CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 28 janvier 2014

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IRELAND   (Application no. 35810/09)               JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   28 January 2014           In the case of O’Keeffe v. Ireland, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   Dean Spielmann, President ,   Josep Casadevall,   Guido Raimondi,   Ineta Ziemele,   Mark Villiger,   Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre,   Boštjan M. Zupančič,   Alvina Gyulumyan,   Nona Tsotsoria,   Zdravka Kalaydjieva,   Nebojša Vučinić,   Vincent A. de Gaetano,   Angelika Nußberger,   André Potocki,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek   Valeriu Griţco, judges ,   Peter Charleton, ad hoc judge , and Michael O’Boyle, Deputy Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 6 March and on 20 November 2013, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 35810/09) against Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Irish national, Ms Louise O’Keeffe (“the applicant”), on 16 June 2009. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr E. Cantillon, a lawyer practising in Cork. The Irish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr P. White, of the Department of Foreign Affairs. 3.     The applicant mainly complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the system of primary education had failed to protect her from sexual abuse by a teacher in 1973 and, under Article 13, that she did not have an effective domestic remedy in that respect. She also relied on Article 8 and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, both alone and in conjunction with Article 14. She also complained of the length of her civil proceedings and of the absence of an effective domestic remedy in that respect, relying on Article 6 alone and in conjunction with Article 13. 4.     The application was allocated to the Fifth Section of the Court (Rule   52 §   1 of the Rules of Court). Ann Power-Forde, the judge elected in respect of Ireland, withdrew from sitting in the case (Rule 28). On 13 June 2012 the President of the Chamber decided to appoint Mr Justice Charleton to sit as an ad hoc judge (Article 26 § 4 of the Convention, and Rule 29 §   1). 5.     On 26 June 2012 a Chamber of that Section (composed of Dean Spielmann, President, Mark Villiger, Karel Jungwiert, Boštjan M. Zupančič, Ganna Yudkivska, André Potocki, judges, Peter Charleton, ad hoc judge, and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar) examined the case. The Chamber, unanimously, struck out the complaints regarding the length of the domestic proceedings and the lack of an effective domestic remedy in that regard, given the friendly settlement reached between the parties on those issues. It also, unanimously, declared admissible the remaining complaints. 6.     On 20 September 2012 that Chamber (Angelika Nußberger, substitute judge, replaced Ganna Yudkivska who was unable to take part in the further consideration of the case (Rule 24 § 3)) relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, neither of the parties having objected to relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72). 7.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24, with Mr Justice Charleton continuing to act as ad hoc judge (Article 26 § 4 of the Convention and Rule 29 § 1). 8.     The applicant and the Government each filed further observations (Rule 59 § 1) on the merits. In addition, the Irish Human Rights Commission and the European Centre for Law and Justice had been given leave by the President of the Chamber (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3) to intervene in the written procedure and their submissions to the Chamber were admitted to the Grand Chamber file. 9.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 6 March 2013 (Rule 59 § 3). 10.     There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Mr   P. White ,   Agent , Mr   F. M cDonagh , Senior Counsel, Mr   C. Power , Barrister,   Counsel , Ms   S. Farrell, Office of the Attorney General, Ms   M. McGarry , Department of Education and Skills,   Advisers ; (b)     for the applicant Mr   D. Holland , Senior Counsel, Mr   A. Keating , Senior Counsel,   Counsel, Mr   E. Cantillon , Solicitor, Mrs   M. Scriven , Solicitor,   Representatives . The applicant also attended. 11.     The Court heard addresses by Mr Holland and Mr McDonagh. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 12.     The applicant was born in 1964 and lives in Cork, Ireland. A.     Background 13.     The following facts were not contested by the parties. 14.     The applicant attended Dunderrow National School from 1968. The school was owned, through trustees, by the Catholic Bishop of the Diocese of Cork and Ross who was recognised by the Department of Education and Science (“the Department”) as the school’s patron. The manager (S.), acting on behalf of the bishop, was the local parish priest. The latter being elderly and infirm, a local priest (Ó.) was the de facto manager who acted on behalf of, and in the interests of, S. The term “manager” used below refers both to Ó. and to the management function he performed. Dunderrow National School had two teachers, one of whom (L.H.) was the school’s principal, a married man. Dunderrow was one of four national schools in the applicant’s parish. 15.     In 1971 a parent of a child complained to the manager that L.H. had sexually abused her child.   