CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 15 octobre 2013

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clear:both } .s68C46B95 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s3F59B822 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-transform:uppercase } .s75A32C27 { border-collapse:collapse } .s3695F815 { border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top; background-color:#dfdfdf } .s2EF62ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:12pt } .sEECE831 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; color:#474747 } .sE8934522 { border:0.75pt solid #949494; padding:1.02pt 5.03pt; vertical-align:top } .s6B505E72 { margin:0pt; padding-left:0pt } .s8F670191 { font-family:Arial; font-size:12pt; list-style-position:inside } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }   SECOND SECTION DECISION Application no. 66365/09 Rimantas SAVICKAS against Lithuania and 5 other applications (see list appended) The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting on 15   October 2013 as a Chamber composed of: Guido Raimondi, President,   Danutė Jočienė,   Peer Lorenzen,   András Sajó,   Işıl Karakaş,   Nebojša Vučinić,   Helen Keller, judges, and Lawrence Early, Acting Section Registrar, Having regard to the above applications lodged by six Lithuanian nationals, Mr Rimantas Savickas (case no. 66365/09, “the first applicant”) on 12   December 2009, Mr Vylius Kryževičius (case no.   12845/10, “the second applicant”) on 23 February 2010, Mrs Daiva Vaškelienė (case no.   29809/10, “the third applicant”) on 21   May 2010, Mr   Vilmantas   Almantas Gaidelis (case no.   29813/10, “the fourth applicant”) on 18   May 2010, Mr Algimantas Pivoriūnas (case no.   30623/10, “the fifth   applicant”) on 26   May 2010 and Mr Petras Rimantas Brazys (case no.   28367/11, “the sixth applicant”) on 17   April 2011, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS A.     The circumstances of the case 1.     The first applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Panevėžys. The second applicant was born in 1941 and lives in Panevėžys. The third applicant was born in 1963 and lives in Vilnius. She is an advocate. The fourth applicant was born in 1945 and lives in Vilnius. The fifth applicant was born in 1939 and lives in Vilnius. The sixth applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Šiauliai. 2.     On 3 February 1993 the Seimas (the Lithuanian Parliament) decided that pending the adoption of the relevant laws the Government would be responsible for establishing judges’ remuneration. In that connection, by rulings of 6   December 1995 and 21   December 1999 the Constitutional Court held that the protection of judges’ salaries and benefits was one of the guarantees of their independence. Accordingly, to ensure the independence of judges it was prohibited to reduce a judge’s salary during his or her term of office. 3.     On 30   June 1997, in order better to fight crime and corruption, the Government adopted Resolution no.   689, raising judges’ salaries by a factor of   2.5. 4.     By Resolution no.   1494 of 28   December 1999 the Government decided that, taking into account the difficult financial and economic situation of the State, a factor of 1.75 instead of 2.5 would be used to calculate judges’ salaries as of 1   January 2000 [a reduction of about 30   per   cent]. 5.     On 29   August 2000 the Seimas adopted the Law on the Remuneration of State Politicians, Judges and State Officials, thus regulating judges’ salaries by law as of that moment. In their observations to the Court the Government noted that the judges’ salaries remained reduced. 6.   The reduction in remuneration affected the entire community of judges. According to the Government, at the relevant time there were 772   judges who worked in the Lithuanian courts. Of that number, 226   judges instituted 103 sets of proceedings before the domestic courts claiming payment of the lost part of their salary on the ground that the reduction of judges’ salaries was in breach of the principle of their independence. 7.     Five of the applicants and the third applicant’s husband, who at that time were Lithuanian judges, sued the State between February and July   2000 in the courts of general and administrative jurisdiction. 8.     On 20   June 2001 the Special Panel on Courts’ Jurisdiction, whose function is to resolve disputes concerning jurisdiction arising between the general and the administrative courts, ruled that in order to ensure the independence and impartiality of the courts, the cases concerning the remuneration of judges of the general courts should be examined by the administrative courts and vice versa . Following that decision and the reform of the administrative courts, the cases concerning the third applicant’s husband and the other applicants and were transferred to the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court acting as the court of first instance. 9.     The Vilnius Regional Administrative Court later requested the Constitutional Court to rule on the question whether the reduction of judges’ salaries was in line with the principle of their independence. 10.     After the third applicant’s husband died in August 2005, she and their two children joined the administrative court proceedings as his heirs, asking the court to award the third applicant his unpaid salary. 11.     By a ruling of 28   March 2006 the Constitutional Court held that when the economic and financial situation in the State deteriorated significantly, a temporary reduction in judges’ salaries was lawful and, provided certain safeguards were met, as such did not breach their independence (for the relevant extracts from the ruling see paragraph 44 below). 