CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 3 décembre 2013

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HUNGARY   (Application no. 64520/10)             JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   3 December 2013     FINAL   03/03/2014   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Ungváry and Irodalom Kft v. Hungary, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Guido Raimondi, President,   Işıl Karakaş,   Peer Lorenzen,   András Sajó,   Nebojša Vučinić,   Helen Keller,   Egidijus Kūris, judges, and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 5 November 2013, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 64520/10) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian national, Mr Krisztián Ungváry and a limited liability company, Irodalom Kulturális Szolgáltató Kft (“Irodalom Kft”), on 31 October 2010. 2.     The applicants were represented by Ms A. Csapó, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice. 3.     The applicants alleged, in particular, that the civil proceedings for defamation brought against them and the order to pay compensation for non-pecuniary damage had breached their right to freedom of expression. 4.     On 20 February 2012 the application was communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The first applicant was born in 1969 and lives in Budapest. The second applicant, Irodalom Kft, is a Hungarian limited liability company, with its seat in Budapest. 6.     Mr Ungváry is a well-reputed historian specialised in 20th century Hungarian history including State security under the Communist regime. Irodalom Kft is the publisher of the literary and political weekly Élet és Irodalom . 7.     On 18 May 2007 Élet és Irodalom published a study (entitled The Genesis of a Procedure – Dialógus in Pécs ) written by Mr Ungváry. The article dealt with the actions of the security service against a spontaneous student peace movement (“ Dialógus ”) active in Pécs and elsewhere in the country in the 1980s. The author stated inter alia that: “... the Dialógus -affair had demonstrated ... how closely the Ministry of the Interior and the ‘social organisations’ – which had taken over some State-security functions covertly, in case of necessity – had been intertwined”. 8.     The lead of the article pointed out that the recent scandals exposing former agents acting for the party-State’s security system covered up the fact that most reporting for that system had been done through accidental, social or official contacts (as had been the case with a Mr K., a judge of the Constitutional Court at the material time, elected by Parliament), rather than by actual agents. The lead contained the following passage: “From the perspective of informing ( besúgás ) and repression ( megtorlás ), Officer   J.   W. ... and the nine “official contacts” ( hivatalos kapcsolat ) proved to be a lot more important ... [in the Dialógus -affair], [these official contacts including] Mr   K. (today judge of the Constitutional Court)... Their respective responsibilities are of course different.” The author argued that Mr K., without being an actual agent, “... was in regular and apparently collegial ( kollégiális ) contact with the State security, quite often anticipating and exceeding its expectations” ... “and as an official contact, he was busy as an informant ( besúgó ) and demanding hard-line policies”. The writing made reference to the role of further contemporary public figures, amongst others the Prime Minister, a member of the European Economic and Social Committee, a former Member of Parliament and a university professor. 9.     In the article, Mr Ungváry relied, inter alia , on documents available in the Historical Archives of the State Security Service archived as a “strictly confidential action plan”. Referring to the above material, he described the role played by leaders of Pécs University – including Mr K., deputy secretary of the local party committee between 1983 and 1988 – in assisting the security operations. Mr Ungváry characterised Mr K.’s attitude in the Dialógus case as that of a “hardliner”, in comparison to other “social contacts”. He recalled that Mr   K. had ordered the removal of Dialógus ’s poster, saying that “the country did not need such an ... organisation [i.e. Dialógus ]”, and that he had reproached a candidate in the Communist youth organisation’s elections for having been supported by Dialógus . 10.     In its next issue of 25 May 2007 Élet és Irodalom published Mr K.’s statement written in response to the disputed article, denying the allegations. 11.     On 27 May 2007 a television channel broadcast an interview with Mr   Ungváry about the article published in Élet és Irodalom . He reiterated his argument that in the previous political system most reporting had been done through accidental, social or official contacts. He argued that providing information, writing reports or removing posters would have qualified as agent activities, and Mr K. had been responsible for at least one of them. He called the latter ‘trash’. Mr K. initiated proceedings with a view to obtaining a rectification in the press, refuting the applicants’ allegations. His claim was sustained by the courts and the second applicant published a rectification on 22   February   2008. 12.     In April 2008 a reference book co-authored by Mr Ungváry was published outlining the history of the Communist State security and including a chapter with the full version of the article published in Élet és Irodalom . 13.     