CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 29 octobre 2013

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ITALY   (Application no. 17475/09)         JUDGMENT (Merits)   [Extracts]   STRASBOURG   29 October 2013     FINAL   24/03/2014   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Varvara v. Italy, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Danutė Jočienė, President,   Guido Raimondi,   Dragoljub Popović,   András Sajó,   Işıl Karakaş,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Helen Keller, judges,   and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 1 October 2013, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 17475/09) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Italian national, Mr Vincenzo Varvara (“the applicant”), on 23 March 2009. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr A. Gaito, a lawyer practising in Rome. The Italian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs E. Spatafora and their co-agent, Ms P. Accardo. 3.     The applicant alleged that the confiscation was incompatible with Articles 7 and 6 § 2 of the Convention, and with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. 4.     On 21 May 2012 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided, in accordance with Article 29 § 1 of the Convention, that the Chamber would decide simultaneously on the admissibility and the merits of the case. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1943 and lives in Gravina di Puglia. A.     The development plan 6.     The applicant submitted a development plan ( piano di lottizzazione ) to the municipality of Cassano delle Murge with a view to building housing near the Mercadante forest, On 31 October 1984 the municipality approved the plan. On 1 March 1985 the applicant concluded a development agreement ( convenzione di lottizzazione ) with the municipality and obtained the building permits for an initial group of buildings. 7.     On 6 February 1986 a ministerial decree of 1 August 1985 was published in the Official Gazette. This decree stated that the land around the Mercadante forest was to be given protected landscape status and as such be subject to the provisions of Law no. 1497/1939, which imposed compulsory prior ministerial authorisation for the issue of building permits. 8.     The municipality of Cassano delle Murge challenged the Ministerial Decree before the Puglia Administrative Court and, under a decision of 10   March 1993, was partially successful. Pursuant to that decision (which is not included in the case file) the land covered by the applicant’s plan was no longer subject to landscape constraints. 9.     Furthermore, two laws had come into force in the meantime. The first (Law no. 431/1985) had granted the regions exclusive legislative powers in the landscape protection field. The second (Regional Law no. 30/1990) made the land adjacent to the forests subject to landscape constraints necessitating authorisation from the Region, except where the development plan had been approved prior to 6 June 1990. Under the combined effect of these laws, plans to be approved after this date had to receive a favourable opinion from the relevant regional committee. 10.     In 1993 the applicant submitted to the municipality of Cassano delle Murge a variant of the plan already approved in 1984. The case file shows that the new variant had been necessary because the original plan had accidentally included an area comprising an aqueduct. It had therefore been necessary to reduce the size of the project by 3,917 square metres. Moreover, the owners of the neighbouring plots had decided not to continue with the project, and so it had had to be modified, particularly where the layout of the buildings was concerned. That variant was approved by the municipality of Cassano delle Murge on 30 May 1994. 11.     On 19 August 1994 the applicant concluded a development agreement with the municipality. The latter issued him with the building permits. 12.     On 21 May 2007 the municipality issued a certificate to the effect that all the buildings constructed by the applicant prior to 30 September 2004 had been in conformity with landscape legislation. B.     Criminal proceedings 13.     Criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant for unlawful land development. On 6 February 1997 and interim attachment order was issued in respect of the land and buildings (seventeen blocks containing four apartments each). 14.     In a judgment of 1 June 1998, the Acquaviva delle Fonti District Court noted that the applicant had built seventeen apartment blocks in accordance with the variant approved in 1994 and the building permits issued by the municipality. However, the court considered that this variant was not merely a modification of the 1984 project but rather a new development plan which had to comply with the provisions which had since come into force. Given that the provisions in question required a favourable opinion from the regional committee responsible for town planning and that the applicant had failed to apply for such an opinion, the building permits issued by the municipality had to be considered inoperative. The situation complained of was therefore that of an unlawful development project which had damaged a protected natural site (section   20   a) and c) of Law no.   47/1985 and Article 734 of the Criminal Code). Having taken account of the mitigating circumstances, the court imposed a nine-month suspended prison sentence and a fine on the applicant. It ordered the confiscation, in favour of the municipality, of the land and buildings covered by the impugned development plan. 15.     