12.   Having regard to that ruling by the Constitutional Court, the Court of Appeal, which at that time was also examining a case concerning the reduction in judges’ remuneration, ordered an expert report to be prepared by the Lithuanian Free Market Institute in order to determine the economic and financial situation in the country at the relevant time. The experts concluded that the financial crisis in the Russian Federation had caused a difficult situation in Lithuania, because at that time the Russian Federation was the biggest export market for Lithuanian producers and after the crisis export to Russia had shrunk three times. Limited economic growth, strong competition and high quality standards in the Western Europe as well as appreciation of the United States dollar did not allow Lithuanian companies to quickly compensate the loss of the Russian market in the West. According to the experts, the extremely difficult economic and financial situation in Lithuania began in 1999 and continued until 2003. On the basis of that finding, on 18   June 2008 the Court of Appeal held that the reduction of the judges’ salaries, which had been carried out in accordance with the principle of proportionality, was legitimate for that period. The Court of Appeal nevertheless noted that the State’s financial and economic situation had improved in 2003. Therefore, the fact that as of that date the State had not revoked the austerity measure (in this case the reduction of salaries) was in breach of the principle that austerity measures could be applied only on a temporary basis. Accordingly, the court awarded the claimants the unpaid part of their remuneration as of 1 January 2003. 13.     In connection with the above-mentioned expert report ordered by the Court of Appeal, the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court adjourned the examination of some of the applicants’ cases. In addition, despite the transfer of jurisdiction (see paragraph 8 above), in February and November   2007 and July 2008 some judges withdrew from examination of the applicants’ cases because they themselves were claimants in other cases concerning the same subject. 14.   On 18   August 2008 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court granted the first and second applicants’ claims in part and awarded them compensation for different periods spanning the years 2003-2007. 15.     On 24 October 2008 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court partly granted the third, fourth and fifth applicant’s claims and awarded them part of their unpaid salary for different periods spanning the years 2000-2008. 16.     On 5   October 2009 the Vilnius Regional Administrative Court partly granted the sixth applicant’s claim and awarded him compensation for the reduction in salary in respect of the years 2003-2005. 17.     The six applicants lodged appeals with the Supreme Administrative Court challenging the Lithuanian Free Market Institute’s conclusions about the severity of the 1999-2003 financial crisis. They also argued that lowering judges’ salaries had been out of proportion. 18.     The Ministry of Finance asked that the appeals be dismissed. It noted, in the sixth applicant’s case, that the fact of the particularly difficult economic situation in Lithuania had been established not only by the experts but also by the Constitutional Court. In deciding whether the judges’ salaries had been lowered proportionately, the scale of the savings measures had to be taken into account. By taking those measures the Government had attempted to reduce the disparities between various groups of the population. The Ministry of Finance emphasised that in December 1999 the average salary in the public sector had been 1,171 Lithuanian litas (LTL [1] ), whereas the average salary of a judge at that time had been LTL 7,784. That being so, the reduction in judges’ salaries had been proportionate. 19.     Having noted the Constitutional Court’s conclusions on the possibility of a temporary reduction of judges’ salaries and the Court of Appeal decision of 18   June 2008, the Supreme Administrative Court confirmed that because of the financial and economic crisis the situation in Lithuania had improved only as of 1 January 2003. Accordingly, the applicants should have received compensation for the period after that date, in accordance with the arrangements laid down by the Law on Compensation for the Unpaid Part of Judges’ Remuneration of 11   November 2008 (see paragraph 46 below). 20.   Eventually, the six applicants’ claims for the unpaid part of their salaries were granted in part by the Supreme Administrative Court, as follows: on 18   June 2009 the first applicant was awarded a sum of LTL 96,657; on 24   August 2009 the second applicant was awarded LTL 101,043; on 1   December 2009 LTL 54,015 was awarded to the third applicant and LTL 16,204 to each of her two children, in respect of the third applicant’s late husband; the fourth applicant was awarded LTL 96,703 and the fifth   applicant LTL 96,814; on 25   October 2010 the sixth applicant was awarded a sum of LTL   104,048. B.     Relevant domestic law and practice 1.     As regards the length of proceedings (a)     Statutory provisions 21.     Article 30 of the Lithuanian Constitution provides that persons whose constitutional rights or freedoms are violated shall have the right to apply to a court. Compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage shall be established by law. Article 138 § 3 of the Constitution stipulates that the international treaties ratified by the Seimas shall be a constituent part of the legal system of the Republic of Lithuania. The Law on International Treaties stipulates that if a treaty ratified by the Republic of Lithuania which has entered into force establishes norms other than those established by the laws or other legal acts of the Republic of Lithuania which are in force at the moment of conclusion of the treaty, or which entered into force after the entry into force of the treaty, the provisions of the treaty shall prevail (Article 11 § 2). 