CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 10 décembre 2013

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De Gaetano,   Paul Mahoney,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek, judges, and Françoise Elens-Passos, Section Registrar, Having regard to the above application lodged on 6 October 2010, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The applicant, Ms A.E.L., is a Finnish national, who was born in 1982. The President of the Section decided of his own motion to grant the applicant anonymity (Rule 47 § 3 of the Rules of Court) and confidentiality of the case file documents (Rule 33 of the Rules of Court). The applicant was represented before the Court by Ms Leeni Ikonen, a lawyer practising in Kerava. 2.     The Finnish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. A.     The circumstances of the case 3.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. 4.     The applicant suffers from paranoid schizophrenia and has twice been treated for about a month in a mental hospital, in 2000 and 2005. Thereafter, she successfully completed her studies and has since been working, inter alia , in an old people’s home. She has been on medication since 2000 and in regular contact with the mental health services since 2007. 5.     The applicant’s son was born on 10 December 2006. Even before the birth of her son, the child welfare authorities had started family work with the applicant because they had been worried about her. At that time the applicant lived with the father of her child but she moved away from him in November 2006. The applicant lived in a family support home before her son was born but moved into her own flat in March 2007 with her son. The father of the child was given a restraining order not to approach the applicant. His paternity of the child was confirmed in December 2007. 6.     When the applicant and her son moved into their own flat, a child welfare officer started to visit them twice a week as there were serious worries about the baby’s basic care. In spring 2007 the child welfare officer became particularly worried also about the lack of interaction between the applicant and her son, and in summer 2007 they were examined in hospital. The examinations showed that the baby was left on its own too much and was isolated, without a strong bond with his mother. The open care measures were seen as insufficient for the applicant’s needs. As a result, the applicant was advised to move back to the family support home with the child, but she did not want to leave her flat. She announced that she would no longer receive the child welfare officer at her home, for at least five weeks. First emergency care order 7.     On 2 July 2007 the leading social worker decided to take the applicant’s son into emergency care. In this decision it was mentioned that the applicant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and that she had been irritable, absent-minded and difficult to approach. She had stopped her regular visits to the mental health services in May 2007. The hospital examination had shown that the son had no strong bond with his mother and that even the family support home was not a sufficient measure to develop the mother-child relationship. The applicant had announced that she would not receive the child welfare officer at her home for at least five weeks. It was not safe to leave a 6-month old baby in a mentally ill mother’s care for more than a month as there was no guarantee of the baby’s safety. The care decision was to apply until 15 July 2007. 8.     On the same day, 2 July 2007, the social workers went with the police to the applicant’s flat and took her son to the family support home. The applicant was taken to see a doctor, who found that she was calm and not psychotic or suicidal. 9.     On 5 July 2007 the child welfare authorities and the applicant had a meeting. It was agreed to terminate the emergency care on the next day as the applicant was able to discuss the matter properly and to take care of things, and she showed no sign of mental instability. The applicant was ready to work with the social workers and to commit herself to the aid offered to her. She agreed to move with her son to the family support home as soon as there was a place available, to continue her visits to the mental health officer and to meet the child welfare officer on a regular basis. 10.     On 23 July 2007 the applicant and her son moved to the family support home. It was decided that this measure would apply for at least two months until 23 September 2007. 11.     The applicant did not appeal against any of these decisions. Second emergency care order 12.     On 7 September 2007 the applicant’s son was again taken into emergency public care. The decision stated that the purpose of the stay in the family support home had been to assess whether there was sufficient development in the interaction between the mother and the child. No such positive development was apparent. The applicant could not secure her son’s development due to her illness, which prevented her from seeing her own shortcomings as a parent. The child’s situation had deteriorated as the applicant had become even more absent-minded and increasingly withdrawn from her child. The emergency care order was to last until 6   October 2007. The applicant’s son was temporarily placed in a family support home. 13.     It is not known whether the applicant appealed against this decision. Proceedings concerning the care order and the first sets of proceedings concerning contact rights 14.     