On 30 April 2008 an interview with Mr Ungváry appeared on an internet news portal concerning the release of the book, where he called Mr   K. “a party secretary writing mood reports”. 14.     Mr K. filed a criminal complaint against Mr Ungváry on charges of libel. In the course of the ensuing proceedings the latter apologised for having called him ‘trash’ in the television interview. The second-instance criminal court was of the view that the statements in question constituted opinions. Mr Ungváry was acquitted on 25   February   2010. 15.     Meanwhile, Mr K. filed a defamation action against both applicants. On 9 February 2009 the Budapest Regional Court found that Mr   Ungváry had infringed Mr K.’s personality rights through his statements made in the study published in Élet és Irodalom , the television interview and the book. The second applicant was found to have violated Mr K.’s personality rights through publishing the study. The court relied on section 84(1) of the Civil Code. 16.     Relying in essence on the findings of fact established in the rectification proceedings (see paragraph 11 above), the court established that Mr Ungváry and the publisher had disseminated false and unproven statements tarnishing the reputation of Mr   K. by maintaining that the latter had acted as a quasi-agent during the Communist regime, been an informant of and collaborated with the State security, reported to them and carried out their orders, and been a “hardliner” in 1983. The court further found that Mr Ungváry had falsely interpreted Mr K.’s political criticism towards a candidate in the Communist youth organisation’s elections as an action motivated by the State security. 17.     The court ordered Irodalom Kft to pay 1,000,000 Hungarian forints   (HUF) (approximately 3,500 euros (EUR)) in respect of the article published in Élet és Irodalom . Mr Ungváry was ordered to pay HUF   2,000,000 (EUR 7,000) in damages. 18.     On appeal, on 13 October 2009 the Budapest Court of Appeal reversed this judgment and dismissed Mr K.’s action, holding that the impugned statements were value-judgments with sufficient factual background. However, it found that Mr Ungváry had violated Mr   K.’s right to honour by calling him ‘trash’. This part of the judgment became final. 19.     On Mr K.’s petition for review, on 2 June 2010 the Supreme Court reversed the second-instance decision as to the remainder of the case. It found for Mr   K., ruling that his personality rights had been violated by the false impression, given by the article in question, that he had been a quasi-agent and an informant during Communist times, collaborated as an ‘official contact’ with the State security and written reports for them, countered the youth organisation official’s election on the secret service’s instigation and demanded hard-line policies in 1983. The court held that the article had not presented fact-driven conclusions of a historical research but mere defamatory and unsubstantiated statements about Mr K. It further affirmed that the applicants had been required to prove the truth of these allegations but had provided no such factual background. The Supreme Court observed that there was no evidence that Mr K.’s report within the party hierarchy on the Dialógus -affair had been written on the commission, instruction or expectation of the Ministry of the Interior. The judgment contained in particular the following passages: “The concept of the author of the impugned article is in essence that, during [the Communist] regime, the so-called ‘official contacts’ also played an important role in the State security’s activities, in addition to the [actual] agents. It is probably true that the Ministry of the Interior indeed considered certain [officials] as ‘official contacts’. It can also be assumed that some of them occasionally cooperated with the State security as ‘official contacts’, that is, carried out State-security tasks, surveyed, reported – in other words, were active in the manner described by the author as ‘unambiguously incarnating the activities of an agent’. However, it is not possible to deduce from this potentiality the general conclusion that every single [official] acted as an ‘official contact’; consequently, in the absence of proven facts, it is not acceptable to qualify all potentially available personalities [i.e. Communist party secretaries] as ‘official contacts’ actually cooperating with the State security. Public opinion condemns those persons who cooperated with the State security, even if they do not fall within the actual category of ‘agent’ or ‘informant’. Therefore, if someone is characterised, without a proper ground, as actually having carried out such activities, this violates that person’s reputation, according to public opinion. ... However, [Mr Ungváry] has committed breaches of law also in addition [to the authoring of the article], which themselves have justified – although all the breaches have originated in the article published in Élet és Irodalom – the plaintiff’s claim for non-pecuniary damage. In respect of the statements made in [the television broadcast] and the book, the Supreme Court establishes the further, reasonable non-pecuniary damage due to the plaintiff in the amount of 1,000,000 Hungarian forints.” 20.     The Supreme Court ordered the applicants, jointly and severally, to pay damages in the amount of 2,000,000 Hungarian forints (HUF) (approximately 7,000 euros (EUR)) and accrued interest, whereas Mr   Ungváry had to pay another HUF   1,000,000 (EUR 3,500) and accrued interest (see paragraph 19 above). The legal costs to be borne by the applicants amounted to approximately EUR   3,300, not including the applicants’ own legal expenses. The plaintiff’s claim as to an obligation on the side of the respondents to publish a compensatory statement was rejected as having been inadequately formulated. