CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 28 mai 2013

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THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA   (Application no. 3564/11)               JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   28 May 2013   FINAL   28/08/2013   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova , The European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Josep Casadevall, President,   Alvina Gyulumyan,   Corneliu Bîrsan,   Ján Šikuta,   Luis López Guerra,   Nona Tsotsoria,   Valeriu Griţco, judges, and Santiago Quesada, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 7 May 2013, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 3564/11) against the Republic of Moldova lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Moldovan nationals, Mrs Lilia Eremia, Ms   Doina Eremia and Ms Mariana Eremia (“the applicants”) on 16 January 2011. 2.     The applicants, who had been granted legal aid, were represented by Ms D.I. Străisteanu, a lawyer practising in Chişinău. The Moldovan Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr   V.   Grosu. 3.     The applicants alleged, in particular, that the authorities had failed to discharge their positive obligations under Articles 3, 14 and 17 of the Convention to protect them from private violence and to punish their aggressor. 4.     On 21 March 2011 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1). 5.     Third-party comments were received from the Equal Rights Trust, which had been given leave by the President to intervene in the procedure (Article 36   §   2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 2 of the Rules of Court). The Government replied to those comments (Rule 44 § 5). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 6.     The applicants were born in 1973, 1995 and 1997 respectively and live in Vălcineț. A.     The background of the case 7.     The first applicant was married to A., a police officer based at the Călăraşi police station. The second and third applicants are their daughters. According to the first applicant, following the birth of the second daughter A. would often come home drunk and assault her, sometimes in the presence of their daughters. On 2 July 2010 the first applicant petitioned for divorce, having been assaulted by A. the day before and having witnessed him verbally abuse their teenage daughters. A. subsequently became more violent, regularly assaulting the first applicant and insulting both her and their daughters. 8 .     On 30 August 2010 the first applicant contacted the local police to report that she had been punched in the head by A. that day. On 18   September 2010 A. was fined by an administrative court the sum of 200   Moldovan lei (MDL, then worth approximately 12.40 euros (EUR)). On 30   September 2010 he was given a formal warning by the authority in charge of the police, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, to stop his violent behaviour. 9 .     On 5 November 2010 A. came home drunk and assaulted the first applicant. On 6 November 2010 she reported the incident to the local prosecutor’s office. 10 .     According to the applicants, on 11 November 2010 A. again assaulted the first applicant in the presence of their daughters. He did the same on 12   November 2010, this time almost suffocating the first applicant, following which she lost her voice for a day and a half. On an unknown date the deputy head of the Călăraşi police station invited the applicant to undergo an examination by a forensic physician in order to establish the extent and nature of injuries to her body. The examination took place on 23   November 2010 but no such injuries were found. B.     The protection order and subsequent events 11 .     On 29 November 2010 the applicants applied to the Călăraşi District Court for a protection order. A protection order was made on 9   December 2010, the judge finding that A. had been abusive towards the first applicant by beating her, insulting her, imposing his will upon her, causing her stress and psychological suffering, threatening her and mistreating their pet. Moreover, this violence had often taken place in the presence of their teenage daughters, whose psychological well-being was being adversely affected as a result. A. was ordered to stay away from the house for ninety days and an exclusion zone of 500 m was attached to the order, prohibiting A. from contacting the applicants or committing any acts of violence against them. The applicants notified the local police, prosecutor’s office and social services of the order, which on 12   December 2010 was served on A. 12 .     On 9 December 2010 the first applicant requested that Judge B.N. from the Călăraşi District Court revoke the six-month waiting period he had insisted the parties observe when the first applicant petitioned for divorce. She based her application on the protection order made that day and submitted that A.’s history of violence prevented any possibility of reconciliation. The first applicant alleged that she was informed by Judge B.N.’s secretary that the judge had refused to treat her divorce as an urgent case. On 12   January 2011 the first applicant complained to the President of the Călăraşi District Court about the judge’s refusal. 13 .     On 10 December 2010 Călăraşi police opened a case against A. to oversee enforcement of the protection order of 9 December 2010. Between 12 December 2010 and 17 January 2011 the local police visited A. on six occasions to warn him against alcohol abuse, bringing shame upon his family, insulting his relatives and breaching the protection order. 