CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 4 décembre 2014

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RUSSIA   (Application no. 76204/11)                   JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   4 December 2014     FINAL   20/04/2015   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Navalnyy and Yashin v. Russia, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Isabelle Berro-Lefèvre, President,   Elisabeth Steiner,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,   Erik Møse,   Ksenija Turković,   Dmitry Dedov, judges, and Søren Nielsen, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 13 November 2014, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 76204/11) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Russian nationals, Mr Aleksey Anatolyevich Navalnyy and Mr Ilya Valeryevich Yashin (“the applicants”), on 11   December 2011. 2.     The applicants were represented respectively by Ms O. Mikhaylova and Mr V. Prokhorov, lawyers practising in Moscow. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights. 3.     The applicants complained that their arrest at a demonstration and their subsequent detention had violated their right to peaceful assembly, freedom of expression and liberty. They alleged that the administrative proceedings before the domestic courts had fallen short of guarantees of a fair hearing. They also complained of appalling conditions at the detention facility, which they regarded as inhuman and degrading. 4.     On 8 February 2012 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicants were born in 1976 and 1983 respectively and live in Moscow. Both applicants are political activists and opposition leaders. The first applicant is also a well-known anti-corruption campaigner and a popular blogger. The second applicant is a leader of the political movement “Solidarnost”. A.     Public demonstration on 5 December 2011 and the applicants’ arrest 6.     On 4 December 2011 general elections of the State Duma took place in Russia. 7.     On 5 December 2011 the applicants took part in a public demonstration (a meeting) at Chistyye Prudy, Moscow, to protest against the allegedly rigged elections. The demonstration had been duly authorised by the mayor of Moscow. The number of participants at the meeting was estimated between 5,000 and 10,000. During the meeting, conducted by the second applicant, the first applicant addressed the participants with a speech calling for fresh, fair elections and describing United Russia, the election frontrunner, as “a party of crooks and thieves”. 8.     After the demonstration the applicants were arrested. The parties disagreed as to the circumstance of their arrest, and their respective submissions are summarised below. 9.     The applicants claimed that at the end of the meeting they had headed, with other people, towards the Kuznetskiy Most metro station, where the first applicant had left his car. They were walking along the pavement, leaving the road clear for traffic. Suddenly their way was blocked by the riot police ( сотрудники внутренних войск и OMOН ). Without any introduction or demand, the police surrounded a group of about one hundred protesters, including the applicants, pressing them against a building. The surrounded group chanted “One for all, and all for one!”. The riot police then began to arrest the protesters. According to the applicants, no one put up any resistance. They obeyed the police and followed them to the police bus. 10.     According to the Government, at the end of the meeting the second applicant called on the participants to march down Myasnitskaya Street onto Lubyanskaya Square and then to the office of the Central Electoral Commission. At 8.30. p.m. about sixty people, including the applicants, began walking down Chistoprudnyy Boulevard, Bolshaya Lubyanka Street and Rozhdestvenka Street. They walked along the road, obstructing the traffic and chanting slogans such as “This is our city!” and “Down with the police state!” At the crossroads of Pushechnaya and Rozhdestvenka Streets the police blocked the march and ordered the marchers to stop. They pushed thought the cordon and went on until they were stopped by the police again at 2 Teatralnyy Proyezd. They ignored the repeated demands of the police to stop and thereby prevented the police from carrying out their mission of securing public order. Confronted with this persistent behaviour, the police arrested the applicants. 11.     Both applicants were arrested at about 8.45 p.m. and were taken to a police bus. B.     The applicants’ transfer to police stations and their overnight detention 12.     At about 9.40 p.m. the applicants were taken to the Severnoye Izmaylovo District police station, Moscow. At 11.40 p.m. the first applicant was subjected to a body search, which lasted until 12.15 a.m. His personal affairs, including his mobile phone, barrister licence, watch, money, credit cards, driving licence and some items of clothing were seized. The second applicant was searched as well, and his mobile phone, belt, watch, whistle and a badge reading “Against the Party of Crooks and Thieves” were seized. The list of the seized objects was recorded in the search report. The applicants have been unable to retrieve them, although those objects were not attached to the case file. 13.     