CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 29 avril 2014

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s2E932ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt } .s598389FB { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sF5E1C6CF { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; text-decoration:underline; color:#ff0000 } .s2E302ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:14pt } .sE208486F { font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000 } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .sA6BC7FA7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:right } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s79DE5897 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s34D46E87 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sDE1FCA9C { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt } .s4B8D41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt } .s4DE7595 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:21.25pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA20670C4 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s59DEA84 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:59.5pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s583D00FA { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA5C4F8A9 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s28BDCFEA { width:6.53pt; display:inline-block } .s3B18E3A1 { width:198.76pt; display:inline-block } .sA2E62387 { width:204.97pt; display:inline-block }       SECOND SECTION             CASE OF Z.J. v. LITHUANIA   (Application no. 60092/12)           JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG     29 April 2014         FINAL   29/07/2014   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.     In the case of Z.J. v. Lithuania, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Guido Raimondi, President,   Işıl Karakaş,   András Sajó,   Nebojša Vučinić,   Paul Lemmens,   Egidijus Kūris,   Robert Spano, judges, and Abel Campos, Deputy Section Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 1 April 2014, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 60092/12) against the Republic of Lithuania lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Lithuanian national, Mr Z.J. (“the applicant”), on 11 September 2012. 2.     The Lithuanian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms E.   Baltutytė. 3.     The applicant alleged in particular that court decisions refusing to grant him custody of two of his children had violated his right to respect for his family life under Article 8 of the Convention. 4.     On 17 December 2012 the application was communicated to the Government. Pursuant to Rule 47 § 4 of the Rules of the Court, the Chamber decided of its own motion to grant anonymity to the applicant. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1960 and lives in Šiauliai. 6.     The applicant was married to V.J., with whom he had two boys – T.J., who was born in 1985, and Do.J., who was born in 1986. 7.     In 1993 the applicant divorced his wife, but they remained living together and had one more boy – Ž.J., born in 1997. 8.     On 18   May 2003 V.J. gave birth to twins – a boy, D.J., and a girl, K.J. 9.     On 5   December 2003 the applicant’s former wife and the mother of their five children died. Immediately afterwards, I.N., a cousin of the applicant’s late wife, took the twins to her home to take care of them. As the applicant wrote in his application to the Court, he had agreed that I.N. would take care of the twins because she had experience in raising children – she had two children of her own. He also mentioned having started dating I.N. and having planned to marry her later. In the applicant’s words, I.N. wanted to get married in church and not to disclose that fact to the State authorities so that it would be possible to keep receiving child benefits. The applicant wrote that then, “seeing such prospects for a bright future, [he] had agreed that I.N. would become official guardian of the twins and [he] had helped her to prepare paperwork for that purpose”. 10.     On 27 January 2004 the Šiauliai City Municipality’s Children’s Rights Protection Service ( Vaiko teisių apsaugos tarnyba , hereinafter – “the Service”) decided that I.N. could be the temporary guardian of the twins who, in turn, were to reside with her. The applicant took part in the hearing held at the Service’s premises and agreed with the decision. He noted that he could barely take care of his three other children, who were schoolboys, and was thus unable to raise the babies. He stated that if he had to bring the babies back to his home, he would be forced to quit his job and this would ruin him financially. His job also included working at night. If I.N. had not agreed to take the twins, he would have given them to a foster home for infants. The applicant agreed to have his parental rights limited should I.N. be appointed as the twins’ guardian. He also agreed to pay money towards the twins’ upbringing. I.N. stated that she did not have a job and agreed to raise the twins. 11.     A few days later, on 3   February 2004, the Director of Administration of Šiauliai City Municipality decided that I.N. should be appointed as the temporary guardian of the twins. 12.     Later on, the Service applied to the Šiauliai City District Court, asking it to appoint I.N. as the twins’ permanent guardian ( nuolatinė globėja ) and manager of their property. 13.     The applicant took part in the court hearing concerning that application and explained that even though he loved all of his children and had been raising the three older ones to the best of his abilities, he was not able to take care of the twins because of a lack of money and knowledge of how to take care of very young children. If he had to quit his job in order to bring up the twins, there would be no money to live on. Whilst noting that he was not giving the twins up, the applicant agreed that I.N. could be appointed as their guardian. He promised to help the twins financially to the best of his abilities. 