CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 12 juin 2014

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FRANCE   (Application no. 40454/07)     JUDGMENT         STRASBOURG   12 June 2014           THIS CASE WAS REFERRED TO THE GRAND CHAMBER WHICH DELIVERED JUDGMENT IN THE CASE ON 10/11/2015   This judgment may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Couderc and Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, The European Court of Human Rights (Former Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Mark Villiger, President,   Angelika Nußberger,   Boštjan M. Zupančič,   Ann Power-Forde,   André Potocki,   Paul Lemmens,   Helena Jäderblom, judges, and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 13 May 2014, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 40454/07) against the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a French national, Ms   Anne-Marie Couderc, and Hachette Filipacchi Associés, a company incorporated in France (“the applicants”), on 24   August 2007. 2.     The applicants were represented by Ms   M.-C. de Percin, of the Paris Bar. The French Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms Edwige Belliard, Director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3.     The applicants alleged that there had been an unjustified breach of their freedom of expression. 4.     On 9 March 2009 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicants are the publication director and the publisher respectively of the weekly magazine Paris Match . Ms Anne-Marie Couderc is a French national and was born in 1950. The company Hachette Filipacchi Associés, a legal entity incorporated under French law, has its registered office in Levallois-Perret. A.     The impugned publication and the proceedings before the French courts 6.     On 3 May 2005 the British newspaper The Daily Mail published claims by Ms C., alleging that Albert Grimaldi, reigning Prince of Monaco since his father’s death on 6 April 2005, was the father of her son. The article referred to the forthcoming report in the Paris Match magazine and reproduced the main points of that report, together with three photographs, one of which showed the Prince holding the child in his arms. 7.     On 3   May 2005, having been informed that an article was about to appear in Paris   Match , Prince Albert served notice on the applicants to refrain from publishing the article in question. 8.     In spite of the notice to refrain, the weekly magazine Paris Match , in its edition no. 2920 of 5   May 2005, 1,010,000 copies of which were printed, published an interview in which Ms C. presented her son A. as having been born from her intimate relationship with the Prince, who had succeeded his father on the previous 6   April. Publicised on the magazine’s cover under the headline “Albert of Monaco: A., the secret child” (“ Albert de Monaco: A., l’enfant secret ”) the ten-page article, entitled “A. is Albert’s son, says his mother”, included several photographs showing the Prince beside Ms C. or the child. Those of the Prince and the child had been taken by Ms C. with the Prince’s consent. Ms C., who had sole parental authority, had handed them over to Paris Match for publication. 9.     The article, in which Ms C. replied to the questions put by a journalist, gave details about the circumstances in which she had met the Prince, their meetings, their intimate relationship and feelings, the way in which the Prince had reacted to the news of Ms C.’s pregnancy and how he had behaved on meeting the child. It noted that the boy had been born on 24   August 2003 and that the Prince had formally recognised him before a notary on 15 December 2003, but had requested that this fact should not be made public before the death of his own father, Prince Rainier III. 10.   On 19 May 2005 the Prince brought proceedings against the applicants in the Nanterre tribunal de grande instance on the basis of Article 8 of the Convention and Articles 9 and 1382 of the Civil Code, seeking compensation for invasion of privacy and infringement of his right to protection of his image through the publication of the above-mentioned article on 5 May 2005. 11.     On 29 June 2005 the court allowed the Prince’s claim, awarding him 50,000 euros in damages and ordering that details of the judgment be printed in a full-page feature on the magazine’s front page, on pain of a daily fine and at the publisher’s expense, under the headline “Court order made against Paris Match at the request of Prince Albert II of Monaco”. The judgment was immediately enforceable. 12.     In allowing the Prince’s claims, the court noted, in particular, that from the first page onwards, the magazine disclosed the Prince’s paternity through the headline “Albert of Monaco: A., the secret child”, accompanied by a photograph showing him holding the child. It added that the ten-page article dealt with the issue of the Prince’s father-son relationship with the child, by means of questions which led the child’s mother to discuss her relationship with the Prince, the feelings of those involved, the Prince’s private life and reactions and the child’s recognition child before a notary. It added that numerous photographs, clearly taken in the context of the intimacy of the protagonists’ private life, had been deliberately chosen to illustrate and lend support to the disclosure; they were accompanied by the magazine’s own captions, which also referred to the Prince’s emotional life, analysing his conduct, his reactions to the young woman