CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 24 juin 2014

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LATVIA   (Application no. 4605/05)             JUDGMENT           STRASBOURG   24 June 2014   FINAL   24/09/2014   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Petrova v. Latvia, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Päivi Hirvelä, President,   Ineta Ziemele,   George Nicolaou,   Nona Tsotsoria,   Paul Mahoney,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek,   Faris Vehabović, judges, and Fatoş Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 3 June 2014, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 4605/05) against the Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Latvian national, Ms Svetlana Petrova (“the applicant”), on 18 January 2005. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr A. Kuzmins, a lawyer practising in Riga. The Latvian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Mrs I. Reine and subsequently by Mrs K. Līce. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that the removal of her son’s organs had taken place without her consent. 4.     On 17 November 2009 the application was communicated to the Government under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. On 9 July 2013 it was decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article   29   §   1 of the Convention). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Riga. She is the mother of Mr Oļegs Petrovs (the applicant’s son), a Latvian national who was born in 1979 and who died on 29 May 2002. A.     Events leading to the organ transplantation 6.     On 26 May 2002 at approximately 7 a.m. the applicant’s son sustained very serious injuries in a car accident near Bauska. At approximately 8.45 a.m. he was taken to hospital in Bauska. Later, at 2.45   p.m., he was transferred to Riga’s First Hospital ( Rīgas 1. slimnīca – “the Hospital”) – an entity that was registered as a “non-profit municipally-owned limited-liability company” ( Rīgas pašvaldības bezpeļņas organizācija sabiedrība ar ierobežotu atbildību ) at the material time – where surgery was carried out on his head. Following the operation his condition remained very serious; he remained in the emergency department of the Hospital ( reanimācijas nodaļa ) and did not regain consciousness. 7.     At 11.50 p.m. on 28 May 2002 a call from the Hospital was received by the transplantation centre of Pauls Stradiņš Clinical University Hospital – an entity that was registered as a “non-profit State-owned joint stock company” ( bezpeļņas organizācija valsts akciju sabiedrība ) at the material time – providing information about a potential donor who was undergoing resuscitation. A coordinator from the transplantation centre, together with another doctor, went to the Hospital. 8.     At 0.45 a.m. on 29 May 2002 the applicant’s son’s condition was noted in his medical record as being fatal. It was noted that medical resuscitation had been started. The death of the applicant’s son was recorded at 1.20 a.m. in his medical record at the Hospital. 9.     Between 1.35 a.m. and 3.45 a.m. a laparotomy was performed on the body, in the course of which the kidneys and the spleen were removed for organ transplantation purposes. This operation was carried out by the transplantation centre’s transplant surgeon, urologist and operating nurse, in the presence of the coordinator and the Hospital’s resuscitation specialist. On the death certificate the time of death was recorded as 2.45 p.m. on 29   May 2002 (probably by mistake – see 15 below). 10.     According to the applicant, during her son’s stay in the Hospital she was in permanent contact with the doctors there. On 29 May 2002, although her son’s condition was deteriorating, the applicant was not informed of it. She was also not asked whether her son had consented to being an organ donor and whether she would consent to organ transplantation in the absence of any wishes expressed by her son. 11.     According to the Government, the Hospital did not have information on record providing the contact details of any relatives, and they had informed the police about the son’s hospitalisation by dialling the emergency telephone number for the police. It had therefore, not been possible to contact any relatives. In this regard the Government referred to information provided by the Hospital which stated that “given the fact that no telephone numbers of any relatives were recorded on the patient’s medical card ... there was apparently no contact with the applicant”. 12.     On 30 May 2002, in the context of criminal proceedings against the person held liable for the car accident, a forensic (post-mortem) examination on the applicant’s son’s body was carried out. It was noted, inter alia , that on 29 May 2002 between 1.35 a.m. and 3.45   a.m. a laparotomy had been performed on the body. The applicant obtained a copy of the forensic report on 11 February 2003 and realised only then that nine months earlier certain organs had been removed from her son’s body for transplantation purposes. B.     Review of complaints at domestic level 13.     In response to a complaint lodged by the applicant, on 12 March 2003 the Hospital stated that the transplantation had been carried out by the transplant doctors in accordance with domestic law. It was noted that the applicant had not been informed of her son’s health condition because she had not visited the doctors at the Hospital. 