14.     On 29   April 2004 the Šiauliai City District Court granted the Service’s application and granted permanent guardianship of the twins in favour of I.N., who was also to be manager of their property. The court also made a custody order concerning the twins in I.N.’s favour. The applicant was ordered to pay 50 Lithuanian litai (LTL) (approximately 15 euros (EUR)) per month in financial support for each child, until the children came of age. The court noted that the applicant could not take care of the twins because of his lack of knowledge of how to take care of infants. Yet it observed that the applicant worked and took care of his three older children, did not exercise his parental rights improperly, and had no negative influence on the older children. The applicant was also ready to support the twins financially, visit them and communicate with them when they became older. The twins were to be removed from the applicant’s care, although he would retain his parental rights, in accordance with Article 3.179 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 70 below). 15.     The decision could be appealed against to a higher court. The applicant notes that he did not appeal against the decision. 16. According to doctors who examined the twins, during the first years of their lives their development of motor skills was slower than normal, and by the age of three they had specific mixed development disorder ( specialus mišrus raidos sutrikimas ), and their language development was delayed. They needed speech therapy, physiotherapy and an undemanding regimen ( tausojantis režimas ). On 7 November 2006, at I.N.’s request and on the basis of reports by psychologists and doctors, the twins received learning support at the Šiauliai Special Upbringing Centre. At the centre the twins received help from a speech therapist and special educational needs teachers ( specialieji pedagogai ), and benefited from such procedures as massages, medical exercise therapy and herbal baths. Upon the request of I.N., who stated that she was ill herself and had to take care of her elderly mother, from 7   November 2006 onwards the twins became weekly boarders (from Mondays to Fridays) at the Special Upbringing Centre. As the doctors later noted during court proceedings, they made no recommendation either in favour of or against the twins boarding there during the week. As I.N. later specified during court hearings, she had not felt it appropriate for the twins to go to a regular kindergarten, because there were twenty-two children in one class ( grupė ) there, whereas at the Šiauliai Special Upbringing Centre there were only eight children in a class. According to the Government, the children stayed at the Special Upbringing Centre until 31 May 2009. It also appears from the documents before the Court that in the event of illnesses and during holidays the children were taken home (for example, in accordance with a doctor’s recommendation that the children stay at I.N.’s home from 23 December 2008 for four months). 17.     As of 1 September 2009 the twins attended daily pre-school classes at the Šiauliai Special Upbringing Centre. On 7 December 2009 the director of the centre noted that the twins were always brought to and collected from the centre by I.N. on time, they were well-rested, properly dressed, and had all the necessary materials for class with them. The applicant came to visit them at the centre twice. After his visits the children acted normally, although they were more interested in the presents he brought and did not communicate much. In May 2010 the institution noted that the applicant would come and see the twins at the centre two to three times a month, teachers were present at the meetings and the children’ behaviour after the meetings was normal. A.     The civil proceedings concerning the return of the twins to the applicant’s care 18.     In autumn 2008 disputes arose between the applicant and I.N. In September 2008 I.N. complained to the Service that the applicant had withdrawn money from the twins’ bank account, without her knowledge or permission, as the administrator of the twin’s property. A criminal case for fraud was opened against the applicant. On 12 April 2010 the applicant was acquitted of that charge the court, having established that he had acted in good faith and in the interests of the twins. 19.     On 9   December 2008 the applicant applied to the Šiauliai City District Court, asking that the twins be returned to him. He argued that the reasons for his two children being removed from his care had ceased to exist. The applicant lived in a three-room apartment and, above all, the twins were now older and he therefore felt able to raise them. Two of his older children, Do.J. and T.J., were now students. The applicant submitted that it would be in the best interests of all his children to grow up together. He also sought to have the twins summoned and questioned in court. 20.     In response, on 15   December 2008 I.N. lodged an application with the same court, seeking to have the applicant’s parental rights permanently limited (as for the outcome of this case, see paragraph 52 below). 21.     By a ruling of 16   March 2009, at I.N.’s request, the Šiauliai City District Court suspended the examination of the case initiated by the applicant for the twins’ custody until the civil case initiated by I.N. for termination of his parental rights was decided. 22.     