14.     On 14 December 2010 A. was cautioned by local police for his violent behaviour and was made to confirm in writing that he had understood the terms of the protection order. It was established that A. had moved out of the family home and was in temporary local authority housing. 15 .     On 16 December 2010 A. saw the first applicant in the street and followed her, using insulting and threatening language and trying to apprehend her. He continued to harass her in a shop where she had tried to seek refuge. 16 .     On 19 December 2010, A. entered the family home notwithstanding the terms of the protection order. According to the Government, however, the applicants had given their permission for him to return until 16   January 2011. The applicants maintained that they had not given such permission, A. having assaulted the first applicant, destroyed certain possessions and verbally abused the third applicant on his return. On 23   December 2010 the first applicant reported the incidents of 16 and 19 December 2010 to the police. Most of the complaints to various authorities were then forwarded to the Călăraşi Prosecutor’s Office. 17 .     On 10 January 2011 the first applicant was invited to give statements at Călăraşi police station regarding her complaints against A. She submitted that she was then pressured by the police into withdrawing her criminal complaint, because if A. had a criminal record and lost his job, this would have a negative impact on their daughters’ educational and career prospects. A meeting with the local prosecutor was fixed for the following day, this time with A. being present. During that meeting the first applicant told the prosecutor that she wanted a divorce but did not want to cause any trouble for her husband. 18 .     On 12 January 2011 the first applicant was informed that the prosecutor would not be initiating a criminal investigation. On 13 January 2011 A. returned to the family home. He again assaulted and verbally abused the first applicant, simulating strangling her, and threatened to kill both her and her aunt if she did not withdraw her criminal complaint. On 14   January 2011 a medical expert found four haematomas on the first applicant’s neck and one on her clavicle, which could have been sustained in the way the first applicant had described. 19 .     The Government alleged that on 1 March 2011 A. telephoned the third applicant to wish her a happy birthday. They further submitted that having obtained permission from the first applicant, A. returned to the home to congratulate his daughter in person, spending twenty minutes there in the presence of all three applicants and his father-in-law. 20.     The first applicant reported the incident to the Călăraşi District Court on 2 March 2011, informing it that she had rejected a request by A. to visit the family home the day before, but that he had turned up nonetheless, in clear breach of the protection order. She asked the court to extend the duration of the order for a further ninety days. On 14 March 2011 A. was called before the court and served with an extension of the order. 21 .     On 15 March 2011 the Călăraşi Social Assistance and Family Protection Department informed the first applicant that owing to a clerical error the protection order of 9 December 2010 had never been enforced by the local social services. 22.     On 14 April 2011 the Chișinău Court of Appeal upheld A.’s appeal, partly revoking the protection order of 9 December 2010. The appellate court found that the law neither expressly provided for the minimum exclusion zone of 500 m, nor did it expressly prohibit the abuser from harassing or using physical violence against the victim, although these were implied in the general obligation not to make contact. The appellate court therefore decided to remove these terms from the order. C.     Criminal proceedings against A. and the applicants’ request for administrative sanctions against him 23 .     On 13 December 2010 the first applicant requested that a criminal investigation be initiated into A.’s acts of violence. On the same day the applicants requested that the second and third applicants be officially recognised as victims of domestic violence for the purposes of the investigation. 24 .     On 17 January 2011 the applicants’ lawyer complained to the Prosecutor General’s Office that she had not been invited to the meeting on 11   January 2011 at the Călăraşi Prosecutor’s Office (see paragraph 17 above) at which the first applicant had been pressured into withdrawing her criminal complaint in A.’s presence. Also on 17   January 2011 a criminal investigation was finally initiated in respect of A.   On 25   January 2011 the applicants again requested that the prosecutor’s office officially recognise the second and third applicants as victims of domestic violence for the purposes of the investigation. 25 .     On 19 January 2011 the first applicant was invited to a meeting with social workers, who allegedly advised her to attempt reconciliation with A. since she was “neither the first nor the last woman to be beaten up by her husband”. On 20 January 2011 the applicants complained to the Ministry of Labour, Social Protection and Family about the social workers’ attitude. 26 .     On 17 February 2011 the applicants asked the Călăraşi police to fine A. for breaching the protection order on 16 December 2010, 20 and 22   January and 6 February 2011, her main reason being that A. had contacted the first applicant and pressured her into withdrawing her criminal complaint. In response she was informed that on 24   February 2011 the administrative case file against A. had been sent to the Călăraşi District Court. 