CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 15 avril 2014

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TURKEY   (Application no. 43875/09)               JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   15 April 2014       FINAL   15/07/2014   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Asalya v. Turkey, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Guido Raimondi, President,   Işıl Karakaş,   András Sajó,   Nebojša Vučinić,   Helen Keller,   Egidijus Kūris,   Robert Spano, judges, and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 18 March 2014, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 43875/09) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Mr İslam H.M. Asalya (“the applicant”), on 14   August 2009. The applicant is stateless and holds a passport issued by the Palestinian Authority. 2.     The applicant was represented by Ms L. Demir, Mr A. Yılmaz and Ms   Ü. Sırımsı Candemir, lawyers practising in Tekirdağ and Istanbul. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent. 3.     On 4 January 2010 the President of the Chamber to which the case was allocated decided, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court, to indicate to the Government of Turkey, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should not be deported to Israel and/or the Gaza Strip until the outcome of the procedure before the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (“the UNHCR”) in his regard was known. It was also decided on the same date to give the case priority under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. 4.     On 31 August 2011 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1988 and lives in Istanbul. A.     Background to the case 6.     The applicant is a Palestinian who lived in the Gaza Strip until March 2008. He claims to have lost approximately twenty-five relatives to Israeli attacks over the years, and to have personally suffered three missile attacks between 2000 and 2007. According to his allegations before the Court, he was directly and personally targeted in the most recent attack, in 2007, as the missile that struck near him on that day immediately followed an anonymous call on his mobile phone asking him to confirm his name, a ruse by the Israeli forces to identify his location. That attack left him severely injured and rendered him paraplegic. 7.     On 25 March 2008 the applicant was taken to Turkey by a humanitarian organisation, the Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief ( İnsani Yardım Vakfı , “İHH”), along with fortynine other injured civilians from the Palestinian territories, to have access to better medical care. 8.     In June 2008 the Ministry of the Interior (“the Ministry”) issued the group of Palestinians with short-term residence permits in view of their continuing medical treatment in Turkey. 9.     On 30 April 2009 the applicant married a Turkish national, who was also his physiotherapist. Because he was married to a Turkish national, he was granted a long-term temporary residence permit valid until 17   May 2010. B.     The applicant’s arrest and detention 10.     On 12 August 2009, at approximately 11 a.m., two police officers from the Istanbul Police Headquarters arrived at the applicant’s house. They informed the applicant and his wife that his presence was required at the police headquarters for an interview and that he would be brought back afterwards. Once he was at the police headquarters, however, he was verbally informed that his temporary residence permit had been cancelled in accordance with orders received from the Ministry and that he would soon be deported from Turkey. Without being given any further information as to the reasons for the deportation order, when it would be carried out and where he would be deported to, the applicant was placed in the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre attached to the Istanbul Police Headquarters. 11.     According to the police record drawn up on the same day at   3.30   p.m., the Ministry had decided on 27 July 2009 to deport the applicant. This decision had been taken at the request of the National Intelligence Agency of Turkey, which had received intelligence regarding the applicant’s possible involvement in acts of international terrorism. Neither the Ministry’s deportation order nor the police record in question was served on the applicant. 12.     Upon learning of the applicant’s detention, on 12 August 2009 his wife got in touch with a local human rights organisation, Mazlumder , which in turn contacted the UNHCR to seek assistance in securing the applicant’s release and halting his deportation. Mazlumder also informed the UNHCR of the poor conditions in which the applicant was being detained, including the fact that he had spent the night sleeping on a table, that he was not able to use the squat toilets at the detention centre, and that his medical treatment had been stopped on account of his detention. 13.     