CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;COMMITTEE;ENG — 6 novembre 2014

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SLOVENIA   ( Application no. 6000/10 )                     JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   6 November 2014       This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Brlek v. Slovenia, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:   Angelika Nußberger, President,   Boštjan M. Zupančič,   Vincent A. De Gaetano, judges, and Stephen Phillips, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 14 October 2014, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 6000/10) against the Republic of Slovenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Slovenian national, Mr Klemen Brlek (“the applicant”), on 24 December 2009. 2.     The applicant was represented by Odvetniška Družba Matoz o.p. d.o.o., a law office practicing in Koper. The Slovenian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs A. Vran, State Attorney. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that the conditions of his detention in Ljubljana prison amounted to a violation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, and that he had no effective remedy in this regard as required by Article 13 of the Convention. 4.     On 21 January 2013 the Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government. It also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1986 and lives in Ljubljana. 6.     The applicant served his prison sentence in the closed section of Ljubljana prison in the period between 5 August 2009 and 5 October 2009.   He was held in cell 119 which measured 17.51 square metres (including a separate 1.74 square metre sanitary facility), with four or five other prisoners, having between 2.63 and 3.15 square metres of personal space. From 5 August 2009 to 15 September 2009 and from 24 September 2009 to 5 October 2009 six prisoners were held therein, from 15 September 2009 to 24 September 2009 five prisoners were held therein. 7.     As regards the general characteristics of the cells, material conditions inside the cells, sanitary conditions and health care, see the judgment in Štrucl and Others v. Slovenia , nos. 5903/10 , 6003/10 and 6544/10 , §§   21 to   32, 20 October 2011. 8.     As to the out-of-cell time in the closed section, the Court found in the aforementioned judgment that sentenced prisoners in the closed section of the prison were locked up in their cells and were only able to leave them if they applied for certain activities, most of which were to take place in the recreation room. There was, however, only one 50 ‑ square-metre recreation room per floor, which was to be used by ten inmates at most ( Štrucl and Others § 86). 9.     As regards the cell temperature, the data provided by the Government showed that the average temperature in the cells in the late afternoon (5 ‑ 5.30 p.m.) in the second half of July and August 2009 had been approximately 28 o C, exceeding 30 o C on seven days. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE 10.     For the relevant domestic law and practice as well as relevant international documents see Štrucl and Others , cited above, §§ 33-56. THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 11.     The applicant complained that the conditions of his detention in Ljubljana prison amounted to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. In particular, he complained of severe overcrowding which had led to a lack of personal space, poor sanitary conditions and inadequate ventilation, as well as excessive restriction on out-of-cell time, high temperatures in the cells, inadequate health care and psychiatric support and exposure to violence from other inmates due to insufficient security. 12.     He submitted that the situation amounted to a structural problem, and that this had been acknowledged by the domestic authorities. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” A.     Admissibility 1.     Complaint relating to physical conditions of detention 13.     The Government, relying on the same arguments as in the case of Bizjak v. Slovenia (dec.), no. 25516/12, §§ 17-22, 8 July 2014, pleaded non ‑ exhaustion of domestic remedies. They argued that the applicant had an effective remedy at his disposal, a claim for compensation under Article   179 of the Civil Code, which he had failed to use. Furthermore, they claimed that the applicant, being released on 5 October 2009, could have lodged the claim by 5 October 2012, namely by the expiry of a three-year time-limit prescribed by Article 352 of the Civil Code. 14.     The applicant maintained that the claim for compensation could not be considered effective in the circumstances of his case, as he had lodged the application to the Court long before the domestic judgments, upon which the Government based the argument of the effectiveness of the remedy, were issued. 15.     At the time of lodging his application in December 2009 the applicant was already released. However, at that time no effective domestic remedy was yet available in respect of prison conditions (see Štrucl and Others v. Slovenia , nos. 5903/10, 6003/10 and 6544/10, § 133, 20 October 2011). Moreover, the Court found the claim for compensation to be effective only in its decision of July 2014, in the case of Bizjak , cited above. 16.     The Court therefore dismisses the Government’s objection of non ‑ exhaustion of domestic remedies. It further finds that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 §   3   (a) of the Convention nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It should therefore be declared admissible. 2.     Complaints relating to inadequate health care and psychiatric support and insufficient security measures 17.   The parties in the present case adduced similar arguments to those in Štrucl and Others , where the Court found the part of the application concerning inadequate health care, psychiatric support and insufficient security measures manifestly ill-founded (§§ 63-69). The Court decided the same in Praznik v. Slovenia (no. 6234/10, 28 June 2012) . In the absence of any reasons that would lead the Court to reach a different conclusion in the present case, the Court finds these complaints to be manifestly ill-founded and should therefore be rejected pursuant to Article   35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. B.     Merits 18.     The parties relied on the same arguments as in the case of Štrucl and Others (cited above, §§ 70-79). 19.     The Court refers as regards the relevant principles to paragraphs   72 ‑ 76 of its judgment in the case of Mandić and Jović v.   Slovenia , nos. 5774/10 and 5985/10, 20 October 2011. 20.   The Court notes that the applicant was held in the closed section of Ljubljana prison in a cell with four or five other prisoners, having between   2.63 and 3.15 square metres of personal space. This space was further reduced by the furniture (see Modarca v. Moldova , no. 14437/05 , §   63, 10   May 2007). 21.     The Court has already found in Štrucl and Others a violation of Article 3 of the Convention as regards the conditions of the applicants’ detention, limited personal space in cells (2.7 square metres of personal space for most of their detention), limited out-of-cell time and high temperatures in the summer of 2009 (see Štrucl and Others v. Slovenia , §§   85 – 87 and 89). 22.     In the present case when the applicant had less than 3 square metres of personal space he was held in the same conditions as the applicants in Štrucl and Others . Therefore, the Court finds that these conditions are contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. 23.     