27 .     On 1 April 2011 a prosecutor from the Călăraşi Prosecutor’s Office established that A. had admitted earlier that day to having physically and psychologically abused three members of his family. A. then concluded a plea bargain with the prosecutor asking to be conditionally released from criminal liability. The prosecutor found that there was substantive evidence of A.’s guilt in the form of various medical reports, witness statements, documents relating to his fine and warnings issued by his employer, the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, given that he had committed a “less serious offence”, did not abuse drugs or alcohol, had three minors to support, was well respected at work and in the community and “did not represent a danger to society”, the prosecutor suspended the investigation for one year subject to the condition that the investigation would be reopened should A. commit another offence during that time. 28 .     On 13 April 2011 the applicants appealed against the prosecutor’s decision of 1 April 2011. On 18 April 2011 the senior prosecutor rejected that appeal on the grounds that suspending the investigation against A. would afford better protection to the applicants. II.     RELEVANT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS A.     Relevant domestic law 29 .     The relevant provisions of the Criminal Code read as follows: Article 59:     Conditional release from criminal liability “A criminal investigation may be conditionally suspended, with subsequent release from criminal liability, in respect of a person accused of having committed a less serious offence who admits his or her guilt and does not represent a danger to society, if the rehabilitation of that person is possible without criminal punishment.” Article 201 1 :     Family violence. “(1)     Family violence, that is the intentional action or inaction manifested physically or verbally, committed by a member of a family against another member of that family, and which caused physical suffering leading to light bodily harm or damage to health, or moral suffering, or to pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage, shall be punished by unpaid work for the community during 150 to 180 hours, or a prison term of up to two years. (2)     The same action: (a)     committed against two or more members of the family; (b)     which caused moderate bodily harm or damage to health - shall be punished by unpaid work for the community during 180 to 240 hours, or a prison term of up to five years. (3)     The same action which: (a)     caused serious bodily harm or damage to health; (b)     provoked the victim’s suicide or an attempt thereof; (c)     caused the victim’s death - shall be punished by a prison term of five to fifteen years.” Article 320:     Non-enforcement of a court decision. “(1)     The intentional failure or avoidance from enforcing a court decision, if it was committed after an administrative sanction, shall be punished by a fine of 200 to 300   conventional units or by unpaid work for the community during 150 to 200 hours, or with a prison term of up to two years...” 30 .     The relevant provisions of Law no. 45 on the prevention of and combat against domestic violence (1 March 2007, “the Domestic Violence (Combat and Protection) Act 2007”) read as follows: Section 15:     Protective measures “(1)     The courts shall, within twenty-four hours of receipt of the claim, issue a protection order to assist the victim, by applying the following measures to the aggressor: (a)     an order to temporarily leave the common residence or to stay away from the victim’s residence, without making any determination as to the ownership of jointly owned assets; (b)     an order to stay away from the victim; (c)     a prohibition on contacting the victim, his or her children or other dependants; (d)     an order not to visit the victim’s place of work or residence; (e)     an order to pay maintenance for his or her children pending resolution of the case; (f)     an order to cover the costs incurred and to compensate for any damage caused as a result of his or her violent acts, including medical expenses and the cost of replacing or repairing any destroyed or damaged possessions; (g)     restrictions on the unilateral disposal of jointly owned assets; (h)     an order to undergo special treatment or counselling if the court determines that this is necessary to reduce or eliminate violence; (i)     an interim contact order for the aggressor to see his or her children below the age of majority; (j)     a prohibition on possessing and carrying weapons ... (3)     The protective measures set out in subsection (1) above shall be applied for up to three months and may be discontinued upon the elimination of the threat or danger which caused the adoption of such measures and extended if a further claim is submitted or if the conditions set out in the protection order have not been complied with.” 31 .     Article 2 of the Law on the Police (no. 416, republished on 31   January 2002) provides that the main tasks of the police include, inter alia , the protection of the life, the rights and dignity of others, prevention of crime and protection of public order. Under Article 21 (8) of the same law, a police officer could be dismissed for committing offences discrediting the police. B.     Relevant international material 32.     A summary of the relevant international materials concerning protection from domestic violence, including its discriminatory nature against women, has been made in the case of Opuz v. Turkey (no. 33401/02, §§ 72-86, ECHR 2009). 