CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 8 avril 2014

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THE UNITED KINGDOM   (Application no. 31045/10)               JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   8 April 2014     FINAL   08/09/2014     This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention.   In the case of National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. the United Kingdom, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Ineta Ziemele, President ,   Päivi Hirvelä,   George Nicolaou,   Ledi Bianku,   Paul Mahoney,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek,   Faris Vehabović, judges , and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 4 March 2014, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 31045/10) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT – “the applicant union”), on 1 June 2010. 2.     The applicant union was represented before the Court by its General Secretary, Mr B. Crow. Its legal representative was Mr N. Todd of Thompsons Solicitors, Manchester. It was advised by Mr J. Hendy QC and Mr M. Ford QC, barristers in London. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms R. Tomlinson, Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 3.     A joint submission was received from the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) and the Trades Union Congress (TUC). A   submission was also received from Liberty. These three organisations were given leave by the President to intervene as third parties in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3 of the Rules of Court). The Government replied to the submission of Liberty. 4.     The applicant union alleged that its ability to protect its members’ interests was subject to excessive statutory restriction, in violation of its right to freedom of association. 5.     On 27 August 2012 notice of the application was given to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1 of the Convention). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 6.     The applicant is a trade union based in London with a membership of more than 80,000 persons employed in different sectors of the transport industry in the United Kingdom. 7.     Noting that in the domestic system industrial disputes are governed by very detailed legislative provisions, the applicant union raised two specific limitations on the statutory protection of strike action that it submitted were inconsistent with Article 11 of the Convention, each of the contested limitations being exposed by a separate set of facts. A.     Strike-ballot notice: The EDF situation 8.     The relevant set of facts relied on under this head involved the company EDF Energy Powerlink Ltd. (EDF), which was under contract to manage, operate and maintain the electrical power network used by London’s underground transport system. The RMT was one of several trade unions recognised by the company for the purposes of collective bargaining. In all, the company employed some 270 staff at three different sites, the biggest one being that at Tufnell Park with 155 employees. According to the applicant union, there were 52 RMT members there at the relevant time. The company would not have known which of its employees were members of a trade union, as it did not operate a system for deducting union subscriptions from staff wages. 9.     Between June and September 2009, the applicant union and the company held several rounds of negotiation on pay and conditions of service. Dissatisfied with the company’s offer, it decided to embark on industrial action and on 24 September gave the requisite ballot notice to the company (see paragraph 18 below). The notice described the category of workers that would be voting on industrial action as “Engineer/Technician” and stated how many of such were based at each site. The following day the company wrote to the applicant union, stating that it did not recognise the term “Technician” (it categorised its workers in a more precise way: fitters, jointers, test-room inspectors, day testers, shift testers, OLBI fitters). It considered the ballot notice served on it was therefore not compliant with the relevant statutory provisions. The applicant union replied the following week, maintaining that the term it had used was sufficient to allow the company to know which employees were concerned, thereby meeting the purpose of the relevant provisions of law. 10.     Following a further exchange of correspondence between the two sides, the company applied to the High Court for an injunction to restrain the applicant union from calling industrial action on the basis of the ballot. The injunction was granted by Blake J on 23 October 2009. 11.     