CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 27 janvier 2015

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s598389FB { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sE208486F { font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000 } .s2E932ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s79DE5897 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s34D46E87 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s85A364CF { width:35.31pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sBD8E234 { width:4.87pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sD3CF845F { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:left; page-break-after:avoid } .sA20670C4 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .sC36A6361 { font-family:Arial; color:#000000 } .s83BE5C30 { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super } .sBB355983 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s67017A4B { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-after:avoid } .s15842A2B { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s26FF04E7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17.3pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s64E792FA { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:39.7pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s959B95E9 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sEF4E3B43 { width:195.64pt; display:inline-block } .s7602FED2 { width:18.21pt; display:inline-block } .sC1AC44A4 { width:228.11pt; display:inline-block } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt }     SECOND SECTION           CASE OF PARADISO AND CAMPANELLI v. ITALY   (Application no. 25358/12)                   JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   27 January 2015       THIS CASE WAS REFERRED TO THE GRAND CHAMBER WHICH DELIVERED JUDGMENT IN THE CASE ON 24/01/2017   This judgment may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Paradiso and Campanelli v. Italy, The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Işıl Karakaş, President,   Guido Raimondi,   András Sajó,   Nebojša Vučinić,   Helen Keller,   Egidijus Kūris,   Robert Spano, judges, and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 9 December 2014, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 25358/12) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by two Italian nationals, Ms Donatina Paradiso and Mr   Giovanni Campanelli (“the applicants”), on 27 April 2012. The applicants also lodged an application on behalf of the child who, according to the birth certificate issued by the Russian authorities on 1 March 2011, was their son, born on 27 February 2011, and was named Teodoro Campanelli. 2.     The applicants were represented by Mr K. Svitnev, a lawyer practicing in Moscow and employed by the company Rosjurconsulting. The Italian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Spatafora. 3.     The applicants alleged, in particular, that the refusal to enter the particulars of the child’s birth certificate in the Italian register of births, marriages and deaths, and the underage child’s removal, were incompatible with Article 8 of the Convention. 4.     On 9 May 2012 the application was communicated to the Government. The respondent Government and the applicants each filed written observations. On 20 February 2014 an additional question was submitted to the parties on whether there existed an effective remedy to challenge the Campobasso Court of Appeal’s decision of 13 April 2013 confirming the refusal to transcribe the birth certificate, and to challenge the Campobasso Youth Court’s decision of 5 June 2013 finding that the applicants no longer had standing to take part in the proceedings. The Government were invited to submit the relevant case-law concerning the effectiveness of any alleged remedies. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicants were born in 1967 and 1955 respectively and live in Colletorto. 6.     The applicants are a married couple. In the application form, they indicated that, after unsuccessful attempts at in vitro fertilisation, they decided to resort to gestational surrogacy in order to become parents. To that end, they contacted a Moscow-based clinic which specialised in assisted reproduction technology. They entered into a gestational surrogacy agreement with the company Rosjurconsulting. After a successful in vitro fertilisation on 19 May 2010, two embryos “belonging to them” were implanted in the womb of a surrogate mother on 19   June 2010. There was no genetic link between this woman and the embryos. 7.     The baby was born on 27 February 2011. The surrogate mother gave her written consent to the child being registered as the applicants’ son. Her written declaration, dated the same day, and read aloud at the hospital in the presence of her doctor, the head doctor and the head of the (hospital) department, is worded as follows (English translation of the original Russian version): “I, the undersigned... gave birth to a boy in the ... maternity hospital in Moscow. The child’s parents are an Italian married couple, Giovanni Campanelli, born on ... and Donatina Paradiso, born on..., who expressed in writing their wish to have their embryos implanted in my womb. On the basis of the foregoing and in accordance with section 16(5) of the Federal Law on Civil Status and Article 51 (4) of the Family Code, I hereby give my consent for the above couple’s entry in the birth record and the birth certificate as parents of the child to whom I gave birth...” This statement, in the Italian translation appended to the original, reads as follows (in English): “I, the undersigned... gave birth to a boy in the ... maternity hospital in Moscow. The child’s genetic parents are an Italian married couple, Giovanni Campanelli, born on ... and Donatina Paradiso, born on..., who expressed in writing their wish to have their embryos implanted in my womb. On the basis of the foregoing and in accordance with section 16(5) of the Federal Law on Civil Status and Article 51 (4) of the Family Code, I hereby give my consent for the above couple’s entry in the birth record and the birth certificate as parents of the child to whom I gave birth...” 