14.     In response to further complaints by the applicant to the police and the prosecutor’s office, several examinations were carried out. 15.     In response to a query by the Security Police ( Drošības policija ), the Inspectorate of Quality Control for Medical Care and Working Capability (“the MADEKKI”) analysed the medical file and met with doctors and managers from the two medical institutions involved – Riga’s First Hospital and Pauls Stradiņš Clinical University Hospital. On 7 May 2003 it completed the examination and informed the Security Police of its conclusions. The MADEKKI provided an answer to the question of whether the medical practitioners had complied with the applicable domestic law in the following terms: “In taking the decision [to remove organs] and in carrying out the removal of organs, the medical practitioners have complied with section 10 of the Law on Protection of the Body of a Deceased Person and Use of Human Organs and Tissue and provisions of regulation no. 431 (1996) ... There is no information at the MADEKKI’s disposal as to whether there was a stamp in Mr Petrovs’ passport signifying his objection to the use of his body tissue and organs. [The applicant] was not informed about the possible removal of organs (the kidneys and the spleen) for transplantation purposes.” The MADEKKI also explained in their letter to the Security Police that the time of biological death was 1.20   a.m. on 29 May 2002 and not 2.45   p.m. as recorded, probably by mistake, on the death certificate. 16.     On 27 May 2003 the Security Police replied to the applicant on the basis of the MADEKKI report that the organs of her son had been removed in compliance with domestic law. They relied on section 10 of the Law on Protection of the Body of a Deceased Person and Use of Human Organs and Tissue (“the Law”) and regulation no. 431(1996). The applicant was forwarded a copy of the MADEKKI’s letter to the Security Police. 17.     On 17 June 2003 the prosecutor’s office forwarded the applicant’s complaint to the Security Police with a view to instituting an additional inquiry. 18.     On 15 July 2003 the MADEKKI replied to questions put by the Ministry of Health, which had been contacted by the National Human Rights Bureau further to a complaint by the applicant. They answered that there was no information at their disposal as to whether, at the time of her son’s death, any refusal of or consent to the use of his body, organs or tissue after his death had been recorded in the Population Register ( Iedzīvotāju reģistrs ). They also answered that the applicant had not been informed of the possible removal of organs (the kidneys and the spleen) for transplantation purposes. There was no information at the MADEKKI’s disposal as to whether there had been a stamp in Mr Petrovs’ passport signifying an objection to the use of his body tissue and organs. On 13   August 2003 the Ministry of Health, replying in turn to the National Human Rights Bureau, concluded on the basis of the information provided by the MADEKKI that, because the applicant had not been informed about the possible transplantation, she had neither consented to it nor refused it. 19.     On 29 July 2003 the Security Police informed the applicant that her complaint was still being examined. 20.     On 12 November 2003 the Security Police adopted a decision not to institute criminal proceedings. For the same reasons as were given in the above-mentioned reports, it was concluded that the transplantation had been carried out in compliance with domestic law. The reports indicated that in his lifetime Mr Petrovs had not indicated any objection to the use of his body tissue and organs after death and that no objection to the use of his organs had been received from his relatives before the start of the transplantation. The coordinator of the transplantation centre had been responsible for informing the relatives about the issues pertaining to transplantation, and for obtaining records, consent, signatures and other relevant information. Taking into account the fact that the relatives had not been at the hospital at the time of the son’s biological death and that the removal of organs in such cases has to be performed immediately, it had not been possible to obtain their consent or refusal in relation to the organ removal. 21.     On 14 November 2003 the applicant was informed of this decision. 22.     On 23 January 2004 the National Human Rights Bureau replied to the applicant. According to the information at their disposal, there was nothing on record in the Population Register indicating whether Mr Petrovs would have allowed or refused the use of his body, tissue and organs after his death. According to the information provided by the Ministry of Health and on the basis of the conclusions established by the MADEKKI, the applicant had not been informed about the imminent removal of her son’s kidneys and spleen, and she had therefore neither consented to it nor refused it. Finally, the applicant was advised that she should contact the prosecutor’s office because the Security Police had not indicated any procedure or time-limits for lodging an appeal. 23.     