The judge did not accept the applicant union’s claim that the statutory requirements unduly restricted the exercise of its right to call industrial action, this same argument having been rejected by the Court of Appeal in the case of Metrobus Ltd v. Unite the Union ([2009] EWCA Civ   829). He also rejected the argument that since the procedure was still at an early stage it would be premature to put a stop to it. Instead he considered the risk of unlawful strike action to be sufficiently imminent to justify the injunction. Given the sector involved, the implications of a shutdown would be substantial, with widespread ramifications elsewhere. Addressing the question whether the applicant union had in fact given sufficient indication of the category of staff that would be balloted, the judge found that it had not, since the union’s members at Tufnell Park included persons working at different trades. The applicant union was not under an absolute duty, but instead a duty to do its reasonable best to provide sufficient information to the company. The fact that it used its own system of job classification was relevant but not decisive. Similarly, the fact that a union might not record or possess such information could be a highly material consideration, but not necessarily a decisive one. The applicant union had accepted that it was practicable for a union to supply the necessary information in the context of a small place of employment – it was therefore neither onerous nor unreasonable to require it to do so. Finally, the judge observed that while there was as yet no stated intention on the part of the applicant union to call a strike (the ballot not having taken place), there was a clear nexus between the failure to provide the requisite notice and the employer’s ability to respond to the situation either by making preparations for a work stoppage or seeking to persuade employees not to vote for industrial action. The applicant union’s failure to comply with the statutory requirements was therefore not a mere technical or immaterial breach. 12.     Application for permission to appeal was refused on the papers on 24 November 2009. Renewed application for permission to appeal was refused on 26 January 2010, by which point the industrial dispute between the applicant union and EDF had already been resolved. 13.     Following the granting of the injunction against the strike, the applicant union set about gathering the precise job descriptions of the workers concerned and included these in a fresh notice of a strike ballot, the result of which supported industrial action. This went ahead on dates in December 2009 and early January 2010. EDF made an improved offer on 7   January 2010 which was accepted by the union’s members and took effect as a collective agreement on 1 April of the same year. B.     Secondary strike action: The Hydrex situation 14.     The set of facts relied on under this head involved some RMT   members who were employed in railway maintenance by Fastline Limited, a company that formed part of a group of companies known as Jarvis plc. Another company in the group, Jarvis Rail Limited, was engaged in rail engineering work. At the time, Fastline and Jarvis Rail Limited (“Jarvis”) employed approximately 1,200 persons in total, 569 of whom were members of the RMT. In August 2007, Fastline transferred part of its undertaking, comprising twenty employees, to another company known as Hydrex Equipment (UK) Ltd (“Hydrex”). These employees’ existing terms and conditions were preserved by Hydrex, as required by law (Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006). According to the applicant union, the employees involved were nonetheless concerned for their situation, as Hydrex workers were paid significantly less. It also appeared that trade unions had less influence in that company. 15.     In March 2009 Hydrex’s management informed the ex-Jarvis employees that because of difficult market conditions it intended to reduce the level of their terms and conditions to that of other Hydrex staff. This meant a reduction in salary of some 36-40%, according to the applicant union. In the months that followed, the applicant union made representations to Hydrex on behalf of the employees concerned but without achieving any agreement. When the company indicated that it intended to proceed with its plan, the applicant union organised a strike ballot of the workers concerned (seventeen by that stage). They voted in favour of a strike, which took place between 6 November and 9 November 2009. During the strike, the participants organised pickets at a number of the sites where they normally carried out their work. This caused Hydrex to write to the applicant union to remind it that by law picketing could take place only at or near the employer’s premises and to warn that the union was exposing itself to liability for any economic loss incurred by the company due to this unlawful action (see paragraph 19 below). 16.     A second strike was announced for 18-20 November 2009, but this was postponed when Hydrex indicated its willingness to resume discussions with the applicant union. This led to a revised offer which the union submitted to its Hydrex members, recommending that they accept it. The result of the vote was known on 21 December 2009. Nine votes were cast, all of them rejecting the Hydrex offer. According to the applicant union, its position was extremely weak given the very small number of its members in the Hydrex workforce. These were far too few for their strike action to have any appreciable effect on the company, whose activities had not really been disrupted at all. The applicant union considered that it would have been in a position to defend its members’ interests much more effectively had it been able to mobilise its Jarvis members as well. The simple threat of a strike on this scale, and a fortiori an actual stoppage, would have exerted significantly more pressure on Hydrex to maintain existing terms and conditions. The applicant union stated that Jarvis employees would have been willing to strike in support of their colleagues at Hydrex. Instead, the Hydrex members had had to stand alone, and in the end had no option but to accept the new terms and conditions. They did so under protest. 