CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 17 avril 2014

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RUSSIA   (Application no. 20110/13)                   JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   17 April 2014     FINAL   08/09/2014   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Ismailov v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, President,   Elisabeth Steiner,   Khanlar Hajiyev,   Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,   Julia Laffranque,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Dmitry Dedov, judges, and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 25 March 2014, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no.   20110/13) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article   34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Uzbek national, Mr   Khamidullo Shukirdzhanovich Ismailov (“the applicant”), on 21   March 2013. 2.     The applicant was represented by Ms   N.   Yermolayeva and Ms   Ye.   Ryabinina, lawyers practising in Moscow. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr   G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that his forcible removal to Uzbekistan would subject him to a risk of ill-treatment, that his detention pending expulsion had been unlawful, and that no effective judicial review of his continued detention had been available to him. 4.     On 22   March 2013 the Acting President of the Section to which the case was allocated decided to apply Rule   39 of the Rules of Court, indicating to the Government that the applicant should not be removed or extradited to Uzbekistan until further notice, and granted priority treatment to the application under Rule   41 of the Rules of Court. 5.     On 6   May 2013 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 6.     The applicant was born in 1980. Prior to his arrest in 2012 he resided in Arzamas, in the Nizhniy Novgorod Region. He is currently detained in the special detention facility in Balakhna, in the Nizhniy Novgorod Region. 1.     The applicant’s arrival in Russia and his immigration status 7.     Until April 2011 the applicant lived in Uzbekistan. His family members, including a minor son, live in Uzbekistan. From 2001 onwards he went to Russia on several occasions, in order to earn money. 8.     On 12   April 2011 the applicant arrived in Russia to look for employment. On 12   July 2011 the period of the applicant’s lawful residence in Russia expired. 9.     On 24   January 2012 he was fined for failure to comply with immigration laws. He did not leave the country at that point. 2.     Criminal proceedings against the applicant in Uzbekistan 10.     On 12   June 2012 the investigator at the Department of the Interior of the Andizhan Region of Uzbekistan charged the applicant with establishing, leading or participating in religious extremist, separatist, fundamentalist or other prohibited organisations (Article   244-2 of the Uzbek Criminal Code). The applicant was accused, in particular, of membership of a banned religious extremist organisation, “the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan”, and a terrorist organisation, “O’zbekiston Islomiy Harakati”, between late 2008 and October 2009. According to the relevant investigator’s decision, the applicant, together with his brother and two other persons, “planned to destroy the constitutional order of Uzbekistan” and then “to create an Islamic State on the territory of Nizhniy Novgorod, Russia”. For these purposes they had moved to Russia and started to “study the ideology of the head of the terrorist movement, Tohir Yo’ldoshev, and Jumaboi Khojayev, also known as Jummah Namangani”. Further, together with other members of O’zbekiston Islomiy Harakati, they had planned an attack with intent to destroy the constitutional order of Uzbekistan and other countries in order to create an Islamic State there. They had also attempted to “carry out terrorist attacks”. The investigator stated that there was sufficient evidence against the applicant, without giving further details. 11.     On the same date, the Andizhan Town Court of Uzbekistan ordered the applicant’s arrest and his name was put on a cross-border wanted list. 3.     Extradition proceedings and detention pending extradition (a)     Extradition proceedings 12.     On 13   September 2012 the applicant was arrested in the town of Arzamas in the Nizhny Novgorod Region, pursuant to a request by the Uzbek authorities, and was detained pending extradition. 13.     On 12   October 2012 the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Republic of Uzbekistan submitted a formal request for the applicant’s extradition. The request contained assurances that the applicant would be prosecuted only for the offences for which he was extradited, that he would be able to freely leave Uzbekistan when he had stood trial and served any sentence, and that he would not be expelled or extradited to a third State without the consent of the Russian authorities. The Uzbek prosecutor’s office further assured its Russian counterpart that the applicant would not be prosecuted in Uzbekistan on political or religious grounds, that he would not be subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment, that he would be provided with an opportunity to defend himself, inter alia through legal assistance, and that the criminal proceedings against him would be conducted in compliance with the domestic law of the Republic of Uzbekistan. It was pointed out in the letter that all forms of inhuman and degrading treatment were prohibited in the destination country. 