That complaint was not reported to the police, to the Department or to any other State authority and was not acted upon by the manager. 16.     During the first six months of 1973 the applicant was subjected to approximately twenty sexual assaults by L.H. during music lessons in his classroom. During the time she attended those lessons, the applicant and her parents were unaware of the allegation made in 1971 about L.H. 17.     In September 1973 other parents brought to the applicant’s parents’ attention similar allegations concerning L.H. Following a meeting of parents chaired by the manager about this, L.H. went on sick leave. In September 1973 he resigned from his post. Those allegations were not reported at that time to the police, to the Department or to any other State authority. In a brief conversation, the applicant’s mother asked her whether L.H. had touched her. The applicant responded to the effect that something of a sexual nature had happened but she did not recall the conversation going any further.   In January 1974 the manager notified the Department that L.H. had resigned and named his replacement. Soon thereafter L.H. took up a position in another national school where he taught until his retirement in 1995. 18.     Between 1969 and 1973, the inspector assigned to the region visited Dunderrow National School on six occasions which was, as he later stated in evidence, an above average number of visits. He met with L.H. and S. He attended parent meetings on the question of Dunderrow’s amalgamation with other schools. No complaint about L.H. was made to him. He observed the teaching work of L.H. and considered it satisfactory. 19.     The applicant suppressed the sexual abuse. While she had significant psychological difficulties, she did not associate those with the abuse.     In 1996 she was contacted by the police who were investigating a complaint made in 1995 by a former pupil of Dunderrow National School against L.H. The applicant made a statement to the police in January 1997 and was referred for counselling. During the investigation a number of other pupils made statements. L.H. was charged with 386 criminal offences of sexual abuse involving some twenty-one former pupils of the school during a period of about ten years. In 1998 he pleaded guilty to twenty-one sample charges and was sentenced to imprisonment. His licence to teach was withdrawn by the Minister for Education (“the Minister”) under Rule 108 of the National School Rules 1965 (“the 1965 Rules”). 20.     In or around June 1998, and as a consequence of the evidence of other victims during the criminal trial and subsequent medical treatment, the applicant realised the connection between her psychological problems and the abuse by L.H. and understood the extent of those problems. B.     Criminal Injuries Compensation Tribunal (“the CICT”) 21.     In October 1998 the applicant applied to the CICT for compensation. An initial award (44,814.14 euros (EUR)) was made by a single judge. The applicant appealed to a CICT panel. She claimed that the CICT gave her the option of continuing her appeal (at the risk of finding that her CICT application would be rejected as out of time) or of accepting the initial offer of the CICT with some additional expenses (EUR 53,962.24, the non-pecuniary aspect being EUR 27,000). The applicant accepted the offer by letter of 5   November 2002 and gave the standard undertaking to repay the CICT award from any other award she may receive, from whatever source, in relation to the same injury. The award was made on an ex gratia basis. Since the State is never a party to CICT proceedings, it became aware of this award later before the High Court (see directly below). C.     Civil action for damages (No. 1998/10555P) 1.     High Court 22.     On 29 September 1998 the applicant instituted a civil action against L.H. and the Minister, as well as against Ireland and the Attorney General, claiming damages for personal injuries suffered as a result of assault and battery including sexual abuse by L.H. Her claim against the latter three defendants (“the State Defendants”) was threefold: (a) negligence by the State arising out of the failure of the State Defendants in relation to the recognition, examination and supervision of the school and in failing to put in place appropriate measures and procedures to protect against, and put a stop to, the systematic abuse by L.H. since 1962; (b) vicarious liability of the State Defendants for the acts of L.H. since, inter alia , the true relationship between him and the State was one of employment; and (c) liability given the applicant’s constitutional right to bodily integrity, the responsibility of the State Defendants to provide primary education under Article 42 of the Constitution and the measures put in place to discharge that responsibility. 23.     Since L.H. did not file a defence, on 8 November 1999 the applicant obtained judgment in default against him. On 24 October 2006 the High Court assessed and awarded damages payable by L.H. in the sum of EUR   305,104, comprising EUR 200,000 in general damages, EUR 50,000 in aggravated damages, EUR 50,000 in exemplary damages, and EUR 5,104 in special damages. The applicant took enforcement proceedings. L.H.   claimed he had insufficient means and she obtained an instalment order of EUR 400 per month. The first payment was received in November 2007 so that she has been paid in the region of EUR 31,000 to date. She registered a judgment mortgage against that part of the family home owned by L.H. 24.     