On 2 October 2007 the municipal social welfare board decided to take the applicant’s son into care and to place him in the family support home where he had already been placed earlier. It found that the applicant was not able to take care of her son and that their interaction was lacking. Even though their interaction was considered mechanical and insufficient, the applicant herself had not been worried about the situation at all or understood the worries expressed by the social workers. She had no strong social network except her own mother who had not understood either the worries expressed by the social workers. It was in the best interest of the child to be taken into care and placed outside the home. His development might already have been endangered, for which reason it was necessary to secure his normal development in the future. This decision was to be confirmed by the Administrative Court ( hallinto-oikeus, förvaltnings-domstolen ) as the applicant contested the decision. 15.     The applicant appealed against this decision to the Administrative Court claiming, inter alia , that all the observations made about her were negative and one-sided. 16.     On 1 December 2007 the applicant’s son was transferred to a foster home where he is currently living. Before the transfer decision, the applicant visited the foster family with a social worker. Although the applicant opposed the public care decision, she did not oppose the placement in the foster family. 17.     Apparently, the applicant could meet her son once a month for two and a half to three hours at a time in the foster family. 18.     On 22 April 2008 the Administrative Court confirmed the social welfare board’s decision and rejected the applicant’s appeal without holding an oral hearing. It found that the applicant had tried her best to take care of her son and that there were no such deficiencies in securing his basic care which could not have been remedied by guidance from the social workers. The applicant had been motivated to receive guidance from the social workers. It had not been shown that the applicant had neglected her son’s basic physical needs or intentionally neglected any other needs either. According to the medical personnel, the son had developed within the normal boundaries. It had not been shown either that the applicant’s paranoid schizophrenia compromised her ability to take care of her child. The fact that she was working showed that, despite her illness, she had resources and the ability to manage her life. However, the court found that the major problem was the lack of positive interaction between the applicant and her son. There were thus grounds for taking the child into care and foster care was in his best interest. 19.     The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court ( korkein hallinto-oikeus, högsta förvaltningsdomstolen ), requesting that an oral hearing be held. 20.     By letters dated 20 October and 10 November 2008 the applicant proposed to meet her son every other weekend or every third weekend for four to five hours at the time. 21.     On 3 December 2008 the child welfare authorities decided that the applicant could meet her son in the foster family for two and a half to three hours once a month. The contacts between the applicant and her son were restricted in order for the child to become attached to his foster family and to repair the damage he had already suffered. Another ground for restricting the visiting rights was the applicant’s passiveness during visits. This decision applied until 31 May 2009. 22.     By letter dated 18 December 2008 the applicant appealed against the decision of 3 December 2008 to the Administrative Court, requesting visits every other weekend and during the holidays, and that the meetings take place at her home. 23.     On 20 February 2009 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the Administrative Court’s decision of 22 April 2008 and referred the matter back to it for a new examination due to lack of an oral hearing. 24.     In February 2009 the applicant proposed to meet her son at her home every other weekend from Friday to Sunday and during public and school holidays. 25.     On 13 March 2009 the child welfare authorities decided that the applicant could meet her son once a month for two and a half to three hours at a time in the foster home. This decision applied until 13 March 2010. 26.     By letter dated 19 March 2009 the applicant appealed against the decision of 13 March 2009 to the Administrative Court, requesting increased visiting rights and meetings at her home. 27.     On 15 September 2009, after having held an oral hearing on 24   March 2009, the Administrative Court confirmed the decision by the social welfare board to take the applicant’s son into public care and rejected the applicant’s appeal. It also rejected the appeals lodged by the applicant against the decisions to restrict her visiting rights. The court found, inter alia , that there had been significant problems in the interaction between the applicant and her son. Her care was of a routine and mechanical nature and lacked feeling, gestures and affection. Positive interaction was of the utmost importance for the healthy development of a small child. The lack of interaction had seriously endangered the health and development of the applicant’s son and less intrusive measures than public care had proved to be insufficient. The situation had not changed since the decision to take the child into care. As to the contact rights, the court found that it was not in the child’s best interest to meet the applicant at her home. 28.     By letter dated 14 October 2009 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court requesting, inter alia , that an oral hearing be held. She claimed, inter alia , that the proceedings had lasted too long. 29.     On 21 May 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the Administrative Court’s decision of 15 September 2009 without holding an oral hearing. It found that an oral hearing was not necessary as it would not add anything new to the case file. As to the length of proceedings, the court found this irrelevant when assessing the material lawfulness of the decision subject to appeal. Subsequent set of proceedings concerning contact rights 30.     On 24 July 2009 the applicant’s visiting rights were restricted so that she could meet her son once a month for two and a half to three hours at a time in a family support unit in the presence of a social worker. This restriction was to remain in force until 24 July 2010. 