and the child, and speculating as to his feelings with regard to this secret child. The court considered that the entire article and the accompanying pictures came within the most intimate sphere of emotional and family life and that they were not apt to be the subject of any debate of general interest. It added that the claimant’s accession to the throne of the Principality of Monaco did not deprive him of the right to respect for his private life, nor of his right to protection of his own image in the face of mere rumours concerning the civil status of a child, which could not serve as a legitimate pretext for providing information to a prying and curious public about the lives of public figures, their feelings and their private conduct. In addition, the court held that a newspaper could not seriously claim to take the place of the courtroom, where the rights of children and women were lawfully defended. 13.     The court concluded that the impugned article, which treated rumours in a sensational manner, both in its wording and through the completely irrelevant accompanying pictures, amounted to a serious breach of the claimant’s fundamental personality rights, the latter having specifically served notice by a bailiff on the publishing company to respect those rights on 3 May 2005. 14.     The applicants appealed against that judgment and obtained a suspension of the judgment’s immediate enforceability. 15.     On 6 July 2005 the Prince issued a statement in which he publicly recognised the child. The notarised document was entered in the register of births, deaths and marriages during the same period. 16.     On 24 November 2005 the Versailles Court of Appeal gave judgment. 17.     It noted that, through the interview with the child’s mother, the impugned article focused on revealing the birth of the child, who was presented as having been born from the intimate relationship she had conducted with the Prince since 1997. Furthermore, on the date of the article’s publication, both his birth and his father’s identity were unknown to the public. 18 .     The court of appeal emphasised that emotional, love or family life and issues of paternity and maternity came within the sphere of private life and were protected by Article 9 of the Civil Code and Article   8 of the Convention, which, according to the court, made no distinction between anonymous persons and public figures, whatever their civil, political or religious functions. It noted that the fact of the Prince’s fatherhood “had never been publicly recognised”, that the Monegasque Constitution made it impossible for a child born outside wedlock to accede to the throne and that the Prince had not given his consent to the disclosure of his possible paternity of the child, having on 3 May 2005 indicated to the applicant company his opposition to the publication of those facts. In consequence, it concluded that the applicant company had deliberately breached the provisions of Article 9 of the Civil Code and of Article   8 of the Convention. It considered that this offence could not be justified by the requirements of current affairs reporting, the legitimacy of the information or readers’ right to information, which did not cover the Prince’s secret paternity, even if he had become the reigning Prince of the Principality since his father’s death in April 2005. 19 .     The court of appeal further noted that the article did not merely disclose the existence of a “secret” child. It also contained numerous digressions derived from the confessions made by the child’s mother, concerning the circumstances of their meeting, the Prince’s feelings, his most intimate reactions in response to the news of the pregnancy and his attitude towards the child during private encounters. It considered that this could not be justified by the concomitant publication of these facts in a German magazine, or by the media impact caused by the content of the article, or by the fact that other publications had subsequently repeated these reports (which had become common knowledge through the fault of the publishing company), or by the alleged legitimacy of such a disclosure. The child had no official status which would have rendered his birth and the disclosure of the father’s identify a subject which the media, as part of their duty to provide information, were required to bring to the public’s attention. It found that although the photographs which accompanied the article and showed the respondent with the child had been taken by the latter’s mother and with the Prince’s consent, he had not consented to their publication, and that consequently she was at fault. 20.     The court of appeal concluded that the publication in question had caused the Prince irreversible damage, in that the fact that he was the child’s father, which he had wished to keep secret, and which had remained so from the child’s birth until publication of the impugned article, had suddenly become public knowledge, against his wishes. The non-pecuniary damage thus caused justified the issuing of an order for publication, as supplementary compensation, which, in view of the nature of the breach and the seriousness of its consequences, was in no way disproportionate to the competing interests and, on the contrary, represented the most adequate redress in such circumstances. 21.     