On 14 August 2009 the applicant brought an action against the Ministry before the Ankara Administrative Court seeking the quashing of the deportation order, and also requested a stay of its execution until the matter had been examined by the administrative court. He maintained before the administrative court that the deportation order was unlawful, in view of his marriage to a Turkish citizen and possession of a residence permit valid until May 2010. The unlawful deportation order had moreover not been communicated to him at any point, nor had the Ministry sought his response prior to its delivery. The State authorities had similarly not put forward any concrete evidence to demonstrate why his continued presence in Turkey was perceived as a threat to national security. The applicant claimed that in the event of his deportation to Israel or elsewhere, his right to life and right to liberty and security would be put at risk, that he would face torture or even death at the hands of Israeli forces or their collaborators, and that the unity of his family would be destroyed. Furthermore, his medical treatment would be stopped, causing irreversible harm to his health. The applicant lastly complained that his detention was unlawful, and also maintained that the conditions of his detention at the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre were highly degrading, in view of the lack of basic infrastructure to accommodate people with disabilities in his situation. As he was not able to use the squat toilet available at the place of detention, he had to be taken to a hotel nearby by police officers each time he had to relieve himself. It appears that his wife was occasionally able to accompany them to the hotel. His medical treatment was also stopped during his detention there, which was likely to result in the worsening of his condition. 14.     In a decision delivered on the very same day, the Ankara Administrative Court asked the Ministry for a copy of its deportation order of 27 July 2009, as well as all the information and documents which formed the basis of that decision. Moreover, noting the irreversible nature of the harm that might be caused in the event of the applicant’s deportation, it ordered a stay of its execution until a further decision. 15.     On the same date, the applicant’s lawyer applied for release from the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre on the basis of the Ankara Administrative Court decision granting a stay of execution. 16.     Following a decision of the Ministry on 18 August 2009, the applicant was released from the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre. 17.     On 9 September 2009 the Ministry submitted its replies to the Ankara Administrative Court in relation to the applicant’s request for the quashing of the deportation order. It stated that the decision to deport had been taken on the basis of a National Intelligence Agency report dated 16   July 2009. The report indicated that within the context of ongoing investigations in connection with international terrorism the applicant had been identified as having had contact with some telephone numbers registered in Israel on issues such as “procurement of arms, new recruits to the group, and measures to be taken to ensure the confidentiality of activities”. His presence in Turkey was therefore perceived as a risk to national security within the meaning of section 8 (5) of the Passport Act (Law no. 5682) and section 19 of the Act on the Residence and Travel of Foreigners in Turkey (Law no. 5683). It also submitted a number of supporting documents as an annex. These documents were not made available to the applicant, nor were they later submitted to the Court. 18.     On 16 September 2009 the Ankara Administrative Court decided that there were no elements warranting the suspension of the applicant’s deportation. It thus reversed its previous decision of 14 August 2009. 19.     On 30 September 2009 the applicant appealed against the decision of the Ankara Administrative Court lifting the stay of execution of his deportation. He submitted that the Ministry had not put forward any tangible evidence in support of its allegation that he posed a threat to national security such as to necessitate his deportation from Turkey. If the Ministry went through with its decision, his physical integrity would be irreparably damaged on account of the termination of the medical treatment he was undergoing in Istanbul. Furthermore, his deportation would disrupt the family life he had since established in Turkey, and would deprive him of the vital assistance and care undertaken by his wife. In addition, if deported he would most certainly be subjected to torture by Israeli forces and his life would be put at risk. Lastly, the applicant drew the administrative court’s attention to his pending application to the UNHCR for refugee status, and also complained of the conditions in which he had been detained between 12 and 18 August 2009 at the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre, which had lacked basic amenities to accommodate people with disabilities, such as a non-squat toilet and a lift. 20.     On 14 October 2009 the Ankara Regional Administrative Court rejected the applicant’s appeal against the Ankara Administrative Court’s decision of 16 September 2009, which had effectively lifted the stay of execution of his deportation, without providing any reasons. 21.     In the meantime, on 25 September 2009 the applicant had applied to the UNHCR for refugee status. On 22   October 2009 he was interviewed by the Ankara office of the UNHCR as part of the refugee status determination process. 22.     On 22 December 2009 the applicant’s lawyer was informed by the State authorities that, pursuant to the latest decision of the Ankara Regional Administrative Court, the applicant was requested to leave Turkey within fifteen days, and that if he refused to comply with that request he would be deported forcibly. 23.     