The applicants requested that their lawyers, who had arrived at the police station and had presented their authority, be allowed to see them, but their request was refused. The applicants were not allowed to make a phone call to their families either. 14.     Both applicants lodged complaints at the police station alleging that their rights had been violated during their arrest and detention. 15.     At about 12.45 a.m. on 6 December 2011 the applicants were transferred from Severnoye Izmaylovo police station to the Vostochnyy District police station, Moscow, where they arrived at about 1.45 a.m. on the same day. They requested to see a lawyer and to make a phone call, but this was refused again. The first applicant lodged a complaint about the refusal. 16 .     At 2.30 a.m. on the same night, the applicants were transferred to the Kitay-Gorod District police station, where police reports were drawn up stating that the applicants had been escorted to the police station in accordance with Article 27.2 of the Code of Administrative Offences. At 2.40 a.m. further police reports were drawn up in which it was decided to remand the applicants in custody under Article 27.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The applicants were charged with an administrative offence for refusing to comply with a lawful order of the police, in breach of Article   19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. The charges were based on the identical statements of two police officers, I.   and F., who alleged that they had ordered the applicants to follow them to the police bus to give statements on the administrative offence but that the applicants had pushed them away and had therefore been arrested. 17.     At the Kitay-Gorod police station the applicants requested permission to see their lawyers and to telephone their families, but their requests were refused. 18.     The first applicant remained in custody at the police station until 3   p.m. on 6 December 2011, and the second applicant until 10 a.m. on that day. 19.     The applicants claimed that the conditions of detention during their transfer between the police stations and in the cell at the Kitay-Gorod police station were inhuman and degrading. In particular, they claimed that they had spent six hours being driven to different police stations without being given any food or drinking water. At the Kitay-Gorod police station they were placed together in a cell measuring about 6 sq. m with concrete walls, a metal grill, a concrete floor, no windows and no furniture except for two narrow wooden benches. The cell was poorly lit and had no ventilation. There was no sanitary equipment, beds or bedding. The applicants did not receive any food or water until later on 6 December 2011 when they were allowed to receive a parcel from their families containing drinking water and crackers; no other food was allowed in the parcels. 20 .     The Government submitted that the applicants had spent about one hour in transit to the Vostochnyy District police station and then about forty-five   minutes in transit to the Kitay-Gorod police station, which was not long enough to require the provision of meals. According to the Government, the applicants were detained at the Kitay-Gorod police station in an administrative-detention cell measuring 12.3 sq. m equipped with artificial lighting and mandatory ventilation. They claimed that the applicants had been provided with a sleeping place – a wooden bench – and bedding, which they had refused. They provided a photograph of the cell with a metal grill, a close-up photograph of the bench, showing with a measuring tape its width of 47 cm, and another photograph showing the same bench covered with a blanket and with a pillow placed on it. The Government further contended that the cells had to be cleaned and disinfected twice a day and that pest control had to be carried out once every three months, in accordance with the cleaning service agreement between the Ministry of the Interior and a private company. The Government provided a copy of the service agreement in support of that statement. They alleged that the applicants had not complained about the conditions of their detention. According to the Government, the applicants had been offered food at the Kitay-Gorod police station, but had refused to take it. C.     Administrative proceedings 21.     On 6 December 2011 the applicants were brought before the Justice of the Peace to have their charges examined in administrative proceedings. They met their counsels for the first time shortly before the hearing. The case of the second applicant was examined first, and then the case of the first applicant. 1.     Hearing of the administrative case against Mr Yashin 22.     The administrative case was examined by the acting Justice of the Peace of Circuit no. 370 of the Tverskoy District of Moscow, Ms B. At the beginning of the hearing the second applicant challenged the judge on the grounds that she had previously found him guilty of an administrative offence and sentenced him to five days’ administrative detention. After that conviction the second applicant had lodged numerous complaints about Ms   B. and had campaigned against her in his online blogs. The Justice of the Peace dismissed the challenge against her. 23.     