The applicant appealed against that ruling, arguing that a delay in the proceedings was harmful to his interests and, even more so, to those of his minor children. He emphasised that in 2004 he had been separated from his children not because of his fault but because of circumstances that were beyond his control – the death of his former wife and the particularly young age of the twins. The applicant also noted that it was he who had addressed the Šiauliai City District Court first; only afterwards had I.N. initiated another set of court proceedings against him. Taking into account that a case concerning termination of his parental rights could reach the appellate courts, such proceedings could last a very long time, in breach of the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The delay in court proceedings could also push the twins away from their biological father and thus was detrimental to their interests. 23.     By a decision of 21   April 2009 the Šiauliai Regional Court granted the applicant’s appeal, on the ground that a delay in the proceedings would be in breach of the twins’ best interests. The court also established that the applicant had been the first to open court proceedings concerning the twins’ future residence. 24.     In July 2009 the Šiauliai City District Court held a hearing in the case initiated by the applicant regarding the twins’ return to him (see paragraph 19 above), at which the applicant, I.N., their lawyers and the Service’s representative were present. The court considered that an expert report was necessary to establish whether the twins were ready to be returned to the applicant’s home. The applicant’s lawyer insisted that, apparently for reasons of impartiality, if experts were to be appointed, those experts should be from Vilnius, and not from Šiauliai. During another court hearing on 31 August 2009 the applicant testified that he had not had problems with I.N. until 2008 when he found out that the twins had attended weekly boarding. 25.     On 7 December 2009 officials from the Service visited I.N.’s home and had a conversation with the twins, without I.N. being present. The two   children called I.N. “mummy”, and the applicant “daddy”, and expressed negative feelings towards their father and about being with him in either his or I.N.’s apartments. The child care specialists admitted, however, that the phrases the twins had used did not always correspond to the language used by children of their age. The conversation with the children also clearly showed that there was a dispute between the applicant and I.N. The child care specialists thus recommended, in the interests of the children, that the applicant and I.N. improve their relationship and strive to ensure that the applicant was able to communicate with his children. The Service concluded that the twins were not yet ready to live with the applicant. According to a further report, the child care specialists had also previously visited the applicant’s apartment in Šiauliai and found that the conditions there were suitable for children. 26.     In reply to a complaint by the applicant, on 4   March 2010 the Ombudsperson for the Protection of Children’s Rights ( Vaiko teisių apsaugos kontrolierius, hereinafter – “the Ombudsperson”) issued a report about his case. The Service informed the Ombudsperson that if the applicant had agreed to raise the twins himself at the time the question of guardianship had been examined, he would have been eligible to receive a monthly payment of around LTL 400 (approximately EUR   116) from the State in support. However, at that time the applicant had refused to raise the twins, even though he had stated that he intended to do so “in the future”, without indicating when, and had only applied to the Šiauliai City District Court for a residence order in respect of the twins on 9   December 2008. 27.     The Ombudsperson noted that the Service had an obligation to establish which help, in particular, the applicant’s family would have benefited from, including all the social services and other assistance available. However, in the Ombudsperson’s view, that had not been done, and the authorities had not taken specific steps to enable the twins to be returned to their biological family. 28.     That being so, the Ombudsperson also observed that since the 29   April 2004 court decision to establish permanent guardianship for the twins, the applicant had never contacted the Service regarding his communication with the twins until November 2008. Neither had he applied to have those two children returned to him. Similarly, until November 2008 the applicant had never claimed that I.N. was not taking care of the twins properly. Child care specialists had visited I.N.’s home during the intervening years and there was no evidence that the children had not been taken care of properly. 29.     Whilst noting the conflict between the applicant and I.N. over when and how the applicant could see the twins, the Ombudsperson urged the two to act prudently so that their dispute did not affect the children. The Service was ordered to take steps towards the improvement of the relationship between the applicant and the twins, provided that this was in the children’s best interests. It was necessary to find a proper balance between the interests of the children, namely, their health and development, and their communication with the applicant. That being so, the Service’s finding of 7   December 2009 that the twins were not yet ready to return to their father’s home was not unreasonable. It was pertinent that a sudden termination of the guardianship could cause distress, especially when the twins’ guardianship had been established at a very early age. I.N. had become their guardian when they were infants and, according to the information collected, they were very attached to her. Moreover, they had negative feelings towards their father, which, to a certain extent had been caused by the dispute between I.N. and the applicant. A transitional period was therefore necessary. 30.     