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 21.     Act no. XX of 1949 on the Constitution (as amended and as in force at the material time) provides as follows: Article 59 “(1) In the Republic of Hungary everyone shall have the right to good reputation, the inviolability of his home, and the protection of privacy and personal data.” Article 61 “(1) In the Republic of Hungary everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression and to receive and impart information of public interest.” 22.     Act no. IV of 1959 on the Civil Code provides, in so far as relevant, as follows: Section 75 “(1) Personality rights shall be respected by everyone. Personality rights are protected by law.” Section 78 “(1) The protection of personality rights shall also include the protection of good reputation. (2) In particular, the statement or dissemination of an injurious and untrue fact concerning another person, or the presentation with untrue implications of a true fact relating to another person, shall constitute defamation.” Section 84 “(1) A person whose personality rights have been infringed may bring the following civil law claims, depending on the circumstances of the case: a) a claim that the court establish that an infringement has taken place; b) a claim that the infringement be discontinued and the perpetrator be prohibited from further infringement; c) a claim that the perpetrator be ordered to give satisfaction by making a declaration or in any other appropriate manner and, if necessary, this be made adequately public by or at the expense of the perpetrator; d) a claim that the prejudicial situation be terminated, and that the situation prior to the infringement be restored by or at the expense of the perpetrator; e) a claim for damages under the rules of civil law liability.” 23.     The Preamble of Act no. II of 1986 on the Press provides as follows: “The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary guarantees the freedom of the press. Everyone shall have the right to express his views or publish his works in the press if they do not violate the constitutional order of the Republic of Hungary.” 24.     Act no. III of 2003 on the Disclosure of the Secret-Service Activities of the Former Regime and the Establishment of the Historical Archives of the State Security Service provides as follows: Section 4 “(1) The Archives authorises a scientific research if the researcher has fulfilled the conditions laid down in [the Act], submits his detailed research plan and his list of publications, if any. The researcher may have access to the documents stored in the Archives within the limits prescribed in subsections (2) and (3); and use them according to the rules concerning the handling of information for the purposes of scientific research, contained in the [relevant law].” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 25.     The applicants complained that, by concluding that they had committed defamation and imposing non-pecuniary damages on them, the Supreme Court had infringed their right to freedom of expression as provided in Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent states from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” 26.     The Government contested that argument. A.     Admissibility 27.     The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     Whether there has been an interference 28.     The Court notes that it has not been disputed by the Government that there was an interference with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression. The Court reiterates that an interference with the applicants’ rights under Article 10 § 1 will infringe the Convention if it does not meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 10. It should therefore be determined whether it was “prescribed by law”, whether it pursued one or more of the legitimate aims set out in that paragraph and whether it was “necessary in a democratic society” in order to achieve those aims. 2.     “Prescribed by law” 29.     The Court observes that the measure complained of was based on sections 75, 78 and 84 of the Civil Code, the accessibility and foreseeability of which have not been contested. It is therefore satisfied that it was “prescribed by law”. Moreover, this has not been disputed by the parties. 3.     Legitimate aim 30.     The Court considers that it is generally for the national courts to determine the facts bearing on the litigation, and finds no reason to depart from the Hungarian courts’ conclusion that the impugned statement was capable of affecting the plaintiff’s reputation. Consequently, it is satisfied that the interference pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the reputation or rights of others. 4.     Necessary in a democratic society a.     The parties’ submissions i.     The Government 31.     The Government argued that a distinction needed to be made between statements of facts and value judgments. They relied on the Contracting States’ margin of appreciation to establish whether a statement amounted to a statement of fact or a value-judgment which was not susceptible to proof. They endorsed the domestic courts’ argument that the impugned expressions in the present case were not “qualifying adjectives in connection with the plaintiff’s person” but “untrue statements of facts” injurious to the plaintiff’s reputation. 