31.     By letter dated 26 August 2009 the applicant appealed against the decision of 24 July 2009 to the Administrative Court requesting, inter alia , that the decision be quashed, meetings with her son be increased and that an oral hearing be held. 32.     On 14 January 2010 the Administrative Court rejected the request for an oral hearing and rejected the appeal. It found that as in essence only the meeting place had changed, it was manifestly unnecessary to hold an oral hearing. As to the merits, there was reason to change the meetings from the foster home to the family support unit as the foster family had felt negative tension between them and the applicant. As the interaction problems still persisted, it was not in the child’s best interest to have the meetings without any supervision, or at the applicant’s home. The family support unit was close to the foster home and it was known to the child as the meetings between him and his father took place there. It was not relevant that the applicant found it more difficult to meet her son at the family support unit than in the foster family. The foster family and the social workers had promised to help the applicant with trips to the family support unit. As the appealed decision only concerned the change of meeting place, the restrictions on visiting rights could not go beyond 13   March 2010. Therefore the decision was quashed as far as it concerned the period between 14 March and 24 July 2010. 33.     It is not known whether the applicant appealed against this decision. 34.     During this period the applicant met her son at least five times under supervision. It was reported that at these meetings the applicant and her son’s interaction had improved, and that she was present and affectionate towards her son, who responded. 35.     Since May 2010, meetings of three hours, supported by a social worker, have been held at the applicant’s home on Saturdays at four-week intervals. Administrative complaint 36.     On 21 October 2009 the applicant complained to the National Supervisory Authority for Welfare and Health ( Sosiaali- ja terveysalan lupa- ja valvontavirasto, Tillstånds- och tillsynsverket för social- och hälsovården ) about the content of the medical information submitted to the Administrative Court. On 2 November 2009 her complaint was transferred to the competent Regional State Administrative Agency ( aluehallintovirasto, regionförvaltningsverket ). 37.     On 23 March 2010 the Regional State Administrative Agency decided not to take any measures on the basis of the complaint. It found that the medical information collected by the medical personnel involved in the applicant’s case was in accordance with law and that it had been collected at the request of the social services. It was for the Administrative Court to assess what emphasis to give to the medical statements submitted to it. Latest set of proceedings concerning contact rights and termination of public care 38.     On 11 October 2010 the applicant asked to meet her child at her home every weekend from Friday to Sunday and for the right to telephone the child every day. She also requested the termination of her son’s public care. 39.     On 2 February 2011 the social worker decided, on the basis of a client plan drawn up on 13 December 2010, that the applicant had an opportunity for supported meetings with the child at her home once a month for five hours at a time. She also had the possibility to call the foster family and speak to the child by telephone once a week. Furthermore, meetings between the child and his father had started so the father had been present every other time the child and the applicant met. It was considered that instead of making the meetings longer, the applicant and her son should have more private time. The goal was that the family worker would gradually withdraw to the background during the meetings and the applicant would take more responsibility for the care and custody of the child. 40.     On 16 February 2011 the social worker decided to continue the public care as the reasons for the measure persisted. As there was no proof of the applicant’s ability to take full responsibility, continued placement in the current foster family was in the child’s best interest. 41.     On 1 March 2011 the applicant appealed against these decisions to the Administrative Court, requesting that an oral hearing be held. 42.     On 22 August 2011 the Administrative Court, after having held an oral hearing, altered the decision of 2 February 2011 so that the child could meet the applicant twice a month. As to the termination of the public care, it found that the grounds for taking the child into public care persisted, even though the applicant’s interaction skills had improved. 43.     On 20 September 2011 the applicant appealed against this decision to the Administrative Court, requesting that an oral hearing be held. 44.     On 2 May 2012 the Supreme Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s appeal and upheld the Administrative Court’s decision. B.     Relevant domestic law 45.     Section 47 of the Child Welfare Act ( lastensuojelulaki, barnskyddslagen , Act no. 417/2007) stipulates, as regards the duration and termination of care, as follows: “Taking into care is valid indefinitely. When the need for care and substitute care under section 40 no longer exists, the municipal officeholder determined under section 13(1) must make a decision on terminating the care when the social worker responsible for the child’s affairs has prepared the case. Care must not be terminated even if the conditions for taking a child into care no longer exist if termination is manifestly not in the interests of the child in the manner referred to in subsection 3. The social worker responsible for the child’s affairs must assess the conditions for continuing care when the client plan is reviewed, when a child or custodian applies for termination of care or when it otherwise proves necessary. When a child’s interests are being considered in a case concerning termination of care, in addition to what is said in section 4(2), the following must be taken into account: the duration of substitute care, the quality of the affection between the child and the party providing substitute care, interaction between the child and the parents and the child’s views. Care is terminated when the child concerned reaches 18 years of age.” COMPLAINTS 46.     