The Versailles Court of Appeal upheld the contested judgement, in particular the payment of 50,000 euros in damages, and merely varied the conditions of the order for publication, which was no longer to appear under a headline and occupy one third of the front cover. Thus, the court ordered that in the first issue to be published in the week following service of the judgment, a box covering the lower third of the front page and containing the following text was to be printed on a white background, failing which the applicant company would be fined 15,000 euros per issue: “By a judgment of the Versailles Court of Appeal, upholding the judgment delivered by the Nanterre tribunal de grande instance , the company Hachette Filipacchi Associés in issue no. 2920, dated 5 May 2005, of the newspaper Paris Match , in an article entitled ‘Albert of Monaco: A. The secret child’ has been found to have invaded the privacy and infringed the right to his own image of Albert II of Monaco.” 22.     This statement was published on the front cover of edition no.   2955 of the magazine, dated 5 January 2006, under the following editorial commentary: “Albert of Monaco: The truth is condemned. Paris   Match disclosed the existence of his son, A. The courts have penalised freedom to impart information. The international press reacts to support us.” 23.     The applicants appealed on points of law. In their further pleadings, they relied, in particular, on Article   10 of the Convention, given that the disclosure of the Prince’s paternity was a matter of public life and was justified by the requirements of imparting information, in view of the functions that he occupied as sovereign of a Principality with a hereditary monarchy. 24.     By a judgment of 27 February 2007, the Court of Cassation dismissed the appeal on the grounds, inter alia , that: “... every person, whatever his rank, birth, property or present or future functions, is entitled to respect for his private life; the judgment notes on the one hand that, on the date on which the article was published, the child’s existence and his family relationship were unknown to the public, and that, on the other, the Principality’s Constitution rules out the possibility of his accession to the throne, since he was born outside wedlock, a situation that, moreover, the company did not allege to be a subject of debate in French or Monegasque society or of examination in the impugned publication, and, lastly, [that] the article contained multiple digressions on the circumstances in which Ms C. and Prince Albert met and about their relationship, the Prince’s reactions to the news of the pregnancy and his subsequent attitude towards the child; in the light of these findings and considerations, the court of appeal correctly noted the lack of any topical news item or any debate on a matter of general interest which justified its being reported at the time of the impugned publication on the grounds of legitimate imparting of information to the public; moreover, the publication of photographs of a person to illustrate subsequent content which amounted to an invasion of his privacy necessarily infringes his right to control of one’s own image.” B.     The publication in Germany and the proceedings before the German courts 25.     The interview with Ms C. and the disputed photographs were also published in the German weekly magazine Bunte of 4 May 2005. 26.     Having brought urgent proceedings against this magazine in order to prevent any further publication, the Prince’s case was dismissed on 19   July 2005 by a judgment of the Freiburg Regional Court ( Landgericht ), upheld on 18   November 2005 by the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal ( Oberlandesgericht ). 27.     The German courts placed the public’s right to information over the Prince’s interests in protection of his private life, having regard to his status as sovereign of a European principality. They described him as an “undeniable figure of contemporary society” and considered that the issue of a male descendent was of decisive importance in a constitutional hereditary monarchy, given that a change to the rule prohibiting a child born out of wedlock from claiming the Monegasque throne could not be ruled out in the future. 28.     They considered that it was for the child’s mother, and not for the Prince, who had not recognised him, to decide whether the disclosure of the child’s existence fell within the protected private sphere. However, the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal ordered that a photograph showing the Prince in Ms C.’s company was not to be published.   II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND EUROPEAN LAW TEXTS A.     The Civil Code 29.     The relevant provisions of the Civil Code provide as follows: Article 9 “Everyone has the right to respect for his private life. Judges may, without prejudice to a right to compensation for the damage sustained, order any measures, such as seizure, attachment and others, that may prevent or cause to cease an interference with the intimate side of private life; in the event of urgency such measures may be ordered on an interlocutory application.” Article 1382 “Any act that causes damage to another shall render the person through whose fault the damage was caused liable to make reparation for it.” B.     Resolution 1165 (1998) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the right to privacy 30.     