33.     In its Recommendation Rec(2002)5 of 30 April 2002 on the protection of women against violence, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe stated, inter alia, that member States should introduce, develop and/or improve where necessary national policies against violence based on maximum safety and protection of victims, support and assistance, adjustment of the criminal and civil law, raising of public awareness, training for professionals confronted with violence against women and prevention. 34.     The Committee of Ministers recommended, in particular, that member States should penalise serious violence against women such as sexual violence and rape, abuse of the vulnerability of pregnant, defenceless, ill, disabled or dependent victims, as well as penalising abuse of position by the perpetrator. The Recommendation also stated that member States should ensure that all victims of violence are able to institute proceedings, make provisions to ensure that criminal proceedings can be initiated by the public prosecutor, encourage prosecutors to regard violence against women as an aggravating or decisive factor in deciding whether or not to prosecute in the public interest, ensure where necessary that measures are taken to protect victims effectively against threats and possible acts of revenge and take specific measures to ensure that children’s rights are protected during proceedings. 35.     With regard to violence within the family, the Committee of Ministers recommended that Member states should classify all forms of violence within the family as criminal offences and envisage the possibility of taking measures in order, inter alia, to enable the judiciary to adopt interim measures aimed at protecting victims, to ban the perpetrator from contacting, communicating with or approaching the victim, or residing in or entering defined areas, to penalise all breaches of the measures imposed on the perpetrator and to establish a compulsory protocol for operation by the police, medical and social services. 36.     In its General Recommendation No. 28 on the Core Obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.2), the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women found that “States parties have a due diligence obligation to prevent, investigate, prosecute and punish ... acts of gender based violence”. 37 .     In her report concerning the visit to Moldova from 4 to 11 July 2008 (document A/HRC/11/6/Add.4, 8 May 2009), the United Nations Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences noted, inter alia : “... patriarchal and discriminatory attitudes are increasing women’s vulnerability to violence and abuse. In this context, domestic violence in particular is widespread, largely condoned by society and does not receive appropriate recognition among officials, society and women themselves, thus resulting in insufficient protective infrastructure for victims of violence. ... ... 19.     Moldovan women suffer from all forms of violence. However, domestic violence and trafficking are major areas of concern. The two are intimately connected and are linked to women’s overall subordinate position in society. ... 20.     While reliable data and a systematic registering of cases on the nature and extent of the phenomenon is lacking, domestic violence is said to be widespread. According to a Ministry of Labour, Social Protection and Family report: “[...] At present, the frequency of domestic violence, whose victims are women and children, is acquiring alarming proportions. Unfortunately, it is very difficult for the State to control domestic violence since in most of the cases it is reported only when there are severe consequences of the violence, the other cases being considered just family conflicts. 21.     Despite this acknowledgement, unless it results in serious injury, domestic violence is not perceived as a problem warranting legal intervention. As a result, it is experienced in silence and receives little recognition among officials, society and women themselves. 22.     According to a survey conducted in 2005, 41 per cent of women interviewed reported encountering some form of violence within the family at least once during their lifetime. The survey revealed that psychological violence, followed by physical violence, is the most widely reported form of abuse in the family. Almost a third of the women interviewed indicated having been subjected to multiple forms of violence. The study notes that domestic violence runs across lines of class and education; however, women with a higher level of education or economic status may tend not to disclose incidents of violence. Sexual violence remains the least reported form of violence. This may be due to lack of recognition of sexual abuse within the family as a wrongdoing or the fear among victims that they will be held responsible and become outcasts. 23.     The perpetrators of violence against women are often family members, overwhelmingly husbands or former husbands (73.4 per cent), followed by fathers or stepfathers (13.7 per cent) and mothers or stepmothers (7 per cent). Staff at the shelter in Chisinau indicated that husbands of many of the women who seek help at the shelter are either police officers or from the military, which makes it far more difficult for these women to escape the violent environment and seek divorce. ... 29.     