The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention that her family life had been violated by the unnecessary emergency taking into public care of her son on 2 July 2007. Her family life had also been violated by the emergency taking into public care on 7 September 2007 as at that moment she and her son had been living in the family support home and there was no imminent danger. Moreover, the authorities had heavily restricted the applicant’s contact rights with her son and visits had been supervised. These decisions had been issued after a considerable delay, the first being only on 3 December 2008. The authorities had not at any point considered reuniting the applicant and her son even though her situation had stabilised and she had been able to study and work. 47.     The applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention that she had not had a fair trial as the Supreme Administrative Court’s decision was not reasoned. Moreover, the Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court had not held an oral hearing and the proceedings had lasted too long. 48.     She complained under Article 13 of the Convention about the lack of an effective remedy. 49.     Lastly, the applicant complained under Article 14 of the Convention that she had been discriminated against due to her health. THE LAW A.     Complaints under Article 8 of the Convention concerning contact rights and family reunion 50.     The applicant complained under Article 8 of the Convention about contact rights and the failure to reunite her with her son. 51.     Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 1.     The parties’ submissions 52.     The Government agreed that the impugned measures constituted an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for family life within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Convention. This interference had, however, a basis in Finnish law, in particular in the Child Welfare Act, and it pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the health or morals and the rights and freedoms of others. 53.     As to the necessity, the Government noted that in the present case contact had been restricted because of the serious shortcomings in the applicant’s interaction with her child. The most important factor in securing the child’s development had been to create a normal affective relationship between the child and the foster parents in order to repair the damage done to the child. It appeared from the client plans that the child welfare authorities had regularly assessed the contacts between the mother and the child and the progress made in their interaction. Since May 2010 the meetings had no longer taken place in the family support unit but at the applicant’s home. The applicant also had the right to call the foster family and the child once a week. Furthermore the child’s grandmother and father had been able to meet him. The number of meetings and their duration had also been increased. 54.     The communication between the applicant and the child had been assessed during negotiations on 13 December 2010, 5 May 2011, 23   September 2011 and 28 May 2012. In addition, separate client plan negotiations concerning the meetings between the child and his father had been held on 3   February 2011. Since March 2009 the child and his father had met regularly. The family worker had also supported interaction between the applicant and her son. The goal had been to increase private time between the applicant and her child so that the family worker could gradually withdraw more to the background during meetings and the applicant could take more responsibility for the care and custody of the child. 55.     Concerning the reunion of the family, the Government noted that regular consultations had been held for reviewing communication between the applicant and the child with a view to family reunion. So far it had not, however, been in the best interest of the child to reunite the family. The child had several neurological difficulties and an extensive rehabilitation plan had been prepared for him. The measures taken had thus been necessary in a democratic society. 56.     The applicant claimed that her illness had been the main factor behind the measures taken against her. However, her health had been stable since 2005 and she could take care of her child. The child had developed normally and the applicant had never neglected him. On the contrary, the child was now suffering from multiple problems due to the destructive measures taken by the child welfare authorities. 57.     The applicant claimed that there was no intention to reunite the child with his family as no plans for reunion had ever been made. Her son had been forced to live almost all his childhood without his mother. 2.     The Court’s assessment 58.     The Court reiterates that mutual enjoyment by parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental element of family life, and domestic measures hindering such enjoyment amount to an interference with the right protected by Article 8 of the Convention (see, inter alia , Johansen v. Norway , 7 August 1996, § 52, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ III). Any such interference constitutes a violation of this Article unless it is “in accordance with the law”, pursues an aim or aims that are legitimate under paragraph 2 and can be regarded as “necessary in a democratic society”. 59.     