The relevant passages of Resolution 1165 (1998), adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on 26 June 1998, read as follows: “1. The Assembly recalls the current affairs debate it held on the right to privacy during its September 1997 session, a few weeks after the accident which cost the Princess of Wales her life. 2. On that occasion, some people called for the protection of privacy, and in particular that of public figures, to be reinforced at the European level by means of a convention, while others believed that privacy was sufficiently protected by national legislation and the European Convention on Human Rights, and that freedom of expression should not be jeopardised. 3. In order to explore the matter further, the Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights organised a hearing in Paris on 16 December 1997 with the participation of public figures or their representatives and the media. 4. The right to privacy, guaranteed by Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, has already been defined by the Assembly in the declaration on mass communication media and human rights, contained within Resolution 428 (1970), as ‘the right to live one’s own life with a minimum of interference’. 5. In view of the new communication technologies which make it possible to store and use personal data, the right to control one’s own data should be added to this definition. 6. The Assembly is aware that personal privacy is often invaded, even in countries with specific legislation to protect it, as people’s private lives have become a highly lucrative commodity for certain sectors of the media. The victims are essentially public figures, since details of their private lives serve as a stimulus to sales. At the same time, public figures must recognise that the position they occupy in society – in many cases by choice – automatically entails increased pressure on their privacy. 7. Public figures are persons holding public office and/or using public resources and, more broadly speaking, all those who play a role in public life, whether in politics, the economy, the arts, the social sphere, sport or in any other domain. 8. It is often in the name of a one-sided interpretation of the right to freedom of expression, which is guaranteed in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, that the media invade people’s privacy, claiming that their readers are entitled to know everything about public figures. 9. Certain facts relating to the private lives of public figures, particularly politicians, may indeed be of interest to citizens, and it may therefore be legitimate for readers, who are also voters, to be informed of those facts. 10. It is therefore necessary to find a way of balancing the exercise of two fundamental rights, both of which are guaranteed in the European Convention on Human Rights: the right to respect for one’s private life and the right to freedom of expression. 11. The Assembly reaffirms the importance of every person’s right to privacy, and of the right to freedom of expression, as fundamental to a democratic society. These rights are neither absolute nor in any hierarchical order, since they are of equal value. 12. However, the Assembly points out that the right to privacy afforded by Article   8 of the European Convention on Human Rights should not only protect an individual against interference by public authorities, but also against interference by private persons or institutions, including the mass media. 13. The Assembly believes that, since all member states have now ratified the European Convention on Human Rights, and since many systems of national legislation comprise provisions guaranteeing this protection, there is no need to propose that a new convention guaranteeing the right to privacy should be adopted.” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 31.     The applicants alleged that the judgment against them amounted to unjustified interference in the exercise of their right to freedom of information, and relied on Article 10 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” A. Admissibility 32.     The Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ submissions 33.     The applicants alleged that the international press had republished the information, and that this information was all the more legitimate in that it raised questions concerning the possible consequences of the fact of the Prince’s fatherhood on the succession, since the Monegasque Constitution, as amended in April 2002, permitted only a “direct” and “legitimate” child to succeed to the throne. They maintained that a new amendment to the Constitution could not be ruled out, which would have direct consequences for the status of young A. They added that, account being had to his public functions and the stakes involved in his succession, the fact of the Prince being a father was a matter of general interest and could not be considered as a simple news item. 34.     Further, they submitted that the agreement of the child’s mother was important, even if the court decision had been intended only to protect the rights of the Prince. Indeed, the latter had explained in an official statement that he had not publicly acknowledged his fatherhood in an effort to protect the child from media coverage, but the applicants queried the relevance of this aim, since he had not officially recognised his son on the date of the article’s publication and did not have parental responsibility. 35.     They added that the freedom of the child’s mother to assert his rights made it necessary, in her view, to disclose the father’s identity. In consequence, as the German courts had acknowledged, it was for the mother, and for the Prince, who had not recognised him, to decide whether or not publicity around this child’s existence fell within the protected private sphere. 36.     