The second applicant requested leave to call and examine five witnesses, including I. and F., the police officers who had drawn up the arrest reports; K., the on-duty police officer at the Kitay-Gorod police station; Mr B., a fellow activist; and the first applicant. The request was granted in respect of I., F. and B. 24.     The second applicant complained of unlawful detention during the first six hours after his arrest, poor conditions of detention at the Kitay ‑ Gorod police station and the acts and omissions of the officials at the Severnoye Izmaylovo police station. However, those complaints were not examined. 25.     The Justice of the Peace questioned the witnesses. Police officers I.   and F. stated that after the public meeting the second applicant had participated, together with some sixty people, in an unauthorised march from Chistoprudnyy Boulevard, through Bolshaya Lubyanka Street, Kuznetskiy Most Street and down Rozhdestvenka Street. The marchers had been obstructing the traffic, chanting slogans and ignoring police orders made on a loudspeaker to stop the march. They (I. and F.) had required the second applicant to follow them to the police bus in order to draw up a report on the administrative offence, but he had ignored them, so they had seized him by the arms; he had resisted, refusing to present his documents and calling out to the crowd. 26.     The second applicant pleaded not guilty and contested the police officers’ testimonies. He testified that he had been arrested at the indicated address while walking alongside other people returning from the authorised meeting. He insisted that he had been arrested without any warning or orders from the police. 27.     Witness B. testified that he “had been present during Mr Yashin’s arrest” and that “the policemen had not given Mr Yashin any orders before arresting him”. 28.     On the same day the Justice of the Peace found the second applicant guilty of having disobeyed a lawful order of the police. She based her findings on the witness statements of I. and F., their written reports and the report on the administrative arrest. She dismissed the testimonies given by the second applicant and B. on the grounds that they had contradicted the police officers’ testimonies and reports. The second applicant was convicted under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences and sentenced to fifteen days’ administrative detention. 2.     Hearing of the administrative case against Mr Navalnyy 29.     The first applicant’s case was examined after the second applicant’s trial by the same Justice of the Peace, Ms B. In the interval between the two hearings the first applicant’s counsel was able briefly to access the case file of the second applicant and meet the first applicant for the first time. 30.     According to the applicants, the proceedings in the first applicant’s case began in the absence of members of the public, who were prevented from entering the hearing room. Many were barred from approaching the courthouse, which was cordoned off by the police. Later, during the proceedings, eight journalists were allowed in at the first applicant’s insistent requests. The Government contended, on the contrary, that the proceedings in this case had been open to the public. 31.     At the beginning of the trial the first applicant requested that the case be transferred, in accordance with the statutory rules, to a court at his place of residence; that the hearing be adjourned in order to give him time to prepare his defence; that the verbatim records of the hearing be kept open; that copies of the complaints that he had lodged at the police stations the previous night be made available to him; and that five eyewitnesses of his arrest, including the second applicant, be called and examined. 32.     The Justice of the Peace dismissed all of the requests, except one: that T. and A. be called as witnesses. The first applicant then challenged the Justice of the Peace, unsuccessfully. 33 .     I. and F. gave testimonies identical to those they had given in the second applicant’s case. The Justice of the Peace disallowed the following questions to I. and F put by the defence counsel: “What orders did you personally give to Mr Navalnyy?”, “Who gave the order to arrest Mr   Navalnyy?” and “Why were two policemen’s reports identical?” 34.     The first applicant pleaded not guilty and contested the police officers’ testimonies. He testified that he had been returning from the authorised meeting, walking, together with other people, not marching or chanting any slogans. However, the police had repeatedly obstructed their way and had then arrested them. He insisted that he had not received any orders from the police and had not resisted the arrest. 35.     Witness T. testified that he had seen the applicant’s arrest. It had been noisy and he had not heard the police officers giving the first applicant any orders before arresting him. The police had announced through a loudspeaker “Your actions are unlawful” while surrounding a group of people, and had then begun arresting them. He had not seen the first applicant resisting the arrest. Witness A. testified that he had been walking down Teatralnyy Proyezd and had seen people in uniform arresting the first applicant on the pavement; during the arrest the police had announced through a loudspeaker “Your actions are unlawful”; witness A. had not seen the first applicant resisting the police during the arrest. 