22.     Article 6.272 of the Civil Code allows a civil claim to be lodged for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage in respect of unlawful actions of the investigating authorities or the courts. The Article in question makes provision for compensation for unlawful conviction, unlawful arrest or detention and for the application of unlawful procedural measures in enforcement proceedings. It reads as follows: Article 6.272. Liability for damage caused by the unlawful actions of preliminary investigation officials, prosecutors, judges and the courts “1. Damage resulting either from unlawful conviction, unlawful arrest as a suppressive measure, unlawful detention, application of unlawful procedural measures in enforcement proceedings, or unlawful imposition of an administrative penalty (arrest) shall give rise to full compensation by the State irrespective of the fault of the preliminary investigation officials, prosecution officials or courts. 2. The State shall be liable for full compensation in respect of the damage caused by the unlawful actions of a judge or a court trying a civil case, where the damage is caused through the fault of the judge himself or of any other court official. 3. In addition to pecuniary damage, the aggrieved person shall be entitled to non-pecuniary damage. 4. Where the damage arises from an intentional fault on the part of preliminary investigation, prosecution or court officials or judges, the State, after compensation has been provided, shall have the right to take action against the officials concerned for recovery, under the procedure established by law, of the sums in question in the amount provided for by the law.” 23.     On 14   April 2011 the Ministry of Justice presented to the Seimas a draft amendment to Article 6.272, adding a new fifth paragraph. As the explanatory note to the amendment states, its aim is to directly establish individuals’ right to compensation for excessively lengthy pre-trial investigation or court proceedings. The Ministry noted that, to that date, there were eighteen judgments in respect of Lithuania in which the European Court of Human Rights had found a violation of a person’s right to a hearing or trial within a reasonable time. It also observed that the Court had not yet acknowledged Article 6.272 of the Civil Code to be an effective remedy in respect of the excessive length of court proceedings, one of the reasons being that the provision in question did not mention excessively lengthy court proceedings as giving grounds for compensation. Should the State fail to act, there was a likelihood that the Court would find excessively lengthy court proceedings to be a systemic problem in Lithuania. Another important factor was that the amendment would allow compensation to be awarded for excessively long court proceedings irrespective of the investigating officers’ or courts’ fault. Moreover, taking into account the Court’s practice in length-of-proceedings cases, the whole range of criteria – the impact of the proceedings on the person concerned, and the actions or failure to act by the State authorities and by the person himself – should be taken into consideration. A crucial element was that the draft amendment did not set out an exhaustive list of criteria as to when compensation could be awarded for damage. The proposed provision reads as follows:   “5. In accordance with the rules set out in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 of this Article, compensation shall also be afforded in respect of damage caused by an excessively lengthy pre-trial investigation or examination of the case by the court. The court, when it determines the issue of compensation for damage, in addition to the general criteria for assessment of the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage as set out in this Code, shall also take into account the impact of the pre-trial investigation and court proceedings on the person claiming compensation for damage, their complexity and the procedural actions or failure to act by the pre-trial investigations officials, prosecutors or judges as well as those of the person claiming damages, and other relevant circumstances.” 24.     On 21   June 2001 the Seimas partly amended the Code of Civil Procedure, adding a new paragraph 3 to Article 72, designed to make proceedings more efficient and speedy. The amendment provides for an additional protective mechanism for the parties: where the court of first instance fails to perform procedural actions which it is obliged to perform, a party may request the appellate court to impose a time-limit within which the action must be performed. (b)     Lithuanian courts’ practice (i)     The Constitutional Court 25.   As regards a person’s right to claim damages for unlawful actions by the State authorities, on 19   August 2006 the Constitutional Court held as follows: “5. In this context it is to be noted that, under the Constitution, persons have a right to claim compensation for damage caused by the unlawful actions of State institutions and officials, including when a particular case of compensation for damage is not specified in any law. The courts, when ruling on such cases in accordance with their competence, have constitutional powers to adjudge the corresponding compensation for damage by directly applying the Constitution (the principles of justice, legal certainty and legal security, proportionality, due process of law, equality of persons and protection of legitimate expectations, and other provisions of the Constitution) and general principles of law, pursuing, inter alia , the principle of reasonableness, etc.” (ii)     The courts of criminal jurisdiction 26.     