As regards her case against the State Defendants, she requested a Professor Ferguson to advise her on the question of the adequacy of child-protection mechanisms in Ireland in the 1970s. He responded by letter of 14   April 2003. Professor Ferguson agreed that, if the child-protection protocols existing in 2003 had been in place in 1973, it was very likely that the applicant’s abuse would have been acted upon in a manner which would have ensured the promotion of her welfare. He feared that pleading the case on the basis of what the State should have known at the time would be unsuccessful because it would not be possible to project onto the past the knowledge and systems of accountability that existed in the present day. 25.     The High Court hearing against the State Defendants began on 2   March 2004. On 5 March 2004, while the applicant was presenting her evidence, the High Court judge, in response to the applicant’s complaint regarding the absence of a State system for adverting to and addressing sexual abuse in national schools, asked Counsel for the applicant as follows: “What evidence do I have, or what should I have deduce[d] from the evidence that has been given that either the system in operation was a bad system, and I will come back to that, or that there was an alternative system that should have been applied, and what that alternative system might have been.” 26.     When the applicant’s case concluded, the State Defendants applied for a direction to strike out the case on the basis that no prima facie case had been made out by the applicant as regards all three grounds, submitting, inter alia , that there was no evidence of negligence. On 9 March 2004 the High Court accepted the State Defendants’ application, the court being “satisfied that the plaintiff had not established a case in negligence against the [State Defendants]” (the “non-suit” order). The court did not and was not called upon to distinguish between the two bases of the negligence claim. However, a prima facie case had been made out on the questions of vicarious and constitutional liability and evidence would be called from the defendants on those matters. The trial finished on 12 March 2004. 27.     On 20 January 2006 the High Court delivered judgment. It found that the action was not statute barred. It also concluded that the State was not vicariously liable for the sexual assaults perpetrated by L.H. given the relationship between the State and the denominational management of national schools. Although counsel for the applicant had orally suggested that the State should be vicariously liable for the inaction of the manager, the High Court judgment did not address this point. Finally, the High Court found that no action lay for a breach of a constitutional right where existing laws (in this case, tort) protected that right. The costs of the proceedings against the State Defendants were awarded against the applicant. 2.     Supreme Court ( O’Keeffe v. Hickey , [2008] IESC 72) 28.     In May 2006 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court.   Her Notice of Appeal challenged the finding on vicarious liability and referred to two matters: the absence of reasons for the interim ruling of 9 March 2004 and the High Court judgment’s failure to rule on the vicarious liability for the inaction of the manager. Mr Justice Hardiman described the appeal as limited to the State’s vicarious liability for the acts of L.H. and the manager, although he commented in his judgment on the other two initial claims of the applicant (direct negligence and the constitutional claim). Mr Justice Fennelly also considered that the appeal concerned only vicarious liability for the acts of L.H., although he refused to accept that the State was vicariously liable for the manager. 29.     The appeal was heard from 11 to 13 June 2006. By a majority judgment of 19 December 2008 (Hardiman J and Fennelly J, with whom Chief Justice Murray and Mr Justice Denham concurred and Mr Justice Geoghegan dissented), the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. 30.     Hardiman J described in detail the legal status of national schools. While the arrangements for national-school education might “seem rather odd today”, they had to be understood in the context of Irish history in the early nineteenth century. Following denominational conflict and the later concession of Catholic emancipation in 1829, the dissenting churches and the Catholic Church wished to ensure that children of their denominations be educated in schools controlled by the denomination and not by the State or the established (Anglican) Church. Those churches were “remarkably successful” in achieving this aim: from the very beginning of the Irish system of national education (encapsulated in the “Stanley letter” of 1831), State authorities paid for the system of national education “but did not manage it or administer it at the point of delivery”. The latter function was left to the local denominational manager. While State funding was accorded on a proportionate basis to all denominational schools, the population was at the time overwhelmingly Catholic so that the majority of national schools had Catholic patrons and managers. 31.     