CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 2 avril 2013

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ITALY   (Applications nos. 25851/09, 29284/09 and 64090/09)           JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG     2 April 2013     FINAL   09/09/2013   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Tarantino and Others v. Italy, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Danutė Jočienė, President,   Guido Raimondi,   Peer Lorenzen,   Dragoljub Popović,   Işıl Karakaş,   Nebojša Vučinić,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, judges, and Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 5 March 2013, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in three applications (nos.   25851/09, 29284/09 and 64090/09) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by eight Italian nationals: Ms Claudia Tarantino, Mr   Giuseppe Reitano, Ms Laura Aziz, Mr Maurizio Brancadori, Mr   Massimo Crosia, Mr Massimo Filetti, Mr Pasqualino La Mela and Mr   Carmelo Marcuzzo (“the applicants”) on 18 May and 2 and 16   November 2009. 2.     The applicants were represented by Mr G. Lipari, a lawyer practising in Misilmeri. The Italian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their co-Agent, Ms P. Accardo. 3.     The applicants complained of a violation of their right to education as provided by Article 2 of Protocol No.   1 to the Convention. In particular they alleged that the aims pursued by Law no. 127/1997 regulating the numerus clausus were not legitimate and the measure not proportionate. 4.     On 21 June 2011 the applications were joined and communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the applications at the same time (Article 29 § 1). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicants’ particulars are set out in the table in the appendix. A.     Background to the cases 1.     The first applicant, Ms Tarantino 6.     On 4 September 2007 Ms Tarantino failed the entrance examination to study at the Faculty of Medicine in Palermo. In 2007 two thousand students sat this examination and there were two hundred and ten places available. She failed the examination again in 2008 and 2009. 7.     On 14 December 2007 the first applicant and other students lodged a complaint with the President of the Republic alleging that Law no.   264/1999, in particular the two binding criteria used by the Ministry to set the number of students allowed admission to the relevant faculty of each university (see paragraph 17 below), was incompatible with Article 3(2)(c) and (g) of the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Directive 2005/36/CE on the recognition of professional qualifications, Article 15 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Article 6 § 2 of the Treaty on the European Union, with regard to the principle of equality, and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. She further contested both the State’s decision to impose the same limitations on private universities and the adequacy of the entrance examinations. The first applicant also asked to be provisionally admitted to the university under a conditional clause. 8.     By a decree of 2 July 2008 the Supreme Administrative Court ( Consiglio di Stato ) rejected her request for an interim measure. 9.     On 23 September 2008 the first applicant made further pleadings and reiterated her request for the matter be submitted to the European Court of Justice (the “ECJ”) for a preliminary ruling. Her pleadings were transmitted to the Supreme Administrative Court in October 2008. 10.     By a decree of 28 April 2009 (no.   2256), adopted on the basis of the Supreme Administrative Court’s advisory opinion delivered on 12 November 2008 and notified to the first applicant on 14 May 2009, the President of the Republic rejected the complaints. The decree stipulated that, bearing in mind the human and material resources of the universities, the contested admission restrictions, allowing entrance only to the most meritorious students, were reasonable and therefore compatible with the provisions of the European Union (EU) invoked. Moreover, in line with the increase in society’s need for qualified doctors, admissions to the faculties of medicine in 2008-09 had increased by 10-20%. It noted that the professional examination, after a degree had been obtained, was not an academic title in itself but a State examination like those held in most States. Lastly, it dismissed the allegation that the entrance examination’s content was inadequate. 2.     The remaining seven applicants 11.     The other seven applicants had been or are still working as dental technicians or hygienists for a number of years. 12.     On 4 September 2009, despite their relevant professional experience, those seven applicants failed the entrance examination to study at the Faculty of Dentistry. Any preceding and subsequent attempts were also unsuccessful. 13.     Mr Marcuzzo (hereinafter “the eighth applicant”) had nevertheless passed the entrance examination in the academic year 1999/2000. However, following his failure to sit examinations for eight consecutive years on account of serious family problems (as provided for by the relevant University Rule, under Article 149 of Royal Decree no.   1592/1933), he lost his student status in July 2009. 14.     