In criminal case no.   2K-7-45/2007, in which judgment was given on 17   April 2007, the Supreme Court found that the duration of the pre-trial investigation in the case of two convicted persons had been unjustifiably long. The court noted the Convention organs’ case-law to the effect that in cases of a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in respect of the right to a trial within a reasonable time, mitigation of the sentence could be one of the appropriate remedies (it referred to Einarsson v. Iceland , no. 22596/93, decision of 5 April 1995, and Beck v.   Norway , no. 26390/95, judgment of 26 June 2001). No custodial sentence was therefore imposed. 27.     In the judgment of 10   February 2009 in criminal case no.   2K ‑ 7/48/2009, the Supreme Court refused the prosecutor’s request to impose a heavier penalty on the convicted persons. The court noted that the criminal proceedings had lasted relatively long and that, according to the settled case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, reducing the sentence was an effective remedy when the proceedings had exceeded a reasonable time (the court referred to Tamás Kovács v. Hungary , no.   67660/01, § 26, 28 September 2004). (iii)     The courts of civil jurisdiction 28.     In case no.   3K-7-7/2007 of 6   February 2007, the Supreme Court examined a civil claim for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage lodged by a claimant whose criminal proceedings had lasted some six years at one level of jurisdiction. The applicant’s case was closely linked to that of another group of persons whose case had lasted a similar period of time and had been pending at two levels of jurisdiction. Both sets of proceedings were terminated because the prosecution became time-barred. As regards the question of non-pecuniary damage caused by unjustified delays in criminal proceedings and the link between the domestic law and Article 6 §   1 of the Convention, the Supreme Court held as follows: “The State has an obligation not only to guarantee that a person’s rights are not breached by the unlawful actions of other persons, but also to make sure that they are not breached by the State authorities and State officials. In the sphere of protection of human rights and freedoms the subject of redress for damage is of particular importance. This means that persons have a right to redress for damage caused by unlawful actions of State authority officials only when it has been established that the State institution or official concerned has performed unlawful actions which have caused damage. Article 6.272 of the Civil Code sets forth the conditions governing liability for damage caused by certain specific subjects: pre-trial investigation officers, prosecutors, judges and the courts. This type of liability ... has a special feature, namely that the damage must be compensated for irrespective of whether the fault of a particular officer has been established or not. The obligation to compensate for damage caused by the unlawful actions of pre-trial investigation officers, prosecutors, judges or the courts arises where unlawful actions have been established (tort liability); therefore, it is very important to determine what actions are considered as unlawful and what are the criteria for establishing unlawfulness. The actions which might be held to be unlawful are listed in Article 6.272 § 1 of the Civil Code. The existence of such a list implies that the legislator regulating the obligation to redress such damage did not comply with the general rule according to which every action that is contrary to law and causes damage creates an obligation to redress such damage. The discretion of the legislator to regulate the present issues has been analysed by the Constitutional Court, which noted in its ruling of 19 August 2006 that when regulating the question of redress for damage, where the damage was caused by State officials, the legislator does not have discretion to establish an exhaustive (finite) list of cases in which such damage must be compensated for, as this would be contrary to the constitutional principle that damage must be compensated for. The claimant seeks to defend her rights on the basis of national law. The defendant states that national law, and in particular the Civil Code, does not provide for civil liability for damage caused by [State] officials’ unlawful actions, in this instance, failure to examine a case within a reasonable time. Such an argument is not valid, because the legal system of the Republic of Lithuania is comprised not only of domestic legal acts but also of international treaties, by which the Republic of Lithuania has assumed an obligation to guarantee certain rights and interests and to treat actions which breach them as a violation. The chamber finds that when a person points out possibly unlawful actions by [State] officials which are not listed in specific legal norms establishing liability, the courts treat such facts as possible violations of common legal principles, within the context of the Lithuanian Constitution and Lithuanian international agreements. ... In cases where State liability for certain infringements is not regulated by the national law, the court may establish the State’s liability in accordance with the international treaties which constitute an integral part of the national legal system (Article 138 § 3 of the Constitution). Article 6 § 