The applicant appealed. 16.     In a judgment of 22 January 2001, the Bari Court of Appeal allowed the applicant’s appeal and acquitted him on the merits ( perché il fatto non sussiste ). The court considered that there was only one development plan, which had been authorised in 1984, that is to say long before the entry into force of the 1985 ministerial decree and Law no. 431/1985. It held that in 1994 the applicant had submitted a simple amendment to the already approved plan. The applicant’s land had therefore not been covered by a landscape protection measure and there had been no unlawful land development. 17.     The public prosecutor and the State Counsel appealed on points of law. 18.     In a judgment given on 17 May 2002, the Court of Cassation set aside the impugned decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. 19.     In a judgment of 5 May 2003, the Bari Court of Appeal convicted the applicant of unlawful land development on the grounds that the variant of the development plan constituted a new, separate plan. 20.     The applicant appealed on points of law. 21.     In a judgment of 10 December 2004, the Court of Cassation allowed the applicant’s appeal, set aside the impugned decision and remitted the case for reconsideration. 22.     In a judgment of 23 March 2006, the Bari Court of Appeal discontinued the proceedings on the ground that the offences had been time ‑ barred since the end of 2002. The court observed that pursuant to the case-law of the Court of Cassation, it was mandatory to order the confiscation in question whether the defendant was acquitted on the merits (on grounds of il fatto non sussiste ) or the case was time-barred, where the development plan was objectively incompatible with spatial planning provisions. The court considered the variant as a new land development plan, which meant that regional authorisation would have had to be obtained before the building permits could be issued. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal ordered the confiscation of the land and the buildings thereon within the meaning of section 1 of Law no. 47/1985. 23.     The applicant appealed on points of law. 24.     In a judgment of 11 June 2008, deposited with the registry on 1   October 2008, the Court of Cassation dismissed the applicant’s appeal.   ...   THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 7 OF THE CONVENTION 44.     The applicant complained of the illegality of the confiscation of his property on the ground that this penalty had been imposed without any prior conviction. He alleged a violation of Article 7 of the Convention, which provides: “1.   No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 2.   This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations.” ... B.     Merits 1.     The applicant’s submissions 46.     The applicant complained that a criminal penalty had been imposed on him even though he had not been convicted of any offence. He observed that under Italian law, criminal prosecutions could not be brought if the criminal offence in question was time-barred. In the present case, according to the applicant, the offence had been time-barred as far back as August 2001. However, the criminal proceedings had continued until 2008 for the sole purpose of imposing a penalty. The applicant further pointed to the inequality between the following two situations. In the normal course of events courts had to acquit defendants in cases of insufficient or contradictory evidence (Article   530 of the Code of Criminal Procedure [CCP]) or where the defendant could not be held responsible beyond any reasonable doubt (Article 533 CCP). Nevertheless, if the offence was time-barred, courts could only acquit defendants on the merits if they had clearly not committed the offence in question, the facts had never occurred, or the facts did not constitute an offence or did not come under criminal law (Article 129 § 2 CCP). The burden of proof had therefore been reversed inasmuch as the applicant had had to attempt to prove that he was clearly innocent, which situation was incompatible with the safeguards of a fair trial and with the Convention. 47.     Moreover, the applicant reiterated that the land development plan had been authorised by the municipality of Cassano delle Murge, that he had built the housing in accordance with the building permits issued to him, and that he had been assured that his plan was in conformity with the applicable provisions. In his view, the conduct of the authorities in first of all authorising and even encouraging the building project and then radically changing their attitude after allowing the work to be completed was highly questionable. Lastly, the applicant pointed out that the fact that his neighbours had decided not to continue with the development plan was immaterial to whether or not the plan itself complied with national law. 2.     The Government’s submissions 48.     