Hardiman J went on to describe as “remarkable” the fact that, whilst in nineteenth-century Europe firmer distinctions were being drawn between Church and State and Church influence in the provision of public services (including education) was ebbing, in Ireland the position of the Church became stronger and more entrenched. He adopted the evidence of one expert witness (in the history of education in Ireland) who described the position after the inception of the Irish Free State in 1922 and noted that the Catholic managers in this “managerial” system “were very clearly articulate and very absolutely ... precise in how they interpreted what the situation was for national schools in the new Ireland ... It had to be Catholic schools under Catholic management, Catholic teachers, Catholic children”. 32.     That expert witness went on to describe the answer of the Catholic Church in the 1950s to a request by a teachers’ trade union to have local committees deal with maintaining and repairing school buildings. The Catholic Church had responded that there could be no interference whatever with the “inherited tradition of managerial rights of schooling”. The limited proposal of the union was considered to be the thin edge of the wedge because, in due course, the request might be to interfere with “other aspects of the manager’s authority vis-à-vis the appointment and dismissal of teachers which was of course the key concern that had been fought for and won over the years”.   Hardiman J referred to the “urgent desire” of the denominations to maintain their role in primary education. 33.     As Hardiman J explained, the Constitution reflected this managerial structure: the obligation in Article 42 § 4) on the State to “provide for” free primary education reflected a largely State-funded, but entirely clerically administered, system of education. As a result there were approximately 3,000 national schools in Ireland: most were under the control of Catholic patrons and managers, a few were under the control of other denominations and even fewer were controlled by non-denominational groups. 34.     Hardiman J noted that, in recent times and after more than a century and a half, the provision of education was belatedly and at least partially placed on a statutory basis by the Education Act 1998; prior to that Act the system had been administered by the 1965 Rules as well as by other ministerial letters, circulars and notes. 35.     As to what could be gleaned from the 1965 Rules, Hardiman J noted: “The Minister laid down rules for national schools but they were general in nature and did not allow him to govern the detailed activities of any individual teacher. He inspected the schools for their academic performance, other than religious instruction, but it did not go further than that. He was ... deprived of the direct control of the schools, and of the enormous power which that brings, because ‘there was interposed between the State and the child the manager or the committee or board of management’. Equally, the Minister did not appoint the manager or the teacher or directly supervise him. This, indeed, was the essence of the ‘managerial system’. I cannot see, on the evidence, that he had any scope whatever to make a personal judgment about either of these two individuals. Moreover, it seems to have been instinctively recognised by the parents who complained about the first defendant that the person with direct authority to receive the complaint and do something about it was the clerical and clerically appointed manager. No complaint, on the evidence, was directed to the Minister or to any State body. The matter was handled, so to speak, ‘in house’ at the election of the complainants. The end result of the process was a voluntary resignation followed by the employment of [L.H.] in another school in the vicinity. All these factors tending to distance the Minister and the State authorities from the management of the school and the control of the first defendant are direct consequences of the long established system of education, described above and mandated in the Constitution whereby the Minister pays and, to a certain extent, regulates, but the schools and the teachers are controlled by their clerical managers and patrons. It is not the concern of the Court either to endorse or to criticise that system but merely to register its existence and the obvious fact that it deprives the Minister and the State of direct control of schools, teachers, and pupils.” 36.     Hardiman J observed that the sexual abuse of a pupil was the negation of what L.H. was employed to do but he also found that in 1973 it “was an unusual act, little discussed, and certainly not regarded as an ordinary foreseeable risk of attending at a school”. He considered it “notable” that she did not sue the patron, the diocese of which he was bishop, his successors or his estate, the trustees of the property of the Diocese of Cork and Ross (owners of the school), the manager or his estate or successors. 37.     Hardiman J concluded that, having regard to the relevant test for vicarious liability and to the above-described arrangements for the control and management of national schools, the State Defendants were not liable to the applicant for the wrongs committed against her. In particular, even applying the wider form of vicarious liability invoked, the Minister’s absence of direct control over L.H., long since ceded to the manager and the patron, prevented a finding against the Minister. The relationship of L.H. and the State – a “triangular one with the Church” – was entirely sui generis and a product of Ireland’s unique historical experience. The manager was “the nominee of the patron, that is of a power other than the Minister and he did not inform the Minister of any difficulties with, or complaints about, [L.H.] or of his resignation and appointment to teach elsewhere until they were faits accomplis . He was the agent not of the Minister, but of the Catholic Church, the power in whose interest the Minister was displaced from the management of the school”. 