14.     On 12   November 2012 the lawyer representing the applicant in the domestic proceedings filed objections against the extradition request. He argued that according to independent international observers, ill ‑ treatment was widespread in the Uzbek prison system and fair trial guarantees were not respected. Referring to the Court’s case-law on the matter, he submitted that the applicant, who was charged with a religious offence, would run a risk of ill ‑ treatment and would be deprived of the minimum fair trial guarantees if extradited to the requesting country. 15.     On 9   April 2013 the Prosecutor General’s Office of Russia refused the Uzbek authorities’ extradition request. It appears that the decision was not appealed against, and the extradition proceedings were discontinued. The parties did not submit a copy of the decision. 16.     By a letter of 12   August 2013 the Prosecutor’s General Office, in reply to a letter from the applicant’s lawyer, notified the applicant of the decision to refuse his extradition to Uzbekistan. (b)     The applicant’s detention pending extradition 17.     On 15   September 2012, that is, two days after the applicant’s arrest, the Arzamas Town Court authorised his detention pending extradition. It appears that the decision was not appealed against. 18.     On 12   November 2012 the Town Court extended the period of his detention to a total of six months, that is, until 12   March 2013. That decision was upheld by the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court on appeal on 11   December 2012. Until 11   March 2013 the applicant was detained in remand prison FKU   SIZO-3 in the Vadskiy District of the Nizhniy Novgorod Region. 4.     The applicant’s re-arrest and detention pending administrative removal (a)     Events of 11-12   March 2013 and the applicant’s arrest on 13   March 2013 19.     On 11   March 2013, that is, one day before the date when he was due to be released, the applicant was transferred to the Arzamas police station. On 12   March 2013 the authorised term of his detention pending extradition expired, and the Arzamas town prosecutor ordered the applicant’s release. (i)     The applicant’s account of the events 20.     According to the applicant, at midnight on 12   March 2013 he was let out into the internal yard of the police station. He was not provided with any documents confirming his release from custody. Immediately afterwards, at 0.05   a.m. on 13   March 2013, he was arrested in the yard by officers of the local department of the Federal Migration Service in connection with a violation of immigration laws (Article   18-8 of the Code of Administrative Offenses (“the CAO”)) and taken into custody. (ii)     Official account of the events 21.     The Government submitted that “according to the [case] materials on the applicant’s detention” he had had to be released from custody at 7   p.m. on 12   March 2013. 22.     According to the custody register at the Arzamas police station, the applicant was released from detention at 11.55   p.m. on 12   March 2013, on account of the expiry of the time-limit for his detention. 23.     According to the Arzamas Town Court’s decision of 13   March 2013 (see paragraph   28 below), the applicant was arrested at 0.05 near the Arzamas police station in the course of an “extraordinary check” by the Arzamas unit of the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Department of the Federal Migration Service. 24.     At 1.20   a.m. on 13   March 2013 an officer of the Arzamas Department of the Interior drew up a record of the applicant’s arrest “for the establishment of the circumstances of an administrative offence following a request by the Arzamas Department of the Federal Migration Service.” At some point in the morning of 13   March 2013 an administrative-offence record was drawn up in respect of the applicant in connection with his failure to leave Russia after 12   July 2011. At some point on 13   March 2013 the applicant was interviewed by the head of the Arzamas unit of the Federal Migration Service and submitted, inter alia , that he had not applied for refugee status in Russia and had not had valid reasons not to leave Russia. (b)     Expulsion proceedings and application of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court (i)     Proceedings before the Arzamas Town Court 25.     On 13   March 2013 the Arzamas Town Court of the Nizhniy Novgorod Region examined the applicant’s case. During the hearing the applicant acknowledged that he had not left Russia after 12   July 2011, contrary to the requirements of the immigration laws. However, his representative submitted that, in accordance with Article   28.1 of the CAO, administrative proceedings should have been brought against him immediately upon the obtaining of sufficient data indicating the occurrence of an administrative offence. The applicant had been arrested on 13   September 2012, and by 14 or 15   September 2012 the authorities had been in possession of sufficient information on the applicant’s immigration status. However, administrative proceedings had been brought against him only six months later, once the term of his detention pending extradition had expired. In these circumstances, the defence considered that the administrative removal of the applicant, if ordered, would amount to a form of extradition in disguise. 