In determining whether the impugned measures were “necessary in a democratic society”, two aspects of the proceedings require consideration. First, the Court must examine whether, in the light of the case as a whole, the reasons adduced to justify the measures were ‘relevant and sufficient’; second it must be examined whether the decision-making process was fair and afforded due respect to the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention (see K and T. v. Finland [GC], no. 25702/94, § 154, ECHR 2001-VII; A.D. and O.D. v. the United Kingdom , no. 28680/06, § 82, 16   March 2010; Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland [GC], no. 41615/07, §   134, 6 July 2010; and R. and H. v. the United Kingdom , no. 35348/06, §§   75 and 81, 31 May 2011). 60.     The Court reiterates that in child care cases the best interests of the child are paramount (see Johansen v. Norway , cited above, § 78; Kearns v. France , no. 35991/04, § 79, 10 January 2008; and R. and H. , cited above, §§ 73 and 81). In identifying the child’s best interests in a particular case, two considerations must be borne in mind: first, it is in the child’s best interests that her ties with her family be maintained except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit; and second, it is in the child’s best interests to ensure her development in a safe and secure environment (see Neulinger and Shuruk , cited above, § 136; and R. and H. , cited above, §§   73-74). It is clear from the foregoing that family ties may only be severed in very exceptional circumstances and that everything must be done to preserve personal relations and, where appropriate, to ‘rebuild’ the family (see Neulinger and Shuruk , cited above, § 136; and R. and H. , cited above, § 73). It is not enough to show that a child could be placed in a more beneficial environment for her upbringing (see K and T. , cited above, §   173). However, where the maintenance of family ties would harm the child’s health and development, a parent is not entitled under Article 8 to insist that such ties be maintained (see Neulinger and Shuruk , cited above, §   136; and R. and H. , cited above, § 73). 61.     The identification of the child’s best interests and the assessment of the overall proportionality of any given measure will require courts to weigh a number of factors in the balance. In particular, the Court considers that in seeking to identify the best interests of a child and in assessing the necessity of any proposed measure in the context of proceedings concerning taking into public care, placement, contact restrictions and reunion, the domestic court must demonstrate that it has had regard to, inter alia , the age, maturity and ascertained wishes of the child (see Y.C. v. the United Kingdom , no.   4547/10 , § 135, 13 March 2012; and K.S. v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 62110/10 , § 39, 10 July 2012). 62.     The Court recognises that, in reaching decisions in so sensitive an area, local authorities and courts are faced with a task that is extremely difficult. The national authorities have had the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned, often at the very stage when care measures are being envisaged or immediately after their implementation. There is therefore a need to allow them a certain margin of appreciation in deciding how best to deal with the cases before them. Accordingly, it is not the Court’s task to substitute itself for the domestic authorities but to review, in the light of the Convention, the decisions taken and assessments made by those authorities in the exercise of their margin of appreciation (see K and T. , cited above, § 154; A.D. and O.D. , cited above, § 83; Neulinger and Shuruk , cited above, § 138; and R. and H. , cited above, § 81). 63.     The margin of appreciation to be accorded to the competent national authorities will vary in the light of the nature of the issues and the seriousness of the interests at stake, such as, on the one hand, the importance of protecting a child in a situation which is assessed as seriously threatening to his or her health or development and, on the other hand, the aim of reuniting the family as soon as circumstances permit (see K and T. , cited above, § 155). The Court has indicated that the authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in assessing the necessity of taking a child into care. However, a stricter scrutiny is called for in respect of any further limitations, such as restrictions placed by the authorities on parental rights of access, and of any legal safeguards designed to secure an effective protection of the right of parents and children to respect for their family life, as such further limitations entail the danger that the family relations between the parents and a young child are effectively curtailed (see K and T. , cited above, § 155; A.D. and O.D. , cited above, § 83; and R. and H. , cited above, § 81). 64.     As to the decision-making process, what has to be determined is whether, having regard to the particular circumstances of the case and notably the serious nature of the decisions to be taken, the parents have been involved in the decision-making process, seen as a whole, to a degree sufficient to provide them with the requisite protection of their interests and have been able fully to present their case (see Neulinger and Shuruk , cited above, § 139; and R. and H. , cited above, § 75). Thus it is incumbent upon the Court to ascertain whether the domestic courts conducted an in-depth examination of the entire family situation and of a whole series of factors, in particular of a factual, emotional, psychological, material and medical nature, and made a balanced and reasonable assessment of the respective interests of each person, with a constant concern for determining what would be the best solution for the child (see, mutatis mutandis , Neulinger and Shuruk , cited above, § 139). In practice, there is likely to be a degree of overlap in this respect with the need for relevant and sufficient reasons to justify a measure in respect of the care of a child. 