Lastly, the applicants emphasised that the official statement regarding paternity, albeit issued at a later date, had been organised by the Prince, who himself acknowledged the importance of the facts, thus entirely legitimising communication by the press of the impugned information. They added that the report had furthermore more been disseminated by the international press in its entirety, which indicated that the publications had contributed to a debate of general interest. Moreover, the Prince, conscious of his duty towards public opinion, had revealed a few months later that he was the father of another child, a fact which had been widely reported in the international press. 37.     The Government acknowledged that the court judgment against the applicants by the domestic courts constituted an interference with the exercise of their right to freedom of expression and to impart information. 38.     They considered that the interference had been “prescribed by law” under Articles 9 and 1382 of the Civil Code and that it pursued a legitimate aim, the protection of the reputation or rights of others. 39.     As to whether the interference had been necessary, the Government emphasised that in the instant case the impugned publication consisted in an interview with Ms C., who presented her son A. as having been born from her intimate relationship with the Prince. The ten-page article contained several photographs showing the Prince beside Ms C. or the child. According to the Government, publication of this article despite the Prince’s formal opposition clearly constituted an invasion of his privacy and an infringement of his right to control his own image. 40.     The Government referred to the reasoning of the domestic courts, considering that there had been a pressing need to protect the Prince from the impugned publication as the disclosures made did not concern a matter of general interest, given that they had absolutely no impact on the organisation of the Monegasque State and were of a particularly intimate nature. They concluded from this that the applicants had not assumed their duties and responsibilities in publishing an article which constituted a serious, manifest and deliberate invasion of the Prince’s privacy and an infringement of his right to protection of his image. They added that the fact that the Prince had been in agreement when those photographs were taken was irrelevant, as his consent had only concerned their private use. They emphasised that the publication of these photos showing the Prince with his son was an especial breach of his private life, as were the digressions revealing intimate aspects of his life. The Government further observed that the official disclosure of paternity had been made through a statement from the Prince subsequent to the publication, and that the fact that the German courts had found against the Prince did not remove from the State the wide margin of appreciation left to it by the Court. 41.     Lastly, they considered that the sentence had been proportionate. The conditions with regard to publication of the court’s judgment had been altered by the court of appeal, and the invasion of privacy and infringement of the right to one’s own image had plainly been serious. 2.     The Court’s assessment (a)     General principles 42.     The Court has repeatedly emphasised the essential role played by the press in a democratic society. Although the press must not overstep certain bounds, regarding in particular protection of the reputation and rights of others, its duty is nevertheless to impart – in a manner consistent with its obligations and responsibilities – information and ideas on all matters of public interest. Not only does the press have the task of imparting such information and ideas; the public also has a right to receive them. Were it otherwise, the press would be unable to play its vital role of “public watchdog” (see Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no.   21980/93, §§   59 and 62, ECHR   1999 ‑ III; Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark [GC], no.   49017/99, §   71, ECHR 2004-XI; and Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July v. France [GC], nos. 21279/02 and 36448/02, §   62, ECHR 2007 ‑ IV). 43.     However, Article 10 § 2 of the Convention states that freedom of expression carries with it “duties and responsibilities”, which also apply to the media even with respect to matters of serious public concern. These duties and responsibilities are liable to assume significance when there is a question of attacking the reputation of a named individual and infringing the “rights of others (see Bladet Tromsø and Stensaas , cited above, §§   59 and 62; Pedersen and Baadsgaard , cited above, §   71; and Lindon, Otchakovsky-Laurens and July , cited above, § 62). 44.     The Court reiterates that the right to protection of reputation is a right which is protected by Article 8 of the Convention as part of the right to respect for private life (see Chauvy and Others v. France , no. 64915/01, § 70, ECHR 2004 ‑ VI; Polanco Torres and Movilla Polanco v. Spain , no.   34147/06 §   40, 21   September 2010; and Axel Springer AG v. Germany [GC], no.   39954/08, § 83g, 7 February 2012). The notion of “private life” is a broad concept, not susceptible to exhaustive definition, which covers the physical and psychological integrity of a person and can therefore embrace multiple aspects of a person’s identity, such as gender identification and sexual orientation, name or elements relating to a person’s right to their image (see S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04, §   66, ECHR 2008). It covers personal information which individuals can legitimately expect should not be published without their consent (see Flinkkilä and Others v. Finland , no.   25576/04, §   75, 6   April 2010, and Saaristo and Others v. Finland , no.   184/06, § 61, 12   October 2010). 