17.     According to the applicant union, neither Jarvis nor Hydrex exist any longer, having been put into administration in March 2010 and November 2011 respectively. The Hydrex undertaking was purchased by another company, which in turn sold it on in November 2012. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE 18.     In relation to the EDF case, Blake J referred to the following provisions of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act   1992 (“the 1992 Act”): Section 226 “(1)     An act done by a trade union to induce a person to take part, or continue to take part, in industrial action (a)     is not protected unless the industrial action has the support of a ballot, and (b)     where section 226A falls to be complied with in relation to the person’s employer, is not protected as respects the employer unless the trade union has complied with section 226A in relation to him.” Section 226A “(1)     The trade union must take such steps as are reasonably necessary to ensure that— (a) not later than the seventh day before the opening day of the ballot, the notice specified in subsection (2), ... is received by every person who it is reasonable for the union to believe (at the latest time when steps could be taken to comply with paragraph (a)) will be the employer of persons who will be entitled to vote in the ballot. (2)     The notice referred to in paragraph (a) of subsection (1) is a notice in writing— (a)     stating that the union intends to hold the ballot, (b)     specifying the date which the union reasonably believes will be the opening day of the ballot, and (c)     containing— (i)     the lists mentioned in subsection (2A) and the figures mentioned in subsection (2B), together with an explanation of how those figures were arrived at, or ... (2A)     The lists are— (a)     a list of the categories of employee to which the employees concerned belong, and (b)     a list of the workplaces at which the employees concerned work. (2B)     The figures are— (a)     the total number of employees concerned, (b)     the number of the employees concerned in each of the categories in the list mentioned in subsection (2A)(a), and (c)     the number of the employees concerned who work at each workplace in the list mentioned in subsection (2A)(b). ... (2D)     The lists and figures supplied under this section, or the information mentioned in subsection (2C) that is so supplied, must be as accurate as is reasonably practicable in the light of the information in the possession of the union at the time when it complies with subsection (1)(a).” 19.     In relation to the Hydrex situation, the statutory protection against liability in tort regarding acts done “in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute” (section 219 of the 1992 Act) is confined, by section 244 of the same Act, to “a dispute between workers and their employer”. Secondary action is expressly excluded from statutory protection by section   224 of the Act, which defines it as follows: “(2)     There is secondary action in relation to a trade dispute when, and only when, a person— (a)     induces another to break a contract of employment or interferes or induces another to interfere with its performance, or (b)     threatens that a contract of employment under which he or another is employed will be broken or its performance interfered with, or that he will induce another to break a contract of employment or to interfere with its performance, and the employer under the contract of employment is not the employer party to the dispute.” The provisions on peaceful picketing are contained in section 220 of the Act, which provides: “(1)     It is lawful for a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute to attend— (a)     at or near his own place of work, or (b)     if he is an official of a trade union, at or near the place of work of a member of the union whom he is accompanying and whom he represents, for the purpose only of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or peacefully persuading any person to work or abstain from working. (2)     If a person works or normally works— (a)     otherwise than at any one place, or (b)     at a place the location of which is such that attendance there for a purpose mentioned in subsection (1) is impracticable, his place of work for the purposes of that subsection shall be any premises of his employer from which he works or from which his work is administered.” 20.     Both parties referred to the previous legislative regime, which included secondary action in the scope of the statutory protection. The Government explained that secondary action was first outlawed by the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1927, adopted in the aftermath of the general strike of 1926. The situation changed with the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act 1946, which lifted the ban. 21.     Further reforms occurred in the 1970s. The Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974 afforded substantially broader protection to industrial action than is the case at present. It provided at section 13(1) (as amended in 1976): “An act done by a person in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute shall not be actionable in tort on the ground only— (a)     that it induces another person to break a contract or interferes or induces any other person to interfere with its performance; or . (b)     that it consists in his threatening that a contract (whether one to which he is a party or not) will be broken or its performance interfered with, or that he will induce another person to break a contract or to interfere with its performance.” 