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights establishes an obligation to determine issues related to criminal charges against a person within a reasonable time. The provisions of the Convention are interpreted by the Court. The Supreme Court has already had occasion to rule as regards the application of the Convention in matters related to redress for damage caused by the actions of officials. It held that the lawfulness of a certain action under national law did not automatically mean that it was lawful within the meaning of the Convention. In the light of this approach to civil liability, the defendant’s argument to the effect that cases where State liability arises for damage caused by the unlawful actions of its officials are limited by the provisions of Article   6.272 § 1 of the Civil Code, is unsubstantiated, as it is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution concerning the structure of the legal system of the Republic of Lithuania. According to the said provisions legal relations are regulated not only by domestic law, but also by international treaties (Article 11 §§ 1 and 2 of the Law on International Treaties). Given that Article 6.272 of the Civil Code provides for civil liability for damage caused by pre-trial investigation officers, that is to say, for infringements similar to those provided for by Article 6 §   1 of the Convention, the principle of analogy of the law should be applied, i.e. the provisions of Article 6.272 of the Civil Code should be applicable when assessing the damage caused by a breach of Article 6 §   1 of the Convention.” 29.     The Supreme Court then went on to examine the claimant’s case in the light of the Court’s criteria under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It noted that the claimant had been charged with a criminal act as far back as 1998. The case concerned a financial crime and thus was clearly complex, involving the smuggling of goods in large amounts (the court referred to Meilus v. Lithuania , no. 53161/99, § 25, 6 November 2003). Twenty   persons had been charged, the case file contained eighty volumes and more than two hundred witnesses had been questioned. Despite that, all the investigative actions in respect of the claimant had been performed in 1998. However, up until 2004, when the prosecution became time-barred, the investigators had not performed any other actions in respect of the claimant and had also failed to transfer her case to the court for trial. Likewise, they had not made use of the possibility to sever the charges against the plaintiff, even though the prosecutors had done so in respect of some of the other accused (the Supreme Court referred to G.K. v. Poland , no. 38816/97, §   102, 20 January 2004). The Supreme Court thus considered that the pre-trial investigation authorities had not acted with sufficient diligence, thereby breaching the claimant’s right to timely criminal proceedings. Having the status of a person charged with a crime, the claimant had experienced uncertainty about the end of the criminal proceedings. Moreover, this procedural status had for an unjustifiably long time limited her other rights: the right to move (she was under an obligation not to leave her place of residence) and her property rights (her property had been seized). Those restrictions had lasted from March 1998 until January 2004. Furthermore, she had been dismissed from her job from December 1998 to July 2002. Taking into account the fact that the delayed criminal investigation and the restrictions applied to the claimant had caused her emotional distress, tarnished her reputation and restricted her opportunities for contact with others, and the fact that the claimant, who had two minor children, had been without income for a long time, the Supreme Court considered that a sum of LTL 15,000 (approximately 4,300 euros (EUR)) would be appropriate to compensate for non-pecuniary damage. It also awarded the claimant LTL 15,000 for pecuniary damage in compensation for loss of salary. 30.     In civil case no.   3K-3-5/2009, in which judgment was given on 4   February 2009, the Supreme Court again considered the issue of non-pecuniary damage for, firstly, the length of criminal proceedings and, secondly, the length of time taken to examine a civil claim in separate civil proceedings which were linked to the criminal proceedings. 31.     As regards the length of the criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court established that the pre-trial investigation in the claimant’s case had lasted for four years and had been terminated as being time-barred. The authorities had not acted with sufficient diligence: there had been substantial delays when no investigative actions had been conducted at all, and the investigators had not coordinated their actions, with the result that the criminal case had been returned for further investigation many times. Such delays could not be justified by the complexity of the case (the court referred to Vachev v. Bulgaria , no. 42987/98, § 96, ECHR 2004 ‑ VIII (extracts)). Whilst noting that the claimant’s conduct during the criminal proceedings, in lodging complaints that were not granted, raised certain suspicions as to whether he had an interest in seeing the proceedings swiftly terminated, the Supreme Court, on the basis of Barfuss v. the Czech Republic (no. 35848/97, § 81, 31 July 2000), nevertheless dismissed the State’s argument that the criminal proceedings had been protracted because the claimant had actively exercised his procedural rights. Having judiciously balanced the actions of the claimant and those of the State authorities, the Supreme Court held that it was the State that had to bear the blame for the principal delay in the proceedings. 