There are also a number of widely held misconceptions about violence against women which treat the problem as isolated cases concerning a particular group. These misconceptions are: (a) violence against women is a phenomenon that takes place in poor and broken homes; (b) victims of violence are inherently vulnerable women needing special protection; (c) violent men are deviants who use alcohol and drugs or have personality disorders; (d) domestic violence involves all members of the household, including men. It has been my experience that such misunderstandings often result in misguided and partial solutions, such as rehabilitation programmes for abusers, restrictions over women in order to protect them or gender neutral solutions that overlook the causes of gender-based violence.” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE FIRST APPLICANT 38.     The first applicant complained that the authorities had ignored the domestic abuse to which she and her children had been subject, and had failed to enforce the binding court order designed to offer them protection. They relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” A.     Admissibility 39.     The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ submissions (a)     The first applicant 40.     The first applicant argued that the State had failed to discharge its positive obligation under Article 3 of the Convention to protect her from domestic violence and to prevent the recurrence of such violence. She was a particularly vulnerable person since her aggressor was a police officer and had the support of his colleagues and other local authorities, which made her attempts to obtain protection more difficult. 41.     The first applicant submitted that the authorities “had or ought to have had knowledge” of A.’s violence against her (citing Z and Others v.   the United Kingdom [GC], no. 29392/95, § 73, ECHR 2001 ‑ V), given the number of assaults carried out by A. and incidents reported. The measures taken in her case had been ineffective and A. had been able to breach the protection order on a number of occasions. 42.     Moreover, the applicants had asked for a protection order on 29   November 2010 and the domestic court had only adopted its decision on 9 December 2010, despite the law obliging it to make such an order within twenty-four hours of receiving the claim, if well-founded. The authorities had therefore reacted extremely slowly despite the urgency of the situation, and consequently the first applicant had not been afforded immediate protection from the risk of further violence. 43.     The first applicant further contended that the respondent State had failed to ensure the timely enforcement of the legislation enacted specifically to protect victims of domestic violence, despite A repeatedly breaching the protection order. The Government seemed to be suggesting that the first applicant herself was responsible for the breach of the protection order that had resulted in her being assaulted on 13 January 2011, despite the onus resting entirely with the State to ensure that protection orders were complied with. 44.     Finally, the first applicant argued that suspending the criminal investigation against A. had resulted in his exemption from criminal liability, despite his numerous breaches of the protection order and the repeated assaults on her. (b)     The Government 45.     The Government submitted that the authorities had taken all reasonable measures to protect the first applicant from the risk of violence and to prevent such violence from recurring. In particular, the domestic court had made the original protection order on the initial request from the first applicant. Prior to the order being made, the authorities had only been aware of two incidents of violence on the part of A. towards the first applicant, which had taken place on 30   August and 6 November 2010. There had therefore been no reason for the authorities to suspect any imminent risk to the applicants, and a few weeks later (on 9 December 2010) a protection order had been made. 46.     It was clear that A. was aware of the terms of the protection order of 12 December 2010 as he had been warned against breaching it (see paragraph 11 above); he had also been registered as a domestic abuser and ordered to stay away from the family home for ninety days. Furthermore, he had been visited by the police on six separate occasions and had had pre-emptive discussions with them about his behaviour (see paragraph 13 above). The Government submitted that A. had returned to the family home in December 2010 and stayed until 16 January 2011 because the first applicant had allowed him to do so. While the Government did not wish to suggest that the first applicant was responsible for the assault on her that had taken place on 13 January 2011, the fact that she had allowed him to stay in the house made the recurrence of violence possible and meant that the authorities were unable to protect her from harm. 47.     The Government argued that all the necessary measures had been taken in the criminal investigation, which had resulted in charges being brought against A. (see paragraph 24 above). However, following A.’s admission of guilt and sincere apologies for his behaviour, the prosecutor had decided to suspend the investigation on condition that A. committed no further offences for one year. Such a suspension had not resulted in impunity for A., but rather it was seen as being the best way of protecting the applicants against the recurrence of A.’s acts of domestic violence, given the potential punishment he now faced (see paragraph 28 above). In this connection, the extension of the protection order on 14 March 2011 (see paragraph 19 above) had not been prompted by any new incident, but by A.’s visit to the family home to wish his daughter a happy birthday, which the Government alleged had only taken place with the first applicant’s permission. 