22.     This provision was considered by the House of Lords in the case of Express Newspapers Ltd v. McShane and another ([1980] AC 672). The case involved secondary action in the newspaper industry, led by the National Union of Journalists. The majority of the House held that the test to be applied to determine whether an act enjoyed the protection of section   13(1) was a subjective one, that is to say, it was sufficient that the person honestly believed that the act in question might further the cause of those taking part in the dispute. The genuineness of such belief could be tested by the courts, but the person calling the strike did not need to prove that it was reasonably capable of achieving the objective. Lord Wilberforce dissented on the nature of the test, but concurred with the finding that the injunction granted against the union should be discharged. 23.     Although the applicant union maintained that the McShane judgment was not a significant development in the law, in that it merely confirmed the interpretation of clear statutory language, the case was referred to during the parliamentary debates leading to the passage of the Employment Act 1980 as one of the reasons for introducing restrictions on secondary action (in section 17 of that Act). The 1980 Act retained immunity for secondary action provided that three conditions were satisfied: (i) that it was taken against first suppliers or customers of the employer in dispute or against associated employers of the employer which were substituting for it during the dispute; (ii) that its principal purpose was to directly prevent or disrupt the supply of goods or services between the employer in dispute and his supplier or customer during the dispute; and (iii) that it was likely to achieve that purpose. 24.     The current rule was originally introduced by the Employment Act 1990, and then re-enacted in the 1992 Act in the terms set out above. 25.     The parties provided statistical information on the number of days lost to industrial action in the United Kingdom, going back to the 1970s. The Government pointed out that in that decade, the average number of days lost each year was 12.9 million. This decreased in the 1980s to an average of 7.2 million days. From the early 1990s to the present day, the figure is much lower, standing at 700,000 days lost per year on average. They attributed part of this decline at least to the ban on secondary action. The applicant union disputed that interpretation. It noted that the available statistics did not distinguish between primary and secondary strikes. It was therefore impossible to identify the true extent of secondary action before 1980 and, consequently, impossible to ascertain the impact of the restrictions introduced in 1980 and 1990. In the applicant union’s view, secondary action had been relatively rare, the overwhelming majority of strikes at that time had been primary strikes. It referred to official figures (contained in a Government publication, the “Employment Gazette”) indicating that, since the 1960s, the United Kingdom was consistently close to the European average for days lost to industrial action. According to this source, the country had been middle-ranking since the end of the 1970s. The only exception was for 1984, on account of the long and widespread strike in the mining industry that year. The Government submitted that the comparative statistics needed to be interpreted with caution, given the profound transformation of Europe over the past twenty years. The fact that the United Kingdom remained close to the European average in this regard indicated that, contrary to the applicant union’s point of view, the rules on industrial action were not so restrictive as to make it excessively difficult to organise strikes. III.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW 26.     In support of its application, the applicant union included references to other international legal instruments, and the interpretation given to them by the competent organs. The most relevant and detailed of these materials are referred to below. A.     International Labour Organization Conventions 27.     While there is no provision in the Conventions adopted by the International Labour Organization (ILO) expressly conferring a right to strike, both the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (“the Committee of Experts”) have progressively developed a number of principles on the right to strike, based on Articles 3 and 10 of the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948   (No. 87) (summarised in “Giving globalization a human face”, International Labour Office, 2012, § 117). This Convention was ratified by the United Kingdom on 27 June 1949. 1.     Concerning notice requirements 28.     