CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 25 mars 2014

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They are forty-two relatives of twenty-one victims of the Hillsborough football stadium disaster. A.     The background facts 2.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows. 3.     On 15 April 1989 the semi-final of the Football Association Cup between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest football clubs was scheduled to take place at Sheffield Wednesday’s football ground, Hillsborough Stadium. The kick-off of the match was scheduled for 3 p.m. 4.     Prior to kick-off there was a huge build-up of supporters outside the Leppings Lane entrance to the ground which in turn caused pressure on those trying to get into the ground through the turnstiles. At 2.52 p.m. the Chief Superintendent in charge of policing at the match decided to authorise the opening of the exit gates at the Leppings Lane entrance in order to relieve the pressure at the turnstiles. The opening of one of the gates, gate C, resulted in a sudden influx of about 2,000 supporters into the ground, the majority of whom continued through a tunnel into the central spectator pens, 3 and 4. Each of these pens was capable of holding just over 1,000 people but both were already full when the gate was opened. The result of the sudden influx was the build-up of intolerable pressure on supporters at the front of the pens. 5.     The match started as scheduled at 3 p.m. Shortly after the match began, the pressure in the pens intensified. Supporters were crushed against the wall at the front of the pens and suffered severe crush injuries. The match was stopped at 3.06 p.m. 6.     Ninety-six supporters died as a result of injuries sustained in the disaster. B.     The domestic proceedings 1.     The Taylor Inquiry and the initial police investigation 7.     On 17 April 1989 the Home Secretary ordered Lord Justice Taylor (as he then was) to conduct an inquiry. His terms of reference were: “To inquire into the events at Sheffield Wednesday Football Ground on 15 April 1989 and to make recommendations about the needs of crowd control and safety at sports events.” 8.     The West Midlands police were appointed to investigate the incident and gather evidence for the Taylor Inquiry. They also assisted Her Majesty’s Coroner for South West Yorkshire, Dr Popper, who was to conduct the inquests. The Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) was asked to consider bringing criminal charges arising out of the incident. 9.     Lord Justice Taylor heard oral evidence from 174 witnesses on a wide range of issues leading to the disaster. He also received a number of written submissions. His interim report was published on 4 August 1989 and his final report was published in January 1990. He found that there were a number of causes for the disaster but that the immediate cause was the failure, when gate C was opened, to cut off access to the central pens which were already overfull. He concluded, at paragraph 278 of his interim report, that: “The main cause of the disaster was the failure of police control.” 2.     The original inquests and the decision not to prosecute 10.     In the meantime, on 18 April 1989, the Coroner formally opened and adjourned the inquests into the deaths of the ninety-five victims of the disaster (the ninety-sixth victim suffered severe brain damage that left him in a persistent vegetative state and died in 1993). He decided that the inquests could not be completed until the DPP had reached a decision on whether criminal proceedings would be pursued. 11.     In February 1990, following consultation with the DPP and a solicitor connected to the Hillsborough Steering Committee, the Coroner decided that the inquests could resume on a limited basis. Although the question of “how” the deceased died would be reserved for a later date, the questions of “who”, “when” and “where” could be dealt with before the DPP’s decision. The Coroner recognised that care would have to be taken to avoid prejudice to any future criminal prosecutions. 12.     Preliminary inquests (“mini-inquests”) were held between 18 April and 4 May 1990 for each of the individuals who had died. At the mini ‑ inquests, West Midlands police officers summarised statements relating to each of the deceased, covering the evidence they had gathered in the course of their investigations. The officers’ evidence was given orally and on oath. The written summaries themselves were not read in evidence. Evidence was also heard from pathologists who had carried out all the autopsies within 48   hours of the incident. In the majority of cases, the cause of death was given as traumatic asphyxia and it was said that the individuals would have been unconscious within a matter of seconds and would have died within a matter of minutes thereafter. 13.     The DPP subsequently decided not to pursue any criminal proceedings. 14.     