These applicants conceded that they had not pursued available domestic remedies, since in their view they would have been ineffective. According to the well-established jurisprudence of the Supreme Administrative Court, limited access to universities is compatible with the Constitution and EU law (see, amongst others, the above-mentioned advisory opinion of 12 November 2008). The eighth applicant also argued that the Supreme Administrative Court had constantly held that subjective reasons, such as family problems (as in his case), could not be considered as exceptions to the rule favouring continuity of studies. In consequence, his claim would not have been successful. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Law no. 127/1997 15.     Law no. 127/1997, amending section 9(4) of Law no. 341/1990, introduced, for the first time, a numerus clausus (limited access) to both public and private Italian universities. Section 17(116) of that Law provided that it was for the Ministry of Universities and Scientific and Technological Research to establish those limits. However, the Law did not establish or set clear criteria to determine the faculties subject to restrictions, the number of available places or the selection procedure. 16.     On 27 November 1998 (judgment no. 383/1998), having been asked to examine the constitutionality of section 17(116) of Law no. 127/1997, the Constitutional Court delivered a judgment upholding the constitutionality of that Law. It considered that the discretion exercised by the Ministry of Universities and Research was not unfettered, since it must act according to an established legal framework. In this connection, in the absence of national legislation on the matter, the Constitutional Court made reference to relevant EU directives which aimed to ensure an adequate standard of education. The court further noted that it was for Parliament to rule on the subject. 17.     Following the Constitutional Court’s judgment, Law no.   264/1999 was enacted. It provided that the Ministry of Universities and Research would establish the entrance quota of the Faculties of Medicine, Veterinary Medicine, Dentistry, Architecture and Nursing on the basis of two binding criteria: the capacity and resource potential of the universities, and society’s need for a particular profession ( fabbisogno di professionalità del sistema sociale e produttivo ). Based on that assessment, the Ministry would set the number of students allowed admission to the relevant faculty of each university. 18.     On 21 April 2009 the Antitrust Authority ( Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato – “the AA”) issued a recommendation on the criteria for admission to the Faculty of Dentistry. The AA noted that: (a) in practice, the two criteria established by the Law were applied on the basis of the observations of the Ministry of Universities and Research and the Ministry of Health, and (b) any data gathered would be discussed by an expert task force, composed, inter alia , of representatives from the National Federation of Doctors and the Chamber of Doctors and Dentists. 19.     In the AA’s view, the Italian Government were acting in breach of the Constitutional Court’s judgment (see paragraph 16 above) and EU law, in so far as the Law took into account not only educational standards but also data concerning occupational demand. Noting that the assessments were made with exclusive regard to the occupational demand of the National Health Service, the AA concluded that limiting admission to the Faculty of Dentistry amounted to an unreasonable restriction of competition in professional services. Indeed, by considering only public demand, to the exclusion of any private demand, the number of dentists was artificially reduced and dental fees were unjustifiably increased. Furthermore, the AA disapproved of the participation of professional associations in the above-mentioned task force, in so far as their decisions might be highly influenced by their own interests. 20.     To be admitted, candidates were required to pass a multiple-choice examination consisting of eighty questions on general culture (including international geography and history), biology, chemistry, mathematics and physics. The examination, based on the high school syllabus, aimed to test the candidates’ aptitude for the subject matter pertaining to the faculty of their choice. B.     Jurisprudence 21.     The relevant domestic courts repeatedly found that a numerus clausus and the way in which it was applied in the Italian legal framework were in accordance with both the Constitution and European Union legislation. Judgments in support of those findings include, inter alia : judgments no.   1931 of 29 April 2008, no. 5418 of 24 June 2008, and no. 5542 of 6 June 2008 of the Supreme Administrative Court; judgment no. 197 of the Florence Tuscany Administrative Tribunal of 12   February 2007; judgment no. 4559 of the Naples Administrative Tribunal of 2008; judgment no. 1931 of the Florence Tuscany Administrative Tribunal of 17 April 2008; judgment no. 145 of the Trent Administrative Tribunal of 11 June 2008; and judgment no. 1631 of the Supreme Administrative Court of 15 April 2010. In particular, in respect of the complainants’ claim that the criterion related to society’s need for a particular profession should not be limited to the national territory – to the exclusion of the current and imminent future needs of the entire European Community – the Supreme Administrative Court held, in its judgment no. 1931 of 29 April 2008, that it was evident that the major determining criterion was that based on the capacity and resource potential of universities, which allowed for proper scientific training as required by EU legislation. As