On 4 March 2004, further to a subsequent complaint, a meeting was convened at which the Minister for Health discussed with the representatives of the Hospital and the transplantation centre the case of the removal of the applicant’s son’s organs. The Minister for Health was of the opinion that the relatives should have been informed about the organ removal and that their consent should have been obtained. The representatives stated that the organ removal had been conducted in compliance with the applicable law. The meeting record contained a note to the effect that in autumn 2003 a working group which had been established by the Ministry of Health had prepared amendments to the above-mentioned Law in order to define its provisions more clearly. They had made two proposals. The first proposal was to include in the Law a provision stating that on all occasions inquiries were to be made about the deceased person’s wishes with his or her closest relatives. The second proposal was to rely on the person’s wishes as expressed during his or her lifetime and, in the absence of any such wishes, to presume consent (no inquiries made with the closest relatives). It was also noted that the relevant committee of the Parliament had opted for the second option (see paragraph 41 below for the adopted text). It was also noted that once the proposed amendments were passed by the Parliament, the occurrence of such “problematic situations would be practically ruled out”. On 17 March 2004 the applicant received reply from the Ministry of Health to this effect. 24.     On 6 May 2004 a prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s complaint concerning the refusal of 12 November 2003 to institute criminal proceedings. She relied on section 11 of the Law and indicated that consent from parents or from a legal guardian was required only in cases relating to the removal of organs for transplantation purposes from a dead child’s body. Accordingly, the actions of the medical practitioners did not constitute a crime and the 12 November 2003 decision had been lawful. 25.     On 29 June 2004 a superior prosecutor dismissed the applicant’s complaint concerning the prosecutor’s decision of 6   May 2004. He stated that – according to the information provided by the Ministry of Health – the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (see paragraph 28 below) had not been ratified by the Latvian Parliament and that Latvia had not even signed the Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin; Latvia was therefore not a party to this Convention. The prosecutor relied on Article 17 of the Additional Protocol and indicated that at the relevant time (May 2002) in Latvia these issues were regulated in sections 4 and 11 of the Law. These provisions did not require consent from close relatives unless the removal was from the body of a dead child. The rules relating to transplantation coordinators obliged them to obtain relatives’ consent only in cases prescribed by law. The prosecutor concluded that there were no grounds to consider that the medical practitioners, in taking the decision to remove organs and in carrying out the removal of those organs, had infringed legal provisions. Therefore, there were no grounds to charge them with a crime under section 139 of the Criminal Law; at that time no other person had been charged with the crime. At the same time, the applicant was informed about the 2 June 2004 amendments to sections 4 and 11 of the Law, in which it was specified that the organs of a deceased person might be removed for transplantation purposes if there was no information recorded in the Population Register indicating any objection and if the relatives of the deceased had not, before the start of the transplantation, informed the hospital in writing of the deceased person’s objection – expressed during his or her lifetime – to the use of his or her organs and tissue after death. 26.     On 23 August 2004 the Prosecutor General in a final decision dismissed the applicant’s complaint concerning the decision of 29 July 2004. He also referred to sections 4 and 11 of the Law and noted that these provisions prohibited removal in cases where a refusal or objection had been received but not in cases where wishes of the closest relatives had not been established. These provisions, as in force in May 2002, therefore did not oblige medical practitioners to actively search for and inform the closest relatives of a deceased person about the possible removal for transplantation purposes of his or her body tissue and organs unless that person was a child. On 29 May 2002 the medical practitioners did not have any information at their disposal concerning a refusal of or objection to the removal of Mr   Petrovs’ organs. He concluded that the organ removal had been performed in accordance with domestic law. The Prosecutor General also observed that activities performed on the body of a deceased person could not be treated as interference with his or her private life. II.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS AND DOMESTIC LAW A.     The Council of Europe documents 27 .     On 11 May 1978 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Resolution (78) 29 on harmonisation of legislations of member states relating to removal, grafting and transplantation of human substances, which recommended that the governments of the Member States ensure that their laws conform to the rules annexed to the resolution or adopt provisions conforming to these rules when introducing new legislation. Article 10 of this Resolution provides: “1. No removal must take place when there is an open or presumed objection on the part of the deceased, in particular, taking into account his religious and philosophical convictions. 