In September 1990 the Coroner was informed of the DPP’s decision. At a meeting prior to the resumption of the inquests, the Coroner announced that he had decided to impose a cut-off time for evidence which he would hear in relation to the incident. Accordingly, he would hear evidence of events which took place before 3.15 p.m. only (the time when the first ambulance arrived on the scene). He was of the view that on the pathological evidence available to him, permanent irrecoverable damage had by then been suffered by all the deceased. In reaching this view, the Coroner took into account the interim report of the Taylor Inquiry. Counsel for forty-three of the families argued against the cut-off point, primarily on the ground that there was evidence to suggest that not all the victims were dead by 3.15 p.m. He argued that there had been no investigation or systemic analysis of the organisation or planning of the emergency response and whether it might have made a difference. The Coroner rejected these submissions. 15.     The mini-inquest into the question “how” the deceased died began on 19 November 1990. The resumed inquest heard, in total, around two hundred witnesses. In summing up, the Coroner left to the jury the verdicts of unlawful killing, accidental death and open verdict. 16.     On 28 March 1991 the jury reached a majority verdict (9-2) of accidental death in all cases. 3.     Civil proceedings 17.     In June 1990 the families of the deceased lost their civil claim for pre-death suffering, because the pathological evidence given at the inquest was that none of the deceased would have felt any pain. 4.     Disciplinary proceedings 18.     The Police Complaints Authority (“PCA”) appointed the West Midlands Police to supervise a disciplinary investigation into the conduct of South Yorkshire Police officers. 19.     In July 1991 the PCA directed the South Yorkshire Police to prefer disciplinary charges against the Chief Superintendent responsible for policing the match for four charges of neglect of duty and one of discreditable conduct; and against his second in command for one charge of neglect of duty. 20.     In November 1991, the Chief Superintendent was allowed to retire on health grounds. The disciplinary charges against him were accordingly discontinued as, under police regulations, a disciplinary hearing could not proceed when a police officer retired. The PCA decided on 13 January 1992 to withdraw the charge against his second in command because it considered that it would have been unfair to pursue what was, in effect, a joint charge in the absence of the more senior officer. 5.     First and second requests to the Attorney General for a new inquest 21.     In January 1992 Mrs Williams, the mother of one of the victims, made a first request to the Attorney General to ask him to exercise his power to refer her son’s case to the High Court and request it to order a new inquest on the basis of new evidence. This request was refused in February 1992. 22.     In 1992 a formal application was made to the Attorney General by the families of six of the victims asking him to refer the case to the High Court on the basis of new evidence. The request was refused in August 1992. 6.     Judicial review 23.     On 6 April 1993 relatives of six victims were granted permission to judicially review the inquest verdict of accidental death. 24.     On 5   November 1994 the Divisional Court refused to quash the verdict. 7.     Third request to the Attorney General for a new inquest 25.     In January 1996 Mrs Williams, made a third request to the Attorney General asking him to refer the case to the High Court. The request was refused on 20 March 1996. 8.     Lord Justice Stuart-Smith Inquiry 26.     In June 1997, the Secretary of State for the Home Department ordered a “scrutiny” of new evidence. Lord Justice Stuart-Smith was appointed to ascertain whether any evidence existed relating to the disaster which was not available to the Taylor Inquiry or to the DPP, the Attorney General and the South Yorkshire Police in the context of their own investigations. If there was any such evidence, he was further asked to advise whether it was of such significance as to justify a further public inquiry and to draw the attention of the DPP, the Attorney General and the South Yorkshire Police to evidence relevant to the carrying out of their duties. 27.     Lord Justice Stuart-Smith received a number of written submissions and evidence in the course of his inquiry. He also heard oral evidence. Although he sat in private, his report was published in February 1998 and set out in detail the evidence and his findings. He concluded: “I have come to the clear conclusion that there is no basis upon which there should be a further Judicial Inquiry or a reopening of Lord Taylor’s Inquiry. There is no basis for a renewed application to the Divisional Court or for the Attorney General to exercise his powers under the Coroners Act 1988. I do not consider that there is any material which should be put before the Director of Public Prosecutions or the Police Complaints Authority which might cause them to reconsider the decisions they have already taken. Nor do I consider that there is any justification for setting up any further inquiry into the performance of the emergency and hospital services. I have carefully considered the circumstances in which alterations were made to some of the self-written statements of South Yorkshire Police officers, but I do not consider that there is any occasion for any further investigation.” 9.     Private prosecutions 28.     