45.     Although the object of Article 8 is essentially that of protecting the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities, it does not merely compel the State to abstain from such interference: in addition to this negative undertaking, there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect for private or family life. They may involve the adoption of measures even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves (see X and Y v. the Netherlands , 26 March 1985, § 23, Series A no. 91; Armonienė v. Lithuania , no. 36919/02, § 36, 25   November 2008; Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, § 98, ECHR 2012; and Söderman v. Sweden [GC], nos.   5786/08, § 78, ECHR 2013). That also applies to the protection of a person’s picture against abuse by others (see Schüssel v. Austria (dec.), no.   42409/98, 21   February 2002; Von Hannover v. Germany , no. 59320/00, ECHR 2004-VI, § 57; Reklos and Davourlis v. Greece , no. 1234/05, § 35, 15   January 2009; and Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) , cited above, § 98). 46.     The Court notes that in order to fulfil its positive obligation to secure one person’s rights under Article 8, the State may be called upon to interfere with the Article 10 rights of another party. When examining the necessity of an interference in a democratic society in the interests of the “protection of the reputation or rights of others”, the Court may be required to verify whether the domestic authorities struck a fair balance when protecting two values guaranteed by the Convention which may come into conflict with each other in certain cases, namely, on the one hand, freedom of expression protected by Article 10 and, on the other, the right to respect for private life enshrined in Article 8 (see Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France , no.   71111/01, §   43, 14   June 2007; MGN Limited v. the United Kingdom , no.   39401/04, §   142, 18   January 2011; and Axel Springer AG , cited above, § 84). 47.     The Court reiterates that, under Article 10 of the Convention, the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent an interference with the freedom of expression guaranteed under that provision is necessary (see Tammer v. Estonia , no.   41205/98, § 60, ECHR 2001 ‑ I, and Pedersen and Baadsgaard , cited above, §   68). 48.     However, this margin goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those delivered by an independent court (see Karhuvaara and Iltalehti v. Finland , no.   53678/00, § 38, ECHR 2004 ‑ X, and Flinkkilä and Others , cited above, § 70). In exercising its supervisory function, the Court’s task is not to take the place of the national courts, but rather to review, in the light of the case as a whole, whether the decisions they have taken pursuant to their power of appreciation are compatible with the provisions of the Convention relied on (see Axel Springer AG , cited above, § 86; Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) , cited above, § 105; and Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland [GC], no. 16354/06, § 60, ECHR 2012 (extracts)). 49.     As regards public figures, more specifically, the Court reiterates that whilst a private individual unknown to the public may claim particular protection of his or her right to private life, the same is not true of public figures (see Minelli v. Switzerland (dec.), no.   14991/02, 14 June 2005; Axel Springer AG , cited above, § 91; and Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) , cited above, § 110). For example, a politician, as such, inevitably and knowingly lays himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both journalists and the public at large, and he must consequently display a greater degree of tolerance (see Lopes Gomes da Silva v. Portugal , no.   37698/97, §   30, ECHR 2000-X; Vides Aizsardzības Klubs v. Latvia , no.   57829/00, § 40, 27 May 2004; Otegi Mondragon v. Spain , no.   2034/07, §   50, ECHR 2011; and Eon v. France , no. 26118/10, § 59, 14   March 2013). He is certainly entitled to have his reputation protected, even when he is not acting in his private capacity, but the requirements of that protection have to be weighed against the interests of open discussion of political issues, since exceptions to freedom of expression must be interpreted narrowly (see, inter alia , Artun and Güvener v. Turkey , no.   75510/01, § 26, 26 June 2007). Accordingly, a fundamental distinction needs to be made between reporting facts capable of contributing to a debate in a democratic society, relating to politicians in the exercise of their official functions for example, and reporting details of the private life of an individual who does not exercise such functions (see Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria (no. 2) , no.   21277/05 § 47, 4 June 2009, and Von Hannover v. Germany (2004), cited above, § 63). 50.     