The Committee of Experts has commented several times upon the notice requirements for industrial action in the United Kingdom. The applicant union referred to the following statement, adopted in 2008: “In its previous comments, the Committee had taken note of comments made by the TUC to the effect that the notice requirements for an industrial action to be protected by immunity were unjustifiably burdensome. The Committee notes that according to the Government, a number of measures have already been taken to simplify sections 226-235 of the TULRA and 104-109 of the 1995 Order; moreover, as part of a plan published in December 2006 to simplify aspects of employment law, the Government explicitly invited trade unions to come forward with their ideas to simplify trade union law further. Since then, the Government has held discussions with the TUC to examine their ideas to simplify aspects of the law on industrial action ballots and notices. These discussions are ongoing. The Committee notes that in its latest comments, the TUC notes that there has been no progress in this reform. The Committee requests the Government to indicate in its next report progress made in this regard .” [1] 29.     More recently, in a direct request to the Government of the United Kingdom, the Committee of Experts stated: “In its previous comments, the Committee had taken note of comments made by the Trade Union Congress (TUC) to the effect that the notice requirements for an industrial action to be protected by immunity were unjustifiably burdensome. The Committee requested the Government to continue to provide information on any developments, as well as any relevant statistics or reports on the practical application and effect of these requirements. The Committee notes the Government’s indication that the Court of Appeal decision in RMT v. Serco and in ASLEF v. London Midland (2011) EWCA 226, overturned injunctions which had been obtained by Serco and London Midland Railway against the two main national transport unions, the RMT and ASLEF. In both cases, the injunctions had been obtained on the basis of the unions’ breaches of statutory balloting and notification procedures. This case was the latest in a series of cases assessing the extent of unions’ technical obligations to ensure that a fair balloting process had taken place. In the RMT v. Serco decision, the Court of Appeal issued some key clarification so that in future it is likely to be more difficult for employers to obtain injunctions to prevent strike action as a result of breaches of the balloting and notice requirements. A Court of Appeal decision is binding on all lower courts. Subsequent to this case, in Balfour Beatty v. Unite (2012) EWHC 267 (QB), the Court found against Balfour Beatty, taking account of the Serco case and the need to strike a balance between striving for democratic legitimacy and imposing unrealistic burdens on unions and their officers. The Committee notes the TUC’s observation that, while it greatly welcomes both decisions, it considers that they do not fully address the problems arising under the legislation that it has identified and that the legislation continues to impose intolerable demands on trade unions. The Committee notes these developments with interest and requests the Government to provide its comments on the concerns raised by the TUC .” [2] 2.     Concerning secondary action 30.     The Committee of Experts has taken the following view (see “Giving globalization a human face”, § 125): “With regard to so-called ‘sympathy’ strikes, the Committee considers that a general prohibition of this form of strike action could lead to abuse, particularly in the context of globalization characterized by increasing interdependence and the internationalization of production, and that workers should be able to take such action, provided that the initial strike they are supporting is itself lawful.” 31.     The Committee on Freedom of Association also considers this form of industrial action to be protected by international labour law (see “Freedom of Association”, Digest of the decisions and principles of the Freedom of Association Committee of the Governing Body of the ILO , Fifth (revised) edition, International Labour Office, 2006): “534.     A general prohibition of sympathy strikes could lead to abuse and workers should be able to take such action provided the initial strike they are supporting is itself lawful. ... 538.     A ban on strike action not linked to a collective dispute to which the employee or union is a party is contrary to the principles of freedom of association.” 32.     In its consideration of the United Kingdom’s observance of Convention No. 87, the Committee of Experts has repeatedly criticised the fact that secondary strikes are illegal. The initial criticism was included in its 1989 [3] observation concerning the United Kingdom: “The Committee notes that the common law renders virtually all forms of strikes or other industrial action unlawful as a matter of civil law. This means that workers and unions who engage in such action are liable to be sued for damages by employers (or   other parties) who suffer loss as a consequence, and (more importantly in practical terms) may be restrained from committing unlawful acts by means of injunctions (issued on both an interlocutory and a permanent basis). It appears to the Committee that unrestricted access to such remedies would deny workers the right to take strikes or other industrial action in order to protect and to promote their economic and social interests. It is most important, therefore, that workers and unions should have some measure of protection against civil liability. There has been legislative recognition of this imperative since 1906 in the form of a series of ‘immunities’ (or, more accurately, ‘protections’) against tort action for trade unions and their members and officials. The current version of the ‘immunities’ is to be found