In June 1998 the Hillsborough Family Support Group commenced private prosecutions against the former Chief Superintendent responsible for policing the match and his second in command, alleging two specimen charges of unlawful killing and wilful misfeasance in public office. The two men were committed to stand trial at Leeds Crown Court on 6 June 2000.   The trial took place between 6 June and 24 July 2000. 29.     The Chief Superintendent’s second in command was acquitted on 20   July 2000.   On 24 July 2000, the jury announced that they could not reach a verdict on the Chief Superintendent and were discharged. 30.     On 26 July 2000 the Hillsborough Family Support Group made an application for re-trial of the Chief Superintendent. The application was refused on the grounds that he would not get a fair trial. 10.     Fourth request to the Attorney General for a new inquest 31.     In 2006, Mrs Williams made a fourth request to the Attorney General to have the case referred to the High Court. Her request was refused on 12 February 2006. 11.     Further disclosure and the Hillsborough Independent Panel 32.     In 2009 it was announced that further documents relating to the Hillsborough disaster would be disclosed and that the thirty-year rule prohibiting publication of documents held by Government departments would be waived. 33.     In January 2010 the Hillsborough Independent Panel (“the Panel”) was appointed by the Home Secretary to oversee and manage the process of public disclosure of documents; to consult with the families to enable their views to be taken into account; to establish an archive of documentation; and to produce a report explaining its work and how the information disclosed added to public understanding of the tragedy and its aftermath. 34.     On 12 September 2012 the Panel published its report. It had reviewed over 450,000 pages of documentation. The report concluded that the risks of overcrowding and crushing at Hillsborough were known and that the crush in 1989 was foreseeable. The prevailing “policing and stewarding mindset” that prioritised crowd control over crowd safety was criticised. The report found that the crush was not caused by fans arriving late and said that there was no evidence of excessive or unusual levels of alcohol consumption by fans. 35.     The Panel further noted that the disclosed documentation raised concerns about the emergency response, which had never been fully examined because of the cut-off point fixed by the coroner at the original inquests. The notion of a “single, unvarying and rapid pattern of death in all cases” was, it said “unsustainable”, such that significant numbers of those who died could have survived had the emergency response been adequate. 12.     The order for new inquests 36.     Following the publication of the Panel’s report, on 10 December 2012 the Attorney General applied to the High Court to have the inquests into the deaths quashed and new inquests ordered. 37.     On 19 December 2012 a Divisional Court allowed the application, emphasising the need for a proper inquiry into the deaths of the victims of the Hillsborough disaster: “10. ... Without minimising the importance of a proper inquest into every death, where a national disaster of the magnitude of the catastrophe which occurred at Hillsborough on 15 April 1989 has occurred, quite apart from the pressing entitlement of the families of the victims of the disaster to the public revelation of the facts, there is a distinct and separate imperative that the community as a whole should be satisfied that, even if belatedly, the truth should emerge.” 38.     The court considered it inevitable that new inquests should be ordered, having regard to the sound grounds advanced by the Attorney General for his application. It referred in particular to the “seriously flawed” decision of the coroner to impose a 3.15 p.m. cut-off point. 13.     The new inquests 39.     In February 2013 Lord Justice Goldring was appointed to conduct the new inquests. Several preliminary hearings have taken place, the first of which was held in April 2013. The full inquest hearings are scheduled to begin on 31 March 2014. 14.     Other ongoing investigations 40.     On 19 December 2012 the Home Secretary announced a new criminal inquiry (“Operation Resolve”) into the events surrounding the Hillsborough disaster. 41.     This inquiry is running alongside an investigation by the Independent Police Complaints Commission (“IPCC”) into claims of police misconduct in the aftermath of the disaster. The IPCC is reviewing allegations surrounding amendments to statements, the actions of police officers after the disaster and the role of those who investigated what happened at the time. COMPLAINT 42.     The applicants complained under Article 2 of the Convention that the respondent State has failed to conduct a prompt, effective and independent investigation into the deaths of their family members, with sufficient levels of public scrutiny and family participation. THE LAW I.     JOINDER 43.     Given their similar factual and legal background, the Court decides that the three applications should be joined pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF THE CONVENTION 44.     