26.     The defence further referred to reports by the UN, international non ‑ governmental organisations, and the Court’s case-law, arguing that the applicant was wanted by the Uzbek authorities in connection with charges relating to a religious offence, and thus he would run a risk of ill ‑ treatment if expelled to Uzbekistan. 27.     Finally, they submitted that in any event his expulsion could not be ordered, since refugee-status proceedings were pending in respect of him. They pointed out in this connection that he had appealed against the refusal of 7   December 2012 to grant him refugee status (see paragraph   36 below) and had received no response by the time of the events. 28.     The Arzamas Town Court found that the applicant had been residing in Russia in breach of the immigration laws. The court established that at 0.05   a.m. on 13 March 2013 at the address of the Arzamas police station “the applicant had failed to leave the Russian Federation after the expiry of the registration term, that is, 12   July 2011”. The court established that there were no circumstances precluding his administrative removal from Russia. The court dismissed the applicant’s argument as regards the refugee ‑ status proceedings, observing that “according to the letter of 23 January 2013 by the Russian Federal Migration Service (“the Russian FMS”), his relevant application had been rejected” (see, for the contents of the letter, paragraph   38 below). It also noted, without giving further details, that the defence’s submissions as regards the risk of torture in Uzbekistan “could not be accepted as well ‑ founded”. In accordance with Article 18   §   8 of the CAO the court found the applicant liable to pay a fine in the amount of 3,000   Russian roubles (RUB) and ordered his administrative removal from Russia. Citing the provisions of the CAO on controlled forced removal (see paragraphs   50-51 below), the court decided that the applicant should be detained in a special detention centre at the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Department of the Interior («специальный приемник ГУВД по Нижегородской области») until his administrative removal. No specific time ‑ limit for the applicant’s detention was given by the court. (ii)     Indication of the interim measure under Rule 39 29.     On 22 March 2013 the Court indicated to the Government, under Rule   39 of the Rules of Court, that the applicant’s administrative removal and extradition should be suspended until further notice. (iii)     Proceedings at the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court 30.     On 19 March 2013 the defence appealed against the decision of 13   March 2013. In addition to their initial arguments, they submitted that the first-instance court had incorrectly established the facts of the case, including in respect of the applicant’s arrest. Contrary to the case materials, they submitted, on 12 March 2013 the applicant had only been let out into the yard of the police station and, in any event, he had not been provided with any documents confirming his release from custody. Therefore, at 0.05   a.m. on 13 March 2013 he had not been at liberty and thus had been unable to deliberately “avoid leaving Russia”. They further maintained that the applicant’s expulsion would amount to his “extradition in disguise”. The extradition proceedings in respect of him had been pending at the material time. The applicant, if removed to Uzbekistan, would be unable either to challenge any decision taken within the extradition proceedings, or to benefit from the minimum guarantees in such proceedings. 31.     They also stated that, contrary to the court’s findings, no final decision in the refugee-status proceedings had been taken on 25   January 2013, as clearly confirmed by the letter of the Russian FMS. Where an application for refugee status was made, domestic law prohibited the expulsion of an applicant in the absence of a final decision on his refugee status. They stressed that the first-instance court had failed to make any assessment of their ill-treatment argument, and reiterated their submissions as regards the risk of ill-treatment if the removal order were to be enforced. Finally, they submitted that the decision ordering the applicant’s detention did not contain any time-limit and was therefore in breach of Article   5 of the Convention. 32.     On 26 March 2013 the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court upheld the administrative removal order, finding that the first-instance court had correctly established the facts of the case, assessed the admissibility of various items of evidence and applied the domestic law. The appeal court upheld the administrative sanction as lawful and found no grounds to amend it. As regards the applicant’s argument about the authorities’ failure to bring the administrative proceedings against him in a timely manner, the court noted that the administrative-offence record had been drawn up in accordance with the domestic procedure. The court found nothing in the applicant’s submissions to suggest that his family members had been persecuted in Uzbekistan. Finally, it noted the applicant had not been granted refugee status in Russia. The administrative removal order became final. 33.     After 12 March 2013 the applicant was detained in the special detention facility in Arzamas. At some point before 25   November 2013 he was transferred to the special detention facility in Balakhna, in the Nizhniy Novgorod Region. He remains detained there to date. 5.     