On 24 December 2009 the applicant claimed asylum in Turkey. He stated that he had been forced to leave Gaza because of the persecution he had faced there. Following an Israeli attack on his house in Gaza, which had left him severely injured, he had come to Turkey to seek medical treatment. This treatment was still ongoing, and in the meantime he had married a Turkish citizen. He claimed that although he had never been involved in any acts of violence, he was wanted by Israel as a terrorist. Returning to his country would entail a great risk to his life, if not from Israeli attacks then because of the termination of his treatment. He would also face torture if captured by the Israelis. 24.     On the same date, the applicant’s lawyer also sent a letter to the Foreigners’ Department of the Istanbul Police Headquarters, reiterating the grounds of appeal against the applicant’s deportation. The lawyer emphasised in the letter that the Ministry’s deportation order had not been served on the applicant, and that the administrative proceedings for the annulment of the deportation order were still pending before the Ankara Administrative Court, which had not yet delivered a judgment on the merits. She referred in this regard to the National Action Plan on Asylum and Immigration, adopted by the Government of Turkey on 25 March 2005, which held that the execution of deportation decisions was to be suspended once administrative proceedings seeking to overturn them had been instituted. C.     Proceedings before the Court 25.     On 28 December 2009 the applicant’s representative asked the Court, under Rule 39 of its Rules of Court, to adopt an interim measure to halt the applicant’s imminent deportation from Turkey. 26.     On 4 January 2010 the President of the Chamber to which the case was allocated decided, in the interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings before the Court, to indicate to the Government of Turkey, under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant should not be deported to Israel or the Gaza Strip until the delivery of a decision by the UNHCR in his regard. D.     Developments following the application of the interim measure 27.     In the light of the interim measure applied by the Court, on 6   January 2010 the Foreigners’ Department of the Istanbul Police Headquarters ordered that the applicant be granted a three-month temporary residence permit, renewable until further notice. 28.     On 22 April 2010 the Ankara Administrative Court quashed the deportation decision of 27 July 2009, as the applicant’s deportation had become unfeasible in view of the interim measure applied by the Court, which was binding on the Turkish authorities. The Ministry appealed against this judgment. 29.     On 31 December 2010 the Supreme Administrative Court upheld the judgment of the Ankara Administrative Court, and on 6 July 2012 it refused the Ministry’s rectification request. 30.     In the meantime, following a number of interviews, on 27   October 2010 the General Security Directorate of the Ministry granted the applicant a temporary residence permit for six months, apparently renewable, in view of his status as an asylum seeker. 31.     On 1 June 2011 the applicant informed the Turkish authorities that he wanted to withdraw his asylum claim, for reasons unknown to the Court. 32.     On 18 March 2013 the General Security Directorate of the Ministry decided to grant the applicant a long-term residence permit, valid for one year, on the basis of evidence that he had established a genuine family life in Turkey. The decision also indicated that this permit would be extended in due course if further inquiries in respect of his marriage demonstrated that he was continuing to maintain a family life in Turkey. 33.     In June 2013 the applicant withdrew his application to the UNHCR for refugee status in order to avoid being resettled to a safe third country as a result of the refugee status determination process, which might have entailed separation from his wife. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE 34.     A description of the relevant domestic law and practice at the material time may be found in the case of Abdolkhani and Karimnia v.   Turkey (no. 30471/08, §§ 29-45, 22 September 2009). III.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL A.     Relevant international law material on the rights of persons with disabilities 1.     Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 13 December 2006 (Resolution A/RES/61/106) 35.     The Convention entered into force on 3 May 2008, was signed by Turkey on 30 March 2007, and was ratified on 28 September 2009. The relevant parts provide: Article 2 - Definitions “For the purposes of the present Convention: ... ‘Reasonable accommodation’ means necessary and appropriate modification and adjustments not imposing a disproportionate or undue burden, where needed in a particular case, to ensure to persons with disabilities the enjoyment or exercise on an equal basis with others of all human rights and fundamental freedoms ...” Article 14 - Liberty and security of the person “2.     States Parties shall ensure that if persons with disabilities are deprived of their liberty through any process, they are, on an equal basis with others, entitled to guarantees in accordance with international human rights law and shall be treated in compliance with the objectives and principles of this Convention, including by provision of reasonable accommodation.” 