32.     As to the claimant’s application for non-pecuniary damage, the Supreme Court found it important that the criminal investigation had been started because of the claimant’s ‘unlawful actions’ – when the tax authorities had established that the claimant’s company had been selling counterfeit intellectual property. Even though the pre-trial investigation had lasted for a long time, no procedural enforcement measures had been applied to the claimant, nor had his property been seized. Given that a violation of the claimant’s rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention had already been established, the Supreme Court considered it appropriate to refer to the Court’s guidelines in cases which bore as close a resemblance as possible to the case at issue. Accordingly, the Supreme Court relied on Gečas v. Lithuania (no. 418/04, 17 July 2007), where the criminal proceedings had lasted for five years and eleven months and had been discontinued as being time-barred and where the main delays had been attributed to the State authorities, one of the arguments for that conclusion being the return of the case for fresh investigation owing to earlier flaws. Accordingly, following the Court’s award of EUR 900 in respect of non-pecuniary damage in Gečas , the Supreme Court awarded the claimant LTL   3,000 (approximately EUR 870). 33.     The Supreme Court then went on to examine the claimant’s complaint that the four-year period for the hearing of his civil case at first instance had been excessive. It noted that under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention parties had a right to have a civil dispute examined within the least time possible. The court also considered that, for civil proceedings to be in compliance with Article 6 § 1, the most pertinent factor was not their duration as such, but the question whether the civil proceedings had been delayed or pending without a valid reason and thus in breach of the principle of concluding proceedings within the shortest time possible. As to the circumstances of that civil case, the court found that its examination had been protracted because of the delays during the criminal proceedings, when the investigators’ actions had been too slow. However, the civil court which heard the case had also contributed to the length of the civil proceedings by delaying the fixing of hearings, postponing hearings without a reason and not always refusing the parties’ ungrounded requests to postpone hearings. Even though both the parties and the court of first instance had been responsible for some of the delays, it was the role of the domestic courts, in line with the Court’s guidelines in Makarenko v. Ukraine (no. 43482/02, §   37, 1 February 2007), to manage their proceedings so that they were expeditious and effective. Moreover, pursuant to Tsirikakis v. Greece (no.   46355/99, § 43, 17 January 2002), even in proceedings based on the principle of the parties’ initiative, the national courts were under an obligation to be very careful in supervising the proceedings and granting various requests by the parties, including requests to postpone the hearings. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the civil court bore the larger share of the responsibility for the unjustifiably long civil proceedings. 34.     By a decision of 15   October 2009 in civil case no.   3K-3-428/2009, the Supreme Court found that, because of the authorities’ inaction, the criminal proceedings in the claimant’s case had been in breach of his right to a trial within a reasonable time (from 1997 to 2004 the claimant had been accused in three criminal cases and had been placed under an obligation not to leave his place of residence). It noted that the Lithuanian courts’ practice regarding the right to compensation for delayed proceedings had been established ( formuojama ) by the Supreme Court’s decision of 6   February   2007 (see paragraphs 28 and 29 above). The court then reviewed the sums which the Strasbourg Court had awarded the applicants in seven length-of-proceedings cases concerning Lithuania, which ranged from EUR   900 to EUR 5,000. Having taken into account the above, it considered that a sum of EUR 5,800 would be just compensation for the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the claimant. 35.     In its decision of 30 November 2009 in civil case no.   3K ‑ 3 ‑ 534/2009, the Supreme Court confirmed that the State’s obligation to compensate for damage caused by excessively lengthy court proceedings, on the basis of Article 6.272 of the Civil Code, had already been confirmed by the Supreme Court. The obligation had likewise been confirmed by the Constitutional Court in its ruling of 19   August 2006. In the case at hand, however, the criminal proceedings concerned a financial – and thus complicated – crime and had lasted one year and ten months. In view of the Court’s case-law, proceedings of that duration were not in breach of the reasonable-time requirement. The plaintiff’s claim for compensation was therefore dismissed. 36.     On 22 June 2010, in civil case no.   3K-3-284/2010, the Supreme Court held that the obligation to provide redress in respect of non-pecuniary damage for excessively lengthy criminal proceedings, as well as the method of assessing the damage, had already been established in Lithuanian law and case-law: “Questions related to compensation for the non-pecuniary damage caused by unreasonable delays in criminal proceedings have been addressed extensively in the case-law of the Supreme Court of Lithuania (the decisions of the Supreme Court of Lithuania of 6 February 2007 in civil case no. 3K-7-7/2007, of 15   October 2009 in civil case no.   3K-3-428/2009 and of 30   November 2009 in civil case no.   3K-3-534/2009). Therefore there is no legal uncertainty or any necessity to form any new rule or case-law in this category of cases.   