32.     The Government drew attention to the domestic courts’ findings that the manifestly defamatory statements made in relation to Mr K.’s activities had overstepped the bounds of journalistic freedom enjoyed vis-à-vis public persons. 33.     They also submitted that the applicants had been sanctioned under the provisions of the Civil Code and forbidden from further infringements, obliged to publish the operative part of the judgment in the media and to pay compensation. Thus, in the Government’s view, the sanctions imposed had not been disproportionate, especially as they were of a civil rather than a criminal character. ii.     The applicants 34.     The applicants submitted that the interference with their right to freedom of expression as a result of the sanctions imposed on them by the domestic courts was not necessary in a democratic society. They maintained, firstly, that by publishing the impugned article in a weekly journal, they had intended to draw attention to the public issues relating to the role of key players in the previous regime, in the present case a former deputy secretary of the local party committee, then a Constitutional Court judge. 35.     The applicants also emphasised their role as a historian and publicist and as a publishing company in a pluralistic society; they considered that, as such, they had a duty to disseminate information on matters relating to the understanding of the country’s past. They asserted that the impugned statements were directed against Mr K., who as a Constitutional Court judge should have accepted that he attracted public scrutiny in connection with his activities during the Communist rule. 36.     The applicants stated, further, that the statements in the article were value-judgments based on facts. They contested the domestic courts’ reasoning that the statements had disseminated untrue facts about Mr K. Lastly, they argued that the sanctions imposed on them had been excessive and susceptible to obstructing the discussion on the collaboration of public officials with the previous regime. b.     The Court’s assessment i.     General principles 37.     The test of “necessity in a democratic society” requires the Court to determine whether the interference complained of corresponded to a “pressing social need”. The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a “restriction” is reconcilable with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 (see, among many other authorities, Perna v. Italy [GC], no. 48898/99, § 39, ECHR 2003-V; and Association Ekin v. France , no. 39288/98, § 56, ECHR 2001-VIII). 38.     The Court’s task in exercising its supervisory function is not to take the place of the competent domestic courts but rather to review under Article 10 the decisions they have taken pursuant to their power of appreciation (see Fressoz and Roire v. France [GC], no. 29183/95, § 45, ECHR 1999-I). This does not mean that the supervision is limited to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully or in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole, including the content of the comments held against the applicants and the context in which they made them (see News Verlags GmbH & Co. KG v. Austria , no.   31457/96, § 52, ECHR 2000-I). 39.     In particular, the Court must determine whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify the interference were “relevant and sufficient” and whether the measure taken was “proportionate to the legitimate aims pursued” (see Chauvy and Others v. France , no. 64915/01, § 70, ECHR 2004-VI). In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself that the national authorities, basing themselves on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts, applied standards which were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 10 (see, among many other authorities, Zana v. Turkey , 25 November 1997, § 51, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 ‑ VII). 40.     As to the sufficiency of those reasons for the purposes of Article 10 of the Convention, the Court must take account of the overall background against which the statements in question were made. Thus, the contents of the impugned articles cannot be looked at in isolation from the controversy (see Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no.   21980/93, § 62, ECHR 1999 ‑ III). 41.     Furthermore, as the Court has previously pointed out in cases such as the present one concerning the press, a factor of particular importance for its determination is the vital role of “public watchdog” which the press performs in a democratic society (see Fatullayev v. Azerbaijan , no.   40984/07, § 88, 22 April 2010); and the national margin of appreciation is circumscribed by the interest of democratic society in ensuring and maintaining a free press imparting information of serious public concern (see Goodwin v. the United Kingdom , 27 March 1996, § 39, Reports   1996 ‑ II). The Court reiterates that the press plays a pre-eminent role in a State governed by the rule of law. Although it must not overstep certain bounds set, inter alia , for the protection of the reputation of others, it is nevertheless incumbent on it to impart – in a way consistent with its duties and responsibilities – information and ideas on political questions and on other matters of public interest (see Prager and Oberschlick v. Austria , 26   April 1995, § 34, Series A no. 313). Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas; the public also has the right to receive them (see Lingens v. Austria , 8 July 1986, § 41, Series A no. 103). 42.     Nevertheless, Article 10 does not guarantee wholly unrestricted freedom of expression to the press, even with respect to coverage of matters of serious public concern. While enjoying the protection afforded by the Convention, journalists must, when exercising their duties, abide by the principles of responsible journalism, namely to act in good faith, provide accurate and reliable information, objectively reflect the opinions of those involved in a public debate, and refrain from pure sensationalism (see, among many others, Fressoz and Roire [GC], cited above, §§ 45, 52; Bladet   Tromsø and Stensaas , cited above, § 65, ECHR 1999 ‑ III; Pedersen   and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017/99, § 78, ECHR   2004 ‑ XI; and Stoll v. Switzerland [GC], no.   69698/01, §§ 102-103, 149, ECHR 2007 ‑ V). 43.     In the exercise of its supervisory duties, the Court must verify in particular whether the authorities struck a fair balance when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention which may come into conflict with each other in cases such as the present application, namely, on the one hand, freedom of expression protected by Article   10 and, on the other, the right of the person concerned to protect his reputation, a right which is enshrined in Article 8 of the Convention as part of the right to respect for private life (see Chauvy and Others, cited above, § 70) – while being mindful of the fact that journalistic freedom also covers possible recourse to a degree of exaggeration, or even provocation (see Prager and Oberschlick , cited above, § 38). However, offence may fall outside the protection of freedom of expression if it amounts to wanton denigration, for example where the sole intent of the offensive statement is to insult (see, e.g. Uj v. Hungary , no. 23954/10, § 20, 19 July 2011; Skałka v. Poland , no. 43425/98, § 34, 27   May 2003). 44.     Furthermore, the limits of acceptable criticism may in some circumstances be wider with regard to civil servants exercising their powers than in relation to private individuals. However, the courts – the guarantors of justice, whose role is fundamental in a State based on the rule of law – must enjoy public confidence; and it may therefore prove necessary to protect judges from offensive and abusive verbal attacks (see De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium , 24   February 1997, § 37, Reports 1997–I; Janowski v. Poland [GC] , no. 25716/94, § 33, ECHR 1999-I). 45.     Where the right to freedom of expression is being balanced against the right to respect for private life, the relevant criteria have been laid down in the Court’s case-law as follows (see Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no. 39954/08, §§ 90 to 109, 7 February 2012): (a)   contribution to a debate of general interest; (b) how well known the person concerned is and what the subject of the publication was; (c) prior conduct of the person concerned; (d) method of obtaining the information and its veracity; (e)   content, form and consequences of the publication; and (f) severity of the sanction imposed. 46.     Moreover, in order to assess the justification of an impugned statement, a distinction needs to be made between statements of fact and value judgments in that, while the existence of facts can be demonstrated, the truth of value judgments is not susceptible to proof. The requirement to prove the truth of a value judgment is impossible to fulfil and infringes freedom of opinion itself, which is a fundamental part of the right secured by Article 10 (see, for example, Lingens v. Austria , 8 July 1986, § 46, Series   A no. 103; Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 1) , 23 May 1991, § 63, Series   A no.   204). The classification of a statement as a fact or as a value-judgment is a matter which in the first place falls within the margin of appreciation of the national authorities, in particular the domestic courts (see Prager and Oberschlick , cited above, § 36). However, even where a statement amounts to a value judgment, there must exist a sufficient factual basis to support it, failing which it will be excessive (see Jerusalem v. Austria, no.   26958/95, § 43, ECHR 2001-II). As the Court has noted in previous cases, the difference lies in the degree of factual proof which has to be established (see Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft v. Austria , no.   39394/98, § 40, ECHR 2003 ‑ XI). 47.     There is a distinction to be drawn between reporting facts – even if controversial – capable of contributing to a debate of general public interest in a democratic society, and making tawdry allegations about an individual’s private life (see Armonienė v. Lithuania , no. 36919/02, § 39, 25   November 2008). In respect of the former, the pre-eminent role of the press in a democracy and its duty to act as a “public watchdog” are important considerations in favour of a narrow construction of any limitations on freedom of expression. However, different considerations apply to press reports concentrating on sensational and, at times, lurid news, intended to titillate and entertain, which are aimed at satisfying the curiosity of a particular readership regarding aspects of a person’s strictly private life (see e.g. Hachette Filipacchi Associés ( ICI PARIS ) v. France , no.   12268/03, § 40, 23 July 2009; and MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom , no. 39401/04, § 