38.     Hardiman J commented on two of the applicant’s original claims which had “not been proceeded with”. 39.     As to the claim of negligence by the State, he remarked “... this is a claim which could more appropriately be made against the manager. It was he who had the power to put in place appropriate measures and procedures governing the running of the school. The Minister can hardly be responsible for a failure to ‘cease’ a course of action of whose existence he was quite unaware”. 40.     As to the claim about the responsibility of the State in the provision of primary education under Article 42 of the Constitution and the measures put in place to discharge that responsibility, Hardiman J stated: “I have already analysed the terms of Article 42 from which it will be seen that the Minister, in the case of this national school, was simply providing assistance and subvention to private and corporate (i.e. Roman Catholic) endeavour, leaving the running of the school to the private or corporate entities. The Minister is thereby, as Kenny J pointed out in Crowley v. Ireland [1980] I.R. 102, deprived of the control of education by the interposing of the patron and the manager between him and the children. These persons, and particularly the latter, are in much closer and more frequent contact with the school than the Minister or the Department. I do not read the provisions of Article 42.4 as requiring more than that the Minister shall ‘endeavour to supplement and give reasonable aid to private and corporate educational initiative’, to ‘provide for free primary education’. ... In my view the Constitution specifically envisages, not indeed a delegation but a ceding of the actual running of schools to the interests represented by the patron and the manager.” 41.     Hardiman J concluded by pointing out that nothing in the judgment could be interpreted as suggesting liability on the part of the Church and, in any event, it was quite impossible to do so because those authorities had not been heard by the Supreme Court since the applicant had not sued them. 42.     Fennelly J, who delivered the other majority judgment, began by noting that the “calamity of the exploitation of authority over children so as to abuse them sexually” had shaken society to its foundations. Cases of sexual abuse had preoccupied the criminal courts and the Supreme Court for many years and it was surprising that that court was confronted for the first time with questions relating to the liability of institutions including the State for sexual abuse of schoolchildren in a national school by a teacher. 43.     Fennelly J also described in some detail the history and consequent legal status of national schools, which system had survived independence in 1922 and the enactment of the Constitution in 1937. He accepted the expert’s evidence that it was not a State system but rather a “State-supported system”. He noted the clear division of power between the State (funding and fixing the curriculum) and the manager (day-to-day running of the school including hiring and firing teachers), noting that the different religions were determined to preserve and guard their own distinct religious education so that national schools developed on a denominational basis. 44.     He considered inspectors to be a crucially important part of the system of State oversight and maintenance of standards which enabled the Minister to be satisfied about the quality of the system. However, he noted that the inspection regime did not alter the division of responsibilities between the State and the manager, the inspectors having no power to direct teachers in the carrying out of their duties. The 1965 Rules reflected this allocation of responsibilities between the Church and State authorities. Even if, in modern times, the State played a more intrusive role, responsibility for day-to-day management remained with the manager.   He concluded that the State was not vicariously liable for the acts of L.H. or, for the same reasons, for the failure of the manager to report the 1971 complaint to the State. L.H. was not employed by the State but, in law, by the manager. While L.H. had to have the qualifications laid down by the Minister and had to observe the 1965 Rules and while the State had disciplinary powers in those respects, L.H. was not engaged by the State and the State could not dismiss him. 45.     Referring back to the reference in the Notice of Appeal to the State’s liability for the failure of the manager to report the 1971 complaint, Fennelly J concluded that “[f]or the same reason, insofar as it is necessary to say so, there can be no liability for the failure of [the manager] to report the 1971 complaint. [The manager] was not the employee of the second defendant.” 46.     Geoghegan J dissented. He accepted that neither the Department nor its inspectors had any knowledge of the assaults. He noted that, for all practical purposes, most primary education in Ireland took the form of a joint enterprise between Church and State and he considered that that relationship was such that there was a sufficient connection between the State and the creation of the risk as to render the State liable. Geoghegan J relied, notably, on the role of school inspectors. He examined in some detail the evidence given by, and concerning the role of, school inspectors noting, inter alia , that if an allegation of sexual assault by a teacher on a national-school pupil was considered well-founded by an inquiry set up by the Department, it could lead to the withdrawal of recognition or to a police investigation and, if the police found the complaint justified, to the withdrawal of the teacher’s licence to teach. 