As the dispute between the applicant and I.N. escalated, on 24   March   2010 the applicant lodged a civil claim with the Šiauliai City District Court seeking a formal decision setting up a contact schedule ( dėl bendravimo tvarkos nustatymo ) for him and the twins. 31.     On 27 May 2010 the Šiauliai City District Court suspended the proceedings for a contact schedule until the civil case concerning the return of the children to reside with the applicant, wherein a psychological assessment of the children had been ordered by the court, had been concluded (see paragraphs 19–24 above). 32.     The applicant also asked the court to issue interim protective measures ( laikinosios apsaugos priemonės ), so that he could regularly communicate with the twins. The applicant asked to spend twenty days in a row with the twins during the summer, see them twice a week for no less than four hours each time every week, and for the twins to stay at his home overnight once a week. The applicant also sought to have his two children stay with him overnight during public holidays, every second year. I.N. partly agreed to the request, but asked that the children not be left with the applicant overnight, because they had health problems and were not used to spending the night in another home. When questioned, the twins stated that they wanted to have contact with the applicant, but did not want to stay at his place overnight or to go on holiday with him for more than one day. The Service noted that the twins had not lived with the applicant for a long time and considered that, in order to restore their relationship, an adaptation period was necessary. The Service left the details of the contact order to the court’s discretion. 33.     On the request of the Šiauliai City District Court (see paragraph 24 above), experts at the Vilnius city psychiatric institution ( Vaikų ir paauglių teismo psichiatrijos skyrius ) examined the twins. Questions were put to the experts by the court, the applicant and I.N. In their report of 10   September 2010, the psychiatrists concluded that D.J. had a strong and positive emotional relationship with I.N., with whom he felt safe. The boy also had an emotionally positive relationship with his father, who was an important person for him, but their contact was insufficient. Such a lack of contact could be one of the reasons why the boy wanted to live with his father. On this last point the psychiatrists also noted that while the boy was able to freely express his wish to live with his father, he did so without being able to think critically and to foresee the consequences of his choice. The psychiatrists also noted: “it was not possible to state or to foresee how the change of living place would affect D.J.’s further development. However, taking into account the wish which D.J. had expressed to live with his father, it was unlikely that the change would affect the child negatively, or even cause him harm. [Nonetheless], taking into consideration that from his infancy to [the present] date I.N. had been raising him, it was not recommended to disrupt the relationship between the boy and I.N. completely”. The experts considered that it was for the court to decide how often the child should have contact with his father so that their emotional relationship could resume. As regards the girl, K.J., the psychiatrists concluded that she had an emotionally strong relationship with her guardian, with whom she felt safe. Her relationship with her father was ambivalent, but it had not broken down entirely. Both the applicant and I.N. were important people in K.J.’s life. All things considered, it was not possible to state or to foresee how a change of living place would affect K.J. It was thus for the court to decide how often the child should have contact with her father so that their emotional relationship could resume. The experts also recommended that the applicant and I.N. should share the duties of taking care of the children, and I.N. should actively cooperate by helping the twins to communicate with their father. 34.     On 4 July 2011 the Šiauliai City District Court held that, in order to gradually restore the twins’ emotional connection with their father, contact should be as follows: the applicant could collect the children from I.N.’s home every Wednesday and be with them for two-and-a-half hours; every Saturday he could spend nine-and-a-half hours with them. The court considered that it would only be appropriate for the twins to be with the applicant during school and public holidays once their bonds with him had become stronger. In the court’s view, such a contact order corresponded to the best interests of the children. The court also noted that, should the circumstances change, the applicant or I.N. could ask the court to amend the contact order. In August 2011 and upon I.N.’s request, the court amended the contact order to the effect that, should the applicant be unable to see the twins on Wednesday or Saturday due to their sickness or another justifiable reason, he could meet with them on Thursday or Sunday. The applicant and his lawyer took part in both court hearings. 35.     On 12   September 2011 the Šiauliai City District Court delivered its decision as to the applicant’s application for a residence order. The applicant, I.N., their lawyers, and the Service took part in the hearings before the court. The twins also took part in the hearings, giving evidence without the applicant, I.N. or their lawyers being present. 36.     The court noted that on 24 April 2004 the twins had been removed from the applicant’s care by a court decision for a legitimate reason – namely, because he could not take care of them (Article 3.179 of the Civil Code, see paragraph 70 below). It was important to observe that their separation was in no way linked to fault on the part of the applicant. Moreover, the measure was temporary in that it could be lifted if the circumstances justifying the separation from the twins no longer existed. Accordingly, it was necessary to examine whether those circumstances still existed, and, if not, whether the children’s being returned to live with the applicant would be in their best interests, which were the overriding consideration. The court noted that the best interests of the children, as the primary consideration, were indicated in Article 3 § 1 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and in Article 3.3 of the Civil Code. 37.     