36.     In his Interim Report of 28 July 2008 (A/63/175), the then United Nations (“UN”) Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Mr Manfred Nowak, noted as follows: “50.     ... Persons with disabilities often find themselves in [situations of powerlessness], for instance when they are deprived of their liberty in prisons or other places ... In a given context, the particular disability of an individual may render him or her more likely to be in a dependent situation and make him or her an easier target of abuse ... 53.     States have the further obligation to ensure that treatment or conditions in detention do not directly or indirectly discriminate against persons with disabilities. If such discriminatory treatment inflicts severe pain or suffering, it may constitute torture or other form of ill-treatment ... 54.     The Special Rapporteur notes that under article 14, paragraph 2, of the CRPD, States have the obligation to ensure that persons deprived of their liberty are entitled to ‘provision of reasonable accommodation’. This implies an obligation to make appropriate modifications in the procedures and physical facilities of detention centres ... to ensure that persons with disabilities enjoy the same rights and fundamental freedoms as others, when such adjustments do not impose disproportionate or undue burden. The denial or lack of reasonable accommodation for persons with disabilities may create detention ... conditions that amount to ill-treatment and torture.” 2.     Council of Europe material 37.     Recommendation no. R (98) 7 of the Committee of Ministers of 8   April 1998 concerning the ethical and organisational aspects of health care in prison, provides, in so far as relevant:   “50.     Prisoners with serious physical handicaps and those of advanced age should be accommodated in such a way as to allow as normal a life as possible and should not be segregated from the general prison population. Structural alterations should be effected to assist the wheelchair-bound and handicapped on lines similar to those in the outside environment ...” B.     Relevant country information 38.     The Court notes that the Israel Defence Forces have been widely reported to carry out military operations targeting specific persons, usually suspected terrorists. In a decision it rendered in December 2006 (“the Targeted Killings case”), the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that targeted killings were not per se illegal [1] . The UN Human Rights Committee noted its concerns on this practice in its Concluding Observations on Israel on 3   September 2010 (CCPR/C/ISR/CO/3): “10.     The Committee notes the State party’s affirmation that utmost consideration is given to the principles of necessity and proportionality during its conduct of military operations and in response to terrorist threats and attacks. Nevertheless, the Committee reiterates its concern, previously expressed in paragraph 15 of its concluding observations (CCPR/CO/78/ISR), that, since 2003, the State party’s armed forces have targeted and extrajudicially executed 184 individuals in the Gaza Strip, resulting in the collateral unintended death of 155 additional individuals, this despite the State party’s Supreme Court decision of 2006, according to which a stringent proportionality test must be applied and other safeguards respected when targeting individuals for their participation in terrorist activity (art. 6). The State party should end its practice of extrajudicial executions of individuals suspected of involvement in terrorist activities ... The State party should exhaust all measures for the arrest and detention of a person suspected of involvement in terrorist activities before resorting to the use of deadly force. The State party should also establish an independent body to promptly and thoroughly investigate complaints about disproportionate use of force.” In the same report, the Human Rights Committee also made the following observations: “11.     The Committee notes with concern that the crime of torture, as defined in article 1 of the Convention against Torture and in conformity with article 7 of the Covenant, still has not been incorporated into the State party’s legislation. The Committee notes the Supreme Court decision on the exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence, but is nevertheless concerned at consistent allegations of the use of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, in particular against Palestinian detainees suspected of security-related offences. .... The Committee also expresses its concern at information that all complaints of torture are either denied factually, or justified under the “defence of necessity” as “ticking time bomb” cases.” 39.     In its report of 23 June 2009 on Israel (CAT/C/ISR/CO/4) the UN Committee against Torture made similar remarks on the problem of torture and ill-treatment of Palestinian detainees: “19.     The Committee is concerned that there are numerous, ongoing and consistent allegations of the use of methods by Israeli security officials that were prohibited by the September 1999 ruling of the Israeli Supreme Court, and that are alleged to take place before, during and after interrogations.” 40.     