2.     The Court’s assessment (a)     General principles 48 .     The Court reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Costello ‑ Roberts v. the United Kingdom , 25 March 1993, §   30, Series   A no.   247 ‑ C and Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, § 91, ECHR 2000 ‑ XI). 49.     It further reiterates that Article 1 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article 3, imposes on the States positive obligations to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are protected against all forms of ill-treatment prohibited under Article 3, including where such treatment is administered by private individuals (see A. v. the United Kingdom , 23   September   1998, § 22, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ VI and Opuz , cited above, § 159). This obligation should include effective protection of, inter alia, an identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party, as well as reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of which the authorities knew or ought to have known (see, mutatis mutandis , Osman v. the United Kingdom , 28 October 1998, § 116, Reports 1998 ‑ VIII; E. and Others v. the United Kingdom , no.   33218/96, §   88, 26   November 2002; and J.L. v. Latvia , no. 23893/06, § 64, 17 April 2012). 50.     It is not the Court’s role to replace the national authorities and to choose in their stead from among the wide range of possible measures that could be taken to secure compliance with their positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis , Bevacqua and S.   v.   Bulgaria , no. 71127/01, § 82, 12 June 2008). At the same time, under Article   19 of the Convention and in accordance with the principle that the Convention is intended to guarantee not theoretical or illusory, but practical and effective rights, the Court has to ensure that a State’s obligation to protect the rights of those under its jurisdiction is adequately discharged (see Nikolova and Velichkova v. Bulgaria , no. 7888/03, § 61, 20 December 2007). 51.     Furthermore, Article 3 requires that the authorities conduct an effective official investigation into the alleged ill-treatment even if such treatment has been inflicted by private individuals (see M.C. v. Bulgaria , no. 39272/98, § 151, ECHR 2003 ‑ XII, and Denis Vasilyev v. Russia , no.   32704/04, §§ 98-99, 17 December 2009). For the investigation to be regarded as “effective”, it should in principle be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. This is not an obligation of result, but one of means. In cases under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention where the effectiveness of the official investigation has been at issue, the Court has often assessed whether the authorities reacted promptly to the complaints at the relevant time. Consideration has been given to the opening of investigations, delays in taking statements and to the length of time taken for the initial investigation (see Denis Vasilyev , cited above, § 100 with further references; and Stoica v. Romania , no. 42722/02, § 67, 4 March 2008). 52 .     Interference by the authorities with the private and family life may become necessary in order to protect the health and rights of a person or to prevent criminal acts in certain circumstances (see Opuz , cited above, §   144). To that end States are to maintain and apply in practice an adequate legal framework affording protection against acts of violence by private individuals (see X and Y v. the Netherlands , 26 March 1985, § 22 and 23, Series A no. 91; Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom , 25 March 1993, §   36, Series A no. 247‑C; D.P. and J.C. v. the United Kingdom , no.   38719/97, § 118, 10 October 2002; M.C. v. Bulgaria , cited above, §§   150 and 152, ECHR 2003 ‑ XII; Bevacqua , cited above, §   65, and Sandra Janković v. Croatia , no. 38478/05, § 45, 5 March 2009). (b)     Application of these principles in the present case (i)     Whether the first applicant was subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention 53.     In the present case, even though the first applicant was unable to produce medical evidence showing that she had been ill-treated again, on 9   December 2010 a court decided that the situation was serious enough to warrant a protection order being made (see paragraph 11 above). Subsequently, the first applicant obtained medical evidence of having been ill-treated by A. on 13   January 2011 (see paragraph 18 above). 54.     Moreover, the fear of further assaults was sufficiently serious to cause the first applicant to experience suffering and anxiety amounting to inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (see Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05 , § 108, ECHR 2010). 55.     In such circumstances, the Court finds that Article 3 of the Convention was applicable to the present case. It must therefore determine whether the authorities’ actions in response to the applicants’ complaints complied with the requirements of that provision. (ii)     Whether the authorities complied with their positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention 56.     As recalled earlier (see paragraphs 48-52 above), the States’ positive obligations under Article 3 include, on the one hand, setting up a legislative framework aimed at preventing and punishing ill-treatment by private individuals and, on the other hand, when aware of an imminent risk of ill-treatment of an identified individual or when ill-treatment has already occurred, to apply the relevant laws in practice, thus affording protection to the victims and punishing those responsible for ill-treatment. 