The obligation to redress the non-pecuniary damage, and the relevant conditions, criteria etc., in cases where such damage has been caused by excessively lengthy criminal proceedings, have been determined in detail in the above-mentioned decisions and other decisions of the Supreme Court, following the case-law developed by this court as well as the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. Therefore, in the present case the Supreme Court shall not explain in detail or more extensively the right to redress for the damage caused by unreasonable delays in criminal proceedings.” (iv)     The courts of administrative jurisdiction 37.     As an illustration of the administrative courts’ case-law concerning non-pecuniary damage caused by the allegedly excessive length of administrative court proceedings, the Government adduced case no.   A858 ‑ 940/2010 concerning a complainant whose driver’s licence had been taken away by the police on suspicion of drunk driving. The administrative court of first instance upheld the police decision. However, the complainant was cleared on appeal by the Supreme Administrative Court. He was nevertheless dissatisfied with the length of the proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court. Claiming that he had suffered non-pecuniary damage because during that period he could not drive a car, the complainant started new administrative proceedings. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 38.     On 23   June 2010, in the above case, the Supreme Administrative Court first turned to the general legal framework governing the State’s liability: “Article 6.272 of the Civil Code sets forth the conditions governing liability for damage caused by the acts of pre-trial investigators, prosecutors, judges and the courts. It follows from the provisions of the Article that the damage sustained by the person concerned should be made good irrespective of whether the fault of a particular official is established. Article 6.271 § 1 defines the actions which give rise to such liability. Although the unreasonable length of proceedings in the administrative courts is not mentioned as giving rise to such liability, the Constitutional Court of Lithuania in its jurisprudence has emphasised the importance of providing redress. That court has noted that the necessity to provide redress for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage caused to a person is a constitutional principle and that it does not follow from the Constitution that it is possible to establish statutory exemptions to the effect that pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary damage is not redressed, for instance, because of the fact that the damage was caused by the unlawful actions of officials or institutions of the State itself. If the law, let alone any other legal act, established a legal regulation of that kind whereby the State could fully or partially avoid the duty to justly compensate for pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary damage caused by the unlawful actions of State institution or officials, it would not only mean that the constitutional concept of compensation for damage was being disregarded, which would be incompatible with the Constitution ( inter alia paragraph 2 of Article 30 thereof), but would also undermine the raison d’être of the State itself .... The Constitutional Court has also emphasised that it is not possible to establish legal regulations such that a person’s right to apply to a court and to claim just compensation for damage caused by unlawful actions is denied (see the ruling of the Constitutional Court of 19 August 2006). In his complaint and appeal the complainant asserts that he has sustained non-pecuniary damage because his right to a hearing within a reasonable time has been breached. The chamber notes that the European Convention on Human Rights is a constituent part of the Lithuanian legal system (see Article 138 § 3 of the Lithuanian Constitution and the Constitutional Court’s conclusions to that effect). Therefore, the administrative courts, in resolving cases, must apply its provisions directly and in the event of a conflict the Convention provisions shall prevail over the national laws and other legal acts. ... Article 13 of the Convention sets out the requirement to guarantee an effective remedy at the national level also in cases where the right under Article 6 § 1 to have one’s case heard within a reasonable time was breached. The European Court of Human Rights has emphasised the subsidiary nature of the Convention and the aim of allowing States themselves to put an end to human rights and freedoms violations at the national level ... When interpreting Article 13 of the Convention the Court has acknowledged that that provision guarantees an effective remedy before a national authority for an alleged breach of the requirement under Article 6 § 1 to hear a case within a reasonable time ( Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 152 and 156, ECHR 2000 ‑ XI ) . The chamber also draws attention to Recommendation Rec(2004)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the improvement of domestic remedies, adopted on 12 May 2004, to the effect that the member States should ascertain that domestic remedies exist for anyone with an arguable complaint of a violation of the Convention, and that these remedies are effective in that they can result in a decision on the merits of the complaint and adequate redress for any violation found (point 1). The chamber also takes note of Recommendation   Rec(2010)3 on effective remedies for excessive length of proceedings, adopted on 24   February 2010, in which, among other things, the member States are invited to take all possible measures to guarantee that State institutions effectively examine complaints about the right to a hearing within a reasonable time, including acknowledging the fact of the violation and compensating for the damage caused by it ...” 