CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 28 mai 2013

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s598389FB { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sF5E1C6CF { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#ff0000 } .s85A66119 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify; font-size:14pt } .sE208486F { font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000 } .s2E932ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s10950C61 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sEC177689 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s967D43C6 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s87F05BA2 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sC443675D { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:30pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sD2857263 { margin-top:30pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s401C450A { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s7EE1C8F0 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s11869A80 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sE7C30868 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sC702907E { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s984A15CA { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sD5DF731 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s93EDF1FF { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:30pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s3C0142D3 { margin-top:30pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s3B3A5DE9 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s6477A72F { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .sA1CDB767 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s8A9F351B { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:24pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .sC31874BD { margin-top:24pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:24pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s25BD2B45 { margin-top:24pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s281358E1 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .sFD4D42B6 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .sEC2CB098 { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s9D48DD53 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; font-size:10pt } .s8F4EE4B8 { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify } .s684F2214 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:24pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s9F223FEE { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s8E011338 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s56E27C8 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:24pt; text-indent:7.1pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s804EF768 { margin-top:24pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sAB173E38 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .s127C7598 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .s11EE8375 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .sD66C1369 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17.3pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s60723A49 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:39.7pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:justify } .s81CCF55C { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17pt; text-align:justify } .s48DB3670 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:36pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:justify; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s7CB9076 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s90A93616 { width:27.66pt; display:inline-block } .s202039A0 { width:126.96pt; display:inline-block } .sE35D254F { width:29.66pt; display:inline-block } .sF6E9AB15 { width:216.66pt; display:inline-block }       FOURTH SECTION           CASE OF NEDELCHEVA AND OTHERS v. BULGARIA   (Application no. 5516/05)             JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   28 May 2013   FINAL   28/08/2013   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Nedelcheva and Others v. Bulgaria, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ineta Ziemele, President,   David Thór Björgvinsson,   Päivi Hirvelä,   George Nicolaou,   Zdravka Kalaydjieva,   Vincent A. De Gaetano,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek, judges, and Françoise Elens-Passos, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 7 May 2013, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 5516/05) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by eight Bulgarian nationals, Ms Kera Genova Nedelcheva, Mr Geno Moskov Dzhingov, Ms Minka Moskova Halvadzhieva, Ms Frosina Dimitrova Gineva, Ms Magda Dimitrova Despotova, Mr Raycho Ginev Kostov, Ms Ginka Dimitrova Georgieva and Ms Todorka Dimitrova Dimitrova, (“the applicants”), on 14 January 2005. 2.     The applicants were represented by Ms S. Margaritova-Vuchkova, a lawyer practising in Sofia. The Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms M. Dimova, of the Ministry of Justice. 3.     The applicants alleged, in particular, that they had been unable to obtain the restitution of formerly collectivised land and had not yet received compensation in lieu of restitution which was due to them. 4.     On 14 October 2010 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicants were born in 1922, 1936, 1938, 1918, 1943, 1918, 1948 and 1946 respectively. Two of the applicants, Ms Ginka Dimitrova Georgieva and Ms Todorka Dimitrova Dimitrova, live in Burgas, and the remaining applicants live in Sozopol. A.     Expropriation of the land and creation of the Duni resort and Duni AD 6.     