had previously been upheld by the Constitutional Court (judgment no. 393 of 1998), the right to higher levels of education, even for the most meritorious students, depended on the availability of technical means and human resources, particularly in the study of sciences, which was both theoretical and practical. Indeed, EU legislation did not ban numeri clausi . European directives provided for the recognition of titles and degrees based on standards of minimum studies and guarantees of a real possession of the necessary knowledge to carry out a profession. However, they left it to individual States to determine the instruments, means and methods to fulfil the obligations set by those directives. The criterion relating to society’s need for a particular profession carried less weight than the capacity and resource criterion, and was indeed secondary. It would come into play in the unlikely event that availability was so abundant that it would be necessary to limit access to the profession to avoid saturating the market. With reference to a recommendation by the Health Ministry to limit the number of registered students (which formed the basis of the decision on the number of places available for the years 2006-07), the court considered that it was to be seen as a quantitative restriction not in view of society’s needs, but in the light of a need to ensure that specialised studies reached European standards. Given that the relevance of this criterion to the decision on the number of candidates to be registered each year had not been proven, and because EU law did not provide for unlimited and unconditional access to education for students, it was not necessary to refer the matter to the ECJ. 22.     According to the Supreme Administrative Court judgment no. 1855 of 2005, the eight-year time-limit indicated in decree no. 1592 of 1933 is not a prescriptive period which can be interrupted, but the maximum time before the right (to attend the course) lapses. C.     Relevant European Union law 23.     Article 39 (former Article 48) of Title III relates to the free movement of persons, services and capital of the Treaty establishing the European Community. It reads as follows: “1. Freedom of movement for workers shall be secured within the Community. 2. Such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work and employment. 3. It shall entail the right, subject to limitations justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health: (a) to accept offers of employment actually made; (b) to move freely within the territory of Member States for this purpose; (c) to stay in a Member State for the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or administrative action; (d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having been employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in implementing regulations to be drawn up by the Commission. 4. The provisions of this Article shall not apply to employment in the public service.” 24.     Other relevant European Union texts include: Council Directive 86/457/EEC of 15 September 1986 on specific training in general medical practice; Council Directive 93/16/EEC of 5 April 1993 on facilitating the free movement of doctors and the mutual recognition of their diplomas, certificates and other evidence of formal qualifications; and Council Directive 2005/36/EC of 7 September 2005 on the recognition of professional qualifications. THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION 25.     The applicants complained of a breach of their right to education under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which provides: “No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.” 26.     The Government contested that argument. A.     Admissibility 27.     The Government considered that the extraordinary remedy before the President of the Republic was a judicial remedy which the applicants could choose as an alternative to proceedings before the regional administrative tribunals (the “TAR”). They considered that in the present case all the applicants had that remedy at their disposal and had used it to complain about the alleged breaches. 28.     The applicants contended that proceedings before the TAR would be ineffective given the constant jurisprudence to the effect that limited admission to universities was compatible with domestic, EU and Convention law. They relied particularly on judgments nos.   1931, 5418 and 5542 of the Supreme Administrative Court of 2008, and on judgment no. 1631 of the Supreme Administrative Court of 15 April 2010. The applicants subsequently noted that the Government had conceded that all the applicants had exhausted domestic remedies. 29.     The Court reiterates that Article 35 § 1 of the Convention requires that the only remedies to be exhausted are those that are available and sufficient to afford redress in respect of the breaches alleged. The purpose of Article 35 § 1 is to afford the Contracting States the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those allegations are submitted to the Court (see, inter alia, Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 74, ECHR 1999-V). However, an applicant is not obliged to have recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective (see Raninen v. Finland , 16 December 1997, § 41, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-VIII). It follows that the pursuit of such remedies will have consequences for the identification of the “final decision” and, correspondingly, for the calculation of the starting point for the running of the six-month rule (see, for example, Kucherenko v. Unkraine (dec.), no.   41974/98, 4 May 1999, and Prystavska v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 21287/02, 17 December 2002). 