36.     The first applicant requested that two video recordings of his arrest, shot by T. and A., be admitted as evidence. He also requested that the court obtain and examine the video footage which the police had at their disposal. Those requests were dismissed on the grounds that the court had no technical means of playing the recordings and that it would be unacceptable to use the devices provided by the defence. Those requests were not joined to the case file on the grounds that they had been submitted at the wrong stage of the proceedings. 37.     According to the first applicant, most of the questions put by the defence to the witnesses were disallowed by the Justice of the Peace. She also refused to entertain his complaints concerning the lack of access to a lawyer, the refusal of a statutory phone call after the arrest, the allegedly unlawful detention during the first six hours after the arrest, the seizure of his possessions during the search, and the inhuman and degrading conditions of transfer and of detention at the Kitay-Gorod police station. 38.     On the same day the Justice of the Peace found the first applicant guilty of having disobeyed the lawful order of the police. As in the second applicant’s case, she based her findings on the witness statements of I. and F., their written reports and the report on the administrative arrest. She dismissed the testimonies of the applicant, A. and T. on the grounds that they had contradicted the police officers’ testimonies and reports, and that no reasons for mistrusting the latter had been established. The first applicant was convicted under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences and sentenced to fifteen days’ administrative detention. 3.     Appeal proceedings 39.     On 6 December 2011 both applicants lodged appeals, claiming that their arrest and conviction for the administrative offence had been in breach of domestic law and in violation of the Convention. They contested the findings of fact made by the first instance as regards the events following their departure from the authorised meeting. In addition, they complained about the manner in which the first-instance hearing had been conducted, in particular, about the refusal of the Justice of the Peace to grant their requests, to admit the video materials as evidence and to call all the witnesses requested by the defence. They also challenged the grounds on which the court had dismissed the testimonies of the applicants and the defence witnesses. The applicants also complained of unlawful detention during the first six hours after their arrest, lack of access to a lawyer and the conditions in which they had been transferred between the police stations and remanded in custody at the Kitay-Gorod police station. 40.     On 7 December 2011 the Tverskoy District Court of Moscow examined the applicants’ appeals in separate proceedings. In both cases the court dismissed the complaints about the refusals to hear witnesses and to admit the evidence requested by the applicants. It also rejected the applicants’ requests to have those witnesses called. It rejected the request to admit the video recordings in evidence because of their “unknown provenance”, and it refused to keep a verbatim record of the hearing because it considered it unnecessary. It granted the request to join a photograph of the first applicant’s arrest to the case file. On the same day the Tverskoy District Court dismissed the applicants’ appeals and upheld the first-instance judgment in both cases, citing the same reasons. 41 .     In the first applicant’s case the court held, in particular: “The Justice of the Peace has correctly established that Mr Navalnyy had disobeyed a lawful order of a police officer ..., in particular: at 8.45 p.m. on 5 December 2011 at 2 Teatralnyy Proyezd, Moscow (near Metropol hotel), after an authorised public event (meeting), in a park of Chistoprudnyy Boulevard, he participated with a group of about 60 people in a march that had not been notified to the executive authorities, went out on the road and continued walking from Chistoprudnyy Boulevard, down the side streets to Bolshaya Lubyanka Street, Kuznetskiy Most Street, and Rozhdestvenka Street in the direction of Red Square; by doing so he obstructed the traffic and created a risk of accident while shouting out “Shame!”, “This is our city!”, “Russia without Putin!”, “Down with the police state!”