143, 18 January 2011). Such reporting does not attract the robust protection of Article 10 afforded to the press. As a consequence, in such cases, freedom of expression requires a more narrow interpretation (see Société Prisma Presse v. France (dec.), nos.   66910/01 and 71612/01, 1   July 2003; Leempoel & S.A. ED. Ciné Revue v. Belgium , no. 64772/01, §   77, 9 November 2006; Hachette Filipacchi Associés ( ICI PARIS) , loc. cit.; and MGN Limited , loc. cit.). While confirming the Article   10 right of members of the public to have access to a wide range of publications covering a variety of fields, the Court stresses that in assessing in the context of a particular publication whether there is a public interest which justifies an interference with the right to respect for private life, the focus must be on whether the publication is in the interest of the public and not whether the public might be interested in reading it (see Mosley v. the United Kingdom , no. 48009/08, § 114, 10 May 2011). 48.     The most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court is called for when the measures taken or sanctions imposed by the national authority are capable of discouraging the participation of the press in debates over matters of legitimate public concern (see Jersild v. Denmark , 23 September 1994, § 35, Series A no. 298). In this regard, the amount of compensation awarded must “bear a reasonable relationship of proportionality to the ... [moral] ... injury ... suffered” by the plaintiff in question (see Tolstoy   Miloslavsky v. the United Kingdom , 13 July 1995, §   49 Series A no.   316-B; and Steel and Morris v. the United Kingdom , no.   68416/01, §   96, ECHR 2005-II, where the Court held that the damages “awarded ... although relatively moderate by contemporary standards ... [were] ... very substantial when compared to the modest incomes and resources of the ... applicants ...” and, as such, in breach of the Convention; see also Lepojić v. Serbia , no.   13909/05, § 77 in fine , 6   November 2007, where the reasoning of the domestic courts was found to be insufficient given, inter alia , the amount of compensation and costs awarded equivalent to approximately eight average monthly salaries). ii.     Application of those principles to the present case 49.     The Court notes that the study contained mostly a factual description of the events from the foundation of the Dialógus movement until its dissolution in late 1983. It also included a detailed account of specific actions of certain individuals. As regards Mr K., the article stated that he had ordered the removal of the movement’s poster from the university’s bulletin board, had prepared reports as a party member, and had reproached a candidate in the Communist youth organisation’s elections for having been supported by Dialógus . As it appears from the circumstances of the case, these activities were not in dispute in the domestic proceedings. 50.     The courts criticised the applicants for having advanced remarks that in the “ Dialógus -case” Mr K. had acted as “an official contact” of the secret services, collaborated with them as a quasi-agent, even exceeding what had been expected from such “official contacts”, and had been a hardliner in comparison with other officials. The domestic courts found that these statements were allegations of fact susceptible to proof. The applicants never endeavoured to provide any justification for these allegations, and their truthfulness has never been proved. The applicants argued throughout the proceedings that the disseminated statements did not constitute statements of facts, but were value judgments and conclusions of a historian with sufficient factual background. (α)     Assessment of the case in respect of the first applicant 51.     At the outset the Court observes that the impugned statements were made in regard to a public official. Although the article asserted that Mr K. cooperated as an “official contact” with the State security of the previous regime, this criticism was limited to his role as a party official in the 1980s while in office at Pécs University and did not focus on his contemporary professional conduct as a Constitutional Court judge. In the Court’s view, in this particular context Mr K. as a public figure had to tolerate stronger criticism by the first applicant acting in his capacity as historian. Mr K. was not prevented from responding to the allegations because of professional self-restraint ( retenue ) due to his function and indeed made use of the press to make his views known. 52.     Concerning the question as to whether the statements were factual, the Court does not dispute (see Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no. 49017/99, § 76, ECHR 2004 ‑ XI) the domestic qualification of the allegations, namely that they were factual in nature, although it notes that the second-instance criminal court and the civil Court of Appeal considered them opinions (see paragraphs 14 and 18 above). The Court further recalls that an assumption as to the reasons and possible intentions of others is a value judgment, not a statement of facts that would lend itself to proof (cf. a/s Diena and Ozoliņš v. Latvia , no. 16657/03, § 81, 12   July 2007). In certain cases, the Court has objected to the restrictive definition of a term (e.g. the term “neo-fascist”, see Karman v. Russia , no. 29372/02, § 40, 14 December 2006) resulting in a selective interpretation which may warrant different facts to be proven. The Court finds that the term “official contact” is a wide one, capable of evoking in those who read it different notions as to its content and significance (see Feldek v. Slovakia , no.   29032/95, § 86, ECHR 2001-VIII). 