Interviews of 14   and 27   September 2012 and refugee ‑ status proceedings 34.     On 14 September 2012, when interviewed by the Arzamas town prosecutor after his arrest, the applicant stated that he had moved to Russia to look for work. Since April 2011, the date of his arrival in Russia, he had not registered as a foreign national temporarily residing in the country. He stated that he had not been persecuted on political grounds in Uzbekistan, and had not applied for refugee status in Russia. He had learned that a criminal case was pending against him in his home country from his parents, since at some point local police had searched their home. However, he had been unaware of the nature of the charges and the basis on which the criminal case had been brought against him until his arrest in Russia. He made similar submissions when interviewed by the Vasdkiy district prosecutor of the Nizhniy Novgorod Region on 27 September 2012. 35.     On 2 October 2012 the applicant lodged an application for refugee status with the Nizhniy Novgorod FMS on the ground of fear of persecution on account of fabricated charges relating to a religious offence. He stated that he did not have any religious beliefs. However, he had learned after his arrest that he had been charged with a religious offence. He submitted that the accusations against him were unfounded. He feared that in Uzbekistan he would be tortured, forced to incriminate himself and sentenced to imprisonment for religiously motivated anti-State offences he had not committed. 36.     On 7 December 2012 the Nizhniy Novgorod FMS rejected the application. They referred to the applicant’s own submissions, as well as the results of checks conducted by the local Department of the Interior and FMS. It also noted that the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Department of the Federal Security Service had recommended that the applicant should not be granted refugee status. The decision also contained a reference to an unspecified undated report on the State system and the social and economic situation in Uzbekistan. It was stated in the report, inter alia , the Uzbek authorities exercised close control over the religious life of the population, that Uzbekistan had ratified several UN human rights treaties and that the use of any unlawful investigative methods was prohibited in the requesting country. The Nizhniy Novgorod FMS observed, with reference to the applicant’s own submissions, that he had applied for refugee status after learning, at the time of his arrest, that he had been placed on the wanted list. Thus, there were grounds to consider the applicant’s request as an attempt to avoid extradition. The Department further found that the applicant had not had any problems with the authorities in his home country prior to his departure to Russia. Overall, the Nizhniy Novgorod FMS concluded that the applicant had not produced any “objective evidence to the effect that he would be persecuted on national, religious or political grounds” and that he had left Uzbekistan in order to look for employment, that is, for a reason falling outside the scope of an admissible refugee request. 37.     On 25 December 2012 the applicant lodged an appeal against the refusal with the Russian FMS office, referring to the risk of ill ‑ treatment and imprisonment in his home country. He cited reports by various NGOs for 2011-2012 pointing to serious human rights problems in Uzbekistan and stated that the Nizhniy Novgorod FMS had omitted to take into account the political and religious nature of the charges against him and to analyse the specific circumstances of his case. 38.     The Russian FMS received the applicant’s appeal on 15   January 2013 and by a letter of 23   January 2013 advised him that it would be considered upon receipt of documents from the Nizhny Novgorod FMS. 39.     On 11 February 2013 the Russian FMS dismissed his appeal. It upheld the decision of the Nizhniy Novgorod FMS, finding that the latter had examined all the relevant individual, social and political aspects of the case and had reached a well-founded conclusion. The Russian FMS found that there was no evidence that the criminal proceedings against the applicant “had a political background”. It noted that neither the applicant nor his wife, child, mother or father, who resided in Uzbekistan, had received any threats or been subjected to any kind of persecution, and reiterated that the applicant had only applied for refugee status after his arrest. It further found that the applicant did not fit the definition of a refugee, since a fear of criminal prosecution did not constitute a ground for granting refugee status. 40.     By a letter of 12 February 2013 the Russian FMS sent its decision to the applicant by post at the address of the remand centre in Arzamas. Having received the decision on 15   March 2013, he challenged it on   2   April 2013 before the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow. He argued, in particular, that the Russian FMS had failed to address his arguments or to assess the circumstances of his case. He reiterated, in addition to his initial submissions, that the thrust of his grievance was not simply the fact of the criminal prosecution, but the fear of being subjected to torture in detention in Uzbekistan with a view to a confession being extracted in respect of offences he had not committed. 41.     