It was found in Praznik that the personal space of the applicant, which was for most of the period of his detention in the closed section about 3.3 square metres, and which was slightly larger than the space available to the prisoners in Štrucl and Others , still fell short of the recommendation of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. It was further found that the applicant’s situation was exacerbated by the very limited time which could be spent outside the cell and by high temperatures in the cell in the summer (see Praznik , cited above, § 20). It was also found that the hardship he endured appeared to have exceeded the unavoidable level inherent in detention and that the resulting suffering went beyond the threshold of severity under Article 3 of the Convention (see, Praznik , cited above, § 21 and mutatis mutandis , Szél v.   Hungary , no. 30221/06, § 18, 7 June 2011, and Peers v. Greece , no.   28524/95, § 75, ECHR 2001 ‑ III). Therefore, it was concluded that the conditions of detention were contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. 24. In the present case when the applicant had more than 3 square metres of personal space his situation was similar to the one of the applicant in Praznik . Therefore, the Court finds that these conditions are also contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 25.     The applicant complained that his allegations in respect of Article   3 also gave rise to a violation of Article 8 of the Convention. 26.     Article 8 of the Convention reads as follows: “1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 27.   As already found in Praznik , the Court notes that in so far as the complaints under Article   8 overlap with those under Article 3 they should be for the same reasons and to the same extent declared admissible. However, in view of the applicant’s submissions and having regard to the finding relating to Article 3, the Court considers that no separate issue arises under Article 8 in this regard (see Orchowski v. Poland , no. 17885/04, §   198, ECHR 2009 ‑ ... (extracts)). III.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION 28.     The applicant complained that owing to the systemic nature of the inadequate prison conditions he did not have any effective remedy at his disposal as regards his complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention. In any event, there is no evidence that the remedies which were available in theory could work effectively in practice when it came to prison conditions and the treatment of prisoners. He cited Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” A.     Admissibility 29.     In so far as the applicant’s complaint under Article 13 of the Convention refers to the lack of effective remedies in respect of inadequate physical conditions of detention, as already found by the Court in Štrucl and Others and Praznik , this aspect of the complaint is not manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 §   3   (a) of the Convention nor inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 30.     As to the lack of effective remedies in respect of the allegedly inadequate medical and psychological care and inadequate security measures, having declared the relevant issues under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention inadmissible, the Court concludes that the applicant has no arguable claim for the purpose of Article 13 of the Convention (see Visloguzov v. Ukraine , no. 32362/02, §§ 74 ‑ 5, 20 May 2010). It follows that this aspect of the applicant’s complaint under Article   13 of the Convention should be rejected as manifestly ill ‑ founded, pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. B.     Merits 31 .     As regards the parties’ arguments the Court refers to paragraphs   13 and 14 above. 32.     The Court recalls that in the case of Bizjak it found that a remedy existed in respect of prison conditions where an alleged violation no longer continues. The question therefore arises whether, as the applicant had been released when he lodged his application in the present case, the findings in that case can be transposed to the present one. The Court notes that the decision in the case of Bizjak was given in July 2014. However, when the present application was introduced, the case-law was as set out in the case of Štrucl and Others (§§   118 ‑ 33), and established that none of the remedies relied on by the Government could be regarded with a sufficient degree of certainty as constituting an effective remedy for the applicants at that time. There appear to be no reasons to reach a different conclusion in the present case from the case of Štrucl . The Court therefore finds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention on account of the lack of an effective and accessible remedy under domestic law for the applicant’s complaints in respect of the conditions of his detention. IV.     APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION 33.     Article 41 of the Convention provides: “If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.” A.     Damage 34.     The applicant claimed 15,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage. 35.     The Government contested the claim. 36.     The Court awards the applicant EUR 1,500 in respect of non ‑ pecuniary damage. B.     Costs and expenses 37.     The applicant also claimed EUR 1,854.40 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court. This sum consisted of EUR 1,500 in lawyer’s fees, which he claimed were calculated on the basis of statutory domestic rates, EUR 20 for material expenses, and the tax thereon. 38.     The Government argued that this claim was excessive. They also argued that the Court should take into account the fact that the applicant’s representative was representing a number of other applicants before the Court and had submitted almost identical pleadings in all these cases. 39.     According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. With regard to an applicant’s Convention costs, the Court reiterates that it does not consider itself bound by domestic scales and practices, although it may derive some assistance from them (see, among many other authorities, Gaspari v. Slovenia , no. 21055/03, § 83, 21 July 2009, and Başkaya and Okçuoğlu v. Turkey [GC], nos. 23536/94 and   24408/94, § 98, ECHR 1999-IV). In the present case, regard being had to the information in its possession and in particular the fact that the law firm representing the applicant has already been reimbursed in other cases for preparation of submissions almost identical to the present one (see Mandić and Jović , cited above, §§ 133-35, Štrucl and Others , cited above, §§ 146-48 and Praznik , cited above §§ 38-40), the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 500 to cover the costs of the proceedings before the Court. C.     Default interest 40.     The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY, 1.     Declares the complaint concerning the physical conditions of detention under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, as well as the complaint under Article   13 of the Convention relating to the complaint concerning the physical conditions of detention, admissible and the remainder of the application inadmissible;   2.     Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention;   3.     Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint concerning the physical conditions of detention under Article 8 of the Convention;   4.     Holds that there has been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention;   5.     Holds (a)     that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts: (i)     EUR 1,500 (one thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage; (ii)     EUR 500 (five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses; (b)     that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;   6.     Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction. Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 November 2014, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court. Stephen Phillips   Angelika Nußberger Deputy Registrar   President