in the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1974. The scope of these protections has been narrowed in a number of respects since 1980. The Committee notes, for example, that section 15 of the 1974 Act has been amended so as to limit the right to picket to a worker’s own place of work or, in the case of a trade union official, the place of work of the relevant membership, whilst section 17 of the 1980 Act removes protection from ‘secondary action’ in the sense of action directed against an employer who is not directly a party to a given trade dispute. In addition, the definition of ‘trade dispute’ in section 29 of the 1974 Act has been narrowed so as to encompass only disputes between workers and their own employer, rather than disputes between ‘employers and workers’ or ‘workers and workers’ as was formerly the case. Taken together, these changes appear to make it virtually impossible for workers and unions lawfully to engage in any form of boycott activity, or ‘sympathetic’ action against parties not directly involved in a given dispute. The Committee has never expressed any decided view on the use of boycotts as an exercise of the right to strike. However, it appears to the Committee that where a boycott relates directly to the social and economic interests of the workers involved in either or both of the original dispute and the secondary action, and where the original dispute and the secondary action are not unlawful in themselves, then that boycott should be regarded as a legitimate exercise of the right to strike. This is clearly consistent with the approach the Committee has adopted in relation to ‘sympathy strikes’: It would appear that more frequent recourse is being had to this form of action (i.e.   sympathy strikes) because of the structure or the concentration of industries or the distribution of work centres in different regions of the world. The Committee considers that a general prohibition of sympathy strikes could lead to abuse and that workers should be able to take such action provided the initial strike they are supporting is itself lawful.” 33.     It appears that the Committee of Experts did not take a definitive position on the ban until its 1995 observation concerning the United Kingdom, when it observed as follows: “The Committee draws the Government’s attention to paragraph 168 of its 1994 General Survey on Freedom of Association and Collective Bargaining where it indicates that a general prohibition on sympathy strikes could lead to abuse and that workers should be able to take such action, provided the initial strike they are supporting is itself lawful. The lifting of immunity opens such industrial action to be actionable in tort and therefore would constitute a serious impediment to the workers’ right to carry out sympathy strikes.” It has maintained this view since, stating in its most recent review of the situation (2012 observation, see Report of the Committee of Experts to the International Labour Conference, 102nd Session, 2013, ILC.102/III(1A), pp.   195-96).): “ Immunities in respect of civil liability for strikes and other industrial action (sections 223 and 224 of the TULRA) . In its previous comments, the Committee had noted that according to the TUC, due to the decentralized nature of the industrial relations system, it was essential for workers to be able to take action against employers who are easily able to undermine union action by complex corporate structures, transferring work, or hiving off companies. The Committee generally raised the need to protect the right of workers to take industrial action in relation to matters which affect them even though, in certain cases, the direct employer may not be party to the dispute, and to participate in sympathy strikes provided the initial strike they are supporting is itself lawful. The Committee takes note of the Government indication that: (1) its position remains as set out in its report for 2006 ‑ 08, that the rationale has not changed and that it therefore has no plans to change the law in this area; and (2) this issue forms part of a matter brought before the ECHR by the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers (RMT) and that the Court has yet to consider the case. The Committee recalls the previous concern it raised that the globalization of the economy and the delocalization of work centres may have a severe impact on the right of workers’ organizations to organize their activities in a manner so as to defend effectively their members’ interests should lawful industrial action be too restrictively defined. In these circumstances, the Committee once again requests the Government to review sections 223 and 224 of the TULRA, in full consultation with the social partners, and to provide further information in its next report on the outcome of these consultations .” [4] B.     European Social Charter 34.     The right to strike is protected by Article 6, paragraph 4, of the European Social Charter, which the United Kingdom ratified on 11 July 1962. It provides as follows: “With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to bargain collectively, the Contracting Parties undertake: ... [to] recognise: 4.     the right of workers and employers to collective action in cases of conflicts of interest, including the right to strike, subject to obligations that might arise out of collective agreements previously entered into.” 1.     Concerning notice requirements 35.     