On 18 June 2013 the Basmnnyy District Court dismissed the appeal and endorsed the Russian FMS’s decision as lawful, noting the applicant’s failure to adduce “convincing arguments to support his allegations of fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality or membership of a particular social group”. The court noted from the questionnaire completed by the applicant on the date of the submission of his application that he had not been a member of any political, religious or military organisations in his home country and had not had any problems with the authorities prior to his departure for Russia. Nothing in the statement of charges drawn up by the Uzbek authorities revealed any political motivation. The court reiterated that the applicant’s family members were living in Uzbekistan and were not subject to any kind of persecution. The actual purpose of his application was to avoid criminal prosecution in Uzbekistan. Further, the applicant had not complained of a risk of persecution in Uzbekistan and had not expressed his wish to remain in Russia as a refugee until after his arrest. Moreover, there existed no medical reasons precluding his departure from Russia. The court concluded that the applicant did not meet the “refugee” definition. 42.     The court also refused the defence’s request to have Ms   Ryabinina questioned as an expert on the human rights situation in Uzbekistan. 43.     The applicant appealed, reiterating his earlier arguments and submitting that the first-instance court had failed to assess the risk on the basis of all the available information, as well as to address his counter ‑ arguments to the Russian FMS’s decision. He maintained that the charges against him were politically motivated and emphasised the risk of ill ‑ treatment, with extensive references to reports by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, as well as to the Court’s case-law. As regards the court’s finding that none of his family members had been persecuted, he noted that on 12   March 2013 his brother had also been arrested in Arzamas, but had then been released because his extradition had been refused by the Russian authorities. 44.     On 24 October 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 18   June 2013. The applicant in his observations of 25 November 2013 provided a copy of the information note on the case progress from the city court’s website containing the case references and indicating that the appeal had been rejected and the judgment had been upheld. The parties did not submit a copy of the decision. 6.     Information on temporary asylum proceedings 45.     In their letter of 4   April 2013 the Government submitted that at some point the applicant had applied for temporary asylum in Russia, and on 23   January 2013 the Nizhniy Novgorod FMS had refused his application, the refusal being upheld on 18   February 2013 by the Sormovskiy District Court of Nizhniy Novgorod. 46.     The applicant stated that he had not applied for temporary asylum and enclosed a letter from the Nizhniy Novgorod FMS of 29   May 2013 confirming that the authority had not received any such application from him. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE 1.     Administrative removal and detention pending enforcement of the removal order (a)     Code of Administrative Offences (i)     Infringement of the residence regulations 47.     Article   18.8 of the CAO provides that a foreign national who infringes the residence regulations of the Russian Federation, including by residing on the territory of the Russian Federation without a valid residence permit or by failing to comply with the established procedure for residence registration, is liable to punishment by an administrative fine of RUB   2,000 to 5,000, with or without administrative removal from the Russian Federation. 48.     The prescribed time-limit for administrative offences listed in Article   18.8 is one year from the date the relevant offence was committed (Article   4.5   §   1). (ii)     Administrative removal 49.     Article   23.1   §   3 provides that the determination of any administrative charge that may result in removal from the Russian Federation must be made by a judge of a court of general jurisdiction. 50.     Article   3.10   §   1 provides for two types of administrative removal, namely controlled unaided removal (or “controlled independent exit”) and controlled forced removal. The type of administrative removal is determined by the judge examining the case (Article   3.10   §   4). 51.     Article   3.10   §   5 allows domestic courts to order a foreign national’s detention with a view to administrative removal. 52.     Article   27.3   §   1 provides that administrative detention can be authorised in exceptional cases if it is necessary for the fair and speedy determination of the administrative charge or for the execution of the penalty. (iii)     Appeal against the administrative removal order 53.     Article   30.1   §   1 guarantees the right to appeal against a court’s decision on an administrative offence to a higher court. Such appeal must be lodged within ten days from the date of the relevant decision (Article   30.3   §   1). An appeal against an administrative removal order must be forwarded to the higher court on the same day (Article   30.2   §   2), and examined within one day of the submission of the appeal (Article   30.5   §   3). (iv)     Supervisory review 54.     