47.     By a judgment of 9 May 2009 the Supreme Court vacated the High Court order for costs against the applicant since it was not disputed that hers was an important and complex test case. It determined that each party had to bear its own costs related to the action against the State Defendants. 48.     The applicant was legally represented throughout the civil proceedings, although she did not have legal aid. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Primary education in Ireland 1.     Background 49.     The Court refers to the description of the history and structure of the national-schools system of primary education provided by the Supreme Court in O’Keeffe v. Hickey , ([2008] IESC 72) and, notably, by Hardiman J and Fennelly J (see paragraphs 30-35 and 42 ‑ 44 above). 50.     Section 4 of the School Attendance Act 1926 required parents to ensure their children attended a national school or another suitable school, unless there was a reasonable excuse for not so doing, for example if the child was receiving suitable primary education elsewhere, if there was no national school accessible to which the parent did not object on religious grounds, or if the child was prevented from attending by some other sufficient cause. Attendance in full-time education was therefore compulsory for all children between 6 and 14 years of age until 1969 when the official school-leaving age was increased to 16. Primary education has been universally free in Ireland since the nineteenth century. 51.     The vast majority of children attending primary school attended “national schools” which are State-financed and denominational primary-education establishments. Department reports for 1972/73 and 1973/74 recorded the existence of 3,776 and 3,688 national schools, respectively. The Department’s statistical report for February 1973 indicated that 94% of primary schools were national schools. According to the 1965 Investment in Education Report , 91% of national schools were Catholic-run and catered for 97.6% of national-school pupils while 9% were Protestant-run, catering for 2.4% of such pupils. A 2011 report by the Department notes that approximately 96% of primary schools remained under denominational patronage and management (including 89.65% under Catholic patronage and management). 52.     In 1963/64 there were 192 fee-paying non-State-aided primary schools for approximately 21,000 children which represented about 4 to 4.5% of all primary-school pupils. The vast majority of these schools were in urban areas, the great majority of which were in Dublin. 53.     The “Commission on School Accommodation’s Report on the Revised Criteria for the Establishment of New Primary Schools” in February 2011 confirmed that, until the 1970s, the only choice effectively available to parents was the local national school. It considered that by the end of the 1970s there was evidence of change with the establishment in 1978 of the first multi-denominational school and a growth in Irish language inter-denominational and multi-denominational schools. 2.     The 1937 Constitution 54.     Article 42 is entitled “Education” and reads as follows: “1.     The State acknowledges that the primary and natural educator of the child is the Family and guarantees to respect the inalienable right and duty of parents to provide, according to their means, for the religious and moral, intellectual, physical and social education of their children. 2.     Parents shall be free to provide this education in their homes or in private schools or in schools recognised or established by the State. 3. (1)     The State shall not oblige parents in violation of their conscience and lawful preference to send their children to schools established by the State, or to any particular type of school designated by the State. (2)     The State shall, however, as guardian of the common good, require in view of actual conditions that the children receive a certain minimum education, moral, intellectual and social. 4.     The State shall provide for free primary education and shall endeavour to supplement and give reasonable aid to private and corporate educational initiative, and, when the public good requires it, provide other educational facilities or institutions with due regard, however, for the rights of parents, especially in the matter of religious and moral formation. 5.     In exceptional cases, where the parents for physical or moral reasons fail in their duty towards their children, the State as guardian of the common good, by appropriate means shall endeavour to supply the place of the parents, but always with due regard for the natural and imprescriptible rights of the child.” 55.     In McEneaney v. the Minister for Education ([1941] IR 430), the Supreme Court observed that for “more than a century it has been recognised that the provision of primary education is a national obligation”. Article 42 § 4) conferred on children a right to receive free primary education and the words “provide for” meant that the State did not itself have to educate children but rather had to ensure that appropriate education was provided to them ( Crowley v. Ireland [1980] IR 102). 