According to the 2009 and 2010 Human Rights Reports of the United States Department of State on Israel and the Occupied Territories, Israeli law, as interpreted by a 1999 High Court decision, prohibits torture and several interrogation techniques but allows “moderate physical pressure” against detainees considered to possess information about an imminent terrorist attack. The decision also indicates that interrogators who abuse detainees suspected of possessing such information may be immune from prosecution. Various human rights organisations have reported that “moderate physical pressure” has been used in practice to include beatings, requiring an individual to hold a stress position for long periods, and painful pressure from shackles and restraints applied to the forearms. THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION IN RELATION TO THE APPLICANT’S CONDITIONS OF DETENTION 41.     The applicant complained under Article 3 of the Convention that the conditions of his detention at the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre violated Article 3 of the Convention, mainly on account of the absence of special arrangements to accommodate the needs of people with disabilities who use wheelchairs, such as himself. 42.     In his observations dated 1 August 2012, the applicant submitted a number of new complaints regarding the material conditions of his detention at the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre, including poor hygiene, insufficient food, damp, and limited access to fresh air as well as to hot water. A.     Admissibility 43.     The Court notes that the complaints submitted on 1 August 2012, which were not raised when the application was initially lodged, concern certain adverse conditions of the applicant’s detention, which ended on 18   August 2009. In these circumstances, the Court rejects them pursuant to Article   35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention as lodged outside the six-month time-limit (see Ashot Harutyunyan v. Armenia , no. 34334/04, § 99, 15   June 2010). 44.     The Court notes on the other hand that the applicant’s remaining complaint under this head regarding the unsuitability of the detention facilities for a person with his disability is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It is, moreover, not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ submissions 45.     The applicant claimed that there were no provisions at the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre catering for the needs of detainees using wheelchairs, such as lifts or suitable lavatory facilities. In particular, the applicant was not able to use the squat toilets available at the place of detention. For this reason, each time he needed to relieve himself during his seven-day detention the applicant had to wait for at least two police officers to carry him to a hotel located 50 metres from the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre and to assist him in the toilet, which he found utterly degrading. Similarly, no special sleeping arrangements were envisaged for people in his condition: on account of the overcrowded conditions and the unavailability of a lift, he was made to sleep on a table in an office on the ground floor. He was also deprived of his daily physiotherapy during his detention, as well as of the constant care his wife provided him with. 46.     The Government contested the applicant’s arguments, and stated that all foreigners’ admission and accommodation centres in Turkey, including the one in Kumkapı, were subject to regular inspections by national and international institutions. Without providing any supporting evidence, the Government claimed that the applicant’s special physical condition was duly taken into consideration and he was not subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment in any way during his detention. Medical assistance was also available upon request at foreigners’ admission and accommodation centres; the applicant had indeed been taken to the emergency service at the Haseki Training and Research Hospital on 14   August 2009 when he complained of a problem in the inguinal (groin) area. 2.     The Court’s assessment 47.     The Court reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention. The assessment of this minimum level is, in the nature of things, relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among many other authorities, Stoyan Mitev v. Bulgaria , no. 60922/00, § 63, 7 January 2010). Treatment has been held by the Court to be “inhuman” because, inter alia , it was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch, and caused either actual bodily injury or intense physical and mental suffering. Treatment has been considered “degrading” when it was such as to arouse in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance. Furthermore, in considering whether treatment is “degrading” within the meaning of Article   3, one of the factors which the Court will take into account is the question whether its object was to humiliate and debase the person concerned, although the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of Article 3 (see Jalloh v.   Germany [GC], no.   54810/00, § 68, ECHR 2006 ‑ IX). 48.     With reference to persons deprived of their liberty, Article   3 imposes a positive obligation on the State to ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kudła v.   Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 92-94, ECHR 2000 ‑ XI; Melnītis v.   Latvia , no.   30779/05, § 69, 28 February 2012; and Savičs v. Latvia , no.   17892/03, §   130, 27 November 2012). 49.     