30.     The Court notes that the Government’s submission to the effect that all the applicants had used the remedy before the President of the Republic is incorrect, as it was only the first applicant who instituted such proceedings. Moreover, the Court reiterates that proceedings before the President of the Republic are considered as an extraordinary remedy which applicants are not required to pursue for the purposes of satisfying the requirements of Article 35 of the Convention (see Nasalli Rocca v. Italy (dec.), no. 8162/02, 31 March 2005). 31.     However, the Court notes that, as can be seen from the domestic jurisprudence (see Relevant domestic law and practice, above), the matters at issue in the present case have repeatedly come before the domestic courts, which have consistently rejected the claimants’ requests. In these circumstances the Court can accept that an attempt to bring proceedings before the regional administrative tribunals followed by an appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court had no prospects of success. Thus, in line with the Government’s lack of an objection in this respect, the Court finds no reason to reject this part of the application for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 32.     The same holds in respect of the subsidiary complaint of the eighth applicant. 33.     The Court further notes that since the first applicant sat the examination again in 2008 and 2009, no issue arises in respect of the six-month time-limit regarding the above-mentioned extraordinary remedy. 34.     Lastly, the Court notes that this part of the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ observations (a)     The applicants 35.     The applicants contended that the restriction applicable to admission to the courses of their choice, namely the basis for applying the numerus clausus , was contrary to the Constitution and EU law. 36.     They further alleged that the aims pursued by the law were not legitimate or proportionate. In particular, while acknowledging the need to guarantee an appropriate level of skills for future professionals, they contested the two criteria established by Law no. 264/1999 and applicable to both public and private universities. Furthermore, they considered that the needs of the community could not be assessed only on the basis of the public sector, particularly given that the majority of professionals, especially in the dental field, worked in the private sector. Moreover, the assessment was exclusively local and did not take into consideration the possibility that persons studying in Italy might want to practise in another country. 37.     The applicants explained that the number of places at individual universities was established by the Ministry of Universities on a regional basis according to the needs of the area. Recently, however, the Italian institutions had realised that the limited access had created a lack of professionals to the extent that certain regions had stated that their hospitals would soon be short of doctors and dentists. They cited as an example (as reported by the press) the region of Lombardy, which had estimated that by 2015 it would have lost 40 % of the current workforce (doctors and dentists) owing to retirement. The region had asked the Government to abolish the current system of limited access, but the Italian Ministry of Health had considered that there were already more doctors than necessary in Italy. The applicants considered that the extent to which a sector was saturated was not a legal reason to impede operators from accessing the market. The applicants opined that the real purpose of the restrictions was to protect doctors’ and dentists’ interests by restricting competition in the sector, a purpose in conflict with EU law. In particular, they contested the application of those restrictive measures to private universities, which could otherwise increase their admission numbers without imposing an extra financial burden on the State. Thus, the current system denied the applicants access to an education of their choice, even against payment to a private university or, if necessary, to a State one. This amounted to restricting the right to education without a valid reason. In this connection the applicants noted that in the Belgian linguistics case the Court had found the impugned measure to be proportionate in view of the fact that it did not prevent the applicants from enrolling (at their own expense) in private French language schools in the region. 38.     The applicants noted that the Court was being called upon to determine the compatibility with the Convention of the measure at issue and not the facts of the case examined by the national courts. They considered that the measure, namely the combination of the entrance examination and the restriction based on “society’s need for a particular profession” (and not the numerus clausus per se ), was not proportionate given the aims pursued. 39.     