An ancestor of the applicants owned agricultural land in the Sozopol district, situated close to the seashore. In the 1980s it was included in the territory on which a new sea resort called Duni was constructed. 7.     The resort was initially managed by a State-owned enterprise, which was, in 1990, transformed into a State-owned company called Duni. The transformation entailed, under the relevant domestic provisions, the company becoming an owner of the assets it had until then used and managed. In 1991 it was registered as a joint-stock company. 8.     Until 1997 the State held all shares in Duni. 25% of the company’s shares were transferred to private parties in 1997, in the framework of a programme for “mass privatisation”. After that the company was named Duni AD. In the following years the State transferred more of its shares and by 2000 it was holding 25% of the company’s shares, a part of which were designated for compensation of former owners of land included in the company’s assets. In 2001 the State transferred a further 14% of its share in the company. 9.     The applicants have submitted a privatisation report dated 8 March 1999. According to the document, at that time about one third of the territory of the resort was comprised of land which had been restituted in kind to its former owners under the Agricultural Land Act (“the ALA”). The report found this state of affairs problematic and considered it most appropriate that the company should buy back that land. B.     Initial decisions on the applicants’ restitution claims 10.     In the meantime, the ALA entered into force in 1991 (see paragraph   37 below). On that basis, on 15 December 1991 the applicants requested the restitution of 19,700 square metres of land taken from their ancestor. 11.     In a decision of 23 May 1992 the competent body, the Sozopol agricultural land commission, adopted a decision to restore the applicants’ property rights to land in the area of Duni totalling 11,517 square metres (“Plot A”). This land adjoined the buildings of the resort. The land commission did not provide reasoning as to why it considered that the criteria for restitution in kind set in the law in force at the time were met. 12.     In the same decision the commission refused to restore the applicants’ property rights in respect of the remaining 8,183 square metres of land (“Plot B”), as there were buildings and infrastructure of the resort constructed on it. 13.     On 6 May 1993 the applicants wrote to the Council of Ministers, with a copy to the Committee on Tourism, requesting (a) to be given possession of Plot A, and (b) to receive in compensation for Plot B shares in the State-owned company Duni, as they were entitled to under section   18   (2) of the Transformation and Privatisation of State and Municipally-Owned Enterprises Act (see paragraph 40 below). At the time the applicants did not receive a response. 14.     The applicants’ respective shares in the properties above were as follows: Ms Kera Genova Nedelcheva and Mr Raycho Genov Kostov were entitled to one quarter each, Mr Geno Moskov Dzhingov and Ms Minka Moskova Halvadzhieva – to one eighth each and the remaining applicants, Ms Frosina Dimitrova Gineva, Ms Magda Dimitrova Despotova, Ms Ginka Dimitrova Georgieva and Ms Todorka Dimitrova Dimitrova – to one sixteenth each. C.     Developments concerning Plot A 15.     On 10 October 1994 the Sozopol agricultural land commission issued an act for the formal transfer to the applicants of possession of that part of the land. On 25 November 1994 the applicants obtained a notary deed. However, they were unable to assume actual possession because the land, although not occupied by buildings or infrastructure of the resort, remained within its fenced territory. The applicants did not bring proceedings to challenge this situation. 1.     Rei vindicatio proceedings 16.     In December 2000 Duni AD brought rei vindicatio actions against all persons who had had their property rights to land in the area of the resort restored after 1991. 17.     In the applicants’ case, Duni AD argued that the applicants had not become owners of Plot A by virtue of the land commission’s decision of 23   May 1992, because the commission had not been competent to order the restitution of land which was no longer agricultural. The company claimed that, on the contrary, it was the owner of the land at issue, which had been included in its assets. 18.     In addition, the company sought an interim injunction and the stay of any procedures concerning construction permits for that land. It is unclear whether the applicants had actually applied to receive such permits. The request for injunction was granted in a decision of the Burgas District Court of 15 December 2000. 19.     The rei vindicatio action was allowed in a judgment of the Burgas District Court of 18 October 2002. Upon an appeal by the applicants, on 17   July 2003 that judgment was quashed in part by the Burgas Regional Court, which upheld the lower court’s finding that Duni AD had been the disputed land’s owner, but disallowed the rei vindicatio claim itself because it found that the applicants were not holding the land. On 23 July 2004 that judgment was upheld by the Supreme Court of Cassation. 20.     The domestic courts found, most notably, that the land claimed by the applicants adjoined the buildings of the resort, and that the resort, including the buildings and the land, represented a complex of works within the meaning of section 10b of the ALA (see paragraph 38 below); it was not permissible physically to separate parts of this complex and transfer them to new owners. What was to be taken into account was the situation at the time of the ALA’s entry into force. These considerations were sufficient to conclude that the preconditions for restitution in kind had not been met and that the Sozopol land commission’s decision of 23 May 1992, on which the applicants based their property claims, was null and void in that part. The company Duni, later Duni AD, had validly acquired property to the land. 2.     