The Government first of all observed that following the finding of a violation in the judgment Sud Fondi ( Sud Fondi srl and Others v. Italy , no.   75909/01, 20 January 2009), the Constitutional Court (judgment no. 239 of 24   July 2009) had ruled that national law should be interpreted in accordance with the Convention, and that according to the principles set out in the judgment Sud Fondi , “confiscation cannot be automatically implemented following unlawful land development, without having regard to of liability for the facts”. Furthermore, Law no. 102 of 3 August 2009 had introduced a procedure for lifting confiscation measures and set out the conditions for compensating persons having suffered a confiscation incompatible with the Convention. 49.     The Government then observed that under Italian law the courts still considered the impugned confiscation to be an administrative sanction. For this reason, the imposition of this sanction in the present case was compatible with Article 7 of the Convention. Unlike Sud Fondi , in the instant case the applicant had not been acquitted on the merits but had had the benefit of a decision not to prosecute because the offence had become time-barred. The Government submitted that the applicant could have waived the implementation of the time limitation and requested the court to decide the case under the terms of Article 129 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. At all events, with reference to the case ‑ law of the Court of Cassation (judgment no. 5857 of 16 February 2011), the Government pointed out that the instant case had not been time ‑ barred before the commencement of the criminal proceedings, which pointed to the legality of the sanction imposed. The construction work carried out had objectively breached the relevant legal provisions, and therefore the offence of unlawful land development had been made out, because the development plan had been unlawful. According to the Government, the applicant had known of the existence of the landscape constraints. The applicant’s neighbours had allegedly dropped out of the project in order to avoid involvement in real-estate speculation. Article 7 of the Convention had not been violated because the applicable provisions had been accessible and foreseeable. In proceeding as he had done the applicant had known that he was running the risk of having his property confiscated. This penalty had therefore been a foreseeable consequence. 50.     The Government requested that should the Court conclude that there had been a violation of the Convention, regard should be had to these submissions for the purposes of just satisfaction. 3.     The Court’s assessment a)     Applicability of Article 7 of the Convention 51.     The Court reiterates that in the case of Sud Fondi ( Sud Fondi srl and others v. Italy , decision cited above) it held that the impugned confiscation should be interpreted as a penalty. Article 7 of the Convention is therefore applicable. b)     Applicable principles 52.     The guarantee enshrined in Article 7, which is an essential element of the rule of law, occupies a prominent place in the Convention protection system, as is underlined by the fact that Article 15 authorises no derogation from it in time of war or other public emergency. It should be construed and applied, as follows from its object and purpose, in such a way as to provide effective safeguards against arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment (see S.W. v. the United Kingdom , 22 November 1995, § 34, Series A no. 335-B, and C.R. v.   the United Kingdom of 22   November 1995, Series A nos. 335-B and 335-C, § 32). 53.     Article 7 § 1 embodies the principle that only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty ( nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege ). While it prohibits, in particular, extending the scope of existing offences to acts which previously were not criminal offences, it also lays down the principle that the criminal law must not be extensively construed to an accused’s detriment, for instance by analogy (see, among other authorities, Coëme and Others v. Belgium , nos. 32492/96, 32547/96, 32548/96, 33209/96 and 33210/96, § 145, ECHR 2000-VII). 54.     It follows that the law must clearly define offences and the relevant penalties (see Achour v. France [GC], no. 67335/01, § 41, ECHR 2006 ‑ IV). This requirement is satisfied where the individual can know from the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the courts’ interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him criminally liable. 55.     When speaking of “law” (“droit”) Article 7 alludes to the very same concept as that to which the Convention refers elsewhere when using that term, a concept which comprises statute law as well as case-law and implies qualitative requirements, including those of accessibility and foreseeability (see, in particular, Cantoni v. France , 15 November 1996, § 29, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-V ; S.W., cited above, §   35; and Kokkinakis v. Greece , 25 May 1993, §§ 40-42, Series A no. 260 ‑ A). In any system of law, including criminal law, however clearly drafted a legal provision may be, there is an inevitable element of judicial interpretation. There will always be a need for clarification of dubious points and for adaptation to changing circumstances. Indeed, in the Convention States, the progressive development of the criminal law through judicial law-making is a well ‑ entrenched and necessary part of legal tradition. Article 7 of the Convention cannot be read as outlawing the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal liability through judicial interpretation from case to case, provided that the resultant development is consistent with the essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen (see Streletz, Kessler and Krenz v.   