2. In the absence of the explicit or implicit wish of the deceased the removal may be affected. However, a state may decide that the removal must not be effected if, after such reasonable inquiry as may be practicable has been made into the views of the family of the deceased and in the case of a surviving legally incapacitated person those of his legal representative, an objection is apparent; when the deceased was a legally incapacitated person the consent of his legal representative may also be required.” 28 .     The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine (Council of Europe Treaty Series no. 164) is the first international treaty in the field of bioethics (“the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine”). It entered into force on 1   December 1999 in respect of the States that had ratified it. Latvia signed the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine on 4 April 1997, ratified it on 25 February 2010, and it entered into force in respect of Latvia on 1 June 2010. The Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine does not concern organ and tissue removal from deceased persons. It concerns organ and tissue removal from living donors for transplantation purposes (Articles 19, 20). 29 .     In relation to organ and tissue removal from deceased persons, an Additional Protocol on Transplantation of Organs and Tissues of Human Origin was adopted (Council of Europe Treaty Series no. 186). On 1 May 2006 it entered into force in respect of the States that had ratified it. Latvia has neither signed nor ratified this Protocol. 30 .     The relevant Articles of the Additional Protocol read: Article 1 – Object “Parties to this Protocol shall protect the dignity and identity of everyone and guarantee, without discrimination, respect for his or her integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to transplantation of organs and tissues of human origin.” Article 16 – Certification of death “Organs or tissues shall not be removed from the body of a deceased person unless that person has been certified dead in accordance with the law. The doctors certifying the death of a person shall not be the same doctors who participate directly in removal of organs or tissues from the deceased person, or subsequent transplantation procedures, or having responsibilities for the care of potential organ or tissue recipients.” Article 17 – Consent and authorisation “Organs or tissues shall not be removed from the body of a deceased person unless consent or authorisation required by law has been obtained. The removal shall not be carried out if the deceased person had objected to it.” 31 .     In May 2002 the Secretary General of the Council of Europe sent a questionnaire to the Council of Europe member States concerning aspects of law and practice in relation to transplantation. [1] The Latvian Government replied in the affirmative to the question of whether removal from a living donor required authorisation and referred to Articles 19 and 20 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine and section 13 of the Law on Protection of the Body of a Deceased Person and Use of Human Organs and Tissue. They noted that written consent was required. In their response to the question “What kind of relationships should exist between the living donor of an organ and the recipient?” they referred to Articles 19 and 20 of the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine. In their response to the question “What sanctions are provided for [organ-trafficking] offenders, in particular, for intermediaries and health professionals?” the Latvian Government referred to section 139 of the Criminal Law (see paragraph 44 below). B.     The European Union documents 32 .     On 21 July 1998 the European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) [2] to the European Commission issued Opinion no. 11 “On Ethical aspects of human tissue banking”. Its relevant parts read: “2.3 Information and consent The procurement of human tissues requires, as a principle, the prior, informed and free consent of the person concerned. This does not apply in the case of tissue procurement ordered by a judge in the context of judicial, in particular criminal, proceedings. While consent is a fundamental ethical principle in Europe, the procedures involved and forms of such consent (oral or in writing, before a witness or not, explicit or presumed, etc.) are a matter for national legislation based on the legal traditions of each country. ... 2.3.2 Deceased donors Consent of a donor for retrieval of tissues after death may take different forms depending on the national systems (“explicit” or “presumed” consent). However, no retrieval of tissues may take place, with the exception of judicial proceedings, if the party concerned formally objected while alive. Furthermore, if there has been no expression of will and the applicable system is that of “presumed” consent, doctors must ensure as far as possible that relatives or next of kin have the opportunity to express the deceased person’s wishes, and must take these into account.” 33 .     