The applicants complained that the United Kingdom failed to conduct an effective investigation into the circumstances of their relatives’ deaths. They invoked Article 2 of the Convention, which provides: “1.     Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law ...” A.     The applicants’ submissions 45.     The applicants argued that their family members had died in circumstances potentially engaging the responsibility of the State. A procedural duty to investigate the deaths accordingly arose. According to the Court’s case-law, an effective investigation had to be independent; to be thorough and rigorous; to be capable of ascertaining responsibility for the death and leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible; to be carried out promptly and with reasonable expedition; to have a sufficient element of public scrutiny; and to involve the victims’ next of kin to the extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests. 46.     In the United Kingdom, the State’s procedural obligation under Article 2 was generally discharged by the holding of an inquest. The fact that the Attorney General had applied to have the original inquest verdicts quashed constituted, the applicants contended, acknowledgment by the State that there had not been to date an effective investigation into the deaths of the victims of the Hillsborough disaster. 47.     The applicants alleged, in particular, that the original inquests were inadequate because new medical evidence had undermined the 3.15 p.m. cut-off time; new evidence had cast significant doubt on weight placed on alcohol levels at the inquests; police and ambulance service statements had been amended to remove or alter comments unfavourable to those agencies; procedural irregularities had occurred at the original inquests; and it had been suggested that unexplored material concerning the stadium’s history would have assisted in determining how the disaster came about. They relied on the contents of the Attorney General’s application to quash the inquest verdicts and the judgment of the Divisional Court, both of which were based on the Panel’s 2012 report into the disaster. The applicants emphasised that the Panel, in preparing its report, had not conducted its own investigation but merely reviewed material held by State agencies. Despite the fact that the material had been in the possession of State for many years, it had never been examined in a proper, public investigative process. 48.     Although new inquests had now been ordered, the fact that the applicants had been required to wait for over twenty-four years for an Article 2-compliant investigation into the deaths of their family members was itself a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. B.     The Court’s assessment 49.     The applicants’ complaint concerns the procedural limb of Article 2 only. They criticise, first, the original inquests, pointing to a number of procedural irregularities which they said meant that the inquests could not be considered Article 2-compliant; and second, the fact that although twenty-four years had now elapsed since the disaster, an effective investigation had yet to be held. 50.     The obligation to investigate deaths which occur in certain circumstances comes into play, primarily, in the aftermath of a violent or suspicious death. For an investigation to be effective, it must be independent; be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible; be prompt and carried out with reasonable expedition; be accessible to the victim’s family; and afford a sufficient element of public scrutiny (see McKerr v. the United Kingdom , no. 28883/95, §§ 112-115, ECHR 2001 ‑ III; and Hackett v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 34698/04 , 10 May 2005).   In the normal course of events, a criminal trial, with an adversarial procedure before an independent and impartial judge, furnishes the strongest safeguards of an effective procedure for the finding of facts and the attribution of criminal responsibility. There is no absolute right, however, to obtain a prosecution or conviction and the fact that an investigation ends without concrete, or with only limited, results is not indicative of any failings as such ( Brecknell v. the United Kingdom , no.   32457/04, § 66, 27 November 2007). 51.     However, where information purportedly casting new light on the circumstances of a death comes into the public domain, a new obligation to investigate the death may arise (see Hackett , cited above; Brecknell , cited above, §§ 66-67; and Williams v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 32567/06, 17 February 2009). The nature and extent of any subsequent investigation required by the procedural obligation will inevitably depend on the circumstances of each particular case and may well differ from that to be expected immediately after the death has occurred. 52.     