Compensation 21.     Following the developments above, on 23 August 2004 the Sozopol Agriculture and Forestry Department (former land commission), relying on the Supreme Court of Cassation’s final judgment of 23 July 2004, adopted a new decision on the applicants’ restitution claims concerning Plot A, whereby it refused to restore the applicants’ property in kind. 22.     In a new decision of 20 January 2005 it held that the applicants were entitled to receive compensation for 6,653 Bulgarian levs (BGN) for the entirety of the land claimed in December 1991, that is for both Plot A and Plot B, through other comparable land or compensation bonds. 23.     On 6 April 2005 the applicants applied for judicial review of the decision of 20 January 2005, arguing, inter alia , that the Agriculture and Forestry Department had wrongly assessed the value of Plot A. On 30   November 2005 the Department’s decision was quashed by the Burgas District Court insofar as it concerned Plot A. In respect of Plot B the decision was upheld. 24.     At the time of the latest communication from the parties of September 2011, the Sozopol Agriculture and Forestry Department (as from 2008 called Agricultural Department) had not yet adopted a new decision setting the value of the compensation to be awarded to the applicants for Plot A, or determining whether the compensation would be through other comparable land or compensation bonds. D.     Developments concerning Plot B 25.     As mentioned above (see paragraph 13), following the Sozopol agricultural land commission’s refusal to restore their rights to Plot B, on 6   May 1993 the applicants applied to receive compensation through shares in the State-owned company Duni under section 18 (2) of the Transformation and Privatisation of State and Municipally-Owned Enterprises Act (see paragraphs 12-13 above). 26.     In 1995 and 1998 the applicants informed the land commission that they had chosen to apply for compensation under the privatisation legislation. 27.     Their application in that regard was examined by a commission of the Ministry of Economics, appointed in December 2003, which took a decision on 5 October 2004. At that time the State retained 35,600 shares of BGN 1 each, equivalent to about 0.34% of Duni AD’s capital. The commission allotted the applicants 17,700 shares (the remaining available State-owned shares being designated for other former owners), in compensation for 5,401.6 square metres of Plot B, and stated that for the remaining 2,781.4 square metres the applicants were to receive comparable land or compensation bonds under the ALA. 28.     On 10 December 2004 the applicants applied for judicial review of that decision. They challenged the assessment of the value of the shares due in compensation for their land and considered that the partial satisfaction of their claim for compensation through shares was not justified. In that latter regard they stated that they did not wish to have their compensation claim referred to another body, where the procedure could take a lengthy period of time. 29.     On 28 June 2007 the Burgas Regional Court quashed the above decision and held that the applicants were entitled to receive 56,997 shares of BGN 1 each in compensation for the entirety of Plot B. It found, in the first place, that the decision did not contain any justification for awarding shares only for part of Plot B. As to the amount of compensation, the Regional Court commissioned an expert report, which the Ministry of Economics did not challenge, and which, by comparing the value of Duni   AD’s assets, calculated on the basis of a recent privatisation proposal, with the value of Plot B, concluded that the applicants were entitled to the amount of shares indicated above, which constituted 0.54926% of Duni   AD’s shares at the time. 30.     That judgment was upheld on 4 January 2008 in a final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court. 31.     On 29 January 2009 the applicants deposited the above judgments with the Ministry of Economics and demanded their implementation. On 25   March 2009, 29 October 2010 and 22 March 2011 the Ministry proposed to transfer to them the State’s remaining 17,700 shares in Duni AD. It referred to the fact that the State did not hold any further shares, although it did not appear to dispute its duty to transfer the remaining shares. The applicants refused the partial settlement proposed. It appears that no other settlement has been offered to them to date. 32.     Upon a request by the applicants, on 24 June 2009 a judge at the Burgas Regional Court ordered the Minister of Economics to pay a fine of BGN 2,000 for having failed to comply with the judgment of 28 June 2007, as upheld by the Supreme Administrative Court on 4 January 2008. On 31   March 2010 the order was upheld by a three-member panel of the Burgas Regional Court, which noted, in particular, that the unavailability of a sufficient amount of State-owned shares did not absolve the Minister from his obligation to comply with the judgments. 33.     Parallel to the above developments, on 25 March 2000 the Sozopol land commission awarded the applicants compensation bonds for BGN   3,601 for the entirety of Plot B. 34.     