Germany [GC], nos. 34044/96, 35532/97 and 44801/98, §   50, ECHR   2001 ‑ II). 56.     Foreseeability depends to a considerable degree on the content of the law concerned, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed. A law may still satisfy the requirement of “foreseeability” where the person concerned has to take appropriate legal advice to assess, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail. This is particularly true in relation to persons carrying on a professional activity, who are used to having to proceed with a high degree of caution when pursuing their occupation. They can on this account be expected to take special care in assessing the risks that such activity entails (see Pessino v. France , no.   40403/02, §   33, 10   October 2006). 57.     The Court must therefore verify that at the time when an accused person performed the act which led to his being prosecuted and convicted there was in force a legal provision which made that act punishable, and that the punishment imposed did not exceed the limits fixed by that provision (see Murphy v. the United Kingdom , no. 4681/70, Commission decision, 3   and 4   October 1972, Reports of Decisions 43; and Coëme and Others, cited above, §   145). c)     Application of these principles to the present case 58.     The Court reiterates that in the Sud Fondi case (see Sud Fondi srl and Others v. Italy , cited above, §§ 112 and 114) it found that the enforcement of the confiscation despite the decision to acquit the applicant companies had been unfounded and arbitrary and breached Article 7 of the Convention. The acquittal had been ordered on the ground that the applicant companies had committed an unavoidable and excusable error in interpreting the law. 59.     In the present case, the applicant had benefited from a decision not to prosecute on the ground that the offence of unlawful land development was statute-barred, and a criminal penalty had been imposed on him, namely confiscation of the buildings and plots of land covered by the impugned development plan. The Court must consider whether the imposition of such a penalty is compatible with Article   7 of the Convention. 60.     Firstly, the Court notes that under the terms of the applicable provision ..., confiscation of the unlawful buildings and the unlawfully developed land is authorised where the criminal courts have issued a “final decision” establishing the unlawful nature of the development in question. This provision does not specify that the “final   decision” must be a conviction. The national courts interpreted this provision as meaning that it was possible to impose the penalty without a conviction where they regarded it as an administrative sanction. The Court notes in this connection that there is a domestic-law principle to the effect that defendants cannot be punished without a conviction. In particular, no penalty can be imposed where the offence is statute-barred. Furthermore, the interpretation of the applicable provision by the national courts was prejudicial to the defendant. 61.     Secondly, the Court fails to see how punishing a defendant whose trial has not resulted in a conviction could be compatible with Article 7 of the Convention, which provision clearly sets out the principle of legality in criminal law. 62.     Given that no one can be found guilty of an offence which is not provided for by law and that no one can incur a penalty which is not provided for by law, the first consequence is clearly to prohibit the national courts from interpreting the law in an extensive manner detrimental to the defendant, otherwise he or she could be punished for conduct which is not defined in law as an offence. 63.     Another consequence of cardinal importance flows from the principle of legality in criminal law, namely a prohibition on punishing a person where the offence has been committed by another. 64.     The Court has previously examined this issue from the angle of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. 65.     