The Šiauliai City District Court agreed with the applicant’s argument that the grounds for removal of the twins from his care in 2004 had ceased to exist, because the twins were now eight years old and had been taken from the applicant because he had not possessed the appropriate knowledge of how to take care of them when they were infants. That being so, the court nevertheless held that the twins had a strong emotional link with I.N. and their emotional link with the applicant was not sufficient, which situation had clearly been influenced by the fact that the twins had lived separately from the applicant since June 2004. The court also observed that because of the dispute over money between the applicant and I.N. which had started in summer 2008, he had had limited opportunities to take part in educating his children and to communicate with them. It was only from July 2011, when the court had issued an interim order providing for the applicant’s contact with the twins in accordance with a fixed schedule, that the applicant had started to have regular contact with the twins. Even so, the applicant had not taken all possible steps to participate in the upbringing of the twins on an equal basis with I.N. Namely, even though the twins had been removed from his care in June 2004, the applicant had never asked for the twins to be returned to live with him until the disagreement with I.N. arose in summer 2008, even though his two other sons were no longer minors as of December 2003 and December 2004 respectively. The court also noted the applicant’s acknowledgement that until 2008 he had not encountered any obstacles to communicating with the twins. Yet, he had communicated with them only “episodically”, with the result that the emotional connection between the twins and the applicant and his other children was less strong than that existing between the twins and I.N. and her children. As the twins had testified in court, they did not want to live with the father. They did not even want to stay at his home during the weekends, this being confirmed by the applicant’s eldest child, Ž.J. 38.     The Šiauliai City District Court also dismissed the applicant’s argument that I.N. had not been taking care of the twins properly because they had been weekly boarders at the Šiauliai Special Upbringing Centre for three years. On the contrary, the court observed that according to the twins’ doctor, the care centre was of great benefit to the family, because the twins received specialist help there. The court found that the applicant ought to have been more active in making inquiries about the twins’ development and health. Lastly, the court noted the applicant’s statement that he had been aware as early as 2006 that the twins were weekly boarders at the care centre. 39.     The first-instance court concluded that because of the twins’ negative feelings towards the applicant, he would not be able to perform his fatherly duties properly. The court also took the psychiatrists’ report into account and held that the twins’ connection with the applicant was not strong enough, whereas they had a strong emotional connection with I.N. It followed that the grounds for removing the twins, who had expressed their wish to live with I.N. in court, from the applicant’s care persisted. Being returned to live with their father was not in the best interests of the children. Nonetheless, the applicant maintained his parental rights, including the right to have contact with his children, who would be well able to communicate with him whilst staying in a familiar environment, with I.N., where they felt safe. Should the circumstances change, that is to say, once the emotional relationship between the twins and the applicant became stronger, the applicant could apply to the courts again and seek the revocation of I.N.’s guardianship of the twins. The court thus dismissed the applicant’s request that the twins be returned to him. 40.     The applicant appealed, submitting that the first-instance court had erred in establishing that the circumstances on the basis of which the twins had been removed from his care in 2004 were no longer valid, but then going on to examine whether there were other reasons why he would not be able to take care of his children properly. He maintained that he had visited his children and communicated with them regularly from the date of their separation. However, as of 2008 I.N. had started turning the children against him. The court had established that there was a lack of a strong emotional relationship between the applicant and the twins, but had not taken into consideration that I.N. had deliberately taken steps to ensure that the children would be hostile to their father. 41.     The applicant also argued that the lower court had erred in establishing that I.N. had been taking care of the twins properly. He submitted that I.N. had without good reason sent the twins to be boarding pupils at the Šiauliai Special Upbringing Centre. Even though during the hearings at first instance the twins’ family doctor and another doctor had confirmed that the twins’ attendance at the centre had been recommended, those specialists had not recommended that the twins board at the centre. The applicant also submitted that until mid-2011 I.N. had not had a job and it was thus not unreasonable to conclude that her sole means of subsistence was child benefit payments, although domestic law required such monies to be used exclusively in the interests of children under guardianship. 