They further contended that the existence of a professional exam devised to assess the adequate preparation of doctors and dentists following their tertiary studies made it unnecessary to restrict prior access to university. Moreover, the entrance examination consisted of a multiple-choice questionnaire and was therefore only adequate to assess sciolistic notions and not one’s natural disposition. They contended that it was random, inadequate and tainted by numerous episodes of corruption and errors in formulating questions. They contended that most of the applicants had obtained a distinction in their other degrees and that their failure to pass the entrance examination was not attributable to their lack of preparation but to the low quota established. They cited as an example the examination in dentistry in 2010, where, for every place available, there were twenty-six candidates. (b)     The Government 40.     The Government submitted that in principle it was not incompatible with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to limit admission to university studies, bearing in mind the available resources and the aim of achieving high levels of professionalism, particularly in respect of critical professions such as those in the medical field. Thus, the application of a numerus clausus could not breach the said provision if it were reasonable and in the general interest of society. The matter fell within the wide margin of appreciation of the State. 41.     In the present case the State had opted for a selection process based on an aptitude test, which provided for an objective assessment allowing the best candidates to benefit from the limited number of places available. They further considered that the AA’s recommendation did not concern the general aspects justifying the measure. Moreover, the Government submitted that it was not for the Court to examine the facts which lead the domestic courts to take one particular decision as opposed to another. 42.     The Government further considered that the eighth applicant’s situation was in accordance with pre-established regulations. 2.     The Court’s assessment (a)     General principles 43.     The Court reiterates that the guarantees of Article 2 of Protocol No.   1 apply to existing institutions of higher education within the member States of the Council of Europe and that access to any institution of higher education existing at a given time is an inherent part of the right set out in the first sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (see Leyla Şahin v. Turkey [GC], no. 44774/98, §§ 134-42, ECHR 2005-XI, and Mürsel Eren v.   Turkey , no. 60856/00, § 41, ECHR 2006 ‑ II). 44.     In spite of its importance, this right is not, however, absolute, but may be subject to limitations; these are permitted by implication since the right of access “by its very nature calls for regulation by the State” (see “C ase relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” v. Belgium ( (Merits) , 23 July 1968, Series A no. 6)). Admittedly, the regulation of educational institutions may vary in time and in place, inter alia , according to the needs and resources of the community and the distinctive features of different levels of education. Consequently, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in this sphere, although the final decision as to the observance of the Convention’s requirements rests with the Court   (see Leyla Şahin , [GC], cited above, § 154, and Ali v. the United Kingdom , no. 40385/06, § 53, 11 January 2011). 45.     In order to ensure that the restrictions that are imposed do not curtail the right in question to such an extent as to impair its very essence and deprive it of its effectiveness, the Court must satisfy itself that they are foreseeable for those concerned and pursue a legitimate aim . However, unlike the position with respect to Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention, it is not bound by an exhaustive list of “legitimate aims” under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1. Furthermore, a limitation will only be compatible with Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 if there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (see Leyla Şahin , [GC], cited above, § 154). 46.     The Court notes that Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 in any event permits limiting admission to universities to those who duly applied for entrance and passed the examination (see Lukach v. Russia (dec.), no. 48041/99, 16   November 1999). (b)     Application to the present case regarding all the applicants 47.     In the present case the Court accepts that the restrictions chosen by the Italian State, namely the entrance examination and the numerus clausus per se , were foreseeable, on the basis of Law no. 127/1997 and Law no.   264/1999, enacted later, which gave further details as to the application of the numerus clausus . 48.     The Court further considers that these restrictions conform to the legitimate aim of achieving high levels of professionalism, by ensuring a minimum and adequate education level in universities in appropriate conditions, which is in the general interest. 49.     As to the proportionality of the restrictions, in relation firstly to the entrance examination, the Court notes that assessing candidates through relevant tests in order to identify the most meritorious students is a proportionate measure designed to ensure a minimum and adequate education level in the universities. With regard to the content of the tests, albeit in a different context, the Court has held in Kjeldsen , Busk Madsen and Pedersen v.   Denmark (7 December 1976, § 53, Series A no. 23) that the setting and planning of the curriculum fall in principle within the competence of the Contracting States and it is not for the Court to rule on such matters. Similarly, the Court is not competent to decide on the content or appropriateness of the tests involved. 