Article   30.12 provides that first-instance and appeal judgments which have become final can be challenged by, inter alia , the defendant or his counsel by way of supervisory review. A regional prosecutor or his deputy, or the Prosecutor General or his deputy can also lodge requests for supervisory review. 55.     Requests for supervisory review must be lodged with regional courts or the Supreme Court of Russia. Such requests are to be examined by the Presidents of such courts or their deputies. The Supreme Court is empowered to deal with appeals against decisions taken on supervisory review at the regional level (Article   30.13). 56.     Requests for supervisory review must indicate the grounds for review (Article   30.14   §   5). The scope of the review is limited to the grounds indicated in the request and the observations in reply. If the interests of legality so require, the supervisory-review judge may review the case in its entirety (Article   30.16   §§   1 and 2). Renewed requests for supervisory review on the same grounds before the same court are not allowed (Article   30.16   §   4). 57.     As a result of the examination of the case by way of supervisory ‑ review proceedings, the following decisions may be taken: (1)   to dismiss the request for supervisory review and uphold the initial decision; (2)   to amend the judgment or other decision, if the shortcomings revealed may be rectified without remittal of the case for a new examination, and provided that such decision does not lead to the application of a heavier administrative penalty and otherwise does not adversely affect the petitioner’s position; (3)   to quash the judgment or decision and remit the case for fresh examination to the first-instance court, in case of a serious violation of the procedural law; or (4)   to quash the judgment or other judicial decision and discontinue the administrative proceedings, where the offence is of an insignificant nature or there are circumstances excluding the possibility of conducting the administrative proceedings, or lack of evidence in respect of the circumstances forming the basis for the judgment or decision in the administrative case (Article   30.17   §   2). 58.     In decision no. 598-O of 3   April 2012 concerning the supervisory review under the CAO, the Constitutional Court found that recourse to supervisory review should be allowable only after exhaustion of the ordinary appeal procedures and should remain limited to exceptional cases disclosing that in the earlier proceedings there had been an error which had determined the outcome of the case or significantly adversely affected the rights or interests of the petitioner. (v)     Enforcement of the decision imposing an administrative penalty 59.     Article   27.19 provides that individuals in respect of whom controlled forced removal has been ordered should be placed in special detention facilities, to ensure the execution of the removal order. 60.     Article   31.9   §   1 provides that a decision imposing an administrative penalty may not be enforced after the expiry of a two-year period from the date on which the decision became final. (vi)     Administrative arrest as an administrative sanction 61.     Article   3.9 provides that an administrative offender can be penalised by administrative arrest only in exceptional circumstances, and with a maximum term of thirty days. (b)     Federal Law no.   109-FZ of 18   July 2006 62.     Section   20   §   2   (2) of Federal Law no.   109-FZ of 18   July 2006 provides that a foreign national temporarily residing in Russia must register with a local migration authority within seven days of his arrival. (c)     Constitutional Court Judgment no.   6-P of 17   February 1998 63.     In judgment no.   6-P of 17   February 1998 the Russian Constitutional Court held, with reference to Article   22 of the Russian Constitution, that the detention of a person with a view to removing him from Russia requires a court decision if that detention exceeds forty-eight hours. The decision must establish whether the detention is necessary for the purposes of enforcing the removal. The court must also assess the lawfulness and reasons for the detention. Detention for an indefinite period of time is not acceptable, since it may become a form of punishment, for which there is no provision in Russian law and which is incompatible with the provisions of the Constitution. 2.     Refugee status and detention pending extradition 64.     For a summary of the relevant provisions concerning refugee status and detention pending extradition, see Zokhidov v.   Russia , no.   67286/10, §§   77-83 and 102-06 respectively, 5   February 2013. III.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIAL 65.     