Directive 2010/45/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 July 2010 on standards of quality and safety of human organs intended for transplantation provides: [Preamble] “(21) Several models of consent to donation coexist in the Union, including opting-in systems in which consent to organ donation has to be explicitly obtained, and opting-out systems in which donation can take place unless there is evidence of any objection to donation. In order to enable individuals to express their wishes in this regard, some Member States have developed specific registries where citizens record them. This Directive is without prejudice to the broad diversity of the systems of consent already in place in the Member States. In addition, by means of its Action plan on Organ Donation and Transplantation the Commission aims to increase public awareness of organ donation and in particular to develop mechanisms to facilitate the identification of organ donors across Europe.” ... CHAPTER III DONOR AND RECIPIENT PROTECTION AND DONOR SELECTION AND EVALUATION Article 13 - Principles governing organ donation “1. Member States shall ensure that donations of organs from deceased and living donors are voluntary and unpaid. 2. The principle of non-payment shall not prevent living donors from receiving compensation, provided it is strictly limited to making good the expenses and loss of income related to the donation. Member States shall define the conditions under which such compensation may be granted, while avoiding there being any financial incentives or benefit for a potential donor. 3. Member States shall prohibit advertising the need for, or availability of, organs where such advertising is with a view to offering or seeking financial gain or comparable advantage. 4. Member States shall ensure that the procurement of organs is carried out on a non-profit basis.” Article 14 - Consent requirements “The procurement of organs shall be carried out only after all requirements relating to consent, authorisation or absence of any objection in force in the Member State concerned have been met.” C.     Domestic law 1.     Law on Protection of the Body of a Deceased Person and Use of Human Organs and Tissues 34.     The Law on Protection of the Body of a Deceased Person and Use of Human Organs and Tissue ( likums “ Par miruša cilvēka ķermeņa aizsardzību un cilvēka audu un orgānu izmantošanu medicīnā ” – “the Law”) , as in force at the relevant time (with amendments effective as of 1   January 2002), provides in section 2 that every living person with legal capacity is entitled to consent or object, in writing, to the use of his or her body after death. The wish expressed, unless it is contrary to the law, is binding. 35.     Section 3 provides that a person must apply to the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs, in accordance with a procedure prescribed by regulations issued by the Cabinet of Ministers, to exercise the right to consent or object to the use of his or her body after death. Only such refusal or consent as is recorded in the Population Register has legal effect. The procedure which, in accordance with the Law, the State institutions have to follow to request and receive this information from the Population Register had not been adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers at the time the applicant’s son went into a coma.   It was adopted on 11 June 2002 and entered into force on 15 June 2002 in the form of amendments to regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers no. 89 (1999). 36 .     Pursuant to section 4, which is entitled “The rights of the closest relatives”, the organs and tissues of a deceased person may not be used against his or her wishes as expressed during his or her lifetime. In the absence of express wishes, they may be used if none of the closest relatives (children, parents, siblings or spouse) objects. Transplantation may be carried out after the biological or brain death of the potential donor (section   10). 37 .     More specifically, section 11 of the Law provides that organs and tissue from a deceased donor may be removed for transplantation purposes if that person has not objected to such removal during his or her lifetime and if the closest relatives have not prohibited it. 38.     By virtue of a transitional provision of the Law, a stamp in a person’s passport added before 31 December 2001 denoting objection or consent to the use of his or her body after death has legal effect until a new passport is issued or an application to the Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs is submitted. 39.     Section 17 provides that the State is responsible for protecting the body of a deceased person and for using organs or tissues for medical purposes. At the material time this function was entrusted to the Ministry of Welfare (as of 30 June 2004 – the Ministry of Health). No organisation or authority can carry out the removal of organs or tissues without an authorisation issued by the Ministry (as of 30 June 2004 – the Minister). 40.     Section 18 prohibits the selection, transportation and use of the removed organs and tissues for commercial purposes. It also provides that the removal of organs and tissues from any living or deceased person can only be carried out with strict respect for that person’s expressed consent or objection. 41.     