CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 7 mars 2013

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margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s6477A72F { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt }       FIFTH SECTION           CASE OF OSTENDORF v. GERMANY   (Application no. 15598/08)           JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   7 March 2013     FINAL   07/06/2013   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Ostendorf v. Germany, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Mark Villiger, President,   Angelika Nußberger,   Boštjan M. Zupančič,   Ann Power-Forde,   Paul Lemmens,   Helena Jäderblom,   Aleš Pejchal, judges, and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 5 February 2013, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 15598/08) against the Federal Republic of Germany lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a German national, Mr Henrik Ostendorf (“the applicant”), on 20 March 2008. 2.     The applicant was represented by Ms G. Pahl, a lawyer practising in Hamburg. The German Government (“the Government”) were represented by one of their Agents, Mr H.-J. Behrens, Ministerialrat , of the Federal Ministry of Justice. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that that his detention for preventive purposes on 10 April 2004 in the context of a football match had breached his right to liberty under Article 5 of the Convention. 4.     On 29 August 2011 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1968 and lives in Bremen. A.     Background to the case 6.     The applicant is a supporter of, inter alia , Werder Bremen football club, which plays in the German Federal Football League, and attends the club’s football matches regularly. 7.     Since 3 September 1996 the applicant has been registered by the Bremen police in a database on persons prepared to use violence in the context of sports events. Between 3 September 1996 and 24 May 2003 eight different incidents in the context of football games in which the applicant was considered to have been involved were listed. The applicant is further registered in a nation-wide database set up in 1994 on persons prepared to use violence in the context of sports events. In that database, persons are entered against whom criminal investigation proceedings were opened for offences in the context of sports events. B.     The applicant’s arrest and detention 8.     On 10 April 2004 the applicant and some thirty to forty other football fans travelled from Bremen to Frankfurt am Main by train in order to attend the match of Eintracht Frankfurt football club against Werder Bremen football club. 9.     The Bremen police had previously informed the Frankfurt am Main police that some thirty to forty persons prepared to use violence in the context of sports events (so-called category C hooligans) planned to travel from Bremen to Frankfurt am Main. 10.     On their arrival at Frankfurt am Main central station, the Frankfurt am Main police verified the identity of the members of the Bremen group of football fans. The majority of its members were considered by the police to be football hooligans prepared to use violence. The applicant had further been identified by the Bremen police as a “gang leader” of the Bremen hooligans. The police searched the members of the group and seized a mouth protection device and several pairs of gloves filled with quartz sand found on members of the group other than the applicant. 11.     The group, placed under police surveillance, went to a pub. When the group left the pub, the police noted that the applicant was no longer with the group. He was then found by the police in a locked cubicle in the ladies’ bathroom of the pub. He was arrested by the police there at approximately 2.30   p.m. and brought to the police station close to the football stadium; his mobile phone was seized. 12.     The applicant was released at approximately 6.30 p.m. on the same day, one hour after the football match had ended. His mobile phone was returned to him on 15 April 2004. C.     The proceedings before the domestic authorities and courts 1.     The decision of the president of the Frankfurt am Main Police 13.     On 13 April 2004 the applicant lodged a complaint with the Frankfurt am Main Police Headquarters. He claimed that his detention on 10   April 2004 and the seizure of his mobile phone had been unlawful. 14.     On 17 August 2004 the president of the Frankfurt am Main police dismissed the applicant’s complaint. He found that the applicant’s complaint was inadmissible. The applicant’s detention constituted an administrative act which had become devoid of purpose by the lapse of time, as he had been released prior to lodging his complaint. Likewise, the seizure of his mobile phone had become devoid of purpose as the phone had been returned to him on 15 April 2004. 15.     The president of the Frankfurt am Main Police further considered that, in any event, the applicant’s complaint was also ill-founded. Relying on section 32 § 1 no. 2 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act (see paragraph 33 below) the president found that the applicant’s detention had been necessary in order to prevent the imminent commission of “a criminal or regulatory offence of considerable importance to the general public”. Having regard to the information available to the police, it had to be expected that there would be an altercation between hooligans from Bremen and from Frankfurt am Main in or in the vicinity of Frankfurt, which would entail the commission of criminal or regulatory offences, in the context of the football match. As a rule, the time and place of such altercations were agreed on in advance by the groups of hooligans concerned. The applicant was considered to have attempted to evade police surveillance in order to arrange an altercation between hooligans. He was known to the Bremen police as a “gang leader” of the Bremen hooligans. He had further been observed speaking to a hooligan from Frankfurt am Main in the pub. He had further attempted to hide in the ladies’ bathroom of that pub. In order to prevent altercations between the groups of hooligans being arranged, it was indispensable to detain the applicant so as to separate him from the other members of the group. Furthermore, he could be released just one hour after the end of the football match, when the Frankfurt am Main and Bremen hooligans had left the stadium and its surroundings and were no longer in the applicant’s vicinity. 