal, the transitional provision of the 1972 Law precluded any challenge to inter vivos gifts granted before the Law came into force. The Court of Cassation had held that as division of the estate had taken place on the mother’s death in 1994, this precluded – under section 25(2) of the 2001 Law – application of the new provisions providing for equal inheritance rights. Those interpretations of domestic law pursued the legitimate aim of safeguarding the principle of legal certainty and the long-standing rights of the legitimate children. Moreover, they did not appear unreasonable, arbitrary or blatantly inconsistent with the prohibition of discrimination. The Chamber distinguished the specific situation in the present case from the cases in which there had not yet been division of the estate ( Mazurek , cited above, and Merger and Cros v. France , no.   68864/01, 22 December 2004) in concluding that the difference in treatment in question was proportionate to the aim pursued and that there had been no violation of Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraphs 50-59 of the Chamber judgment). B.     The parties’ submissions 1.     The Government (a)     Applicability of Article 14 of the Convention 39.     The Government submitted that the facts complained of by the applicant did not fall within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which rendered Article 14 of the Convention inapplicable. They observed in that connection that the inter vivos division of 1970 had vested title to the property in the two legitimate children and established an acquired legal situation which precluded the applicant from obtaining a share in his mother’s estate. Neither the 1972 Law nor the 2001 Law had had the effect of enabling him to acquire the share in the estate to which he would have been entitled if the deed of 1970 had not existed. Unlike the cases of Mazurek and Merger and Cros , in which the applicants had automatically acquired inheritance rights following the death of their parent, the succession in the present case had been settled in 1970 before the death of the applicant’s mother. Moreover, division of the property had taken effect several years before the applicant’s filiation had been established in 1983. Consequently, according to the Government, the applicant had no inheritance rights in respect of the estate (they referred, mutatis mutandis , to Alboize-Barthes and Alboize-Montezume v. France (dec.), no. 44421/04, 21   October 2008). (b)     Merits 40.     As they had previously submitted before the Chamber, the Government maintained that the applicant had not been “excluded” from his mother’s succession but, in so far as the assets had already been disposed of under the terms of the deed of inter vivos division of 1970, he could not acquire the share to which he would have been entitled under the 1972 and 2001 Laws if that deed had not existed. Accordingly, it was not the judicial decisions in question which had prevented the applicant from inheriting under his mother’s estate, but a prior deed of transfer of property which had established an acquired legal situation. 41.     It was to those rights acquired by the other heirs that the legislature in 2001 – having, moreover, fully satisfied the general obligations incumbent on it to execute the Mazurek judgment – had had to have regard when bringing the Law into force. Application of the new Law to pre-existing situations necessarily had to abide by the principles of legal certainty and foreseeability of the law established by the case-law of the Court. Section 25 of the 2001 Law thus excluded application of the new rights to successions already open on the date of its publication that had given rise to division before that date. In the Government’s view, the Court of Cassation’s interpretation did not therefore conflict with the Mazurek judgment. Unlike that judgment and the case of Merger and Cros , in which the applicants had challenged situations that were not yet established when they lodged their action in the domestic courts, the action for abatement brought by the applicant in 1998 had sought to challenge a situation in which there had already been division of the estate. 42.     The Government acknowledged that a judgment finding a violation of the Convention could give rise to general measures in the respondent State and have an impact going beyond the dispute concerning the parties before the Court. Nevertheless, they stated that the Court had never recognised a retroactive effect of its judgments. To claim that the Mazurek judgment should apply to the present case, that is, to a legal situation that had been definitively established before it was delivered, and that it should have retroactive effect, would render Article 46 of the Convention nugatory. 2.     The applicant (a)     Applicability of Article 14 of the Convention 43.     The applicant did not file additional observations with the Grand Chamber to those produced before the Chamber in which he had expressed his disagreement with the Government on this point (paragraph 37 of the Chamber judgment). He submitted that the establishment of his maternal filiation in 1983 had vested inheritance rights in him at the opening of his mother’s succession – pending on the day he lodged his application – which fell within the scope of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. (b)     Merits 44.     According to the applicant, the effectiveness of Article 14 of the Convention had to be guaranteed and only “very weighty” reasons could lead to a difference in treatment on the ground of birth being regarded as compatible with the Convention. Legal certainty was neither a right guaranteed by the Convention nor a public-interest ground capable of justifying an infringement of the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 45.     What might have been tolerable in 1972, on grounds of the concept of legal certainty, in frustrating the principle of non-discrimination guaranteed by Article 14 could no longer be so after Mazurek . However, the applicant stressed that rights unfairly acquired should not be made secure by the transitional provisions of the 2001 Law, which was meant to put an end to violations of the type found in that judgment. In his submission, in redressing the damage caused to Mr Mazurek the Court had refused to secure pre-existing legal situations obtaining prior to its judgment. The applicant considered that the Court should take note here of the failure to observe the binding force of Mazurek and find against France accordingly. To conclude otherwise would be tantamount to accepting that a State enacting legislation designed to draw the consequences of the Court’s case ‑ law had an indefinite period of time in which to transpose its decisions, and could be concerned, in the particular circumstance, only with future successions, and thus validate ex post facto recognised violations of the Convention. The applicant complained of continuing discrimination which perpetuated the effects of the 1972 Law that had been the subject of a finding against France by the Court and disavowed by the legislature in 2001. 46.     He further submitted that the action for abatement that he had brought in 1998 had been pending when the 2001 Law was published, which should have r