3.     Relevant legislation 56.     The Children Act 1908 governed child protection and contemplated State intervention in the form of taking a child into care in cases of inter-familial abuse. The Education Act 1998 (“the 1988 Act”) was the first comprehensive legislation on education since the foundation of the State. It put on a statutory basis the State-funded and privately managed nature of primary education, making no fundamental structural changes thereto. 4.     Rules for national schools (“the 1965 Rules”) and relevant ministerial circulars 57.     Rules in place before independence in 1922 were applied to national schools until the 1965 Rules were adopted by the Department. While the 1965 Rules were neither primary nor secondary legislation, they have legal force and form part of the relevant statutory regime ( Brown v. Board of management of Rathfarnham Parish national school and Others ([2006] IEHC 178). Otherwise, the Department regulated matters within its remit by notes, circulars and other official Department instruments. The Minister could withdraw recognition from a school or withdraw an individual teacher’s licence if the 1965 Rules were not complied with (Rules 30 and 108 of the 1965 Rules, respectively). 5.     Managers and boards of management 58.     Rule 15 of the 1965 Rules provided that the manager was charged with the direct government of the school, the appointment of the teachers and, subject to the Minister’s approval, their removal. A manager was to visit a school and ensure the 1965 Rules were complied with (Rule 16). Subject to the authority of the manager, the principal was responsible for discipline, the control of the other members of the teaching staff and all other matters connected with school arrangements (Rule 123(4)). 59.     Rule 121 set out rules for teachers’ conduct: they had to, inter alia , act in a spirit of obedience to the law; pay the strictest attention to the morals and general conduct of their pupils; take all reasonable precautions to ensure the safety of their pupils; and carry out all lawful instructions issued by the manager. Rule 130 required teachers to have a lively regard for the improvement and general welfare of their pupils, to treat them with kindness, combined with firmness, and to govern them through their affections and reason and not by harshness and severity. 60.     Most primary schools now have boards of management. A ministerial circular (16/76) set out arrangements until the 1998 Act put the boards on a statutory basis. Section 14 of that Act provides that it is the duty of the patron to appoint, where practicable and in accordance with the “principle of partnership”, a board the composition of which is agreed between the Minister and the education partners. As bodies corporate with perpetual succession, the boards could sue and be sued. 6.     Inspectors 61.     The 1965 Rules envisaged that the Minister and persons authorised by him (inspectors) could visit and examine the schools whenever they thought fit (Rule 11). Rule 161 defined inspectors as being agents of the Minister required to supply the Minister with such local information as he or she might require for the effective administration of the system. They were required to call the attention of managers and teachers to any rules which appeared to them to be being infringed. They were entitled to communicate with the manager with reference to the general condition of the school “or to matters requiring the manager’s attention, making such suggestions as they may deem necessary”. An inspector was required to pay frequent incidental visits to the schools in his district and to make obligatory annual visits to assess the work of teachers. Circular 16/59 provided guidance to inspectors as to their role vis-à-vis managers and teachers, as to the manner in which incidental and general inspections were to be carried out and as regards their assessment of the work of teachers. 7.     Complaints 62.     A Guidance Note of 6 May 1970 outlined the practice to be followed as regards complaints against teachers. The complainant was to be informed that the matter was one for the manager, in the first instance, and asked to clarify whether the complaint had been notified to the manager. The manager had to obtain observations from the relevant teacher and to forward those observations, together with the manager’s own views, to the Department. The Deputy Chief Inspector within the Department would then identify whether an investigation was required. If so, the inspector was to interview the manager, the teacher and parents. If an inquiry led to relevant findings against the teacher, Rule 108 authorised the Minister to take action against a teacher if the latter had conducted him or herself improperly or failed or refused to comply with the 1965 Rules. The Minister could pursue the teacher’s prosecution, withdraw recognition and/or withdraw or reduce the teacher’s salary. As noted above, the manager could dismiss a teacher, subject to the Minister’s approval. B.     Criminal law and related matters 63.     