16.     Furthermore, the seizure of the applicant’s mobile phone, based on section 40 no. 4 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act (see paragraph 36 below), had been lawful. Having regard to the hooligans’ usual practice, it had to be assumed that the applicant would use his mobile phone in order to contact other hooligans from Frankfurt am Main and Bremen in order to agree on the details of the hooligans’ altercation. It had therefore been indispensable to seize the telephone and not to return it immediately after the end of the football match in order to prevent such an altercation. 2.     The judgment of the Frankfurt am Main Administrative Court 17.     On 6 September 2004 the applicant, who was from then onwards represented by counsel, brought an action against the Land of Hesse in the Frankfurt am Main Administrative Court. He requested the court to declare that his detention on 10 April 2004 and the seizure of his mobile phone had been unlawful. He argued that he was not a “gang leader” of a group of football hooligans, had not planned to arrange an altercation between hooligans or to commit an offence and had therefore not posed a threat which would justify his detention. He had not hidden in the ladies’ bathroom but had gone there because the men’s bathroom had been in a state excluding its use. 18.     On 14 June 2005 the Frankfurt am Main Administrative Court, having held a hearing, dismissed the applicant’s action. It found that the applicant’s detention on 10 April 2004 and the seizure of his mobile phone had been lawful and had not breached his rights. 19.     The court had heard the applicant and a witness, police officer G., who had been present during the police operation on 10 April 2004. The latter had confirmed that the group from Bremen the police considered to be hooligans prepared to use violence had already consumed a considerable number of alcoholic beverages during the train trip. He had added that during a search of the members of the group in Frankfurt am Main, a mouth protection device and several pairs of gloves filled with quartz sand had been found, which were instruments typically used by hooligans during altercations. During these clashes, offences such as bodily assault and breach of the peace ( Landfriedensbruch – that is, acts of violence against persons or things committed jointly by a crowd of people in a manner which endangers public safety) were committed on a regular basis. He had personally told the group that they would be accompanied to the football stadium by the police and that every person leaving the group would be arrested. He had considered the applicant to be the leader of the group at that time. When entering the ladies’ bathroom, he had come across a man from Frankfurt who had claimed “to have nothing to do with the whole thing”. When he had then found the applicant in a locked cubicle of the ladies’ bathroom, the latter had not given any plausible explanation as to why he was there. When the applicant’s mobile phone had then rung, it had displayed a male name and the addition “Ftm.”. 20.     The Administrative Court found that the applicant’s detention for some four hours had been lawful under section 32 § 1 no. 2 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act. It considered that in the circumstances of the case, it had been reasonable for the police to conclude that the applicant’s detention had been necessary to prevent the commission of considerable offences, such as bodily assault and breach of the peace. The applicant had attempted to evade police surveillance. As the applicant was a hooligan considered by the Bremen police to be a “gang leader” and was registered in a database of the Bremen police as a person prepared to use violence in the context of sports events, that conclusion had been appropriate. Moreover, it was a well-known practice of football hooligans, confirmed by witness G., to set up altercations. It was uncontested that the applicant had been in contact with a person considered by the police to be a hooligan from Frankfurt am Main. 21.     The Administrative Court further considered that the seizure of the applicant’s mobile phone had been lawful under section 40 no. 4 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act. The applicant had had to be prevented from making arrangements for an altercation between hooligans both during his detention and directly after his release. It had not been possible to return the mobile phone to the applicant the next day as he did not live in Frankfurt am Main and had therefore been unable to pick it up on that day. 3.     The decision of the Hessian Administrative Court of Appeal 22.     On 1 February 2006 the Hessian Administrative Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s request to be granted leave to lodge an appeal against the Administrative Court’s judgment. 23.     