In May 2004 the applicants requested from the Sozopol Agriculture and Forestry Department (former land commission) official documents concerning Plot B, which they needed to submit to the Ministry of Economics in connection with the procedure described above for compensation through shares. The applicants reminded the Department that they were entitled to choose and had chosen to seek compensation for Plot   B through shares, and did not wish to receive compensation bonds under the ALA. 35.     Subsequently, the Agriculture and Forestry Department annulled its decision of 25 March 2000 and the compensation bonds issued on its basis. Nevertheless, as already mentioned, on 20 January 2005 the Department awarded once again to the applicants compensation for Plot B under the ALA. That decision, upheld by the Burgas District Court in the respective part, is still in force (see paragraphs 22-23 above). 36.     After the present application’s communication, on 4 November 2010 the Ministry of Economics requested from the Sozopol Agricultural Department (formerly the Agriculture and Forestry Department) information about any compensation procedures concerning Plot B. In a letter of 12 November 2010 the Department informed the Ministry of its decisions concerning the plot. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     The Agricultural Land Act 37.     The Agricultural Land Act ( Закон за собствеността и ползването на земеделските земи , “the ALA”), adopted in 1991, entitled persons, or their heirs, whose land has been expropriated, to request restoration of their ownership rights under certain conditions or, if the relevant conditions for that have not been met, to seek compensation. 38.     Section 10b of the ALA, introduced on 3 April 1992, provides that former owners are not entitled to the restoration of their property rights and are to receive compensation in cases where the land “has been constructed upon or a complex of construction works ( мероприятия ) which do not permit restoration of property have been carried out”. 39.     Compensation in lieu of restitution under the ALA can be either through comparable municipally-own land, or through compensation bonds, which can, most notably, be used as means of payment in the framework of the privatisation of public enterprises or for the purchase of State-owned agricultural land. B.     Compensation under the legislation concerning transformation and privatisation of former State and municipally-owned enterprises 40.     The Transformation and Privatisation of State and Municipally ‑ Owned Enterprises Act was adopted in 1992 and remained in force until 2002. It regulated the transformation of State and municipally ‑ owned enterprises into companies and their privatisation. Section 18 (2) of the Act provided that former owners of collectivised agricultural land included in the assets of State or municipal enterprises could receive in compensation shares in the companies into which those enterprises had been transformed. By section 18 (1), the interested parties’ requests to that effect were to be made before or following the transformation. The requests had to be submitted before 30 September 1994 and, as concerns State-owned enterprises, were to be addressed to the Council of Ministers. 41.     Following an amendment of 1999, paragraph 6 (6) of the concluding and transitory provisions of the Act provided that former owners of agricultural land which had been included in the assets of State or municipally-owned companies, subsequently privatised, could receive, in compensation in lieu of restitution, shares in these companies, or, if the available shares held by the State and the municipalities were insufficient, compensation bonds. An identical compensation scheme was provided for in paragraph 11 of the concluding and transitory provisions of the Privatisation and Post-Privatisation Control Act, which regulated the matter after 2002. As to the modalities of that compensation scheme, the two Acts above referred to other legislation regulating compensation available to former owners of nationalised property. According to the procedure provided for therein, requests for compensation were to be submitted to the regional governor or the competent Minister. Any tacit or express refusal of these bodies was amenable to judicial review. 42.     According to the practice of the Supreme Administrative Court, when former owners were entitled to compensation both under the ALA and the privatisation laws, it was up to them to choose which of the two paths to pursue. C.     Other relevant provisions 43.     The remaining relevant domestic law and practice concerning restitution of agricultural land and compensation in lieu thereof under the ALA and the privatisation laws, and the transformation and privatisation of former State or municipally-owned enterprises, have been summarised in the Court’s judgments in the cases of Sivova and Koleva v. Bulgaria (no.   30383/03, §§ 29-54, 15 November 2011) and Lyubomir Popov v.   Bulgaria (no. 69855/01, §§ 83-95, 7 January 2010). THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 44.     The applicants raised several complaints, relying on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No.   1. They complained, first, that they had been unfairly deprived of property of Plot A, without the possibility of obtaining effectively adequate compensation. Secondly, the applicants complained that they had not yet received compensation for Plot   B, despite a final court judgment determining the compensation due to them. The applicants also considered that the restitution procedures had been excessively lengthy. 45.     