. In order to intercept the march a [police] cordon was set up at the crossroads of Pushechnaya and Rozhdestvenka Streets. Repeated lawful orders to stop and end the march were given through a loudspeaker; despite that, Mr Navalnyy with a group of people pushed through the cordon and came out onto Teatralnyy Proyezd while continuing to chant slogans, and there they were met by the police cordon. [He] did not react to the repeated lawful orders to stop these acts and disperse, continued his unlawful acts drawing the attention of citizens and the press. During his arrest Mr Navalnyy, in reply to an invitation to proceed to the police bus for the issuing of an administrative offence report, began to push away [I.] and [F.], trying to cause panic among people, and by doing so [he] manifested his refusal to comply with the lawful orders of the police and prevented them from carrying out their duties, an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. ... Despite his denial, Mr Navalnyy’s guilt is proven by the report on the administrative charges ..., the statements of the police officers [I.] and [F.] [and] their testimonies given to the Justice of the Peace at the court hearing. The Justice of the Peace gave a correct and convincing assessment of this evidence, which led to the conclusion that Mr Navalnyy had deliberately refused to comply with the police officers’ lawful order to stop his actions breaching public order, and continued them in defiance of [the police order]. This evidence, which is relevant, admissible and credible, is consistent. No bias on the part of the aforementioned witnesses or grounds for them to slander Mr Navalnyy have been established [by the court], including the appeal instance; therefore the explanations of Mr Navalnyy, as well and the witness testimonies of A. and T., have been duly rejected for want of reliable corroboration; the ruling of the Justice of the Peace is sufficiently reasoned in this respect. ... ... As follows from the [escorting report] and the [detention report], the [police] had sufficient grounds for arresting Mr Navalnyy and for escorting him to the Kitay ‑ Gorod police station, Moscow, in particular, the impossibility of drawing up an administrative offence report on the spot. The reports comply with the requirements of the law, in substance and in form. At the same time the court dismisses the arguments of the defence concerning the unlawful deprivation of liberty during six hours as unsubstantiated. As follows from the case file, after his arrest at Teatralnyy Proyezd, at 2.30 a.m. on 6 December 2011 Mr Navalnyy was taken to the Kitay-Gorod police station, Moscow, where the administrative material against him was issued. On   6   December 2011 the administrative case was remitted to the Justice of the Peace. The police officers have complied with the terms of administrative detention provided for by Article 27.5 of the Code of Administrative Offences. ... During the [appeal] hearing ... Mr Yashin was examined as a witness. He testified that at the time of Mr Navalnyy’s arrest he had been with him at Teatralnaya Square. At the time of arrest [they] were on the pavement near the underpass, and did not commit any unlawful acts. About 100 people were blocked by the riot police. Then both Mr Navalnyy and Mr Yashin were arrested, virtually simultaneously. At this point the police officers did not give any orders, there was no disobedience on the part of [the applicants]. The police officers [I.] and [F.] did not take part in their arrest; their court testimonies were false. Giving its assessment of the witness testimony of Mr Yashin, the court finds it unreliable and dismisses it because it contradicts the testimonies of [I.] and [F.], which are logical, consistent, concordant and objectively corroborated by the written evidence ...” 42.     The judgment held in the second applicant’s case was essentially the same, including the similar testimonies of the other applicant. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW 43.     The Federal Law on Assemblies, Meetings, Demonstrations, Marches and Picketing (no. 54-FZ of 18 August 2004 – “the Law on Assemblies”) provided, at the material time, that a public event could be stopped if (i) there was a real threat to life or the physical integrity of persons or property; (ii) the participants had acted unlawfully or the event organiser had knowingly breached the requirements of the Act as regards the conduct of the event (section 16). In such circumstances, a representative of the public authority, who had to be present at the event, could order the event organiser to put an end to the event. The representative had to explain the reasons for such an order and provide time for compliance with it. If the organiser did not comply, the public official could issue the same order to the participants. If both failed to comply, the police were to take appropriate measures to stop the event (section 17). 44.     The relevant provisions of the Code of Administrative Offences of 30 December 2001 at the material time read as follows: Article 19.3     Refusal to obey a lawful order of a police officer ... “Failure to obey a lawful order or demand of a police officer ... in connection with the performance of their official duties related to maintaining public order and security, or impeding the performance by them of their official duties, shall be punishable by a fine of between 500 and 1,000 Russian roubles (RUB) or by administrative detention of up to fifteen days.” Article 20.2 Breaches of the established procedure for the organisation or conduct of public gatherings, meetings, demonstrations, marches or pickets “1. Breaches of the established procedure for the organisation of public gatherings, meetings, demonstrations, marches or pickets shall be punishable by an administrative fine of between ten and twenty times the minimum wage, payable by the organisers. 