The Administrative Court of Appeal found that there were no serious doubts as to the correctness of the Administrative Court’s judgment. It stressed that a person’s detention, having regard to the serious restriction of the right to liberty it entailed, was only indispensable within the meaning of section 32 § 1 no. 2 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act if concordant facts in the circumstances of the case warranted the conclusion that it was very likely that a criminal or regulatory offence would be committed in the imminent future by the person detained and that, thereby, the general public’s interest in security would be seriously affected. The Administrative Court had convincingly found that, having regard to the circumstances and the information available, it had been reasonable for the police to assume that an altercation, entailing bodily assaults and breaches of the peace, between hooligans prepared to use violence had been imminent. It had further been reasonable for them to assume that the applicant’s detention had been necessary to prevent such an altercation. 24.     The Administrative Court of Appeal noted that at the time of the applicant’s arrest, the Frankfurt am Main police had had at their disposal information transferred to it by the Bremen police that the applicant was member of a group of football fans prepared to use violence (so-called category C hooligans) and was known as a “gang leader” of that group. The transfer of such information was justified under the provisions of the Länder on data transfer between police authorities. In any event, it was the Bremen police transferring the data in question, and not the Frankfurt am Main police receiving that information, which were responsible for the legality of the collection and transfer of the data in question. Therefore, the question whether the Bremen police had lawfully collected and stored data concerning the applicant was not to be determined in the present proceedings, which had been brought against the Land of Hesse, which was represented by the Frankfurt am Main Police Headquarters. Furthermore, the entries on the applicant in the database of the Bremen police had not been known to the Frankfurt am Main police on 10 April 2004 and the latter had not, therefore, based its assumptions concerning the applicant on those entries. 25.     The Administrative Court of Appeal further did not share the applicant’s view that, contrary to the Administrative Court’s findings, the police could not reasonably have concluded that the applicant’s detention was necessary to prevent the commission of an offence in the imminent future. The mere fact that the police had seized objects they had considered dangerous from the Bremen group of hooligans and that they had accompanied that group to the football stadium would not have sufficed to exclude an altercation between hooligan groups. Moreover, simply asking the applicant to rejoin the group of Bremen football supporters after he had been found by the police in the ladies’ bathroom would not have been sufficient to prevent the risk of an altercation between hooligans being arranged. Likewise, the police had not been obliged to conclude that separating the applicant from the Bremen group of hooligans would be sufficient to prevent such an altercation. As had been confirmed by the applicant himself, such clashes did not, as a rule, take place in or close to the football stadium, but in different places. 26.     The Administrative Court of Appeal further endorsed the Administrative Court’s finding that it had been reasonable for the police to assume that the applicant, having been identified as a group leader prepared to use violence, would be personally involved in the altercation with the Frankfurt hooligans. 27.     Finally, the Administrative Court of Appeal also confirmed that the police had been authorised to seize the applicant’s mobile phone under section 40 no. 4 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act. The applicant’s telephone had been seized in order to prevent him from using it in order to commit an offence. 4.     The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court 28.     On 1 March 2006 the applicant lodged a constitutional complaint with the Federal Constitutional Court. He complained that his detention had breached his right to liberty. There had not been any reason to assume that he was about to commit a criminal offence. Furthermore, the administrative courts had wrongly refused to examine whether his registration in the database of the Bremen police as a “gang leader” of persons prepared to use violence in the context of sports events was lawful. This registration led to him being prohibited by football clubs to enter football stadiums and to travel restrictions being imposed on him by the police during international football matches. Therefore, the fact that he had never been able to lodge an appeal against this registration had violated his right to liberty. Moreover, in the applicant’s submission, the seizure of his mobile phone had violated the right to secrecy of telecommunications and his property rights under the Basic Law. 29.     On 26 February 2008 the Federal Constitutional Court, without giving reasons, declined to consider the applicant’s constitutional complaint (file no. 2 BvR 517/06). II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW A.     Provisions of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act 30.     The Hessian Public Security and Order Act governs the powers of the Hessian police and administrative authorities to fulfil their duty to avert dangers to public security and order (see sections 1 and 3 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act). 31.     Section 11 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act, on general powers, provides that the police may take the measures necessary to avert a danger to public security and order in individual cases unless the following provisions of the said Act provide for specific rules on their powers. 32.     Under section 31 § 1 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act, on banning orders ( Platzverweisung ), the police may temporarily ban a person from a place or prohibit a person from entering a place in order to avert a danger. 33.     