In January 2013 Human Rights Watch released its annual World Report for 2013. The chapter entitled “Uzbekistan”, in so far as relevant, states: “Uzbekistan’s human rights record remains atrocious, with no meaningful improvements in 2012. Torture is endemic in the criminal justice system. Authorities intensified their crackdown on civil society activists, opposition members, and journalists, and continued to persecute religious believers who worship outside strict state controls. ... Criminal Justice, Torture, and Ill-Treatment Torture remains rampant and continues to occur with near-total impunity. Detainees’ rights are violated at each stage of investigations and trials, despite habeas corpus amendments passed in 2008. The government has failed to meaningfully implement recommendations to combat torture made by the UN special rapporteur in 2003 and other international bodies. Suspects are not permitted access to lawyers, a critical safeguard against torture in pre-trial detention. Police coerce confessions from detainees using torture, including beatings with batons and plastic bottles, hanging by the wrists and ankles, rape, and sexual humiliation. Authorities routinely refuse to investigate allegations of abuse ... Human Rights Watch continues to receive regular and credible reports of torture, including suspicious deaths in custody in pre-trial and post-conviction detention. Freedom of Religion Although Uzbekistan’s Constitution ensures freedom of religion, authorities continued their multi-year campaign of arbitrary detention, arrest, and torture of Muslims who practice their faith outside state controls. Over 200 were arrested or convicted in 2012 on charges related to religious extremism.” 66.     The chapter on Uzbekistan in the Amnesty International 2013 annual report, released in May of the same year, reads, in so far as relevant, as follows: “ Torture and other ill-treatment Torture and other ill-treatment of detainees and prisoners by security forces and prison personnel continued to be routine. Scores of reports of torture and other ill ‑ treatment emerged during the year, especially from men and women suspected or convicted of belonging to Islamic movements and Islamist groups and parties or other religious groups, banned in Uzbekistan. As in previous years, the authorities failed to conduct prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations into such reports and into complaints lodged with the Prosecutor General’s Office. ... Counter-terror and security The authorities continued to seek the extradition of suspected members of Islamic movements and Islamist groups and parties banned in Uzbekistan in the name of security and the fight against terrorism. They also requested the extradition of political opponents, government critics and wealthy individuals out of favour with the regime. Many of these extradition requests were based on fabricated or unreliable evidence. The government offered diplomatic assurances to sending states to secure the returns, pledging free access to detention centres for independent monitors and diplomats. In practice, they did not honour these guarantees. Those forcibly returned to Uzbekistan faced incommunicado detention, torture and other ill-treatment and, after unfair trials, long prison sentences in cruel, inhuman and degrading conditions. The authorities were also accused of attempting assassinations of political opponents living abroad.” 67.     In their 2013 report “Return to Torture: Extradition, Forcible Returns and Removals to Central Asia”, Amnesty International stated as follows: “Over the past two decades thousands of people across the region have alleged that they have been arbitrarily detained and tortured or ill-treated in custody in order to extract a forced confession or money from relatives. In this period, piecemeal reforms have been introduced in most Central Asia countries with the aim of strengthening the accountability of law enforcement agencies and improving the protection available in the criminal justice system. Nowhere, however, have they had any significant success in eliminating the practices of torture and other ill-treatment that are often used in relation to people suspected of ordinary crimes, and routinely used in relation to political opponents and individuals suspected of involvement in extremism and terrorism-related activities or in banned religious groups. ... ... Detainees are often tortured and ill-treated while being held incommunicado for initial interrogations. Those detained in closed detention facilities run by National Security Services on charges related to national security or “religious extremism” are at particular risk of torture and other ill-treatment.” 68.     For a summary of the relevant reports by the UN institutions and NGOs on Uzbekistan during the period between 2002 and 2011, see Zokhidov , cited above, §§   107-13, with further references. THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLES 3 AND 13 OF THE CONVENTION 69.     The applicant complained that in event of his extradition or administrative removal to Uzbekistan he would risk being subjected to ill ‑ treatment in breach of Article   3 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” 70.     He further complained under Article   13 that he did not have an effective domestic remedy in respect of the above grievance. Article   13 of the Convention reads as follows: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” A.     The parties’ submissions 71.     