The European Committee on Social Rights (ECSR) has examined the British rules on strike ballots and deemed them incompatible with the proper exercise of the right to strike. In its most recent assessment of the matter (Conclusions XIX-3, 2010) it stated: “The Committee considered in its previous conclusions ... that the requirement to give notice to an employer of a ballot on industrial action, in addition to the strike notice that must be issued before taking action, is excessive (even the simplified requirements introduced by the Employment Relations Act (ERA)2004). As there have been no changes to the situation, the Committee reiterates its finding that the situation is not in conformity with Article 6 § 4 of the Charter in this respect.” 2.     Concerning secondary action 36.     Like the ILO Committee of Experts, the ECSR has consistently criticised the situation in the United Kingdom. In its first consideration of the matter (Conclusions XIII-1, 1993) it stated: “Referring to the report, the Committee noted the Government’s observations concerning the limitations on the right to strike, imposed by the 1990 Employment Act in respect of Great Britain. In particular, it noted that while the Government emphasised the importance of protecting the right of employers to dismiss those engaged in a strike, it also emphasised that the legislation continues to: (i)     allow special protection for peaceful pickets at their own place of work; (ii)     provide statutory immunity to peaceful and lawful pickets; (iii)     provide statutory immunity for lawful trade disputes. The Committee also noted the recent observations of the ILO Committee of Experts recommending that the legislation be amended to conform with the principle of freedom of association in accordance with ILO Convention No. 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise, 1948). Having regard to this information and having noted that there is no immunity afforded individuals in respect of: –     secondary industrial action other than inducement in the course of peaceful picketing; –     industrial action organised in support of employees dismissed while taking part in unofficial action; the Committee reiterated its previous negative conclusion for the reasons cited in the twelfth cycle of supervision.” (Conclusions XIII-I, reference period 1990-1991).” 37.     In the ECSR’s most recent pronouncement on the matter (Conclusions XIX-3, 2010) it said: “In its previous conclusions ... the Committee found that lawful collective action was limited to disputes between workers and their employer, thus preventing a union from taking action against the de facto employer if this was not the immediate employer. It furthermore noted that British courts excluded collective action concerning a future employer and future terms and conditions of employment in the context of a transfer of part of a business (University College London NHS Trust v.   UNISON). The Committee therefore considered that the scope for workers to defend their interests through lawful collective action was excessively circumscribed in the United Kingdom. Given that there have been no changes to the situation, the Committee reiterates its finding that the situation is not in conformity with Article 6 §   4 of the Charter in this respect.” C.     Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union The relevant provisions are the following: Article 12 Freedom of assembly and of association “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association at all levels, in particular in political, trade union and civic matters, which implies the right of everyone to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his or her interests. ...” Article 28 Right of collective bargaining and action “Workers and employers, or their respective organisations, have, in accordance with Community law and national laws and practices, the right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate levels and, in cases of conflicts of interest, to take collective action to defend their interests, including strike action.” Article 28 appears in Title IV of the Charter. As regards the United Kingdom, reference must be made to Protocol (No 30) to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. It provides, in so far as relevant: Article 1 “... 2.     In particular, and for the avoidance of doubt, nothing in Title IV of the Charter creates justiciable rights applicable to Poland or the United Kingdom except in so far as Poland or the United Kingdom has provided for such rights in its national law.” IV.     ELEMENTS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 38.     The parties provided some elements of comparative law in relation to secondary strikes. Both referred to a comparative study on the regulation of industrial action in Europe ( Strike rules in the EU27 and beyond: A comparative overview [5] , W. Warneck, European Trade Union Institute for Research, Education and Health and Safety (ETUI-REHS), 2007). According to this source, secondary action is protected or permitted, subject to varying restrictions and conditions, in the great majority of the member States of the European Union. The States that, like the United Kingdom, do not permit secondary action were identified as Austria, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 39.     