8.     On 10 March 2011, in accordance with Russian law, the applicants were registered as the baby’s parents. The Russian birth certificate, which contained no reference to the gestational surrogacy, was certified in accordance with the provisions of the Hague Convention of 5 October 1961 (hereafter, “the Hague Convention”) Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents. 9.     On 29 April 2011 the first applicant went to the Italian Consulate in Moscow to obtain the documents that would allow the baby to leave for Italy with her. The applicant answered questions and submitted the paperwork concerning the child’s birth. The Italian Consulate issued the documents enabling the boy to leave for Italy with the first applicant. 10.     On 30 April 2011 the first applicant and the child arrived in Italy. A few days later the second applicant contacted the Colletorto municipality, requesting that the particulars of the birth certificate be entered in the register. 11.     In a note of 2 May 2011 – which is not included in the Court’s case ‑ file – the Italian Consulate in Moscow indicated to the Campobasso Youth Court, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Colletorto Prefecture and municipality that the paperwork in respect of the child’s birth contained false information. 12.     On 5 May 2011 the applicants were placed under formal investigation for “altering civil status” within the meaning of Article   567 of the Criminal Code and forgery within the meaning of Articles 489 and 479 of the Criminal Code; and also for breaching section 72 of the Adoption Act (Law no. 183/1984), since they had brought the child into the country in breach of the law and had circumvented the condition set out in the adoption authorisation obtained by them on 7 December 2006, which prohibited them from adopting such a young child. 13.     On 5 May 2011 the State Counsel’s Office attached to the Campobasso Youth Court asked that proceedings to free the child for adoption be opened, since the child ought to be considered, for legal purposes, as having been abandoned. On the same date the Youth Court appointed a guardian ad litem ( curatore special ) within the meaning of section 8 of Law no.   184/1983 and opened proceedings to free the child for adoption. On 16   May 2011 the State Counsel asked for a court-appointed adviser ( curatore ) to be named within the meaning of sections 8 and 10 of Law no. 184/83. A court-appointed adviser was named. It appears from the case file that the applicants protested against the measures in respect of the child and had asked to be able to adopt him. 14.     On 25 May 2011 the first applicant, assisted by a lawyer of her own choosing, was questioned by the Larino carabinieri. She stated that she had travelled to Russia alone in September 2008, carrying with her seminal fluid that had previously been collected from her husband. She had concluded a contract with the company Rosjurconsulting, which had undertaken to find a surrogate mother willing to have implanted in her womb genetic material from the first applicant and her husband, through the Vitanova Clinic in Moscow. This practice was perfectly legal in Russia, and made it possible to obtain a birth certificate which identified the applicants as parents. In June/July 2010 the first applicant had been contacted by the Russian company, which stated that a surrogate mother had been found and had agreed to the medical procedure. On 10 March 2011 the first applicant had travelled to Moscow. In April 2011, with a birth certificate issued on 10   March 2011 by the Russian authorities, she had gone to the Italian Consulate in Moscow to obtain the documents that would enable the child to leave Russia and travel to Italy. The birth certificate showed the applicants’ names and identified them as the parents. 15.     On 27 June 2011 the applicants were heard by the Youth Court. The first applicant stated that, after eight unsuccessful attempts at in vitro fertilisation, which had endangered her health, she had resorted to the Russian clinic, since it had been possible in Russia to use ova from a donor, which were subsequently implanted in the surrogate mother’s womb. 16.     At the same time, the child’s court-appointed adviser asked the court to suspend the applicants’ parental responsibility within the meaning of section 10 § 3 of Law no. 184/1983. 17.     On 7 July 2011 the court ordered that DNA testing be carried out in order to establish whether the second applicant was the child’s biological father. 18.     On 11 July 2011 the Ministry of the Interior asked the Registry Office to refuse to enter the particulars of the birth certificate in the civil-status register. 19.     