57.     In respect of the first obligation, the Court notes that the Moldovan law provided for specific criminal sanctions for committing acts of violence against members of one’s own family (see paragraph 29 above). Moreover, the law provided for protective measures for the victims of family violence, as well as for sanctions against those persons who refused to abide by court decisions (see paragraphs 29and 30 above).   The Court concludes that the authorities had put in place a legislative framework allowing them to take measures against persons accused of family violence. 58.     The Court must determine whether the domestic authorities were aware, or ought to have been aware, of the violence to which the first applicant had been subjected and of the risk of further violence, and if so whether all reasonable measures had been taken to protect her and to punish the perpetrator. In verifying whether the national authorities have complied with their positive obligations under Article 3 of the Convention, the Court must recall that it will not replace the national authorities in choosing a particular measure designed to protect a victim of domestic violence (see, mutatis mutandis , A. v. Croatia , cited above, § 61 and Sandra Janković , cited above, § 46). 59.     The Court considers that the authorities were well aware of A.’s violent behaviour (see paragraphs 8-10 above), which became even more evident when the domestic courts made the protection order on 9 December 2010 (see paragraphs 11, 15, 16 and 18 above). In particular, despite the clear provisions of the order, on 19 December 2010 A. returned to the applicants’ home (see paragraph 16 above). While the Government submitted that this happened with the first applicant’s consent, they did not provide any evidence to substantiate their claim. In any event, it is clear that the first applicant promptly complained to the authorities about A.’s twofold breach of the protection order by harassing her on the street and entering her house without her consent (see paragraphs 15 and 16 above). This complaint not only shows that the applicants were unwilling for A. to return to the family home, but also that the authorities should have realised that the first applicant was exposed to an increased risk of further violence, given that A., a police officer, had clearly disregarded a court order. 60.     On 11 January 2011 A. met the local prosecutor to discuss the criminal complaint made by the applicants (see paragraph 17 above). Even though, as a result of that meeting, A. knew that a decision would be made as to whether a criminal investigation would be opened against him, he returned to the family home only two days later, on 13   January 2011 (again in breach of the protection order), where he assaulted and threatened to kill the first applicant in the presence of their daughters (see paragraph 18 above). The Court considers that by 13 January 2011 the authorities had sufficient evidence of A.’s violent behaviour and that the first applicant was at risk of further domestic violence because of A.’s blatant disregard of the protection order. 61.     The Court considers that the first applicant was particularly vulnerable, being unable to defend herself from A., who was a police officer trained to overcome any resistance. The fact that such violence occurred in the privacy of their home prevented any outside help. It considers that the risk to the applicant’s physical and psychological well-being was imminent and serious enough as to require the authorities to act swiftly. 62.     It appears from the parties’ submissions that the authorities did not remain totally passive: A. was given a warning by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, had pre-emptive discussions with the police and was fined by the administrative courts (see paragraphs 9 and 13 above). However, none of these measures were effective and on 23   December 2010 the applicants informed the authorities of two further breaches of the protection order by A. (see paragraph 16 above). No action was taken, which allowed A. to return to the family home on 13 January 2011 and assault her, again breaching the protection order. Even after this incident no particular measures were taken against A. to ensure the applicants’ safety; he continued to carry out his duties as a police officer throughout the relevant period. 63.     The absence of decisive action by the authorities in dealing with A. is even more disturbing considering that the aggressor was a police officer whose professional requirements included, under domestic law (see paragraph 31 above), the protection of the rights of others, the prevention of crime and the protection of public order. The authorities never considered the impact of such a failure to enforce a court order by a police officer on the public order and never initiated criminal proceedings under Article 320 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 29 above). It is also arguable that, because A. worked for the State, the authorities had more of an opportunity to influence his conduct than they would have had in respect of a private individual, yet they did very little. 64.     The Court lastly observes that the investigation into A.’s violent behaviour towards the first applicant was suspended with the possibility for A. to be completely released from criminal liability if he committed no further offences for one year (see paragraphs 27 and 28 above). Given that A. carried out repeated assaults on the first app