2. Breaches of the established procedure for the conduct of public gatherings, meetings, demonstrations, marches or pickets shall be punishable by an administrative fine of between RUB 1,000 and RUB 2,000 for the organisers, and between RUB 500 and RUB 1,000 for the participants.” Article 27.2     Escorting of individuals “1.     The escorting or the transfer by force of an individual for the purpose of drawing up an administrative offence report, if this cannot be done at the place where the offence was discovered and if the drawing up of a report is mandatory, shall be carried out: (1)     by the police ... ... 2.     The escort operation shall be carried out as quickly as possible. 3.     The escort operation shall be recorded in an escort operation report, an administrative offence report or an administrative detention report. The escorted person shall be given a copy of the escort operation report if he or she so requests.” Article 27.3     Administrative detention “1.     Administrative detention or short-term restriction of an individual’s liberty may be applied in exceptional cases if this is necessary for the prompt and proper examination of the alleged administrative offence or to secure the enforcement of any penalty imposed by a judgment concerning an administrative offence. ... ... 3.     Where the detained person so requests, his family, the administrative department at his place of work or study and his defence counsel shall be informed of his whereabouts. ... 5.     The detained person shall have his rights and obligations under this Code explained to him, and the corresponding entry shall be made in the administrative arrest report.” Article 27.4     Administrative detention report “1.     Administrative detention shall be recorded in a report ... 2.     ... If he or she so requests, the detained person shall be given a copy of the administrative detention report.” Article 27.5     Duration of administrative detention “1.     The duration of administrative detention shall not exceed three hours, except in the cases set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article. 2.     Persons subject to administrative proceedings concerning offences involving unlawful crossing of the Russian border ... may be subject to administrative detention for up to 48 hours. 3.     Persons subject to administrative proceedings concerning offences punishable, among other administrative sanctions, by administrative detention may be subject to administrative detention for up to 48 hours. 4.     The term of the administrative detention is calculated from the time when [a person] escorted in accordance with Article 27.2 is taken [to the police station], and in respect of a person in a state of alcoholic intoxication, from the time of his sobering up.” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 10 AND 11 OF THE CONVENTION 45.     The applicants complained that their arrest and detention following a demonstration on 5 December 2011, as well as their conviction for an administrative offence, had violated their right to freedom of expression and to freedom of peaceful assembly guaranteed by Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, which read as follows: Article 10 (freedom of expression) “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) “ 1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2.     No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This Article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.” A.     Admissibility 46.     The Court notes that this part of application is not manifestly ill ‑ founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ submissions 47.     The applicants alleged that they had been arrested after having taken part in an authorised political rally, and had been placed in custody and subsequently convicted of an administrative offence as a reprisal for their active participation in the rally and for expressing the political views of the opposition. They both contended that they had not planned a march after the authorised meeting. They alleged that they had been walking towards the first applicant’s car when the riot police had obstructed their way and arrested them without giving any warning or reason. Both applicants denied having received any orders from the police. They referred to the testimonies of the eyewitnesses before the Justice of the Peace, who had stated that the applicants had not contravened the police. They complained that the courts had discarded that evidence as irrelevant and biased. 48.     The Government accepted that the applicants’ arrest and their conviction for an administrative offence had constituted an interference with their freedom of expression and their freedom of assembly. However, they maintained that those measures had been lawful, had pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining public order and had been proportionate to that aim, in compliance with Articles 10 § 2 and 11 § 2 of the Convention. They claimed that the applicants had attempted to conduct a spontaneous unauthorised public march in the centre of Moscow, that the police had lawfully demanded them to stop the march, but that they had persisted with their illegal conduct and had had to be dispersed and arrested. 2.     The Court’s assessment (a)     The scope of the applicants’ complaints 49.     