On 2 June 2004 amendments to sections 4 and 11 of the Law were passed in the Parliament, effective as of 30 June 2004. From then on section   4 provides that if there is no information recorded in the Population Register about a deceased person’s refusal or consent to the use of his or her body, organs or tissue after death, the closest relatives have the right to inform the medical institution in writing about the wishes of the deceased person expressed during his or her lifetime. Section 11 provides that the organs and body tissue of a deceased person may be removed for transplantation purposes if there is no information recorded in the Population Register about the deceased person’s refusal or consent to the use of his or her organs or body tissue after death and if the closest relatives of the deceased have not, before the start of the transplantation, informed the medical institution in writing about any objection by the deceased person to the use of his or her organs and body tissue after death expressed during his or her lifetime. It is forbidden to remove organs and body tissue from a dead child for transplantation purposes unless one of his or her parents or his or her legal guardian has consented to it in writing. 2.     Regulation of the Cabinet of Ministers no. 431 (1996) 42.     This regulation ( Noteikumi par miruša cilvēka audu un orgānu uzkrāšanas un izmantošanas kārtību medicīnā ) provides that removal of organs may be carried out after the biological or brain death of a person if his or her passport and medical record contain a stamp signifying consent to such removal (paragraph 3). In the absence of such a stamp, the provisions of the Law (see above) are to be followed. 43.     If a potential donor arrives at the hospital, the coordinator of the transplantation centre must be contacted (paragraph 11). Kidney removal must be carried out by two transplant doctors, the coordinator and one or two nurses from the transplantation centre (paragraph 12). 3.     Criminal law provisions 44 .     Section 139 of the Criminal Law provides that unlawful removal of organs or tissues from a living or deceased human being in order to use them for medical purposes is a criminal offence if carried out by a medical practitioner. 45 .     Relevant provisions pertaining to the rights of civil parties in criminal proceedings under the former Code of Criminal Procedure (effective until 1 October 2005) are described in Liģeres v. Latvia (no.   17/02, §§   39-41, 28 June 2011) and Pundurs v. Latvia ((dec.), no.   43372/02, §§   12-17, 20   September 2011). 4.     Civil law provisions 46.     All relevant provisions pertaining to compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage under the Civil Law (before and after the amendments that were effective from 1 March 2006) are quoted in full in Zavoloka v. Latvia (no. 58447/00, §§   17-19, 7 July 2009). Sections 1635 and 1779 are further described in Holodenko v. Latvia (no. 17215/07, §   45, 2   July 2013). THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 47.     The applicant alleged a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in that the removal of her son’s organs had been carried out without his prior consent or that of the applicant herself. Article 8 reads: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 48.     The Government denied that there had been a violation of that Article. A.     Scope of the applicant’s complaint 1.     The parties’ submissions 49.     The Government raised an argument pertaining to the scope of the applicant’s complaint. They submitted that on the application form the applicant had complained of a violation of her son’s rights under Article 8 on account of the removal of his organs without his or the applicant’s prior consent. It was their contention that nothing in the case-file demonstrated that the applicant had ever complained of a violation of her own rights under the Convention. 50.     The Government also objected that the applicant could not claim to be a victim of the alleged violation of Mr Petrovs’ rights under the Convention. 51.     The applicant disagreed and maintained that she had raised the complaint on her own behalf. She had indicated her name in “the applicant” field in the application form and it was evident that, in the absence of any specific indication to the contrary, she had complained of a violation of her rights under the Convention. She also relied on quotes from her application form to further substantiate this. The applicant indicated that her submissions had been as follows: “I consider Article 8 of the Convention to be violated” and that she as “the mother of Oļegs Petrovs was refused rights, granted by law, to object to removal of organs”. 52.     The applicant considered herself to be a victim. 2.     The Court’s assessment 53.     Having examined the case material in its possession, the Court observes the following. The application form, sent to the Court on 18   January 2005, contains several indications that it was lodged in the name of the applicant, Ms Svetlana Petrova. The application form contains the necessary information about the applicant herself – full name and contact details. The application form was signed by the applicant’s sister, Ms Ļuda Belruse, who had received an authorisation from the applicant to act on her behalf. The applicant in her observations further specified that her intention had been to lodge an application on her own behalf. She quoted her submissions from the application form and confirmed that the application concerned her own rights. 54.     The Court notes at the outset that an application cannot in principle be brought in the name of a deceased person, because he or she cannot be considered to be a “person” (“ personne physique ” in French) for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention (see Dvořáček and Dvořáčková v.   Slovakia , no. 30754/04, §   41, 28 July 2009, and Aizpurua Ortiz and Others v. Spain , no. 42430/05, § 30, 2   February 2010). 