The sexual abuse of a minor was prohibited by sections 50 and 51 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (as amended). The Criminal Law Amendment Act 1935 (“the 1935 Act”) was designed to make further provision for the protection of young girls and to amend the law concerning sexual offences. Sections 1 and 2 of the 1935 Act created the offences of defilement of girls under 15 years of age and of girls between 15 and 17   years of age. Section 14 of the 1935 Act also provides: “It shall not be a defence to a charge of indecent assault upon a person under the age of fifteen years to prove that such person consented to the act alleged to constitute such indecent assault.” Consequently, any girl under 15 years of age cannot consent to any form of sexual contact and any such contact was (and still is) a crime. In addition to these statutory offences, these acts amounted to ordinary assault. 64.     There was no limitation period applicable to indictable offences in Ireland so that an offender could be prosecuted until the end of his or her life. 65.     A victim can apply for compensation for injury suffered as a result of violent crime under the Scheme of Compensation for Personal Injuries Criminally Inflicted. The Scheme is administered by the CICT. The prescription period is three months, but it can be extended. The initial decision is taken without a hearing and a hearing is held in private before a division of the CICT. The appeal decision is final. Compensation is paid on an ex gratia basis. It covers expenses and losses (out-of-pocket expenses and bills less social welfare payments, salary or wages received while on sick leave) and, until 1986, non-pecuniary loss. C.     Civil law and related matters 66.     A tort is a civil wrong which causes someone to suffer loss resulting in legal liability for the person who commits the tortious act, the tortfeasor. The tort of negligence requires proof that there was a duty of care between the plaintiff and the defendant (which involves establishing the existence of a relationship of proximity between the parties such as would call for the exercise of care by one party towards the other), that that duty was breached and that that breach was causative of damage (for example, Beatty v. The   Rent Tribunal [2005] IESC 66). 67.     Vicarious liability is the attribution of liability to a person or entity who did not cause injury and who may not be at fault but who has a particular legal relationship to the person who did cause the injury, and who himself was at fault, including through negligence. Legal relationships that can lead to vicarious liability include the relationship of employer and employee. 68.     It is also possible to rely on the Constitution to seek redress against an individual for a breach of one’s constitutional rights. In Meskell v. CIE [1973] IR 121), the court stated: “... if a person has suffered damage by virtue of a breach of a constitutional right or the infringement of a constitutional right that person is entitled to seek redress against the person or persons who have infringed that right.” Such a resort to constitutionally created torts only occurs if there is a gap in existing tort law which needs to be supplemented. D.     Relevant public investigations and child-protection developments 1.     The Carrigan Report 1931 69.     The Carrigan Committee was appointed in 1930 to consider whether certain criminal statutes needed amendments and to make proposals to deal with “the problem of juvenile prostitution”. It held seventeen sittings, heard twenty-nine witnesses and considered other written submissions. 70.     On 20 August 1931 the Committee submitted its final report to the Minister for Justice. The report recommended a combination of social and legislative reforms as regards, inter alia , sexual crimes against minors. 71.     The Police Commissioner was an important witness before the Committee. Prior to appearing, he submitted statistical information he had gleaned from responses to a circular issued by him to over 800 police stations about the prosecution of sexual offences from 1924 to 1930 including for the offences of “defilement, carnal knowledge or rape” of girls under 10 years of age, between 10 and 13, between 13 and 16, between 16 and 18 and over 18 years of age. He submitted a detailed analysis of those statistics noting, inter alia , that there was an “alarming amount of sexual crime increasing yearly, a feature of which was the large number of cases of criminal interference with girls and children from 16 years downwards, including many cases of children under 10 years of age”. He was of the opinion that less than 15% of sexual crime was prosecuted for various reasons including the reluctance of parents to pursue matters for various reasons. 72.     On the advice of the Department of Justice (in a memorandum accompanying the report), neither the evidence before, nor the report of, the Carrigan Committee was published. In so advising, the Department of Justice criticised the report in several respects and noted that the obvious conclusion to be drawn from it was that the ordinary feelings of decency and the influence of religion had failed in Ireland and that the only remedy was by way of police action. The debate on the report took place in a parliamentary committee. Several recommendations were implemented including the adoption of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1935 (see paragraph 63 above). The Department of Justice’s files on this report were published in 1991. Further archival material was released in 1999. 2.     Reformatory and industrial schools 73.     Reformatory schools were established in the 1850s and industrial schools in the 1860s. These schools were mainly denominational and State-funded. The former received young offenders but there were never more than a few of such schools. However, there were fifty or so industrial schools which were schools for the training of children: childr