It is undisputed between the parties that while detained at the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre, the applicant was paraplegic and used a wheelchair. While they denied that the applicant had been subjected to any inhuman or degrading treatment during the term of his detention, the Government did not contest the applicant’s allegations regarding the specific conditions he was kept in, namely that he was detained for seven days in a regular detention facility, which was not adapted for wheelchair users, and that no special arrangements were made during that time to alleviate the hardships he faced. 50.     The Court reiterates in this connection that where authorities decide to place and keep a person with a disability in detention they should demonstrate special care in guaranteeing such conditions as correspond to the special needs resulting from his disability (see Price v. the United Kingdom , no. 33394/96, § 30, ECHR 2001-VII; Farbtuhs v.   Latvia , no.   4672/02, § 56, 2 December 2004; Jasinskis v. Latvia , no.   45744/08, §   59, 21 December 2010; and Z.H. v. Hungary , no. 28973/11, §   29, 8   November 2012; and the international law material in paragraphs   35 ‑ 37 above). 51.     The Court notes that as a result of the lack of effort to cater for his disability, the applicant experienced serious difficulties in meeting his most basic needs, such as using the toilet. The Court notes in this connection that the inaccessibility of the sanitation facilities raises a particular concern under Article 3 of the Convention, in particular as the applicant was dependent entirely on the good will of the police officers to assist him, on account of the structural deficiencies at the place of detention (see Grimailovs v. Latvia , no. 6087/03, § 158, 25 June 2013). The fact that the applicant’s wife was occasionally available to accompany him and the police officers to the toilets did not diminish the applicant’s suffering in this regard. 52.     The Court further considers that the circumstances in which the applicant was made to spend his nights, which apparently involved sleeping on a hard table in an office that was unsuitable for overnight use, was equally unacceptable, taking into account in particular that the applicant had sustained a serious spinal injury not very long before. 53.     There is no evidence in this case of any positive intention to humiliate or debase the applicant. The Court nevertheless considers that the detention of the applicant in conditions where he was denied some of the minimal necessities for a civilised life, such as sleeping on a bed and being able to use the toilet as often as required without having to rely on the help of strangers, was not compatible with his human dignity and exacerbated the mental anguish caused by the arbitrary nature of his detention (see paragraph 68 below), regardless of its relatively short period. In these circumstances, the Court finds that the applicant was subjected to degrading treatment incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis , Price , cited above; and Aleksandra Dmitriyeva v.   Russia , no.   9390/05, §   84, 3 November 2011). 54.     There has, accordingly, been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on account of the conditions of the applicant’s detention between 12 and 18 August 2009. 55.     Having reached the above conclusion, the Court does not need to examine additionally whether there has been a violation of Article 3 on account of the alleged disruption of his medical care during his detention at the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre, noting also that the applicant has not provided any detailed information about the particular treatment he needed, nor has he explained how, if at all, the seven ‑ day interruption of his treatment adversely affected his condition (see Arutyunyan v. Russia , no. 48977/09, § 82, 10 January 2012). II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION 56.     The applicant complained under Articles 5 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention that his detention at the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre had no legal basis and that there were no judicial remedies available to him to challenge the lawfulness of his detention. He maintained under Article 5 § 5 of the Convention that he had no right to compensation under domestic law in respect of these complaints. He further claimed under Article 8 of the Convention that his right to family life had been breached on account of his unlawful detention. A.     Article 5 of the Convention 1.     Admissibility 57.     The Government did not contest the admissibility of the applicant’s complaints. 58.     The Court observes that these complaints are not manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible. 2.     Merits 59.     The Government maintained that the applicant had been detained with a view to deportation from Turkey in accordance with the relevant domestic legislation. His detention had therefore been in conformity with Article   5 § 1 (f) of the Convention. 60.     The Government further submitted that the applicant had had the opportunity to apply to the administrative courts under Article 125 of the Constitution to object to the decision to hold him at the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre, and indeed had done so. They therefore considered that the applicant had had a remedy whereby he could challenge the lawfulness of his deprivation of liberty. 61.     