The Court is of the view that the complaints above are most appropriately examined under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 alone, which reads as follows: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” A.     Admissibility 1.     Government’s objection for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies 46.     Without specifying which of the complaints above they referred to, the Government raised an objection for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, because the applicants had failed to bring an action for damages against the State. The applicants disputed the objection. 47.     The Court notes that the refusal to allow the restitution in kind of Plot A and the failure, up to now, to provide compensation for Plot B were not deemed unlawful under domestic law, whereas one of the prerequisites for successfully pursuing a tort claim is to establish the wrongfulness of the conduct causing the damage (see Valkov and Others v. Bulgaria , nos.   2033/04 et al., § 107, 25 October 2011). Moreover, the Government have not specified the respondent to such a claim, or cited any decisions of the Bulgarian courts showing its practicability in the present context. As to the delays in the restitution process, the Court refers to its findings in cases against Bulgaria concerning similar complaints (see Vasilev and Doycheva v. Bulgaria , no. 14966/04, §§ 26-30, 31 May 2012, with further references) that a tort claim could not be considered an effective remedy, as it was of a purely compensatory nature and could not bring about the completion of the restitution process. In addition, the Court recalls that in the cases of Vasilev and Doycheva (cited above, § 69) and Mutishev and Others v. Bulgaria ((just satisfaction), no. 18967/03, § 38, 28 February 2012) it urged the respondent State to introduce a remedy permitting any aggrieved person to effectively obtain compensation in cases of delays in the restitution proceedings. 48.     Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 2.     Complaint of deprivation of property concerning Plot A 49.     As already mentioned, concerning this plot the applicants complained of unjustified deprivation of property. 50.     The Government considered that the case did not concern deprivation of property because the Sozopol agricultural land commission’s decision of 23 May 1992 had not created title to property for the applicants. The Government argued that the applicants could not have legitimately expected to have their property restored, given that the land they claimed had been within the boundaries of the Duni resort. They pointed out that Duni, later Duni AD, had not participated in the restitution procedure and had not had an opportunity to present its claims. 51.     The Government pointed out also that the outcome of the rei   vindicatio proceedings did not preclude the applicants’ restitution claims, because the applicants remained entitled to receive compensation for their land, through other comparable land or compensation bonds. 52.     The applicants contested the Government’s arguments. They considered that they had acquired title to property to the land at issue, on the basis of the Sozopol land commission’s decision for restitution of 23 May 1992 and the subsequent formal transfer of possession. They argued that the domestic courts’ decisions in the rei vindicatio proceedings, and depriving them of this property, had been arbitrary, which had rendered the interference with their rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 unlawful. Lastly, the applicants considered that the compensation they remained entitled to, through other land or compensation bonds under the ALA, was inadequate. 53.     The Court has recapitulated the relevant principles applicable to restitution of nationalised property in the case of Kopecký v. Slovakia ([GC], no. 44912/98, § 35, ECHR 2004 ‑ IX) in the following manner (citations omitted): “(a)     Deprivation of ownership or of another right in rem is in principle an instantaneous act and does not produce a continuing situation of ‘deprivation of a right’. (b)     Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not guarantee the right to acquire property. (c)     An applicant can allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 only in so far as the impugned decisions related to his ‘possessions’ within the meaning of this provision. ‘Possessions’ can be either ‘existing possessions’ or assets, including claims, in respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a ‘legitimate expectation’ of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property right. By way of contrast, the hope of recognition of a property right which it has been impossible to exercise effectively cannot be considered a ‘possession’ within the meaning of Article   1 of Protocol No. 1, nor can a conditional claim which lapses as a result of the non-fulfilment of the condition. (d)     Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 cannot be interpreted as imposing any general obligation on the Contracting States to restore property which was transferred to them before they ratified the Convention. Nor does Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 impose any restrictions on the Contracting States’ freedom to determine the scope of property restitution and to choose the conditions under which they agree to restore property rights of former owners. In particular, the Contracting States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation with regard to the exclusion of certain categories of former owners from such entitlement. Where categories of owners are excluded in this way, their claims for restitution cannot provide the basis for a ‘legitimate expectation’ attracting the protection of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. On the other hand, once a Contracting State, having ratified the Convention including Protocol No. 1, enacts legislation providing for the full or partial restoration of property confiscated under a previous regime, such legislation may be regarded as generating a new property right protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying the requirements for entitlement. The same may apply in respect of arrangements for restitution or compensation established under pre-ratification legislation, if such legislation remained in force after the Contracting State’s ratification of Protocol No. 1.” 