42.     The applicant also observed that the first-instance court had completely disregarded the Ombudsperson’s report (see paragraphs 26-29 above). Likewise, the lower court had disregarded the psychiatrists’ reports about the twins (see paragraph 33 above), which had clearly stated that the boy wanted to live with the applicant and that there was no reason to believe that the boy’s well-being would suffer should he be returned to his biological father. 43.     Neither could the applicant agree with the lower court’s conclusion that he had not taken as much of a role in taking care of the twins as I.N. On this point he noted that his participation in the twins’ life had only been restricted as of 2008, when I.N. had taken steps to limit his communication with them. It was also noteworthy that in 2008 the applicant had applied to the courts for an order establishing a schedule for him to have contact with the twins. Lastly, the applicant maintained that the Service had from the very beginning and up to the present date, and by unjustified means, sought to further I.N.’s interests and not those of the children. 44.     By a ruling of 2 February 2012 the Šiauliai Regional Court upheld the lower court’s decision, noting that as an appellate court it was free to interpret the evidence as it saw fit. The applicant and I.N. took part in the appellate court’s hearing. The court noted that the case had a public interest element, because it concerned children’s rights. Accordingly, it examined supplementary evidence of its own motion and took notice of an earlier court decision to dismiss the applicant’s claim that I.N. had been embezzling the twins’ money (see paragraph 18 above). It therefore considered that the applicant’s accusations of selfishness and property mismanagement against I.N. were unfounded. 45.     The court considered that both the applicant and I.N. had not made enough effort to ensure that “the twins would return to the family”. The dispute between the two had negatively influenced the twins’ feelings towards their father, and had had a long term negative impact on the twins’ emotional and psychological development. The court noted the experts’ conclusion that so far the children had developed a firm, safe and positive emotional connection with I.N. Even so, the experts had also acknowledged that the twins’ connection with the applicant still existed and it was emotionally positive. Accordingly, it was crucial to develop that connection, and both the applicant and I.N. had to contribute to that development. The assistance of the Service would also be particularly important. 46.     The court also emphasised that it would necessarily take time for the children to be ready to be returned to their father: the latter and I.N. had to make an effort towards that goal. The children were to get used to the fact that they could see their father when they wanted, and not when I.N. sent them to visit him. On this point the court noted that children of the twins’ age already understood and were affected by the fact that their guardian, I.N., was not enthusiastic about them being in contact with the applicant. Equally, as regards the applicant’s attitude towards the situation, the court considered that the applicant blamed everybody else without seeing any fault on his own part. The panel of judges noted that the applicant was a very uncompromising individual who only accepted the validity of his own viewpoint and was not willing to have regard to the opinions of others. The panel concluded that so long as the applicant was not taking any steps to work on his issues, such as by seeking psychological assistance, the children could not be returned to an emotionally cold and harsh environment. A sudden removal of the children from the environment provided by I.N., which was safe and comforting for the children, would absolutely be a disproportionate and traumatic step which the court could not allow. 47.     The appellate court also noted that from birth the twins had had serious health problems, which had never gone away. In 2008 D.J. had been diagnosed with a medium level of disability; in 2010 the disability’s assessment had been changed to a mild level. K.J had a light level of disability, established in 2008. Both children were hyperactive, had numerous health problems and thus needed a greater level of attention. Accordingly, the applicant’s argument that the twins could stay at home until he returned from work showed that it would not be possible for him, and he was not ready, to take concrete steps to take care of the two children, who came home from school at noon. The applicant’s other children were busy to the extent that they also could not stay with the twins all the time. 48.     Lastly, the appellate court dismissed the applicant’s argument that the children should be returned to him on the basis of Article 3.181 of the Civil Code (see paragraph 70 below), which, in the applicant’s view, provided that a child should be returned to a parent once the grounds which necessitated their separation no longer existed. The court held that the best interests of the child were the priority. In the applicant’s case the appellate court had not established the existence of any new circumstances. Nevertheless, this did not automatically mean that the twins had to be returned to the applicant’s home immediately. A transitional period was necessary, which, in the court’s view, might be six months. In arriving at that timeframe it took into particular account the fact that this period would include the summer holidays, when the twins could leave their familiar environment, I.N.’s apartment, and re-establish a close relationship with their father. If the twins could have contact with their father for a longer period than the current sporadic, twice-a-week arrangement, they would be able to see that their father was there for them and that they could resolve everyday problems with their father’s assistance. 