The Court notes that, in the circumstances of the case, Article 10 is to be regarded as a lex generalis in relation to Article 11, a lex specialis (see Ezelin v. France , 26 April 1991, § 35, Series A no. 202, and Kasparov and Others v. Russia , no. 21613/07, §§ 82-83, 3 October 2013). Accordingly, the Court will examine this complaint under Article 11 of the Convention. 50.     On the other hand, notwithstanding its autonomous role and particular sphere of application, Article 11 must, in the present case, also be considered in the light of Article 10. The protection of personal opinions, secured by Article 10, is one of the objectives of freedom of peaceful assembly as enshrined in Article 11 (see Ezelin , cited above, § 37). (b)     Whether there was interference with the exercise of the freedom of peaceful assembly 51.     The Court reiterates that an interference with the exercise of freedom of peaceful assembly does not need to amount to an outright ban, legal or de facto , but can consist in various other measures taken by the authorities. The term “restrictions” in Article 11 § 2 must be interpreted as including both measures taken before or during an assembly and those, such as punitive measures, taken afterwards (see Ezelin , cited above, § 39). For instance, a prior ban can have a chilling effect on the persons who intend to participate in a rally and thus amount to an interference, even if the rally subsequently proceeds without hindrance on the part of the authorities (see Bączkowski and Others v. Poland , no.   1543/06, § 66-68, 3   May 2007). A refusal to allow an individual to travel for the purpose of attending a meeting amounts to an interference as well (see Djavit An v.   Turkey , no.   20652/92, §§ 59 ‑ 62, ECHR   2003 ‑ III). So too do measures taken by the authorities during a rally, such as dispersal of the rally or the arrest of participants (see Oya Ataman v.   Turkey , no. 74552/01, §§ 7 and 30, ECHR 2006 ‑ XIII, and Hyde Park and Others v. Moldova , no. 33482/06, §§   9, 13, 16, 41, 44 and 48, 31 March 2009), and penalties imposed for having taken part in a rally (see Ezelin , cited above, § 41; Osmani and Others v.   “the   former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia” (dec.), no.   50841/99, ECHR 2001 ‑ X; Mkrtchyan v. Armenia , no. 6562/03, § 37, 11   January 2007; Galstyan v. Armenia , no.   26986/03, §§   100 ‑ 102, 15 November 2007; Ashughyan v. Armenia , no.   33268/03, §§   75 ‑ 77, 17 July 2008; and Sergey Kuznetsov v. Russia , no. 10877/04, §   36, 23 October 2008). 52.     In the present case, the Government stressed that the applicants had been holding an unauthorised demonstration which had had to be dispersed, and that since the applicants had failed to obey the order to stop the march, it had been necessary to arrest them in order to maintain public order. They also submitted that the applicants had been convicted of an administrative offence for their failure to follow the police instruction to stop the march, imposed in accordance with section 17.4 of the Federal Law on Assemblies. That provision stipulated the imposition of administrative liability on participants of public events for non-compliance with lawful orders of the police. The applicants, for their part, considered that in fact they had been sanctioned for having taken part in an authorised demonstration at Chistyye Prudy. The Court considers that under any interpretation there was a clear and acknowledged link between the exercise of the freedom of peaceful assembly by the applicants and the measures taken against them. Accordingly, their arrest, detention and the ensuing administrative charges constituted an interference with their right guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention. (c)     Whether the interference was justified 53.     The Court reiterates that the right to freedom of assembly is a fundamental right in a democratic society and one of the foundations of such a society (see among numerous authorities, Galstyan , cited above, §   114). This right, of which the protection of personal opinion is one of the objectives, is subject to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any restrictions must be convincingly established. When examining whether restrictions on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention can be considered “necessary in a democratic society”, the Contracting States enjoy a certain but not unlimited margin of appreciation. An interference will be considered “necessary in a democratic society” for a legitimate aim if it answers a “pressing social need” and, in particular, if it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued and if the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient” (see, for example, Coster v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 24876/94 , § 104, 18 January 2001, and S. and Marper v.   the   United Kingdom [GC], nos. 30562/04 and 30566/04 , § 101, ECHR   2008). It is, in any event, for the Court to give a final ruling on the restriction’s compatibility with the Convention and this is to be done by assessing the circumstances of a particular case (see Osmani and Others , cited above). 54.     In the light of those principles, the Court will examine whether the interference with the applicants’ right to peaceful assembly was lawful, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. 