54.     In addition, the Court has held (see Kopecký , cited above, § 52; and Maria Atanasiu and Others v. Romania , nos. 30767/05 and 33800/06, §   137, 12 October 2010) that “where the proprietary interest is in the nature of a claim it may be regarded as an ‘asset’ only where it has a sufficient basis in national law, for example where there is settled case-law of the domestic courts confirming it.” 55.     Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that although the decision of 23 May 1992 in the applicants’ favour served as a basis for the issuance of a notary deed, and the land commission issued an act for the formal transfer to the applicants of possession of the plot (see paragraph 15 above), the decision remained unenforced, as the applicants never assumed actual possession. They did not bring proceedings to challenge that state of affairs after their request to that effect to the Council of Ministers and the Committee on Tourism was left unanswered (see paragraphs 13 and 15 above). 56.     In its judgments in the cases of Lyubomir Popov (§ 117) and Sivova   and Koleva (§ 74), both cited above, the Court observed that, under the national law, administrative decisions determining claimants’ rights to restitution under the ALA were given in ex parte proceedings before the land commission and could be challenged either directly or indirectly by another person claiming property rights over the same land. It noted further that third parties claiming rights to the same land could defend these rights in a subsequent procedure, such as rei vindicatio judicial proceedings (see Sivova and Koleva , cited above, § 104). The possibility to re-examine an administrative decision for restitution in kind in subsequent judicial proceedings with third parties is the subject of well-established practice of the national courts (ibid., §§ 102 ‑ 103). Moreover, the law explicitly provides for further proceedings to determine the compensation due in lieu of restitution. 57.     The Court is of the view that, given the approach under domestic law, the administrative decision of 23 May 1992 allowing the applicants’ restitution claims could not be considered to have validly created property rights for them prior to the examination of third parties’ competing claims to the same land (see Sivova and Koleva , cited above, § 74). In the case, Duni did not participate in the procedure before the land commission. Moreover, the land commission itself failed in its decision to comment on any possible rights of the company (see paragraph 11 above). For these reasons, and since, as in Sivova and Koleva , the applicants must have been aware from the beginning of Duni’s competing claims because the company was holding and using the land (see paragraph 15 above), the Court considers that the applicants could not have legitimately expected that the decision of 23 May 1992 determined with finality their restitution rights, which were contested by a third party. 58.     In fact, the question whether all the preconditions for restitution in kind, as provided for by law, had been met, including whether Duni, later Duni AD, had acquired rights to the land at issue which it could oppose to the applicants, was for the first time examined in the rei vindicatio proceedings brought by the company against the applicants (see Sivova and   Koleva , cited above, § 107). This situation is thus in contrast to that in Kehaya and Others v. Bulgaria (nos. 47797/99 and 68698/01, §§ 74-76, 12   January 2006), which concerned an attempt by the State to obtain a fresh examination of the question, already examined in earlier judicial proceedings, whether all the preconditions for restitution had been met. 59.     Moreover, the Court notes that the domestic courts’ decisions in the rei vindicatio proceedings do not appear to have been arbitrary, but were based on what appears to have been a due application of domestic law, namely section 10b of the ALA, as in force at the moment of examination of the applicants’ restitution claims by the land commission (see paragraph 38 above). 60.     In view of the above, the Court agrees with the Government’s position (see paragraph 50 above) that the land commission’s decision of 23   May 1992 did not represent a stable legal basis which could give rise to final and enforceable property rights for the applicants. This is also evident from the fact that after the rei vindicatio proceedings the authorities took further measures to determine the contents of the applicants’ restitution rights, in particular by preparing to award them compensation (see paragraphs 21-24 above). 61.     As to the applicants’ argument that the compensation they can receive would be inadequate, the Court refers to its findings in Sivova and   Koleva (see §§ 109-114 of the judgment) that the manner of compensation chosen by the Bulgarian legislator did not run contrary to the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Moreover, the Court refers to its findings cited in paragraph 56 above that States had freedom to determine the scope of property restitution and to choose the conditions under which they agreed to restore property rights of former owners. 