On 1 August 2011 the second applicant and the child underwent DNA testing. The result of those tests showed that there was no genetic link between them. 20.     On 4 August 2011 the Registry Office refused to register the birth certificate. The applicants lodged an appeal with the Larino Court against this refusal. The State Counsel’s Office asked the court to give the child a new identity and to issue a new birth certificate. 21.     The Larino Court having ruled on 29   September   2011 that it did not have jurisdiction, the proceedings resumed before the Campobasso Court of Appeal. The applicants demanded that the particulars of the Russian birth certificate be entered in the Italian register. 22.     On 20 October 2011, on the basis of the genetic testing and the submissions of the parties, including those of the child’s court-appointed adviser, the Youth Court decided to remove the child from the applicants. This decision was immediately enforceable. In reaching its decision, the court took account of the following factors: the first applicant had stated that she was not the genetic mother; the ova came from an unknown woman; the DNA test carried out on the second applicant and the child had shown that there was no genetic link between them; the applicants had paid a large sum of money (49,000 euros (EUR)); contrary to his allegations, there was nothing to prove that the second applicant’s genetic material had indeed been transported to Russia. The only thing that was certain in this story was the identity of the surrogate mother, who was not the biological mother and who had relinquished the child just after his birth. The biological parents remained unknown. That being the case, the situation was not one of subrogated maternity, since the child had no biological link with the applicants. The latter were steeped in illegality: they had brought a child into Italy by passing him off as their son. In so doing, they had, in the first place, breached the provisions on international adoption (Law no. 184 of 4   May 1983), section 72 of which made such breaches a criminal offence, the assessment of which was not, however, a matter for the youth court. Secondly, the agreement entered into by the applicants with the company Rosjurconsulting was contrary to the Medically Assisted Reproduction Act (Law no. 40 of 19 February 2004), section 4 of which prohibited heterologous assisted fertilisation. This illegal situation had to be brought to an end, and the only way to do so was to remove the child from the applicants. The child would admittedly suffer harm as a consequence of the separation but, given the short period spent with the applicants and his young age, the child would be able to surmount this. Steps would be taken immediately to find a couple of adoptive parents. In addition, given that the applicants had preferred to circumvent the adoption legislation, notwithstanding the authorisation they had received, it could be thought that the child resulted from a narcissistic desire on the part of the couple or indeed that he was intended to resolve problems in their relationship. In consequence, the court cast doubt on whether they were genuinely capable of providing emotional and educational support. As the child had neither a biological family nor his surrogate mother, since she had relinquished him, the court considered that the Italian legislation on adoption was applicable to this case (within the meaning of section 37 bis of Law no. 184/1983), entrusted the child to the social services and appointed a guardian ( tutore ) for his defence. 23.     The child was placed in a children’s home ( casa famiglia ) in a locality that was unknown to the applicants. They were forbidden from having contact with the child. 24.     The applicants lodged an appeal ( reclamo ) with the Campobasso Court of Appeal. They argued, inter alia , that the Italian courts could not call into question the birth certificate. They further requested that no measures be taken concerning the child while the criminal proceedings brought against them and the proceedings challenging the refusal to enter the birth certificate in the Italian register were pending. 25.     By a decision of 28 February 2012, the Campobasso Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. It transpires from this decision, among other points, that section   33 of Law no. 218/95 (Private International Law Act) did not prevent the Italian courts from refusing to comply with certified information from a foreign State. There was no issue of lack of jurisdiction, since section 37 bis of the International Adoption Act (Law no.   184/1983) provided that Italian law was applicable if the alien minor had been abandoned, and that was the situation in this case. Moreover, it was unnecessary to await the outcome of the criminal proceedings, since the applicants’ criminal liability was irrelevant. On the contrary, it was necessary to take an urgent measure in respect of the child, in order to put an end to the illegal situation in which the applicants existed. It was not possible to lodge an appeal on points of law against this decision. 26.     It appears from a memorandum dated 22 May 2012, sent by the youth court to the Ministry of Justice, that the child had not yet been declared available for adoption, since the proceedings with regard to the transcription of the child’s birth certificate were pending before the Campobasso Court of Appeal. 27.     