65.     The taking into care of a child should normally be regarded as a temporary measure to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permit, and any measures of implementation of temporary care should be consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the natural parent and child (see Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1) , 24 March 1988, § 81, Series A no. 130; Johansen v. Norway , cited above, § 78; and E.P. v. Italy , no. 31127/96, § 69, 16   November 1999). In this regard a fair balance has to be struck between the interests of the child remaining in care and those of the parent in being reunited with the child (see Olsson v. Sweden (no. 2) , 27 November 1992, §   90, Series A no. 250; and Hokkanen v. Finland , 23 September 1994, § 55, Series A no. 299 ‑ A). In carrying out this balancing exercise, the Court will attach particular importance to the best interests of the child which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may override those of the parent (see Johansen v. Norway , cited above, § 78). 66.     Turning to the present case, the Court notes that it is common ground that the contact restrictions and the failure to reunite the family interfered with the applicant’s right to respect for her family life. This interference had, however, a basis in the Child Welfare Act and it was also clearly aimed at protecting the health and best interest of the applicant’s child. 67.     As to whether the impugned measures were “necessary in a democratic society”, the Court notes first of all that it is not able to examine any of the contact restrictions which were applied or became final before 6   April 2010. As the applicant’s application was lodged with the Court on 6   October 2010, the restrictions applied or becoming final before 6   April 2010 fall outside the six-month time-limit. Moreover, it appears that no appeal was made against the decision of 14 January 2010 by the Administrative Court. The applicant has thus in this respect failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available to her. 68.     The Court notes that the applicant appealed against the decisions of 3 December 2008, 13 March 2009 and 2 February 2011 by the child welfare authorities. These decisions were upheld by the Administrative Court on 15   September 2009 and 22 August 2011, and by the Supreme Administrative Court on 21 May 2010 and 2 May 2012 respectively. It is apparent from these decisions that the contact restrictions have gradually been diminished and that the applicant now has an opportunity for supported meetings with the child at her home twice a month for five hours at a time. She also has a possibility to call the foster family and speak with the child by telephone once a week. The Court finds that there were sufficient and relevant grounds for the domestic authorities to conclude that these contact restrictions needed to be imposed on the applicant due to the established interaction problems and the need to secure the child’s well-being. The Court notes that the goal of the child welfare authorities is to increase private time between the applicant and her child so that the family worker can gradually withdraw to the background during the meetings and the applicant can take more responsibility for the care and custody of the child. The Court agrees with the national courts that, in the circumstances of the case and in the child’s best interest, this gradual approach is appropriate. 69.     As concerns the possible reunion of the family, the Court notes that the applicant only once requested the termination of her son’s public care. This request was refused as the termination of public care at that time, in the assessment of the domestic authorities, was not in the child’s best interest. Moreover, the possible reunion of the family has also been discussed in client plan meetings. The Court considers that when examining the request to terminate public care the domestic authorities gave relevant consideration to the applicant’s circumstances as well as to the ultimate aim of family reunion. There is no indication of any intention on the part of the authorities permanently to prevent reunion of the family. On the contrary, it can be clearly seen in the case documents that the possibility of family reunion is the ultimate goal of the child welfare authorities. 70.     In conclusion, the Court finds that the social welfare authorities and the administrative courts acted in the child’s best interest, struck a proper balance between the competing interests and did not overstep their margin of appreciation in ordering and implementing the necessary measures. The Court finds therefore that the contact restrictions and refusal so far of family reunion were based on reasons which were not only relevant but also sufficient for the purposes of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention. Moreover, the decision-making process was fair and afforded due respect to the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention. Accordingly, this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded and declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. B.     Remainder of the application 71.     The applicant also complained under Article 6 of the Convention about the lack of a fair trial and the length of the proceedings; under Article   8 of the Convention about the taking into public care and the emergency taking into public care; under Article 13 of the Convention about the lack of an effective remedy; and lastly under Article 14 of the Convention about discrimination. 72.     In the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols. Accordingly, this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded and declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court by a majority Declares the application inadmissible. Françoise Elens-Passos   Ineta Ziemele   Registrar   President