Under section 32 § 1 no. 2 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act, on custody, the police may take a person into custody if this is indispensable in order to prevent the imminent commission or continuation of a criminal or regulatory offence of considerable importance to the general public. This provision refers to the offences listed in the Criminal Code and in the Regulatory Offences Act. Under section 32 § 1 no. 3 of the said Act, a person may further be taken into custody if this is indispensable in order to enforce measures taken under section 31 of the said Act. 34.     Section 33 § 1 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act, on judicial decision, provides that where a person is detained on the basis of section 32 § 1 of the same Act, the police shall obtain, without delay, a judicial decision on the lawfulness and continuation of the deprivation of liberty. A judicial decision does not have to be obtained if it can be assumed that the decision would be made only after the grounds for the police measure ceased to exist. 35.     Section 35 § 1 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act, on the duration of deprivation of liberty, provides that a detained person shall be released as soon as the grounds for the police measure ceased to exist (no.   1) or twenty-four hours at the latest after his or her arrest if he or she has not been brought before a judge before that lapse of time (no. 2). The detained person shall equally be released if the continuation of the deprivation of liberty is declared unlawful by judicial decision (no. 3). The person concerned shall further be released in any case by the end of the day following his or her arrest at the latest if the continuation of the deprivation of liberty has not been ordered by judicial decision before that time. The judicial decision on detention under section 32 § 1 no. 2 must fix the maximum duration of detention which may not exceed six days (no. 4). 36.     Section 40 no. 4 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act provides that the police may seize an object if there are concrete reasons to assume that it will be used in order to commit a criminal or regulatory offence. B.     Provisions of criminal law 37.     Under Article 125 of the Criminal Code, breach of the peace – or rioting – shall be punished with up to three years’ imprisonment or a fine. A person is guilty of breach of the peace if he or she participates in acts of violence against persons or objects or in threats to persons to commit acts of violence which are committed by a crowd of people together in a manner posing a threat to public security. The same applies if the perpetrator encourages a crowd to commit such acts. 38.     Article 223 of the Criminal Code, on bodily injury, provides that whoever physically assaults or damages the health of another person shall be liable to imprisonment of up to five years or a fine. Under Article 224 of the Criminal Code, on dangerous bodily injury, whoever causes bodily injury, in particular, by using a weapon or other dangerous instrument, by acting jointly with others or by a treatment posing a risk to life shall be liable to imprisonment from six months up to ten years, in less serious cases from three months to five years. 39.     Article 231 of the Criminal Code, on participation in a brawl, provides that whoever takes part in a brawl or in an attack committed jointly by several persons shall be liable to imprisonment of up to three years or a fine for that participation alone if the death of a person or a serious bodily injury (Article 226 of the Criminal Code) was caused by that brawl or attack. THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION 40.     The applicant complained that his detention for preventive purposes in the context of the football match on 10 April 2004 had violated his right to liberty as provided in Article 5 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a)     the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b)     the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law; (c)     the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so; ... 3.     Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph   1   (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial. ...” 41.     The Government contested that argument. A.     Admissibility 42.     The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ submissions (a)     The applicant 43.     The applicant took the view that his detention had violated Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. He argued that the deprivation of his liberty failed to comply with any of the sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 § 1. (i)     Justification under sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1 44.     The applicant submitted, in particular, that his detention could not have been “reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence” for the purposes of sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1. There had not been a sufficient suspicion that he had to be prevented from committing an unlawful act. The police’s suspicion in this respect had only been based on his entry into the database of the Bremen police as a person prepared to use violence in the context of sports events. As the entries in that database were wrong and unlawful and as he had never been in a position to have examined his entry in that database before the domestic courts, the fact that he figured in that database could not have raised any sufficient suspicion that he was about to commit an offence. Without that unlawful entry into the police database, he would never have been taken into custody as a supposed gang leader of football hooligans. In any event, according to the information contained in that database, he had allegedly been involved in only ten incidents during a period of more than seven years and had been detained only once. Given the large number of football matches he had been present at, the small number of incidents did not justify his classification as a violent offender. 