49.     The applicant lodged an appeal on points of law, but on 13   April 2012 the Supreme Court refused to examine it on the basis that it raised questions of fact only. B.     The resumed civil proceedings concerning contact rights 50.     On 22 February 2012 the applicant asked the Šiauliai City District Court to resume the suspended civil proceedings regarding his contact rights with the twins, noting that the other civil case concerning his application for the twins’ return had already ended (see paragraph 31 above). Six days later the court resumed the examination of the civil case concerning his application for a contact order, and with the aim that the case be examined expeditiously, set an oral hearing in that case for 26   March 2012. In May of that year the court also decided to join the two civil cases pending in relation to the twins (the civil case concerning the application for a parental contact order initiated by the applicant on 24 March 2010 and the civil case concerning the application for termination of the applicant’s parental rights initiated by I.N. on 15 December 2008; see, respectively, paragraphs 30 and   20 above). 51.     During the hearing of the joined civil case on 27 June 2012 a psychologist was present, the children were questioned (the applicant and I.N. were asked to leave the courtroom, their lawyers were present) and the psychologist made the following comments: “... From the statements made by K.J. we understand that the relationship between I.N. and her father is difficult and that the child sees and understands this. The girl mentioned a wish to meet [go out] with both of them if their relationship was better. I did not note entirely negative feelings towards her father, however there is no close relationship, and the relationship between the girl and I.N. is very strong. I understood from both of the children that their father promises things which never come true [and] this fell short of their expectations. D.J. states that he is willing to have contact with his father but only when he [the boy] so wishes, hence the child should not be forced to contact his father. ... The girl has no emotional relationship with her father, because she has seen him disputing [things] and [experienced him making] promises which never came true. The boy wishes to have contact with his father but at the present date the latter cannot arrange that. <...>” 52.     On 13 July 2012 the Šiauliai City District Court rejected I.N.’s civil claim for termination of the applicant’s parental rights (see paragraph   20 above) and partly granted the applicant’s civil claim for a contact order. The court noted that there was no basis for I.N.’s claims that the applicant had harmed the twins or had not taken care of them at all until autumn 2008. On the contrary, the evidence showed that he had been seeking contact with the children. The boy wanted to have contact with the applicant, and the girl would agree to have contact with him if he ceased his dispute with I.N. However, the twins’ contact with the applicant could not be forced. Whilst observing that the child’s best interests were paramount, the first-instance court also relied on the Court’s case-law, noting that in matters of child custody, for example, the reason for considering the “child’s best interests” may be twofold: firstly, to guarantee that the child develops in a sound environment and that a parent cannot take measures that would harm its health and development; secondly, to maintain its ties with its family, except in cases where the family has proved particularly unfit, since severing those ties means cutting a child off from its roots (the court referred to Maumousseau and Washington v. France , no. 39388/05, § 67, 6   December 2007). Lastly, the court rejected all the accusations by I.N. that the applicant had been antagonistic, because a criminal case initiated by her had been dismissed by the authorities (see paragraphs 18 and 44 above). The applicant thus had a right to have contact with the twins and an inherent duty to take part in educating them. He was also able to offer them appropriate living conditions. 53.     The Šiauliai City District Court also noted that both parties to the dispute – the applicant and I.N. – had put their own ambitions and their subjective views as to what would be best for the children first. For that reason, the applicant had sometimes tried to have contact with his daughter when she did not want to spend time with him, although his son was prepared to meet him. As for I.N., she had not attempted to restore the twins’ relations with their father and had showed no concern for the fact that the applicant’s and his daughter’s relationship was getting weaker and was close to breaking down. Accordingly, the parties’ failure to take care of the children’s best interests required that those interests be protected by the courts. Moreover, considering that the biggest issue was the communication between the applicant and his daughter, the court saw it appropriate to set, on its own initiative, a further schedule for their communication during the transitional period, so that the girl’s contact with the applicant be re-established. In particular, a psychologist or child care specialist was to assist the applicant and his daughter, during contact sessions which would take place in a neutral setting. Lastly, the court reiterated that the principle of the rights of the child having priority was relevant not only when setting a schedule for the contact between the applicant and the twins, but also when executing the court decision establishing that schedule. The applicant thus should not make use of his right to see the children, including taking them to his apartment, if this would breach the twins’ rights, even though his right to see them had been established in the court’s decision. 