They lastly contended that the applicant also benefited from a right to compensation within the meaning of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention, as he could claim compensation for damage caused by any act of the administration under Article 125 of the Constitution. 62.     The applicant reiterated his complaints. (a)     Alleged violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention 63.     The Court considers at the outset that the applicant’s complaints under Article 5 §§ 1 and 3 regarding the alleged unlawfulness of his detention should be examined from the standpoint of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention alone. 64.     The Court observes that the applicant was taken into detention on 12   August 2009. Although he was initially induced to attend police headquarters under false pretences, once there he was verbally informed of the decision to deport him. He was subsequently released on 18   August 2009 by an executive decision, after spending seven days at the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre. 65.     The Court notes the Government’s submission that the applicant was detained with a view to his deportation, in conformity with Article 5 §   1   (f) of the Convention. The Court reiterates that any deprivation of liberty under the second limb of Article 5 § 1 (f) would be justified as long as deportation proceedings were in progress, and only to the extent that the deprivation of liberty in question was effected “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law”. 66.     The Court has already examined a similar grievance in the case of Abdolkhani and Karimnia (cited above, §§ 125-135), in which it found that in the absence of clear legal provisions in Turkish law establishing the procedure for ordering detention with a view to deportation, the applicants’ detention was not “lawful” for the purposes of Article 5 of the Convention. There are no particular circumstances which would require the Court to depart from its findings in that judgment. 67.     The Court is particularly struck by the fact that the applicant continued to be deprived of his liberty for four more days after an interim decision of the Ankara Administrative Court ordering the suspension of his deportation, which had unequivocally rendered his continued detention devoid of any legal ground, as the deportation procedure was no longer in progress. 68.     In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that there has been a violation of Article   5   §   1 of the Convention. (b)     Alleged violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention 69.     The Court notes that on 14 August 2009 the applicant applied to the Ankara Administrative Court under Article 125 of the Constitution, which provides in general terms that all acts or decisions of the authorities may be subject to judicial review, and complained specifically of the unlawfulness of his detention. 70.     On the very same day, the Ankara Administrative Court suspended the execution of the applicant’s deportation pending the submission of certain information by the administration, but did not pronounce on the legality of his detention, nor did it order his release. Nevertheless, on 18   August 2009 the State authorities decided at their own discretion to release the applicant until the judicial review process before the Ankara Administrative Court was complete. 71.     The Court reiterates that the purpose of Article 5 § 4 is to guarantee persons who are deprived of their liberty the right to judicial supervision of the lawfulness of the measure to which they are thereby subjected. A remedy must be made available during a person’s detention to allow the individual to obtain speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of the detention. That review should be capable of leading, where appropriate, to release (see Abdolkhani and Karimnia , cited above, § 139). The forms of judicial review satisfying the requirements of Article 5 § 4 may vary from one domain to another, and will depend on the type of deprivation of liberty in issue. Nonetheless, whatever the form of judicial review may be, it is essential that the competent domestic court or body expressly pronounce on the question of the lawfulness of a deprivation of liberty when so requested. Moreover, the question whether a person’s right under Article 5 § 4 has been respected has to be determined in the light of the particular circumstances of each case. 72.     The Court observes that in the instant case, despite his specific complaint, the administrative court did not examine the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention, neither when it initially ordered the suspension of his deportation, nor at the subsequent stages of the proceedings. This is despite the fact that there was clearly no legal basis for the applicant’s detention, as established under Article 5 § 1 above. The Court stresses that the Ankara Administrative Court was in an even better position than the Strasbourg Court to observe this lack of legal basis in domestic law governing the procedure for detention pending deportation (see, mutatis mutandis , Athary v.   Turkey , no. 50372/09, § 41, 11 December 2012). 73.     