In balancing the right to freedom of expression and the right to respect for private life, the Court has established the following criteria: the contribution to a debate of general interest, the public profile of the person concerned and the subject of the report, the prior conduct of the person concerned, the means by which the information was obtained and its veracity, the content, form and consequences of the publication and the circumstances in which photographs were taken, and the severity of the sanctions imposed (see Axel Springer AG , cited above, §§   90 to 95; Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) , cited above, §§ 109 to 113; and Ruusunen v. Finland , no. 73579/10, § 43, 14   January 2014). The Court will rely on these criteria for guidance in the present case. (b)     Application to the present case 51.     The Court notes, and it is common ground between the parties, that the judgment against the applicants for invasion of privacy and infringement of the Prince’s right to protection of his own image amounted to interference with the exercise of their right to freedom of expression. It also considers that that interference was prescribed by law and pursued a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the reputation and rights of others. 52.     It remains to be ascertained whether the interference was “necessary” in a democratic society to achieve those aims. 53. In a case such as the present one, the outcome of the application should not vary according to whether it has been lodged with the Court under Article 10 of the Convention by the publisher who has published the offending interview or under Article 8 by the person who was the subject of that interview. Indeed, as a matter of principle these rights deserve equal respect (see Hachette Filipacchi Associés (“Ici Paris”) v. France , no.   12268/03, § 41, 23 July 2009; Timciuc v. Romania (dec.), no.   28999/03, § 144, 12 October 2010; and Mosley v. the United Kingdom , no.   48009/08, § 111, 10 May 2011). Accordingly, the margin of appreciation should in principle be the same in both cases (see Axel Springer AG , cited above, § 87, and Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) , cited above, §   106). 54.     In addition, in the present case the Court must take into account the fact that this was not merely a dispute between the press and a public figure, but that the interests of Ms C. and the child A. were also at stake. Ms C. supplied information to the press and played a pivotal role in the case as the mother of the child born outside marriage; the published report came within the sphere of her private life as well as that of her son or of the Prince. The child’s existence and origins were the main focus of the report. The Court must be mindful of the fact that Ms C. used the press to draw public attention to the situation of her child, who had been born outside marriage and not publicly recognised by his father (see paragraph   9 above). i.     Contribution to a debate of general interest 55.     The Court notes in the present case that the French courts, unlike their German counterparts, took the view that the birth of the Prince’s son, who had no official status, fell within the sphere of private life rather than forming part of a debate of general interest (see paragraphs 12, 18, 19 and 27 above). In its judgment of 27 February 2007 the Court of Cassation noted “the lack of any topical news item or any debate on a matter of general interest which justified its being reported at the time of the impugned publication on the grounds of legitimate imparting of information to the public” (see paragraph 24 above). 56.     The Court notes at the outset that, according to the Court of Cassation, the Constitution of the Principality rules out the possibility of the child’s succeeding to the throne on the ground that he was born outside wedlock, an issue that was not a subject of debate and, moreover, was not raised in the offending article. 57.     The Court reiterates that it has recognised the existence of a debate of general interest where the publication concerned events of contemporary society, such as the illness of Rainier III, the reigning Prince of Monaco at the time (see Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) , cited above, §§ 38 and 117, and Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 3) , no. 8772/10, §§ 49 and 52, 19   September 2013). However, the rumoured marital difficulties of a president of the Republic or the financial difficulties of a famous singer were not deemed to be matters of general interest (see Standard Verlags GmbH v. Austria (no.   2) , cited above, § 52, and Hachette Filipacchi Associés (“Ici Paris”) , cited above, §   43). Equally, the Court found that, although the relationship between a prime minister and a young woman concerned a debate of public interest, in that it could provide indications as to the former’s honesty and judgment, the description of his sex life and of the couple’s intimate moments amounted, in contrast, to an invasion of privacy (see Ruusunen , cited above, §§ 50 to 52). 58.     The Court has also concluded that a State’s interest in protecting the reputation of its own head of State or of a foreign head of State cannot serve as justification for affording that individual privileged status or special protection vis-à-vis the right to convey information and opinions concerning him. To think otherwise cannot be reconciled with modern practice and political conceptions (see, mutatis mutandis, Colombani and Others v. France , no. 51279/99, § 68, ECHR 2002-V; Artun and Güvener , cited above, §   31; and Otegi Mondragon , cited above, § 55). Thus, the Court has interpreted the concept of general interest rather widely, taking account of the context and of public reaction to specific information. 