In the case of A.P., M.P. and T.P. v. Switzerland , 29 August 1997, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 ‑ V, a number of heirs had been punished for a criminal offence committed by the deceased. The Court considered that the criminal sanction imposed on the heirs for tax fraud attributed to the deceased was incompatible with the fundamental rule of criminal law that criminal liability does not survive the person who has committed the criminal act (ibid., §   48). Swiss law explicitly acknowledged this principle, and the Court affirmed that this rule was also required by the presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. Inheritance of the guilt of the dead is not compatible with the standards of criminal justice in a society governed by the rule of law. That principle was reaffirmed in the case of Lagardère ( Lagardère v. France , no. 18851/07, 12   April 2012, § 77), in which the Court reiterated that the rule that criminal liability does not survive the person who has committed the criminal act is not only required by the presumption of innocence enshrined in Article   6   §   2 of the Convention, but also by the principle that inheritance of the guilt of the dead is incompatible with the standards of criminal justice in a society governed by the rule of law 66.     Given the connection between Articles 6 § 2 and 7 § 1 of the Convention (see Guzzardi v. Italy , 6 November 1980, § 100, Series A no.   39), the Court considers that the rule reiterated by it in the preceding paragraph is also valid from the angle of Article 7 of the Convention, which requires that no one can be held guilty of a criminal offence committed by another.     While it is true that anyone must be able at any time to ascertain what is permitted and what is prohibited via clear and detailed laws, a system which punished persons for an offence committed by another would be inconceivable. 67.     Nor can one conceive of a system whereby a penalty may be imposed on a person who has been proved innocent or, in any case, in respect of whom no criminal liability has been established by a finding of guilt. This is the third consequence of the principle of legality in criminal law: the prohibition on imposing a penalty without a finding of liability, which also flows from Article 7 of the Convention. 68.     This principle was also affirmed by the Court in respect of Article   6 § 2 of the Convention. In the case of Geerings (see Geerings v. the Netherlands , no. 30810/03, § 47, 1 March 2007), the domestic courts had confiscated the applicant’s property because they had considered that he had benefited from the criminal offence in question, even though he had never been found in possession of property whose origin he had been unable to explain. The Court considered that the confiscation of the “illegally obtained advantage” had been an inappropriate measure, especially since the applicant had not been found guilty of the crime in question and it had never been proved that he had obtained an advantage from it. The Court held that this situation was necessarily incompatible with the presumption of innocence, and concluded that there had been à violation of Article 6 § 2 of the Convention. 69.     A comparison between Article 5 § 1 a) and Articles 6 § 2 and 7 § 1 shows that for the purposes of the Convention there can be no “conviction” unless it has been established in accordance with the law that there has been an offence – a criminal or, if appropriate, a disciplinary offence (see Engel and Others v. Netherlands , 8 June 1976, § 68, Series A no. 22, and Guzzardi v. Italy , 6 November 1980, §   100, Series   A no. 39). Similarly, there can be no penalty unless personal liability has been established. 70.     Of course the Contracting States remain free, in principle, to apply the criminal law to an act where it is not carried out in the normal exercise of one of the rights protected by the Convention and therefore to define the constituent elements of such offence. In particular, and again in principle, the Contracting States may, under certain conditions, penalise a simple or objective fact as such, irrespective of whether it results from criminal intent or negligence. Examples of such offences may be found in the laws of the Contracting States (see Salabiaku v. France , 7 October 1988, Series A no.   141, § 27). The same principle was affirmed in Janosevic v. Sweden (no.   34619/97, 23 July 2002, § 68), where the Court added that “the lack of subjective elements does not necessarily deprive an offence of its criminal character; indeed, criminal offences based solely on objective elements may be found in the laws of the Contracting States”. Article 7 of the Convention does not explicitly demand any “psychological”, “intellectual” or “moral” link between the substantive element of the offence and the person deemed to have committed it. The Court in fact recently found that there had been no violation of Article 7 in a case where a fine had been imposed on an applicant party which had committed a proven offence without intention or negligence on its part (see Valico S.r.l. v. Italy (dec.), no.   70074/01, ECHR   2006 ‑ III). The finding of liability was sufficient to justify implementing the sanction. 71.     The “penalty” and “punishment” rationale and the “guilty” concept (in the English version) and the corresponding notion of “ personne coupable ” (in the French version) support an interpretation of Article 7 as requiring, in order to implement punishment, a finding of liability by the national courts enabling the offence to be attributed to and the penalty to be imposed on its perpetrator. Otherwise the punishment would be devoid of purpose (see Sud Fondi and Others , cited above, § 116). It would be inconsistent on the one hand to require an accessible and foreseeable legal basis and on the other to permit punishment where, as in the present case, the person in question has not been convicted. 