In the meantime, on 30 October 2011 the State Counsel attached to the Larino Court had ordered the interim attachment of the Russian birth certificate, on the ground that it was an essential piece of evidence. It appeared from the case file that not only had the applicants probably committed the offences with which they were charged, but that they had attempted to conceal them. Among other things, they had stated that they were the biological parents, and had corrected their versions of the events over time as those versions had been proved inaccurate. 28.     The applicants appealed against the interim attachment order. 29.     By a decision of 20 November 2012, the Campobasso Court dismissed the applicants’ appeal. The decision indicates that there existed serious suspicions that the offences in question had been committed. In particular, the first applicant had put about a rumour that she was pregnant; she had gone to the Consulate and implied that she was the natural mother; she had then admitted that the child had been born to a surrogate mother; she had stated to the carabinieri on 25 May 2011 that the second applicant was the biological father, although the DNA tests had disproved this, and had therefore made false statements; she had been very vague as to the identity of the genetic mother; the documents concerning the surrogate motherhood stated that the two applicants had been seen by the Russian doctors, which did not accord with the fact that the second applicant had not been in Russia; the documents about the birth did not have a precise date. All that was known was that the child had been born and that he had been handed over to the first applicant against payment of almost EUR   50,000. Accordingly, the hypothesis that the applicants had conducted themselves illegally with a view to having the particulars of the birth certificate entered in the register of births, marriages and deaths and to circumventing the Italian legislation appeared sound. 30.     In November 2012 the decision regarding the interim attachment was transmitted to the youth court by State Counsel, since it had the following implications. The charges under section   72 of Law no.   184/1983 deprived the applicants of the possibility of fostering ( affido) the child and of adopting him or other minors. There was therefore no other solution but to proceed with the adoption procedure for the child. The temporary placement with a foster family had been requested by virtue of sections 8 and 10 of Law no. 184/83. The State Counsel repeated his request and emphasised that the child had been removed more than a year previously, and that he had since been living in a children’s home ( casa famiglia ), where he had developed meaningful relationships with the persons responsible for looking after him. Thus, the child had not yet found a replacement family environment for the home that had been illegally provided by those who had brought him to Italy. He seemed destined for yet another separation, even more painful than that from the mother who had given birth to him and from the woman who was claiming to be his mother. 31.     It appears from the file that the child was placed in a foster family on 26 January 2013. 32.     In March 2013, at the guardian’s request, an expert examination was carried out to determine the child’s age. It found that the child was probably aged 30   months, with a margin of error of three months. 33.     In addition, at the beginning of April 2013 the guardian asked the juvenile court to give the child a formal identity, so that he could be registered for school without difficulty. He stated that the child had been placed in a family on 26 January 2013, but that he did not have an official identity. This “lack of existence” had a significant impact on administrative matters: it was unclear under what name the child was to be registered for school, for vaccination records, or for residence. Admittedly, this situation corresponded to the aim of preventing the original family, that is, the applicants, from discovering the child’s whereabouts, for his own protection. However, a temporary formal identity would enable the secrecy surrounding the child’s real identity to be maintained, while simultaneously enabling him to have access to public services; for the time being, he was entitled only to use emergency medical services. 34.     By an immediately enforceable decision of 3 April 2013, the Campobasso Court of Appeal ruled in respect of the birth certificate and on whether an order should be made for it to be entered in the register of births, marriages and deaths (within the meaning of Article 95 of Presidential Decree (“DPR”) no. 396/00). It dismissed the objection raised by the guardian to the effect that the applicants did not have standing before the court; it acknowledged that the applicants had capacity to act in legal proceedings, in so far as they were indicated as the “parents” in the birth certificate that they wished to have transcribed. However, it was clear that the applicants were not the biological parents. There had not therefore been a gestational surrogacy, although the applicants had referred in their pleadings to heterologous artificial fertilisation; the parties agreed that the Russian legislation presupposed a biological link between the child and at least one of the potential parents before the term surrogate motherhood could be used. The birth certificate was therefore fraudulent ( ideologicamente