In its 2009 decision in Williams , cited above, the Court considered a complaint lodged by Mrs Williams in August 2006 about the failure properly to investigate the death of her son in the Hillsborough disaster. It found the complaint to be inadmissible on the basis that it had not been lodged within the six-month period set out in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In particular it held that any fresh investigative obligation based on the new evidence to which Mrs Williams referred in her application had been discharged by Lord Justice Stuart-Smith’s scrutiny review and report, since the evidence in question was all available at the time of that review. Any complaint about Lord Justice Stuart-Smith’s review itself should have been lodged with the Court’s within six months of the publication of his 1998 report. Because the complaint had been lodged out of time, the Court was unable to comment on the merits of Mrs   Williams’ complaint. In particular, it could not consider whether the original inquest or the subsequent scrutiny review had been ineffective, as she alleged. 53.     The flawed character of the original inquests has now been recognised, two decades on, by the Hillsborough Independent Panel, the Government and the High Court in the light of newly disclosed information (see paragraphs 32-38 above).   The question for this Court is whether any procedural obligation incumbent on the respondent State to investigate the deaths of the Hillsborough victims has been revived and, if so, what is the content of that obligation. The Court is prepared to accept that the nature of the deaths in the present case engages the procedural aspect of Article 2. It is persuaded that the findings of the Hillsborough Independent Panel constitute new evidence and information which cast doubt on the effectiveness of the original inquest and criminal investigations. In these circumstances, the authorities are under an obligation, pursuant to Article 2 of the Convention, to take further investigative measures. 54.     It is clear that extensive investigative measures are underway. Less than three months after the Panel published its report, the Attorney General applied to the High Court to have new inquests ordered and the application was granted a week later (see paragraphs 36-38 above). A senior judge was swiftly appointed as coroner and a number of preliminary hearings have taken place, the first only four months after the original inquest verdicts were quashed. The full inquests are scheduled to begin on 31 March 2014 (see paragraph 39 above). Simultaneously, a new criminal inquiry has begun and the IPCC is investigating allegations of police misconduct in the aftermath of the disaster (see paragraphs 40-41 above). The steps taken by the authorities of the respondent State are notable for both their haste and their comprehensive nature. There is nothing to indicate that the respondent State has failed to satisfy the investigative obligations which have arisen as a consequence of the Panel report. There is also no reason currently to doubt that the inquests and other investigations will be able to establish the facts and determine the lawfulness or otherwise of the deaths in question (see, e.g. McCaughey and Others v. the United Kingdom , no. 43098/09, §   127, 16   July 2013). It is noteworthy that the applicants have neither criticised the steps taken since the publication of the Panel report in September 2012, nor suggested that the new inquests will not afford them the opportunity to have their relatives’ cases re-examined in light of all relevant information. 55.     As to the specific complaint about the alleged twenty-four year delay, it is important to recognise that this is not a case where criminal investigations or inquest proceedings have dragged on for a number of years and never reached any conclusion (compare and contrast McKerr and McCaughey and Others , both cited above). The DPP decided in 1990 not to pursue criminal charges (see paragraphs 13-14 above). The original inquests, which were opened within days of the tragedy, were completed in 1991, following the publication of the Taylor Inquiry report and after hearing from a large number of witnesses (see paragraphs 10 and 15-16 above). Disciplinary proceedings against two police officers terminated in 1991 and 1992 respectively (see paragraphs 18-20 above). Any complaint concerning the compliance of those investigations and proceedings with Article 2 should have been made at the time. 56.     Following the conclusion of the inquests and the disciplinary proceedings, the victims’ family members fought tirelessly to have matters reviewed, and were successful with the establishment of the Stuart-Smith scrutiny review in 1997 (see paragraphs 26-27 above). To the extent that a fresh investigative obligation arose at that time, the Court has already found that it was discharged by the review and the report subsequently published; and that any complaints about alleged procedural failings of that review ought to have been brought within six months of the report’s publication (see Williams , cited above). 57.     