72.     In the present case, the criminal penalty which was imposed on the applicant despite the fact that the criminal offence had been time-barred and his criminal liability had not been established in a verdict as to his guilt, is incompatible with the principle that only the law can define a crime and prescribe a penalty, which the Court has recently clarified and which is an integral part of the legality principle laid down in Article 7 of the Convention. Consequently, the penalty in issue is not prescribed by law for the purposes of Article 7 of the Convention and is arbitrary. 73.     Therefore, there has been a violation of Article 7 of the Convention.   ...   III.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 78.     The applicant complained of the unlawfulness and the disproportionate nature of the confiscation of his property. He alleged a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the relevant part of which provides as follows: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the used of property in accordance with the general interest ...”. 79.     The Government contested that argument. ...   B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ submissions 81.     The applicant mainly reiterated the arguments advanced under Article 7, asking the Court to find a violation of this provision. He further observed that the impugned penalty was disproportionate given that 90% of the land confiscated was undeveloped. 82.     The Government contested that argument. In their view the lawfulness and proportionality   criteria had been satisfied since the deterrent aim of the confiscation ensured its proportionality even if it covered the whole surrounding land and not just the buildings erected. The Government invited the Court to have regard to these arguments for the purposes of just satisfaction should it find a violation of the Convention. 2.     The Court’s assessment a)     Applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 83.     As the Court held in Sud Fondi (cited above, §§ 125 and 129), the confiscation of the disputed land and buildings owned by the applicant companies constituted an interference with the enjoyment of their right to respect for their possessions. It must be concluded that Article 1 of Protocol   No. 1 is applicable. It remains to be seen whether this situation is covered by the first or the second rule set out in that provision. Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 comprises three distinct rules: the first rule, set out in the first sentence of the first paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property; the second rule, contained in the second sentence of the first paragraph, covers deprivation of possessions and subjects it to certain conditions; and the third rule, stated in the second paragraph, recognises that the Contracting States are entitled, inter alia , to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest. The three rules are not, however, “distinct” in the sense of being unconnected. The second and third rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first rule (see, inter alia , James and Others v. the United Kingdom , 21 February 1986, §   37, Series   A no. 98, and Iatridis v. Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, § 55, ECHR 1999-II). In Sud Fondi (cited above, §§ 128-129), the Court held as follows: “128. The Court notes that the present case differs from that of Agosi v.   the United Kingdom (judgment of 24 October 1986, Series   A no.108), in which the confiscation was ordered in respect of property which had been the object of the offence ( objectum sceleris ) following the defendants’ conviction, because in the instant case the confiscation was ordered following an acquittal. For the same reason, the present case also differs from C.M . v. France ([dec.], no. 28078/95, ECHR 2001 ‑ VII) and Air Canada v. the United Kingdom (judgment of 5 May 1995, Series   A no. 316 ‑ A), in which the confiscation was ordered after the defendants’ conviction in respect of property which was the instrumentum sceleris and was in the possession of third persons. In connection with the proceeds of a criminal activity ( productum sceleris ), the Court observes that it has considered a case in which the confiscation followed the applicant’s conviction (see Phillips v.   the United Kingdom , no.   41087/98, §§   9-18, ECHR 2001-VII) and cases in which confiscation had been ordered independently of the existence of any criminal proceedings because the applicant’s property had been assumed to be of unlawful origin (see Riela and Others v. Italy (dec.), no. 52439/99, 4 September 2001; Arcuri and Others v.   Italy (dec.), no. 52024/99, 5 July 2001; and Raimondo v.   Italy , 22   February 1994, Series   A no.   281-A, §   29) or to be used for unlawful activities (see Butler v. the United Kingdom (dec.) no. 41661/98, 27 June 2002). In the first case cited above, the Court held that the confiscation constituted a penalty within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Phillips, cited above, §   51, and, mutatis mutandis , Welch v.   the United Kingdom , 9   February 1995, Series   A no.   307-A, §   35), whereas in the other cases it considered that the aim had been to control the use of property. 