55.     The Court reiterates the need to distinguish cases in which the applicant died in the course of the proceedings from cases where the application was lodged with the Court by the applicant’s heirs after the death of the victim (see Fairfield v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no.   24790/04, ECHR 2005 ‑ VI; Biç and Others v. Turkey , no.   55955/00, §   20, 2   February 2006; and, more recently, Ergezen v. Turkey , no.   73359/10, §   28, 8 April 2014 (not yet final) and the case-law cited therein). In cases where the applicant died before an application was lodged with the Court, the Court has emphasised that Article   8 rights are eminently personal and non-transferable (see Sanles Sanles v. Spain (dec.), no.   48335/99, ECHR 2000 ‑ XI). Therefore, in principle Article   8 cannot be relied on by relatives or next-of-kin unless they are personally affected by the interference at issue. 56.     In the present case the rights of the deceased, Mr Petrovs, and his mother, the applicant in the present case, are closely related. The domestic law at the material time explicitly provided that the right to express one’s wishes in relation to removal of organs or body tissue after death pertained not only to the person concerned but also to his or her closest relatives, including parents (see paragraphs 36 and 37 above). The Court considers, however, that there is no need to examine the issue of transferability of rights in more detail in the present case since the applicant complains of a violation of her own rights in connection with the removal of her son’s organs after his death. Contrary to what has been argued by the Government, the Court finds that on the application form the applicant expressly indicated her wish to complain in her name and she maintained that position in her observations on the admissibility and merits of the case. 57 .     The Government’s objection relating to the scope of the applicant’s complaint is therefore dismissed. 58.     Having found that the applicant’s complaint relates to her rights under the Convention and not to the rights of her deceased son, the Court does not consider it necessary to address separately the Government’s argument pertaining to the applicant’s victim status. B.     Admissibility 1.     The parties’ submissions 59.     First of all, the Government raised a preliminary objection concerning the exhaustion of domestic remedies, relying on the Court’s decision in Grišankova and Grišankovs v. Latvia ((dec.), no. 36117/02, ECHR-2003 II (extracts)). They considered that the applicant should have lodged a complaint with the Constitutional Court since the removal of her son’s organs had been carried out in accordance with the procedure laid down in sections 4 and 11 of the Law. She should have raised the issue of the compliance of these legal provisions with the Latvian Constitution. 60.     Secondly, the Government argued that the applicant had not submitted a complaint to the MADEKKI. The Government emphasised that at the material time the MADEKKI had been the competent body to examine the applicant’s complaints. Moreover, the applicant had not appealed against the MADEKKI’s report, which it had submitted to the Security Police and to the prosecutor’s office. It was the Government’s submission that the MADEKKI’s examination of the compliance of the organ removal procedure with domestic law was a necessary precondition for instituting any civil or criminal proceedings against those responsible. They did not provide any further information in this regard. 61.     Thirdly, the Government submitted that the applicant could rely on section 1635 of the Civil Law (as effective from 1 March 2006) and claim compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss in the civil courts. The possibility of using this remedy was still open to the applicant. Citing the Court’s decision in Andrasik and Others v. Slovakia (no.   57984/00, 22   October 2002), the Government argued that the proposed remedy had become available shortly after the applicant had submitted her application to the Court on 18 January 2005. The Government provided some examples of domestic case-law pertaining to the application of section 1635 in practice. They referred to the proceedings in case PAC-714 (instituted on 7 February 2005), where a claimant had sought compensation for non-pecuniary damage from a hospital where she had given birth and where tubal ligation (surgical contraception) had been performed without her consent (see L.H. v. Latvia , no. 52019/07, § 8, 29 April 2014 (not yet final)). On 1   December 2006 that claim had been upheld and the claimant had been awarded compensation for physical injury and moral suffering in the amount of 10,000 Latvian lati (LVL) in respect of the unlawful sterilisation on the basis of section 2349 of the Civil Law. This judgment had taken effect on 10   February 2007. The Government also referred to one of the “Talsi tragedy” cases (instituted on 15 September 2006), where on 16   March 2010 the appellate court had awarded compensation payable by the State in the amount of LVL   20,000 in connection with the incident of 28   June 1997 in Talsi where, among other children, the claimant’s daughter had died. The final decision in this case was adopted on 28 September 2011. The Government did not provide copies of the decisions in the latter case. 62.     