62.     In view of the above, the Court finds that the applicants’ complaint concerning deprivation of property is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 3.     Remaining complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 63.     The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention, nor inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     Complaint concerning the authorities’ failure to provide the compensation due to the applicants for Plot B 64.     In respect of Plot B the applicants complained, first, that they had not received the compensation due to them. 65.     The Government argued that the Ministry of Economics had been unable to comply with the court judgments setting the amount of compensation through shares in Duni AD, because the State no longer held the necessary shares. They attached a statement of the Ministry of Economics to the same effect dated 22 March 2011. 66.     The applicants reiterated their complaint. They pointed out that it was not disputed that the State remained bound by the court judgments finding that the applicants were entitled to receive 56,997 shares in Duni   AD and that a fine had been imposed on the Minister of Economics for his failure to abide by those judgments. As to the Government’s argument that the State could not enforce the judgments because it did not hold a sufficient amount of shares, the applicants pointed out that the authorities had, though their own actions, placed themselves in that position, because they had privatised parts of Duni AD prior to meeting their obligations to provide compensation to former owners of land included in the company’s assets. 67.     The Court notes that the parties to the case seem to agree on the fact that the Burgas Regional Court’s judgment of 28 June 2007, confirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court on 4 January 2008 (see paragraphs 29-30 above), determined with finality the extent of the applicants’ right to compensation in lieu of restitution. The applicants complained of the authorities’ failure, for several years, to abide by those judgments. 68.     The Court recalls that it examined a similar situation, namely where the administrative authorities refused to comply with a final court judgment determining the contents of the applicants’ restitution rights, in Mutishev   and Others v. Bulgaria (no. 18967/03, 3 December 2009). In that case the Court reiterated that the principle of legal certainty required, inter   alia , that where the courts have finally determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question, save for reasons of a substantial and compelling character (see also, mutatis mutandis , Brumărescu v.   Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61, ECHR 1999 ‑ VII; Ryabykh v. Russia , no. 52854/99, § 52, ECHR 2003 ‑ IX; and Mancheva v. Bulgaria , no.   39609/98, § 59, 30 September 2004). 69.     No such reasons were indicated in the present case. In particular, the Court cannot accept that the fact that the State was not holding the necessary amount of shares could absolve it from the duty to comply with the court judgments mentioned above. This was also the finding of the Burgas Regional Court, which imposed a fine on the Minister of Economics for failing to comply with the judgments (see paragraph 32 above). The Court observes that the State could, for example, seek to purchase the necessary shares or replace them with other assets, and that this possibility remains open to the present date. Instead, the authorities remained inflexible and have not shown that they sought a solution. Moreover, the Court notes that the authorities used as grounds for non-compliance their own earlier behaviour, namely the sale or transfer of almost the entirety of their shares in Duni AD prior to having satisfied all compensation claims from former owners of land included in the company’s assets (see paragraphs 8 and 26 above). The authorities’ failure to comply with the final court judgment affected the applicants’ legitimate expectation to receive compensation in lieu of restitution, as determined in accordance with the applicable domestic law. 70.     Accordingly, the Court considers that in respect of the authorities’ failure to provide the compensation due to the applicants for Plot B there was a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 2.     Complaint concerning the delays in the procedures for restitution and compensation 71.     In respect of both Plot A and Plot B, the applicants complained of excessive delays in the procedures for restitution and compensation in lieu thereof. 72.     As concerns Plot A, the Government submitted that the delays were due to numerous applications for judicial review of decisions of the Agriculture Department by former owners who were to receive land in the Sozopol area. In addition, in 2009 the boundaries of the Sozopol administrative district were modified, which reduced the quantity of land available for compensation. The Government submitted a letter from the Sozopol Agriculture Department, which considered that this latter development would lead to the modification of all decisions concerning compensation in the area. 73.     The Government did not comment on the delays in the procedures concerning Plot B. 74.     The applicants repeated their complaint that the delays in the procedures were excessive. As regards Plot B, they pointed out in particular that they had expressed their preference to receive compensation through shares as early as 6 May 1993, and had since awaited that compensation. 