129. In the instant case the Court considers it unnecessary to determine whether the confiscation falls into the first or the second category because the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 applies in all cases (see Frizen v. Russia , no. 58254/00, §   31, 24 March 2005).” As in Sud Fondi (cited above, § 129), the Court considers it unnecessary to determine whether the confiscation falls into the first or the second category because, in both cases, it is the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol no. 1 which applies. b)     Compliance with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 84.     The Court reiterates that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 above all requires that any interference by a public authority with the enjoyment of property be in accordance with the law: the second sentence of the first paragraph of this article only authorises deprivation of property “subject to the conditions provided for by law”; the second paragraph entitles the States to control the use of property by enforcing “laws”. Moreover, the rule of law, which is one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society, is inherent in all the Articles of the Convention   (see Iatridis v. Greece [GC], no. 31107/96, §   58, ECH 1999 ‑ II, and Amuur v. France , 25 June 1996, §   50, Reports 1996 ‑ III). It follows that the need to ascertain whether a fair balance has been struck between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights (see Sporrong and Lönnroth v.   Sweden , 23 September 1982, § 69, Series A no. 52, and Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece [GC], no. 25701/94, §   89, ECHR 2000 ‑ XII) becomes relevant only once it has been established that the impugned interference satisfied the requirement of lawfulness and was not arbitrary. 85.     The Court has already noted that the offence in respect of which the confiscation was imposed on the applicant was not provided for by law within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention and was arbitrary (see paragraphs 72-73 above). Accordingly, the Court finds that the interference with the applicant’s right to the peaceful enjoyment of his property was contrary to the requirement of lawfulness and was arbitrary, and that there was a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. This finding dispenses the Court establishing whether or not a fair balance was struck. IV.     APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 86.     Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A.     Damage 87.     The applicant requested the restitution of the confiscated property plus a sum of 500,000 euros (EUR) in compensation for the deterioration of the buildings. He also requested the payment of EUR 250,000   in respect of non-pecuniary damage. 88.     The Government objected to an award of any amount because they considered that the application raised no issues under the Convention. Should the Court find a violation, they requested that the fact that the applicant had not been acquitted on the merits be taken into account for the purposes of just satisfaction. 89.     The Court considers that under the circumstances of the case, the question of the application of Article 41 is not ready for decision in respect of pecuniary damage, given the complexity of the case and the possibility of the parties securing some form of compensation at the domestic level. This question should therefore be reserved and the subsequent procedure determined in the light of a possible agreement between the respondent State and the applicant (Rule 75 § 1 of the Rules of Court). 90.     Where non-pecuniary damage is concerned, the Court, ruling on an equitable basis, awards the applicant EUR 10,000. B.     Costs and expenses 91.     The applicant did not claim reimbursement of the costs and expenses incurred hitherto in the proceedings. Under these circumstances the Court considers that the applicant should receive no award under this head. C.     Default interest 92.     The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT ...   2.     Holds , by six votes to one, that there has been a violation of Article 7 of the Convention;   ...   4.     Holds , unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;   5.     Holds , unanimously, (a)     that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article   44   §   2 of the Convention, the sum of EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros) plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; (b)     that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;   6.     Holds , unanimously, that the question of Article 41 of the Convention is not ready for decision in respect of pecuniary damage; consequently, it   a) reserves this question;   b) invites the Government and the applicant to inform it, within six months, of any agreement which they may reach   c) reserves the procedure and delegates to the President the power to fix the same if need be;   7.     Dismisses , unanimously, the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in French, and notified in writing on 29 October 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Stanley Naismith   Danutė Jočienė   Registrar   President In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate opinion of Judge   Pinto de Albuquerque is annexed to this judgment. D.J. S.H.N.   