Lastly, proceeding on the assumption that the alleged violation stemmed from the actual wording of the relevant provisions of the domestic law, the Government argued that the applicant had failed to comply with the six-month time-limit since, in their view, complaints to the Security Police or the prosecutor’s office were not effective remedies. Even if they had been, the outcome of proceedings before these institutions would have been largely dependent on the examination carried out by the MADEKKI, the report of which institution the applicant had not contested. The Government insisted that the applicant had found out about the organ removal on 11   February 2003 and that the MADEKKI report had been adopted on 7   May 2003. They concluded that the applicant had failed to lodge an application with the Court within six months from either of these dates. 63.     The applicant disagreed. In response to the first remedy invoked by the Government – recourse to the Constitutional Court – the applicant pointed out that the Constitutional Court’s competence did not include examining whether a specific legal provision had been correctly interpreted. The case of Grišankovs and Grišankova concerned a legal provision which the applicants in that case considered to be contrary to the Convention. The applicant in the present case referred to section 11 and pointed out that the system of “presumed consent” in Latvia had been limited by the wishes expressed by the relatives. She considered that the issue in the present case was not a legal provision itself but rather the fact that persons responsible for the removal of the organs had carried out the procedure without trying to establish the wishes of the closest relatives. Therefore, Grišankovs and Grišankova did not apply. 64.     In response to the second remedy invoked by the Government, namely a complaint to the MADEKKI, the applicant agreed that she had not personally submitted a complaint to that authority. However, in response to her complaint to the Security Police and the prosecutor’s office, both had requested the report. Even if the applicant had personally submitted such a complaint, the result would have been the same. According to the applicant, she could not have appealed against the MADEKKI report since it was not an administrative act but rather an expert report drawn up in the course of criminal proceedings, against which no appeal lay. In any event, the MADEKKI report in itself had been neither sufficient to provide redress for the applicant nor legally binding. The applicant referred to the case of Manoussakis and Others v. Greece (26   September 1996, § 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ IV) in support. 65.     In response to the third remedy invoked by the Government, the applicant pointed out that section 139 of the Criminal Law provided for criminal responsibility expressis verbis for the unlawful removal of organs or body tissue. She pointed out that, making use of her right to choose the remedy, she had sought to find out who was responsible and bore criminal responsibility for the removal. The applicant had done everything that could have been expected of her within the criminal proceedings; she could not have been required to start civil proceedings on the same matter. She relied on the cases of Assenov and Others v. Bulgaria (28 October 1998, § 86, Reports 1998 ‑ VIII) and Fredriksen and Others v. Denmark (no. 12719/87, Commission decision of 3 May 1988, DR 56, p.   237) in this regard. 66.     Lastly, as regards compliance with the six-month time-limit, the applicant did not agree that criminal proceedings were not an effective remedy. She reiterated that the issue in the present case was not the compatibility of a legal provision with the Constitution but rather the fact that persons responsible for the removal had carried it out without allowing the applicant to express her wishes. The MADEKKI report had merely contained an expert’s opinion obtained in the course of criminal proceedings on some of the many questions arising in those proceedings; it had not been a final decision. 2.     The Court’s assessment 67.     In so far as the Government refer to a constitutional complaint as a remedy relevant in the applicant’s circumstances, the Court considers that such a complaint was not an effective means of protecting the applicant’s rights under Article 8 of the Convention for the following reasons. 68.     The Court has already examined the scope of the Constitutional Court’s review in Latvia (see Grišankova and Grišankovs , cited above; Liepājnieks v. Latvia (dec.), no. 37586/06, §§   73-76, 2   November 2010; Savičs v. Latvia , no.   17892/03, §§   113-117, 27   November 2012; Mihailovs v. Latvia , no.   35939/10, §§   157-158, 22   January 2013; Nagla v. Latvia , no.   73469/10, §   48, 16 July 2013; and Latvijas jauno zemnieku apvienība v.   Latvia (dec.), no.   14610/05, §§   44-45, 17   December 2013). 69.     The Court has noted that the Constitutional Court examined, inter alia , individual complaints challenging the constitutionality of a legal provision or its compliance with a provision having superior legal force. An individual constitutional complaint can be lodged against a legal provision only when an individual considers that the provision in question infringes his or her fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitution. The procedure of an individual constitutional complaint cannot therefore serve as an effective remedy if the alleged violation resulted only