59.     In the present case, a distinction is to be made between the core message of the article and the details contained in. The published article and the photographs concerned the offspring of a reigning Prince, revealing the existence of a son born outside marriage of whom the public had previously been unaware. Although, under the Monegasque Constitution as it currently stands, this child does not have a claim to succeed his father, his very existence is apt to be of interest to the public and, in particular, to the citizens of Monaco. As succession to the title is based on heredity, the birth of a child has special significance. Furthermore, the Prince’s attitude could provide an insight into his personality and his capacity to perform his duties adequately (see Ruusunen , cited above, § 14). In the present case, the requirements of the protection of the Prince’s private life and the debate on the future of the hereditary monarchy were thus in competition. However, this was an issue of political significance. The public therefore had a legitimate interest in knowing of the child’s existence and being able to conduct a debate on the possible implications for political life in the Principality of Monaco. However, this approach cannot be applied to all the details concerning the private lives of the Prince and of Ms C. contained in the article, and in particular the circumstances of their meeting and their relationship and the Prince’s attitude towards the news of the pregnancy and subsequently towards the child (see the Court of Cassation’s judgment, cited in paragraph 24 above). 60.     In these circumstances the Court considers that the published article included elements that were important for a debate of general interest, but also elements which related solely to the private, or even intimate, life of the Prince and Ms C. ii.     Official functions and public profile of the person concerned, and subject of the report 61.     With regard to the Prince’s public profile, it is clear that, as Head of State, he was a public figure at the time the interview was published. 62.     As to the subject of the report and the photographs, the Court reiterates that the decisive factor in balancing the protection of private life against freedom of expression should lie in the contribution that the published photos and articles make to a debate of general interest. 63.   In the present case, the report and the photographs concerned the Prince’s relationship with the child’s mother, the birth of the child, the Prince’s feelings and his reaction to the birth of his son, and his relationship with him. While the matters dealt with in this case came within the sphere of the Prince’s private life, the Court reiterates that it was not only his private life that was at stake, but also that of the child’s mother and the child himself. It is difficult to see how the private life of one person, in this instance the Prince, can act as a bar to the claims of another person, his son, seeking to assert his existence and have his identity recognised. The Court notes in this regard that Ms C. consented to publication on her own behalf and on behalf of her son. The Court emphasises that the information reported fell within the sphere of the Prince’s private life, but that they went beyond that sphere, in view of his hereditary functions as Head of State (see paragraph 59 above). iii.     The means by which the information was obtained and its veracity 64.     With regard to the text, the Court notes that it was an interview with the child’s mother, who provided information on her relationship with the Prince and on his relationship with his son. In contrast to other cases that the Court has had to deal with (see, inter alia , the Von Hannover cases, cited above, and Axel Springer AG , cited above), it was one of the persons directly concerned who took the initiative of informing the press on a certain subject, as opposed to the investigative press uncovering the information. 65.     As to the manner in which the photographs illustrating the article were obtained, the Court notes that, unlike in many cases brought before it, the photographs had not been taken without the Prince’s knowledge (see Ojala and Etukeno Oy v. Finland , no.   69939/10, § 52, 14 January 2014, and, in contrast, Von Hannover v. Germany (2004), cited above, §   68). On the contrary, they had been taken, for the most part by the child’s mother, in the privacy of a flat. Although the images published included a large number of photographs of a very small child, they were handed over to the magazine by the child’s mother, who herself appeared in some of them. The Prince has never disputed the veracity of those images, but has simply taken issue with their publication (see Ojala and Etukeno Oy , cited above, § 51). Furthermore, the photographs had not been taken in circumstances that were unfavourable to the Prince or his son (compare with Von Hannover v. Germany (no.   2) ), cited above, §   121). 66.     Accordingly the Court considers that, in the present case, the fact that the interview was initiated by the child’s mother and that she handed over the photos to the magazine of her own free will is an important factor to be considered in weighing the protection of private life against freedom of expression. iv.     Form and repercussions of the impugned articles 67.     As to the form of the published article, the Court points out that it was presented as an interview between the child’s mother and a journalist, and it was accompanie