75.     The Court has, in numerous cases against Bulgaria, found violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on the ground of lengthy delays in the procedures concerning restitution of agricultural land which affected the applicants’ legitimate expectations to restitution or compensation (see Sivova and Koleva , Vasilev and Doycheva and Lyubomir Popov , all cited above; Naydenov v. Bulgaria , no. 17353/03, 26 November 2009; Petkova   and Others , nos. 19130/04, 17694/05 and 27777/06, 25 September 2012; and Ivanov v. Bulgaria , no. 19988/06, 11 December 2012). In the case of Vasilev and Doycheva (see § 69 of the judgment) the Court concluded that the problem was recurrent and expressed the view that the Bulgarian authorities had to provide for clear time ‑ limits for the adoption and enforcement of administrative decisions necessary for the completion of the process of restitution of agricultural land. 76.     In the present case, as concerns Plot A, as of September 2011, the date of the latest communication from the parties, the compensation due to the applicants had not yet been provided. Moreover, the procedure seemed to be in a standstill, as no decision had been adopted since 2005. In particular, it had not been determined whether and when the applicants would receive other comparable land or compensation bonds, and for what value (see paragraph 24 above). 77.     As concerns Plot B, the Court notes that the applicants applied to receive compensation through shares in Duni AD on 6 May 1993 (see paragraph 13 above). Their application was examined only in 2004, when a decision on the amount of shares to be transferred was taken by a commission of the Ministry of Economics (see paragraph 27 above). After the applicants’ application for judicial review, the question concerning the amount of shares to be transferred was settled with finality only in 2008 (see paragraphs 28-30 above). However, as already discussed, the applicants have not yet received anything and the procedure is still pending. 78.     The Court notes that the delays in the present case, most notably in respect of Plot A, were to a great extent due to the fact that the processes of restitution of nationalised property and of transformation and privatisation of public enterprises, as regulated by the Bulgarian legislator, were carried out in a parallel manner, and that it was foreseen that any conflict between the interests of the parties to such procedures would be settled in separate judicial proceedings. Acknowledging to the States a wide margin of appreciation in regulating important social and economic reforms such as the ones introduced in Bulgaria after the fall of communism, the Court recalls nevertheless that States remain bound to organise their judicial and administrative systems in such a way so as to guarantee the rights provided for under the Convention (see Sivova and Koleva , cited above, § 116). In the case at hand, by requiring that the applicants participate in two procedures, first a restitution procedure and then rei vindicatio judicial proceedings aimed at specifying the rights recognised in the restitution procedure, the authorities delayed significantly the effective exercise of the applicants’ restitution rights. 79.     Moreover, even after the conclusion of the rei vindicatio proceedings the delays continued and the restitution process has not yet been completed. The Court takes note of the Government’s explanations for that particular period of delay (see paragraph 72 above); however, it does not consider them sufficient to justify the absence of any effective steps towards providing compensation to the applicants for such a lengthy period of time, namely at least seven years after the conclusion of the rei vindicatio proceedings in 2004. 80.     The Court is of the view that the significant delays in the procedures concerning Plot B were also imputable to the authorities, who appear not to have examined the matter in a prompt and diligent manner. The Government have not provided any explanation for the initial lengthy delay between 1993 and 2004. Moreover, the Court already found (see paragraphs   69-70 above) that the delay after 2008 was also unjustified. 81.     The Court finds in addition that the applicants were not responsible for any of the delays incurred in respect of Plot B. It is true that they could have brought about a partial completion of the compensation process by accepting the 17,700 shares the State was prepared to transfer to them after 2008 (see paragraph 31 above). However, this would only have represented a partial solution. At the same time, the Court notes that the applicants attempted to prompt the Ministry of Economics to act, by successfully suing the Minister for failure to abide by the Burgas Regional Court’s final judgment on the amount of compensation (see paragraph 32 above). 82.     The Court considers that the situations described above must have placed the applicants in a situation of lengthy uncertainty (see Sivova and   Koleva , § 116, and Lyubomir Popov , § 122, both cited above). The relevant authorities also acknowledged that the applicants and the other persons awaiting compensation in lieu of restitution in the area of Sozopol under the ALA (in the case at hand for Plot A) were placed in a situation of uncertainty. Moreover, they admitted that all decisions taken in that regard had to be yet re-examined (see paragraph 72 above). 83.     As to Plot B, the Court notes in addition the apparent confusion caused by the actions of the Sozopol agricultural land commission (later Agriculture and Forestry Department), which, in disregard of the applicants’ choice of