45.     The applicant stressed that, in the factual circumstances of the case, the police’s suspicion that the commission of a criminal offence by him had been imminent had been completely unfounded. He had separated from the group of Bremen football fans in the pub as he still had to pay and had to go to the bathroom which he had informed the police of. He had gone to the ladies’ room as the men’s room was in a poor state. A police officer and a male person from Frankfurt had approached him there and he had left the pub with the police without resistance before he had been taken into custody. 46.     Moreover, the applicant argued that his detention had, in any event, been unnecessary. The police had had the situation fully under control. Due to their police surveillance and the previous seizure of objects considered as dangerous, the commission of any offence by the group of unarmed football fans would have been impossible. It would have been sufficient in order to avert a hooligan brawl prior to the match to escort the applicant together with the Bremen group of football fans to the football stadium or to simply separate him from the Bremen group and to seize his mobile phone without taking him into custody. (ii)     Justification under sub-paragraph (b) of Article 5 § 1 47.     The applicant further argued that his detention had not been covered by sub-paragraph (b) of Article 5 § 1 either. It had neither been based on a court order nor had it been ordered to secure the fulfilment of any statutory obligation. (b)     The Government 48.     The Government took the view that the applicant’s custody had complied with Article 5 § 1 of the Convention. The applicant’s detention, based on section 32 § 1 no. 2 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act, had been lawful. It had further been justified under both sub-paragraph (c) and sub-paragraph (b) of Article 5 § 1. (i)     Justification under sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1 49.     In the Government’s submission, the applicant’s detention had been justified under sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1 in the first place, as it had been “reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence”. They stressed that the applicant had not yet committed a criminal offence as his preparatory acts arranging a hooligan brawl were not punishable under German law. However, the applicant had to been taken into custody by the police for preventive purposes as the police had reasonably considered his detention necessary in order to stop him from committing serious offences, in particular bodily injuries, breaches of the peace and participation in a brawl (Articles 223, 125 and 231 of the Criminal Code, see paragraphs 37-39 above), in the context of the football match. 50.     The Government stressed that the applicant was a hooligan seeking violent altercations. Since the end of the 1980s, the applicant, who held right-wing extremist views and has worked for the right-wing National ‑ Democratic Party of Germany ( Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands ), has belonged to a group of nationalist football fans in Bremen classified by the police as “hooligans seeking violence” (so-called category C fans). He has been identified as one of the leaders of that group notably during a previous demonstration of hooligans against travel restrictions organised and animated by him. He has previously been convicted of breach of the peace in 1994 and criminal investigation proceedings were opened against him on a number of occasions, inter alia , for breaches of the peace and bodily injury. 51.     In the Government’s view, preventive police custody as that of the applicant was covered by sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1, despite the fact that it was not connected with criminal proceedings as required in the Court’s current case-law, if it was indispensable to avert an imminent, specific criminal offence. This was confirmed by the wording of Article 5 §   1 (c), second alternative, which authorised detention of a person “when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence”. It was not necessary that the person concerned had already committed a criminal offence as this situation was covered by the first alternative of Article 5 § 1 (c) – detention “on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence” – and the second alternative would be superfluous otherwise. Police custody for preventive purposes, which was only authorised as a measure of last resort in order to avert imminent serious offences, also did not amount to arbitrary detention. 52.     Furthermore, the State’s duty flowing from Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention to protect the public from offences should be taken into account in the interpretation of Article 5 § 1 and militated in favour of an authorisation of preventive police custody under that provision. 53.     The Government further argued that the fact that everyone detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of Article 5 § 1 was entitled, under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, to “trial within a reasonable time” did not warrant the conclusion that Article 5 § 1 (c) only covered pre ‑ trial detention. It was true that no criminal trial would be held in respect of persons held in police custody for preventive purposes as they were not accused of a criminal offence. However, the duty to bring a detainee promptly before a judge, as equally required by Article 5 § 3, also applied to persons in preventive police custody. The term “trial”, in these circumstances, had to be understood as referring to the judicial decision on the lawfulness of the preventive police custody of the person concerned. 