53.     The Court notes the finding of the Supreme Court according to which the first applicant was unable to prove that Mr K. had been in regular contact with the State security, often anticipating and exceeding its expectations. The Court finds that these expressions exceeded the limits of journalism, scholarship and public debate. In the present case, it is not the –arguably excessive – form of the expression but the defamatory content of these speculations, which the Court finds objectionable as being without sufficient factual support. Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that the allegations had subsequently been reproduced in a television broadcast and a book (see paragraph 19 above), causing additional injury to Mr K. The Court likewise finds objectionable that the statements were repeated even after the judgment of rectification, by the publication of the book in question (see paragraph 12 above). 54.     The Supreme Court attributed much weight to the statement, which described Mr K. as an “official contact” who had actually cooperated with the State security; and it found that that statement was devoid of a factual basis. The requisite most careful scrutiny (see paragraph 48 above) requires the Court to consider whether the statements were interpreted in light of the article as a whole. For the Supreme Court, it was essential for the finding of lack of factual grounds (and of the resultant false perspective in which the applicants were found to have portrayed Mr K.) that there was no evidence that Mr K.’s report on the Dialógus affair made within the party hierarchy had been written on the commission, instruction or expectation of the Ministry of the Interior (see paragraph 19 above). 55.     However, the Court notes that the article intended to demonstrate that collaboration, that is, the activities of “official contacts” meant cooperation without specific, express operational instructions from the State security. Limiting its analysis to this kind of direct cooperation with the State security, the Supreme Court failed to consider that Mr K.’s reports had been in any case available to the authorities of the Communist regime, nor did it attribute any particular relevance to the fact that the first applicant’s undeniably offensive and exaggerated statements were made within the context of the broader presentation of the workings of the oppressive mechanism of a totalitarian regime. It did not consider relevant, either, that the first applicant had indicated the sense in which he had used the term informing (see paragraph 8 above). Indeed, the article was written in order to demonstrate how closely the Ministry of the Interior and the “social organisations” had worked together, and especially, how tight the relation had been between party functionaries and the Ministry of the Interior (see paragraph 7 above). 56.     The Court further recalls that the degree of precision for establishing the well-foundedness of a criminal charge by a competent court can hardly be compared to that which ought to be observed by a journalist or a historian when expressing his opinion on a matter of public concern, for the standards applied when assessing someone’s past conduct in terms of morality are quite different from those required for establishing an offence under criminal law (see e.g. Unabhängige Initiative Informationsvielfalt v.   Austria , no.   28525/95, §   46, ECHR 2002-I; Wirtschafts-Trend Zeitschriften-Verlags GmbH v.   Austria , no.   58547/00, §   39, 27 October 2005; and Karman , cited above, § 42). 57.     It follows that the Supreme Court did not assess the impact on Mr   K.’s personality rights in the light of the role of the press and did not apply the “most careful scrutiny”, which is to be exercised by the Court in the present context. In particular, it did not consider the fact that many of the allegations regarding the involvement of Mr K. in the actions directed against the Dialógus movement had been proved true (cf. Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas , cited above, § 71). 58.     In the context of the public debate regarding historical responsibility for the injustices of Communism, the Supreme Court argued that it was not acceptable to qualify all potentially available officials, that is, Communist party secretaries, as “official contacts” actually cooperating with the State security. The Court notes that the Supreme Court interpreted the first applicant’s description of these officials as one portraying them “guilty by association” – which, in that court’s view, could not prove that Mr K. “actually cooperated” with the State security (see paragraph 19 above). The Court cannot agree with the deduction of the Supreme Court. This line of reasoning disregards the fundamental tenet of the article, namely that the “official contacts” writing reports had indeed contributed to the work of the State security, and that even the “official contacts” had had a certain degree of freedom in cooperation. In the Court’s eyes, the evaluation of the use of this freedom in cooperation is a fact-related value judgment. 59.     The Supreme Court concluded that the impugned defamatory statement, in the absence of a factual ground, presented Mr K. in a false light or was false. The Court finds that although the first applicant did not prove that Mr K. and his reports had actually been commissioned by t