PARTLY CONCURRING AND PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PINTO DE ALBUQUERQUE In the Varvara case the Court has once again to deal with a confiscation without any prior conviction in criminal proceedings. While the confiscation in Sud Fondi srl and Others had been ordered in respect of applicant companies which were third parties vis-à-vis the defendants in criminal proceedings which had resulted in the acquittal of the latter on the ground that they could not be accused of any negligence or intention to commit a criminal offence and that they had committed an “unavoidable   and excusable error” in interpreting “obscure and poorly worded”   regional provisions [1] , the applicant in the present case had himself been accused in criminal proceedings which had led to a decision not to prosecute on the grounds that the offence was statute-barred. In the light of the uncertainties in the Court’s case-law regarding the point of principle of the compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights (“the Convention”) of systems of confiscation without criminal conviction and “extended confiscation”, the present case should have been an opportunity for the Court to clarify the conditions and modalities of this fundamental instrument of contemporary criminal-law policy, by taking account of developments in international human rights law, international criminal law, comparative criminal law and European Union law. The Chamber decided not to take this opportunity. That is precisely what I intend to do in this opinion, pending urgent clarification by the Grand Chamber. I shall try to highlight the reasons for my opposition to the finding of a violation of Article 7 of the Convention, even though I agree with the finding of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and the decision not to rule in respect of Article 6 § 2.   The international obligation to confiscate the instruments and proceeds of crime   International law has long recognised the cardinal importance of confiscation as a means of combating the most serious forms of crime, such as drug trafficking, terrorism, organised transnational crime and corruption. Article 37 of the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs as amended by the 1972 Protocol thereto, provides for the confiscation of any drugs, substances ( objectum sceleris ) and equipment used in or intended for the commission of any of the offences referred to in Article 36 ( instrumentum sceleris ). Article   22 (3) of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971 also incorporates this provision. Article 5 of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances extends confiscation beyond narcotics, psychotropic substances and equipment or other instruments used in or intended in any way for the commission of the offences referred to in Article 3 (1) of the Convention, to include proceeds derived from offences established in accordance with this paragraph, or property the value of which corresponds to such proceeds ( productum sceleris ). Incomes or other advantages derived from the proceeds of the crime, property into which the proceeds have been transformed or converted or property with which such proceeds have been intermingled may also be confiscated, unless this would prejudice the rights of bona fide third parties. The burden of proving the lawful origin of the presumed proceeds of the crime or of other property liable to confiscation may be placed on the defendant [2] . These rules on confiscation have been incorporated into several other binding international provisions such as Articles 77 (2) (b), 93 (1) (k), and 109 (1) of the Rome Statute of 1998 of the International Criminal Court [3] , Article 8 of the 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism [4] , Article 12 of the UN Convention of 2000 against Transnational Organised Crime [5] , Article 31 of the UN Convention of 2003 against Corruption [6] , and Article 16 of the 2003 Convention of the African Union on Preventing and Combating Corruption [7] . The international rule in matters of confiscation is firmly anchored in Europe. In the Council of Europe framework, Articles 2 and 13 of the Council’s 1990 Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime already provided for the confiscation of the instruments and proceeds of crime, confiscation of the equivalent value and confiscation without criminal conviction [8] . Articles 5 and 23 of the 2005 Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime and the Financing of Terrorism further clarified the previous provisions [9] . The current legal framework of the European Union in respect of confiscation of the instruments and proceeds of crime comprises several texts: Framework Decision 2001/500/JHA, which requires Member States not to make or uphold reservations in respect of the provisions of the Council of Europe Convention on confiscation where the offence is punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention order of a maximum period of more than one year, to authorise value confiscation where the direct proceeds of the crime cannot be apprehended and to ensure that requests from other Memb