54.     The Government stressed that the possibility to have recourse to such custody for preventive purposes was indispensable for the police in order to maintain public security and order. All German Länder therefore had provisions similar to those applicable in Hesse, which authorised custody for preventive purposes for a short period where this was indispensable to avert an imminent significant criminal or regulatory offence. The authorisation of custody for preventive purposes was particularly important in cases of imminent domestic violence or where there was a risk of clashes provoked by violent participants or counter ‑ demonstrators in the context of demonstrations of right-wing or left-wing groups. Likewise, preventive police custody served to prevent persons ready to block the transport of casks for the storage and transport of radioactive material (CASTOR) on streets or by train from doing so. The weekly football matches of the German Federal football league and football championships, in particular, could no longer be carried out in a peaceful manner without taking recalcitrant hooligans provoking violent clashes with rival hooligans into preventive police custody. Finally, altercations between drunk persons in pubs or on fairs could often not be prevented without taking the person(s) concerned in preventive police custody. 55.     Such preventive police custody was particularly important in Germany where, contrary to the applicable law in other Member States, criminal law punished acts by which an offence was prepared only in exceptional cases. Thereby, potential offenders were incited to give up their plans to commit an offence (without being punishable). However, in order to protect potential victims effectively, the police could not await the commission of an offence and the occurrence of serious damage prior to their intervening. It would, however, run counter to the protection of fundamental rights if, in order for a preventive custody to comply with Article 5 § 1 (c) (first alternative), the State had to provide for more preparatory acts to be punishable under criminal law. 56.     There had been no less intrusive means than the applicant’s detention for a short duration in order to achieve the aim of crime prevention. The applicant no longer had to be brought before a judge as required by Article 5 § 3 as a court decision could not have been obtained before the end of the applicant’s short detention. Requiring a court order would therefore have deprived the applicant of his liberty longer than necessary. The applicant had been free to obtain a court decision on the lawfulness of his detention after his release. (ii)     Justification under sub-paragraph (b) of Article 5 § 1 57.     The applicant had further been arrested and detained in compliance with sub-paragraph (b) of Article 5 § 1 in order to secure the fulfilment of an obligation prescribed by law. Prior to his detention, the applicant had repeatedly been warned by the police, notably by police officer G., that the group of hooligans he had been part of would be escorted by the police on the way to the football stadium and that everyone who left that group might be arrested. It had been clear to the applicant that the police’s order had been aimed at preventing arrangements of altercations with other hooligan groups. The applicant had failed to comply with the police’s order, which had implemented his obligation prescribed by law – section 11 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act (see paragraph 31 above) – to remain with the group and not to arrange an altercation. As it had been clear from his conduct that he would not comply with that order in the future, he had been taken into custody under section 32 § 1 no. 2 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act. 58.     The order had been lawful as there had been sufficient facts to indicate that the applicant – known to the police as a violence-seeking hooligan holding right-wing extremist views – had intended to evade the police escort in order to organise by mobile phone and take part in an altercation between hooligans supporting Eintracht Frankfurt football club and hooligans supporting Werder Bremen football club before or after the football match. The police could reasonably base that assumption on their surveillance of the applicant prior to his arrest. The applicant had been observed speaking to a hooligan from Frankfurt am Main and had given no plausible explanation why he had attempted to evade police surveillance by hiding in the ladies’ toilets. The Government contested in particular that the applicant had informed the police that he still had to pay and to go to the restroom prior to leaving the group. 59.     Moreover, the applicant had been identified by the Bremen police as the leader of a group of violence-seeking hooligans during many years of surveillance and criminal investigation proceedings had been opened for related offences against him on several occasions. Furthermore, objects typically serving to attack or defend oneself during hooligan altercations had been found on members of the applicant’s group. In addition, the police had generally experienced that hooligans, as a rule, fixed the time and place of altercations with rival hooligan groups in advance. During the altercation which the applicant had attempted to arrange, significant offences punishable under the Criminal Code, in particular bodily injuries, breaches of the peace and participation in a brawl, would have been committed by the applicant and the other hooligans involved. 60.     