The Government submitted, on the one hand, that the applicant had had not requested refugee status immediately on his arrival in Russia and had also omitted to raise the issue of the risk of ill-treatment within the administrative-removal proceedings. According to them, where applicants raised an ill-treatment argument before the authorities in extradition proceedings, the domestic courts duly verified those allegations. To demonstrate the existence of an “established practice” in that regard, they referred to the case of Zokhidov (cited above), where the applicant had brought his ill-treatment argument to the attention of the domestic authorities and the extradition order had been set aside. In any event, the applicant in the present case had failed to provide any reliable evidence demonstrating that if he was removed to Uzbekistan he would run the risk of being subjected to ill ‑ treatment. On the other hand, they maintained that the applicant had various remedies available to him to raise the ill ‑ treatment issue and had “made use of them in full”. The domestic authorities had carefully examined the potential risk of treatment contrary to Article   3, as well as the applicant’s family situation, in the administrative-removal and the refugee-status proceedings and had dismissed his allegations. They also noted that it had remained open for the applicant to challenge the latest court decisions in the refugee-status and the administrative ‑ removal proceedings by lodging a further complaint with the Nizhniy Novgorod Regional Court by way of cassation appeal and with the Supreme Court by way of supervisory review and concluded that the complaint was manifestly ill ‑ founded. 72.     The applicant submitted in reply that he had consistently raised the grievance concerning the risk of ill-treatment at all stages of the extradition, the expulsion and the refugee-status proceedings. He maintained that the administrative-removal proceedings had been used by the authorities in order to circumvent the guarantees available to the applicant in extradition proceedings. For instance, the CAO did not contain any provisions obliging the authorities concerned to consider the risk of ill-treatment allegations in a removal case. The refugee-status proceedings had not had any suspensive effect in relation to the administrative expulsion. He further argued that a supervisory-review appeal against the final administrative removal order would not have suspensive effect either, and therefore could not be regarded as an effective remedy. 73.     He further maintained that the domestic authorities had disregarded his allegations of a risk of ill ‑ treatment both in the administrative-removal and the asylum proceedings, despite the information he had relied on stemming from reputable international organisations, and had failed to question Ms   Rryabinina as an expert. He relied on the Court’s earlier finding in several extradition cases that the ill-treatment of detainees was a pervasive and enduring problem in Uzbekistan, especially in respect of detainees charged with membership of banned religious organisations, as in his case. Those findings were corroborated by other independent sources. If forcibly removed to Uzbekistan, he would be placed in detention and thus run an increased risk of torture in view of the charges against him. B.     The Court’s assessment 1.     Admissibility 74.     The Court notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article   35   §   3   (a) of the Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible. 2.     Merits (a)     Article   3 of the Convention (i)     General principles 75.     The Court will examine the merits of the applicant’s complaint under Article   3 in the light of the applicable general principles reiterated in, among others, Umirov v.   Russia (no.   17455/11, §§   92-100, 18   September 2012, with further references). (ii)     Application of the principles to the present case 76.     The Government may be understood as arguing that the applicant did not bring a sufficiently reasoned argument with regard to the risk of ill ‑ treatment in the event of his removal to Uzbekistan to the attention of the authorities. The Court notes that they refer in this regard to the case of Zokhidov (cited above), in which the extradition order in respect of the applicant was set aside. In the Government’s view, that happened because Mr   Zokhidov – unlike the applicant in the present case – had submitted persuasive and consistent arguments in respect of the risk of ill-treatment, which had received due assessment by the domestic courts. The Court observes that the same example has been quoted by the Government in other similar cases (see, for instance, Ermakov v. Russia , no. 43165/10, §   185, 7   November 2013). Nonetheless, even leaving aside the subsequent developments in Zokhidov (cited above, §   62 et seq.), the Court observes that the main reason for the domestic authorities’ refusal to extradite the applicant in that case was of a more “technical” nature, namely the fact that his prosecution had become time ‑ barred under Russian law (see Zokhidov , cited above, §   129). Therefore, the Court is not persuaded by the Government’s argument as regards the existence of the “established practice” in dealing with the risk of ill ‑ treatment complaints, in so far as it is based on the Z okhidov case. 77.     Be that as it may, the Court observes that the applicant in the present case raised the issue of the risk of being subjected to ill-treatment if returned to Uzbekistan in the extradition, administrative-removal and the refugee ‑ status proceedings. While denying any previous involvement in religious activities, he argued that in view of the nature of the criminal charges against him he would be persecuted for “political and religious” reasons in Uzbekistan. The Court is satisfied that his submissions remained consistent and that he advanced a number of specific and detailed arguments in support of his grievance (see paragraphs   14, 25-26, 30-31, 35, 37 and 40 above). Therefore, the Court considers that the applicant duly brought his complaint to the attention of the authorities. (α)     The domestic authorities’ assessment of the risk 78.     The Court notes that the extradition