The ceaseless efforts of the victims’ families led to the Government’s decision in 2009 to waive the thirty-year rule prohibiting publication of official documents and the Home Secretary’s 2010 announcement that the Hillsborough Independent Panel would be created to oversee the disclosure process (see paragraphs 32-33 above). The applicants have not alleged any bad faith on the part of the Government in failing to disclose the material earlier. They do not contest the Government’s explanation that the previous non-disclosure of the material was the consequence of the thirty-year rule prohibiting publication of documents held by Government departments. The applicants have also not suggested that Government officials were aware of any information in the disclosed material which undermined the conclusions of the earlier inquiries, inquests and reviews. In so far as the Panel report gives credence to suspicions of police interference in the original investigation into the Hillsborough disaster, such suspicions are now being examined by the IPCC and in the context of Operation Resolve (see paragraphs 40-41 above). It is too early to reach any conclusions as to the likely outcome of those inquiries. 58.     Even where no Article 2 procedural obligation exists, it is in the interests of governmental transparency and of justice in the wide sense for a government to arrange for a further review in connection with a national tragedy in response to concerns of victims or their families who are not satisfied with the results of the terminated investigations carried out in accordance with national law, notwithstanding that the tragedy has occurred many years earlier. The Government’s discretionary decisions in the present case to arrange for early, managed disclosure of documents and to create the Panel to oversee and report on the disclosure are therefore to be commended. With the publication of its report in 2012 (see paragraphs 34-35 above), the Panel has given hope to many families that the truth of the events surrounding the deaths of their sons, daughters, fathers and mothers will finally be fully elucidated. In terms of the Convention, as found above (see paragraph 53), the Panel’s findings may be taken to constitute a new element that revived the positive obligation of the British State to carry out adequate investigations into the cause and circumstances of the Hillsborough tragedy. However, it would be wrong to see the revival of the procedural obligation incumbent on the United Kingdom under Article 2 following the emergence of new relevant information as the continuation of the original obligation to investigate, bringing with it the consequence that the State may be taxed with culpable delays going back many years. Attaching retroactive effect in this way is likely to discourage governments from taking any voluntary steps that might give rise to the revival of the procedural obligation under Article 2 in the first place. 59.     The procedural obligation under Article 2 that is before this Court to consider in the present applications came into existence with the findings of the Panel. This being so, and having regard both to the understandable absence of criticism by the applicants of the prompt and effective measures taken so far by various authorities of the respondent State to further investigate the deaths of the Hillsborough victims following the setting up of the Panel and to the pending inquests and investigations, the applications must be regarded as premature and inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 1 and 4. If the applicants become dissatisfied with the progress being made or, upon the conclusion of the investigations and inquests, are not content with the outcome, it remains open to them to lodge further applications with the Court.   For these reasons, the Court unanimously Decides to join the applications; Declares the applications inadmissible. Françoise Elens-Passos   Ineta Ziemele   Registrar   President   Appendix   No. Application No. Lodged on Applicant Date of birth Place of residence Represented by   44301/13 10/06/2013 Karen HARRISON 11/10/1961 Liverpool   Paul HARRISON 18/12/1984 Liverpool   Claire HARRISON 07/12/1980 Liverpool     EAD Solicitors LLP   44379/13 12/06/2013 Gordon BARON 10/08/1951 Preston   Winifred BARON 10/10/1958 Preston   Margaret QUINN 19/07/1954 Perth (Australia)   Jean KEMP 25/11/1955 Sydney (Australia)   Catherine ELLIS 06/03/1950 Coventry   Anne BURKETT 18/10/1950 Birkenhead   Cathy GORMLEY 02/11/1972 Birkenhead   Jennifer LEWIS 20/12/1984 Birkenhead   Tracey MCKEOWN 01/07/1965 Liverpool   David CHURCH 15/02/1941 Liverpool   Tracey CHURCH 31/12/1971 Liverpool   Karen STANIFORD 28/06/1949 Liverpool   Barry DEVONSIDE 18/02/1947 Liverpool   Jacqueline DEVONSIDE 11/05/1950 Liverpool   Victoria JENKINS 09/11/1977 Liverpool   Dorothy GRIFFITHS 10/05/1949 Wrexham   Teresa GLOVER 17/04/1939 Liverpool   Joanne HAMILTON 11/08/1971 Liverpool   Stuart HAMILTON 27/09/1973 Virginia (USA)   Wendy HAMILTON 01/11/1951 Liverpool   Karen HANKIN 29/10/1959 Liverpool   Lyndsey HANKIN 07/03/1977 Liverpool         Stephen HARRISON 31/03/1981 Liverpool   Charlotte HENNESSY 09/06/1982 Chester   Stephen KELLY 01/07/1953 Liverpool   John OWENS 12/12/1944 St Helens   Patricia OWENS 17/03/1946 St Helens   Edward RIMMER 12/02/1938 Liverpool   Doreen RIMMER 08/06/1938 Liverpool   Kevin RIMMER 29/07/1960 Liverpool   Gail JOHNSON 16/10/1962 Liverpool     Joan TOOTLE 14/03/1947 Liverpool   Peter TOOTLE 04/03/1944 Liverpool   Rebecca SHAH 17/03/1972 London   Michael THOMPSON 05/03/1940 Liverpool   Daniel GORDON 20/08/1949 Liverpool   Sara WILLIAMS 06/07/1979 Liverpool   Stephen WRIGHT 11/05/1968 Liverpool     Broudie Jackson Canter   44384/13 18/06/2013 Stephanie SWEENEY 05/07/1965 Bury   Butcher & Barlow LLP