The Government stressed in that context that, contrary to the applicant’s view, the police’s estimation that he had planned to organise an altercation between hooligans had not been based on the lawful entries concerning him in the database on violent football fans. At the time the Frankfurt am Main police had taken the applicant into custody, they had not been aware of those entries. The Bremen police had only informed them that the applicant was the leader of a group of violence-seeking hooligans travelling to Frankfurt. The police’s view that he posed a threat to public security and his detention had not, therefore, been predetermined by his entry into that database. 61.     The applicant’s detention had also been proportionate. The applicant had persistently refused to comply with the police’s orders. Moreover, there had been no effective alternative way to keep him under surveillance before and during the football match in order to prevent him from organising and taking part in an altercation between hooligans after the match. In particular, separating him from the group and seizing his mobile phone would have been insufficient to prevent him from organising a brawl with a different telephone. The duration of the custody of four hours had been the minimum period necessary as his detention had been necessary until the football match had been over and the hooligan groups had left the football stadium and its vicinity. The applicant’s custody had served to prevent serious criminal offences and to maintain public order as no altercation between hooligans from Frankfurt and Bremen had taken place as a result of that custody. 62.     The Government stressed that the police could not be expected to wait for the altercation to start before terminating it, which would have been very difficult, if not impossible, would necessitate a considerable number of police officers and entail dangers for life and limb of those officers as well as of uninvolved third persons. It would also not have sufficed to issue the applicant with a banning order under section 31 § 1 of the Hessian Public Security and Order Act (see paragraph 32 above). The banning order would have had to comprise the entire city of Frankfurt am Main as a hooligan altercation could have been organised anywhere within that city. The police would have been unable to control whether the applicant complied with such an order. 2.     The Court’s assessment (a)     Recapitulation of the relevant principles (i)     Deprivation of liberty 63.     The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 1 protects the physical liberty of the person. It does not concern mere restrictions upon liberty of movement, which are addressed by Article 2 of Protocol no. 4 (see Engel and Others v.   the Netherlands , 8 June 1976, § 58, Series A no. 22; Guzzardi v. Italy , 6   November 1980, § 92, Series A no. 39; and Raimondo v. Italy , 22   February 1994, § 39, Series A no. 281 ‑ A). 64.     The Convention institutions have repeatedly found that being brought to a police station against one’s will and being held in a cell amounted to a deprivation of liberty, even if the interference lasted for a relatively short duration (see, for instance, Murray v. the United Kingdom [GC], 28 October 1994, §§ 49 ss., Series A no. 300 ‑ A, concerning custody at an army centre for less than three hours for questioning; Novotka v.   Slovakia (dec.), no. 47244/99, 4 November 2003 with further references, concerning one hour spent in police custody; Shimovolos v. Russia , no.   30194/09, §§ 49-50, 21 June 2011, concerning police custody of 45   minutes for questioning; see also Witold Litwa v. Poland , no. 26629/95, §   46, ECHR 2000 ‑ III, concerning confinement for six and a half hours in a sobering-up centre). (ii)     Grounds for detention 65.     The Court reiterates that sub-paragraphs (a) to (f) of Article 5 § 1 contain an exhaustive list of permissible grounds for deprivation of liberty, and no deprivation of liberty will be lawful unless it falls within one of those grounds (see, inter alia , Witold Litwa , cited above, § 49; Saadi v.   the   United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229/03, § 43, ECHR 2008; and Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39692/09, 40713/09 and   41008/09, § 60, ECHR 2012). Only a narrow interpretation of those exceptions is consistent with the aim of that provision, namely to ensure that no one is arbitrarily deprived of his liberty (see, among many others, Shimovolos , cited above, § 51). 66.     Under the second alternative of sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 § 1, the detention of a person may be justified “when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence”. Article 5 § 1 (c) does not, thereby, permit a policy of general prevention directed against an individual or a category of individuals who are perceived by the authorities, rightly or wrongly, as being dangerous or having propensity to unlawful acts. That ground of detention does no more than afford the Contracting States a means of preventing a concrete and specific offence (see Guzzardi , cited above, § 102; Ciulla v. Italy , 22 February 1989, § 40, Series A no. 148; and Shimovolos , cited above, § 54) as regards, in particular, the place and time of its commission and its victim(s) (see M. v. Germany , no. 19359/04, §§ 89 and 102, ECHR 2009). This can be seen both from the use of the singular (“an offence”) and from the object of Article 5, namely to ensure that no one should be dispossessed of his liberty in an arbitrary fashion (see Guzzardi , cited above, § 102; and M. v. Germany , cited above, § 89). 67.     Under the Court’s well-established case-law, detention to prevent a person from committing an offence must, in addition, be “effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority”, a requirement which qualifies every category of detention referred to in Article 5 § 1 (c) (see Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3) , 1 July 1961, pp. 51-53, §   14, Series A no. 3; and, mutatis mutandis , Engel and Others , cited above, § 69; and Jėčius v. Lithuania , no. 34578/97, §§ 50-51, ECHR 2000 ‑ IX). 68.     Sub-paragraph (c) thus permits depr