39.     The Supreme Administrative Court then went on to examine the particular circumstances of the complainant’s case. It considered that taking into account the serious consequences of the sanction applied to the complainant – a prohibition on driving a car that lasted for a little longer than one year – Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its criminal head applied. The court then continued to examine the Court’s criteria in length ‑ of-proceedings cases. Firstly, it was necessary to look at the overall length of the proceedings (the court referred to Hentrich v. France , 22   September   1994, § 59, Series A no. 296 ‑ A). In the Lithuanian case the complainant had been issued with an administrative sanction by the police on 28   August 2007, his case had been examined by the administrative court of first instance on 12   November 2007, and by the time the Supreme Administrative Court took the final decision on 19   December 2008, one year, three months and twenty-one days had passed. Given that the complainant did not argue that the proceedings had been unduly delayed until his case reached the Supreme Administrative Court, it was appropriate to verify whether that court had acted swiftly enough. On this point the chamber noted that it was not aware of a single European Court judgment finding a similar duration [one year and one month at one level of jurisdiction] to be in breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. On the contrary, in the above-mentioned Hentrich judgment (§   61), a nine-month period before the first-instance court had been considered to be in compliance with the guarantee of a trial within a reasonable time. Accordingly, there were no grounds for finding a violation of the complainant’s rights under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 2.     As regards judicial independence and judges’ salaries 40.     As regards judicial independence, the Lithuanian Constitution provides that in administering justice, judges and courts shall be independent. When considering cases, judges must obey only the law (Article 109 §§ 2 and 3). Interference by institutions of State power and governance, Members of the Seimas and other officials, political parties, political and public organisations or citizens with the activities of a judge or the courts is prohibited and may give rise to liability as provided for by law (Article 114 § 1). 41.     In its rulings of 6 December 1995 and 21   December 1999   the Constitutional Court held that any attempts to reduce the salary and other social benefits of a judge, and any reduction in funding for the courts, were to be seen as an attack on the judges’ and courts’ independence. 42.     The Law on the Courts (wording of 24   January 2002) provided that during a judge’s term of office his or her remuneration and other social guarantees could not be lowered unless provided for by law (Article 96 § 2). The Law nevertheless stipulated that the Seimas could review the material conditions for the functioning of the courts “when the economic and financial situation of the State deteriorates significantly” (Article 11 § 3). 43.     In a ruling of 23   August 2005 the Constitutional Court acknowledged the effect of the economic situation and held as follows: “IV. ... 2. ... in Lithuania, at the end of 1999, there was an especially grave economic situation which was determined to a large extent by the Russian economic and financial crisis and other outside factors, and which had a negative impact on the economic and financial system of Lithuania as well as other States, inter alia because very large sums which were necessary in order to finance education, healthcare, social welfare and other needs of society and the State, and in order to discharge other functions of the State, had not been collected in the 1999 State Budget.” 44.     On 28   March 2006, in its ruling concerning guarantees of judicial independence and the compliance of Article 11 § 3 and Article 96 § 2 of the Law on the Courts with the Constitution, the Constitutional Court held as follows: “IV. ... 4. ... The expression ‘when the economic and financial situation of the State deteriorates significantly’ contained in paragraph 3 (wording of 24 January 2002) of Article 11 of the Law on the Courts is to be construed as meaning a fundamental change in the economic and financial situation of the State when, owing to particular circumstances (economic crisis, natural disasters, etc.), an extremely difficult economic and financial situation occurs in the State. In such cases and for objective reasons there may be a lack of resources for exercising the State’s functions and meeting public needs, including guaranteeing the material and financial needs of the courts. In such circumstances the legislator may amend the legal regulation establishing the salaries of various persons, and introduce a legal regulation on salaries which is less favourable to those persons, if it is necessary in order to ensure the vital interests of society and the State and to protect other constitutional values. However, even in such cases the legislator must maintain a balance between the rights and legitimate interests of those persons to whom the less favourable statutory regulations apply, and the interests of society and the State, that is to say, it must pay heed to the req