55.     The Court observes that in contesting the lawfulness of the measures taken against them, the applicants alleged that the domestic decisions had been based on false representation of the underlying facts. They contended, in particular, that they had been walking along the pavement without meaning to hold a march; they denied that they had received an order from the police to stop, or that they had disobeyed any order of the police. 56 .     It is undisputed that on 5   December 2011 the applicants took part in an authorised and peaceful public demonstration at Chistyye Prudy. It is also common ground that after the meeting the applicants walked for about 1.5 km in a group of about sixty to one hundred people until they were intercepted by the riot police at 2 Teatralnyy Proyezd. According to the authorities, the applicants walked from Chistoprudnyy Boulevard, down Bolshaya Lubyanka Street, Kuznetskiy Most Street and Rozhdestvenka Street. That route has not been contested by the applicants at any stage, so the Court will consider it as an established fact. Against that background, the applicants’ allegation that at the time of their arrest they were heading towards their car near Kuznetskiy Most metro station appears inconsistent, because they must have passed that point long before reaching the site of their arrest. In any event, it is clear that by that stage the applicants had walked some distance together with a certain number of people. Irrespective of whether they were shouting slogans and whether they were walking on the road or the pavement, it was not unreasonable for the authorities to have taken the crowd for a spontaneous march, even if the applicants themselves had not perceived it as such. 57.     As regards the applicants’ ensuing confrontation with the riot police, the parties disagree as to whether the police had ordered the applicants to stop the march before they decided to arrest them. They also disagree as to whether the applicants pushed the police officers away or otherwise resisted the arrest. 58 .     Police officers I. and F. claimed that they had given repeated warnings to the applicants before proceeding with their arrest and contended that the applicants had first ignored them and had then resisted the arrest. The testimonies to the contrary given by both applicants and three other witnesses were rejected by the courts because of their incompatibility with the statements given by I. and F., on the ground that the latter had no reason to slander the defendants. As the file stands, the Court has insufficient material in support of either party’s account of the events, and it is unable to establish whether the police gave any orders to the applicants before proceeding with their arrest. 59.     Consequently, the Court cannot decide on the basis of the evidence at its disposal whether the authorities acted lawfully. In any event, it considers that in this case the issue of compliance with the law is indissociable from the question whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society”. It will therefore examine this issue below ( see Christian Democratic People’s Party v. Moldova, no. 28793/02, § 53, ECHR 2006 ‑ II). 60     Turning to the existence of a legitimate aim, the Court will accept that the applicants’ arrest and their conviction for an administrative offence pursued the legitimate aim of maintaining public order, as the Government claimed. 61.     To assess whether the interference was “necessary in a democratic society” the Court will examine the proportionality of the measures taken against the applicants in the light of the reasons given by the domestic courts. It observes that in the present case those measures included the interception of the march, the arrest of the applicants and their conviction for an administrative offence, and it will examine the proportionality of each measure. (i)     The interception of the march 62.     According to the domestic judgments, the acts imputed to the applicants included the holding of a spontaneous march in breach of the regulations and persisting in pursuing their route despite orders to end their demonstration. The Court has established above that even if the applicants had not intended to hold a march, the appearance of a big group of protestors walking in a cluster could reasonably be perceived as one (see paragraph 56 above). Whether this march was objectionable and what, if any, measures it called for on the part of the police depended on the gravity of the nuisance it was causing. 63.     The Court reiterates that although it is not a priori contrary to the spirit of Article 11 if, for reasons of public order and national security, a High Contracting Party requires that the holding of meetings be subject to authorisation, an unlawful situation, such as the staging of a demonstration without prior authorisation, does not justify an infringement of freedom of assembly ( see Cisse v. France , no. 51346/99, §   50, ECHR 2002 ‑ III, and Oya Ataman , cited above, §§ 37 and 39). While rules governing public assemblies, such as the system of prior notification, are essential for the smooth conduct of public events since they allow the authorities to mi