54.     The order establishing a contact schedule between the applicant and his two children essentially specified that, until a psychologist determined the readiness of K.J. to have contact with her father without the presence of a psychologist or a social worker, the applicant should have contact with her once a week in the presence of either a psychologist or a social worker and at a place and time agreed upon in advance. In addition to that, if the twins so agreed, the applicant could see them two or three times a week, for up to four hours, during the working week. He could also have them over every second week from Friday evening to Sunday evening, and also during some of the State holidays and spend with them two weeks during his vacations. 55.     I.N. appealed against the decision, seeking to have the applicant’s application for a contact order rejected and her application to have his parental rights terminated granted. The applicant submitted a response to the appeal, submitting that the decision of the first-instance court had been reasoned and lawful and thus that there were no legal grounds for quashing or changing it. He also claimed that I.N. was influencing the children’s testimony. 56.     On 20 November 2012 the Šiauliai Regional Court fully upheld the lower court’s decision to reject I.N.’s application to have the applicant’s parental rights terminated. In any event, the applicant’s parental rights could only be terminated if he failed to perform his fatherly duties, and there were no indications of this in his case. That being so, the appellate court also noted that at the time of the first-instance proceedings the twins had expressed a categorical and consistent wish not to stay at the applicant’s apartment overnight. In addition, according to the most recent reports by the doctors, the twins had become more nervous and agitated, and their emotional and psychological state and behaviour had become worse. It was therefore considered better for them to reside at I.N.’s home. The psychologist had testified that the boy wanted to see his father, but on a schedule of his choosing. The girl avoided meeting with her father at all. 57.     As concerns the issue of the parental contact order, the appellate court stated as follows: “... The panel of judges notes that it is impossible to raise a child without having contact with him/her. In Article 24 of the Law on the Fundamentals of Protection of Children Rights it is also established that if a child’s mother or father does not live with him/her, [the child] must have the opportunity to spend time with [his or her] mother or father, save for the exceptions established by law, [in the event that] such contact could prove to be of detriment to the child. Minimum contact may be established only if permanent maximum contact would be harmful to the interests of the child, if frequently spending time with the [non-resident] parent would traumatise the child psychologically, if the contact and parenting ( auklėjimas ) [offered] by a parent does not satisfy the interests, wishes and views of the child at all, [or] if [there would be] a negative impact on the child’s maturity and outlook [on life]. The evidence in the [instant] case allows the panel of judges to hold that at present there are grounds for changing the maximum parental contact order established by the [lower] court to a minimum [contact order]. The court has had regard to the current categorical and consistent position of the children towards the opportunity to stay overnight with their father as envisaged in the [lower court’s] parental contact order. The medical certificates included in the case file allow the court to state that the children’s state of health, anxiety, and irritability strengthened, their emotional state and behaviour worsened, hence treatment at home is recommended for them. The medical documents recording the existence [of] weakness of the central nervous system, attention-deficit disorder, [delayed] language development, learning [difficulties], etc. were neither refuted during the examination of the case before the court of the first instance, nor during the examination on appeal. While commenting on the children’s feelings towards their father the psychologist has noted that there is not currently a close relationship between the father and the children, the son [D.J.] states that he only wants to have contact with his father when he [D.J.] so wishes, the daughter [K.J.] is avoiding contact with her father. The twins [D.J.] and [K.J.] were examined in terms of their psychological state, heightened fear of separation from their guardian, and feelings of insecurity. While stating that the major problem is the daughter’s [K.J.’s] communication with her father, the court of first instance correctly emphasised the need [for it] to establish additional conditions for contact between the girl and her father, hence it justly noted that the father’s contact with his daughter was essential to restore a normal relationship with his daughter. A transitional period had to be established given that [it would take] a reasonable period of time for the child to become accustomed to [spending time] her father. Accordingly, the [lower] court’s conclusion in the present case that it is not currently possible for the father to have maximum contact with his minor daughter [K.J.] is correct, because it is indisputably established in the case that any ties, including emotional ones, between father and daughter have almost broken down. The panel of judges also considers that contact with the [applicant’s] son [D.J.] contrary to his wishes (involuntarily) would not satisfy the interests of the child. In view of the aim of reinstating the lost connection, forced (involuntary) contact [on the part of] the children with their father would be meaning