In their initial submissions, the Government sought to draw support for the situation in the United Kingdom by reference to the situation in the following States: Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, Austria, Norway, Denmark and Germany. They contended that these illustrated a broad tendency in Europe to subject secondary action to much more restrictive conditions than primary industrial action. In reply to this the applicant union provided to the Court statements from labour-law experts in a number of European countries contradicting the Government’s remarks. The applicant union concluded that the United Kingdom is the most restrictive among the Contracting Parties to the Convention in this respect. The Government concluded that the material demonstrated that, notwithstanding the great variety of industrial-relations systems and traditions in Europe, most States distinguished between primary and secondary action, with greater restriction on the latter. The broad right claimed by the applicant union was not supported by any real European consensus. 40.     The Court notes that comparative information is available from the monitoring mechanism of the European Social Charter [6] . As indicated above, this body has repeatedly criticised the situation in the United Kingdom, which appears to be the only State subject to criticism on this specific ground. The ECSR has also commented in recent years on the lawfulness of secondary action (sometimes using the term “sympathy” or “solidarity” action) in the following States: Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Malta, Norway, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Spain and Sweden. With reference to the three other States identified in the Warneck study as not permitting secondary action, the Court notes that the ECSR has not criticised the situation in the Netherlands on this ground. Nor has it made any comment at all in relation to the situation in Austria or Luxembourg, neither State having accepted Article 6, paragraph 4, of the Social Charter. 41.     Some further comparative information is available from the publications and legal databases of the ILO. For example, the Committee of Experts referred to the removal from the Turkish Constitution of the prohibition on solidarity strikes (“Giving globalization a human face”, §   125). It has also referred, in its review of State implementation of Convention No. 87, to the lawfulness of sympathy strikes in Albania, Georgia and Latvia. The Committee on Freedom of Association has referred to solidarity strike action in Hungary (complaint no. 2775), and noted that Russian law does not expressly provide for, or for that matter prohibit, such action (complaint no. 2251). Additionally, the Court notes that in Swiss law strikes are permitted if they “relate to employment relations” (Article 28 § 3 of the Constitution). According to one constitutional commentary, a strike must actually be about working conditions, and not pursue corporatist or political objectives outside of the enterprise or branch ( Droit constitutionnel suisse , vol. II, Auer, Malinverni and Hottelier, p. 723). THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION 42.     The applicant union contended that the two situations described above, regarding the statutory requirements on strike-ballot notice and on secondary strike action, disclosed excessive restrictions on its freedom of association under Article 11 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “ 1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2.     No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.” 43.     The Government contested that argument. 44.     The Court will examine consecutively the two sets of facts presented by the applicant union and the distinct Convention issues to which each gives rise. A.     Admissibility 1.     Strike-ballot notice 45.     Regarding the first complaint, notice of which was not given to the Government, the Court finds that it is inadmissible for the following reason. The facts of the practical example provided, as reported by the applicant union, indicate that, while the union experienced some delay in taking action to protect the interests of its members, it succeeded in holding a strike two months later. That action, by the applicant union’s own admission, induced EDF to improve its offer to union members, who accepted it and it took effect as a collective agreement shortly afterwards. That successful outcome cannot be disregarded. It would be artificial for the Court to consider the issuing of the injunction against the RMT in isolation from subsequent events. In sum, there is no basis here for the Court to find that the applicant union’s exercise of its rights under Article 11 of the Convention has been interfered with, over and above being required to comply with the procedural requirements set down in law, which it succeeded in doing. While those requirements have been the subject of criticism by other international bodies (see paragraphs 26-37 above), the Court can only examine complaints in light of their concrete facts. It considers that what the EDF situation discloses in reality is ultimately successful collective action by the applicant union on behalf of its members. This aspect of the application is therefore manifestly ill ‑ founded and so must be rejected as inadmissible pursuant to Article   35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 2.     Secondary strike action 46.     In relation to the second aspect of the application, a first issue of admissibility arises out of the fact that the applicant union has complained of the sam