50.     With regard to the numerus clausus , the Court notes that the applicants complained in particular about the basis used for applying the numerus clausus , namely the two criteria referring to a) the capacity and resource potential of universities, and b) society’s need for a particular profession. The Court considers that a balance must be struck between the individual interest of the applicants and those of society at large, including other students attending the university courses. The Court notes that the two criteria are in line with the Court’s case-law holding that regulation of the right to education may vary according to the needs and resources of the community and of individuals (see Belgian linguistics case , cited above). It further notes that, in the present case, such restrictions need to be seen in the context of the highest level of education, namely tertiary education. 51.     Concerning the first criterion,   resource considerations are clearly relevant and undoubtedly acceptable – a notion which follows logically from the interpretation given to the provision, namely that the right to education entails access to any institution of higher education “existing” at a given time (ibid .). The Court reiterates that the Convention lays down no specific obligations concerning the extent of the means of instruction and the manner of their organisation or subsidisation (see X v. the United Kingdom , no.   8844/80, Commission decision of 9 December 1980, DR 23, p. 228, and Georgiou v.   Greece (dec.), no. 45138/98, 13 January 2000) . This implies a right of access to education only in as far as it is available and within the relevant limits. The Court notes that such limits are often dependent on the assets necessary to run such institutions, including, inter alia , human, material and financial resources with the relevant considerations, such as the quality of such resources. This is relevant particularly when the universities are State run. 52.     In so far as the applicants complained that the same restrictions applied to private universities and therefore to instruction they were willing to pay for, it is undeniable that the resources for theoretical and practical education would in fact be largely dependent upon the private universities’ human, material and financial capital and therefore on that basis it would be possible to have higher admission numbers without imposing an extra burden on the State and its structures. However, it is not irrelevant that the private sector in Italy is partly reliant on State subsidies. More importantly, in the present circumstances the Court cannot find disproportionate or arbitrary the State’s regulation of private institutions as well, in so far as such action can be considered necessary to prevent arbitrary admission or exclusion and to guarantee equal treatment of persons. It reiterates that the fundamental right of everyone to education is a right guaranteed equally to pupils in State and independent schools, without distinction (see Leyla Sahin , [GC], cited above, § 153). Accordingly, the State has an obligation to regulate them so as to ensure that the Convention is complied with. In particular, the Court considers that the State is justified in being rigorous in its regulation of the sector – especially in the fields of study in question where a minimum and adequate education level is of utmost importance – in order to ensure that access to private institutions is not available purely on the basis of the financial means of candidates, irrespective of their qualifications and suitability for the profession. 53.     Furthermore, the Court recognises that overcrowded classes can be detrimental to the effectiveness of the education system in a way which hinders the specific training experience. 54.     Thus, bearing in mind the competing interests, the Court considers that the first criterion imposed is both legitimate and proportionate. 55.     As to the second criterion, namely, society’s need for a particular profession, the Court considers that its interpretation is indeed restrictive. It is confined to a national outlook, which pertains, moreover, to the public sector, thus ignoring any relevant needs originating in a wider EU or private context. Furthermore, it may be considered short-sighted in so far as it does not appear that serious consideration is given to future local needs. 56.     However, in the Court’s view such a measure is nevertheless balanced in so far as the Government are entitled to take action with a view to avoiding excessive public expenditure. The Court observes that the training of certain specific categories of professionals constitutes a huge investment. It is therefore reasonable for the State to aspire to the assimilation of each successful candidate into the labour market. Indeed, a lack of posts for such categories due to saturation represents further expenditure, since unemployment is without doubt a social burden on society at large. Given that it is impossible for the State to ascertain how many graduates might seek to exit the local market and seek employment abroad, the Court cannot consider it unreasonable for the State to exercise caution and thus to base its policy on the assumption that a high percentage of them may remain in the country to seek employment there. In the Court’s view, therefore, the second criterion is also proportionate. 57.     