The Court is mindful of the fact that the applicant regained his liberty on the seventh day of his detention. However, his release did not result from a review of the legality of his detention by a competent court, as required under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, but was brought about by a purely discretionary decision of the executive, which could be reversed at any moment. Moreover, unlike in some other cases where the applicants were released within a matter of hours before any judicial scrutiny of their detention could in practice have taken place (see, for example, Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. the United Kingdom , 30 August 1990, §   45, Series   A no. 182; Slivenko v. Latvia [GC], no. 48321/99, §   159, ECHR 2003 ‑ X; and M.B. and Others v. Turkey , no. 36009/08, § 45, 15   June 2010), the Ankara Administrative Court had the opportunity in the instant case to pronounce on the lawfulness or otherwise of the applicant’s detention, such as when it delivered its interim decision on 14 August 2009 suspending the execution of the deportation decision. In fact, the administrative court could reasonably have been expected to rule on the unlawfulness of the applicant’s detention on that very day, if for no other reason than that its interim decision, by its very nature, had the automatic effect of rendering the detention absolutely groundless, regardless of whatever legal regime it may have been governed by before. 74.     In these circumstances, having regard to the clear lack of a legal basis for the applicant’s detention in domestic law and the very strict standards of speedy review under Article   5   § 4 where an individual’s liberty is at stake (see, mutatis mutandis , Shcherbakov v. Russia (no.   2), no.   34959/07, § 101, 24 October 2013), the Court concludes that the applicant was denied an effective remedy whereby he could obtain a speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of his detention. 75.     There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention. (c)     Alleged violation of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention 76.     Having regard to its above findings, and in the absence of any examples provided by the Government of cases where proceedings pursued under Article 125 of the Constitution resulted in the granting of compensation for unlawful detention pending deportation proceedings, the Court concludes that the applicant did not have an enforceable right to compensation within the meaning of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention (see Dbouba v. Turkey , no. 15916/09, § 55, 13 July 2010). 77.     There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 5 of the Convention. B.     Article 8 of the Convention 78.     With regard to the alleged violation of Article 8 stemming from the applicant’s detention, the Court considers that having already found that the applicant’s detention in the Kumkapı Foreigners’ Admission and Accommodation Centre was in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see paragraph 68 above), it is not necessary to examine the admissibility or the merits of this complaint. III.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 2, 3, AND 8 OF THE CONVENTION IN RELATION TO THE APPLICANT’S THREATENED DEPORTATION 79.     The applicant complained under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention that his deportation to Israel or the Gaza Strip, directly or indirectly, would expose him to a real risk of ill-treatment and/or death, bearing in mind that he and his family had been targeted by Israeli forces before and that he was wanted in Israel. He further maintained under Article 8 of the Convention that his removal from Turkey would constitute an interference with the family life that he had established with his wife in Turkey. 80.     As part of his complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, the applicant also contended that his removal from Turkey would call a halt to his medical treatment, thereby denting any prospects of his full recovery. He claimed in particular that if returned to the Gaza Strip he would not have access to the same level of treatment and care, and as his removal would entail separation from his wife, he would also be denied the constant assistance he received from her in order to meet his daily needs. A.     The parties’ submissions 81.     Without raising any particular objections in respect of the admissibility of the applicant’s complaints, the Government stated that the deportation order against the applicant had been based on intelligence indicating his involvement in acts of international terrorism and thus pursued the aim of protecting national security and public order. The deportation order did not, however, specify the country to which he would be removed; the applicant would therefore be deported to any third country willing to offer him a visa. The medical services available in that third country would also be taken into consideration before executing the deportation decision. In these circumstances, the applicant’s allegations concerning the potential risks he would face in Israel or the Gaza Strip were irrelevant. The Government also confirmed that there were no criminal charges against the applicant in Turkey, nor had an official request for his extradition been submitted by Israel. 82.     The applicant contended that while the Government claimed that he did not have to be deported to Israel or the Gaza Strip but could choose his destination, that was not a realistic argument in view of his economic, physical and legal status as a stateless Palestinian. B.     The Court’s assessment 83.     Turning to the remainder of the complaints under this head, although the respondent State did not raise any objection as to the Court