Lastly, the Court notes that the applicants were not denied the right to apply for any other course in which they might have expressed an interest (see, mutatis mutandis , Lukach, (dec.) cited above), and in respect of which they had the requisite qualifications. Nor have they been denied the opportunity to pursue their studies abroad in line with their possible wish to pursue careers abroad. Given that it does not appear that there is a limit on the number of times a candidate can sit the test, the applicants still have the opportunity to pass it and gain admission to the course of their first choice. 58.     In conclusion, the Court considers that the measures imposed were not disproportionate and that in applying those measures the State did not exceed its margin of appreciation. 59.     It follows that there has not been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. (c)     Application to the present case regarding Mr Marcuzzo, the eighth applicant 60.     In so far as it can be said that the eighth applicant’s claim goes further than that argued above, in that he was made to resit the entrance examination after having been excluded from the course following his eight-year absence, the Court notes that it has not been argued that the measure was unforeseeable. It further considers that it is not unreasonable to exclude from a course of studies a student who has failed to sit examinations for eight consecutive years, particularly in view of the fact that a numerus clausus applies to the university course in question. In consequence, the Court finds that the measure pursued a legitimate aim and, in the light of the State’s entitlement to regulate the right to education, the measure was proportionate. In fact it struck a balance between the interests of the applicant on the one hand and those of other persons wishing to enrol on the course and the needs of the community at large on the other hand. 61.     It follows that there has not been a violation in respect of this part of the complaint related to the eighth applicant. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION 62.     The first applicant complained of the unfairness of the proceedings, in particular their outcome, the fact that the domestic court had failed to request a referral to the ECJ to ensure that the measures complied with EU law, and a lack of reasons in that the decision of 28 April 2009 had not addressed all her arguments. She invoked Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides as follows: “1.     In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” 63.     The Court notes that the first applicant, in lodging a special appeal with the President of the Republic in 2007, did not institute contentious proceedings falling within the scope of Article 6 of the Convention (see Nardella v. Italy (dec.), no. 45814/99, ECHR 1999 ‑ VII, and Nasalli Rocca (dec.), cited above), and therefore the provision is not applicable. 64.     It follows that the complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4 of the Convention. III.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION 65.     The applicants (except the first applicant) complained that they had been discriminated against under Article 14, which provides as follow:   “   The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” 66.     The applicants alleged that freshly graduated students had more chance of passing knowledge-based examinations, in particular those based on high school syllabi, and that therefore the system was discriminatory on grounds of age. 67.     The Court observes that university is a knowledge-based institution, and therefore it cannot be considered unreasonable or arbitrary to set knowledge-based examinations. Moreover, it has not been shown that persons of a certain age have found it more difficult to pass the examination. The complaint is therefore unsubstantiated. Lastly, the Court considers that the subjective perception an applicant may have of an exam cannot in itself raise an issue under Article 14. 68.     It follows that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article   35 §§   3 and   4 of the Convention. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT 1.     Declares , unanimously, the complaints concerning Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention admissible and the remainder of the applications inadmissible;   2.     Holds , by six votes to one, that there has not been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;   3.     Holds , unanimously, that there has not been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respect of the eighth applicant’s further complaint.   Done in English, and notified in writing on 2 April 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Françoise Elens-Passos   Danutė Jočienė         Deputy Registrar   President In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque is annexed to this judgment. D.J. F.E.P.     ANNEX   Application nos. Date of introduction Name, DOB, residence 25851/09 18/05/2009 Claudia TARANTINO 22/07/1988 Palermo   29284/09 02/11/2009 Giuseppe REITANO 30/01/1973 Catania   64090/09 16/11/2009 Laura AZIZ 22/10/1985 Milano   Maurizio BRANCADORI 01/06/1966 Macerata   Massimo CROSIA 21/01/1969 Piacenza   Massimo FILETTI 11/12/1967 Catania   Pasqualino LA MELA 24/04/1969 Catania   Carmelo MARCUZZO 23/11/1974 Siracusa       PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PINTO DE ALBUQUERQUE The Tarantino and Others case deals with a State-imposed numerus-clausus system for obtaining access to State or private university studies in certain areas such as dent