falso ). Further, given that there was nothing to show that the child had Russian citizenship, the applicants’ argument that Italian law was inapplicable ran counter to section 33 of Law no. 218/95, which stated that the legal parent-child relationship was determined by the national law governing the child at the time of his or her birth. In addition, it was contrary to public order to enter the particulars of the disputed birth certificate in the register of births, marriages and deaths, since it was fraudulent. The applicants had pleaded their good faith, alleging that they were unable to explain why the second applicant’s seminal fluid had not been used in the Russian clinic; however, this did not alter the situation, and did not rectify the fact that the second applicant was not the biological father. In conclusion, it was legitimate to refuse to enter the particulars of the Russian birth certificate in the register of births, marriages and deaths, and to grant the State Council’s request that a new birth certificate be issued. The court therefore ordered that a new birth certificate be issued, indicating that the child was the son of persons unknown, born in Moscow on 27 February 2011, and that he be given a new name (determined within the meaning of DPR no. 396/00). 35.     The proceedings relating to the child’s adoption were resumed before the Youth Court. The applicants confirmed their opposition to the child’s placement with third persons. The guardian asked the court to rule that the applicants no longer had locus standi . The State Council asked the court not to rule on its request to declare that the child was available for adoption using the child’s original name, on the ground that, in the meantime, he had opened a second set of proceedings requesting that the child be declared available for adoption using his new identity as a child of unknown parents. On 5 June 2013, in the light of the material in the file, the Youth Court held that the applicants no longer had capacity to act in the adoption proceedings brought by them, given that they were neither the child’s parents nor members of his family, within the meaning of section   10 of Law no. 184/1983. The court stated that it would decide on the question of the child’s adoption in the context of the other adoption proceedings, referred to by State Council. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Private International Law Act 36.     Under section 33 of the Private International Law Act 1995 (Law   no.   218), the legal parent-child relationship is determined by the national law governing the child at the time of his or her birth. B.     Simplification of Civil Status Act 37.     Presidential Decree no.   396   of 3 November 2000 (Simplification of Civil Status Act) provides that declarations of birth concerning Italian nationals which have been drawn up abroad must be transmitted to the consular authorities (section 15). The consular authorities transmit a copy of the documents, for the purpose of their entry in the register, to the civil status registrars of the municipality in which the individual concerned intends to take up residence (section 17). Documents drawn up abroad cannot be entered in the register of births, marriages and deaths if they are contrary to public order (section   18). In order to have full legal force in Italy, foreign decisions ( provvedimenti) in respect of persons’ capacity or the existence of family relationships... must not be contrary to public order (section 65). C.     Medically Assisted Reproduction Act 38.     Section 4 of Law no. 40 of 19 February 2004 (the Medically Assisted Reproduction Act) prohibited the use of medically assisted reproduction. Breach of this provision entailed a financial penalty ranging from EUR   300,000 to EUR 600,000. By a judgment of 9 April 2014, the Constitutional Court declared those provisions unconstitutional. D.     The relevant provisions in respect of adoption 39.     The provisions concerning the procedure for adoption are set out in Law no.   184/1983. Section 2 provides that a minor who has temporarily been deprived of a satisfactory family environment may be placed with another family, if possible including other minors, or with a single person, or with a family ‑ type community, for the purposes of providing him or her with support, an upbringing and education. If it is not possible to provide him with a satisfactory family environment, a minor may be placed in a public or private children’s home, preferably in the area in which he has been living. Section 5 provides that the family or person with whom the minor has been placed must provide him or her with support, an upbringing and education... based on instructions from the guardian and in compliance with the judicial authority’s directions. In any event, the foster family exercises parental responsibility with regard to relations with the school and the national health service. The foster family must be heard in the proceedings on placement and the proceedings for a freeing for adoption order. Furthermore, section 7 provides that minors who have been declared available for adoption may be adopted. Section 8 provides that “the Youth Court may, even of its own motion, declare ... a minor available for adoption if he or she has been abandoned in the sense of being deprived of all emotional or material support from the parents or the members of his or her family responsible for providing such support (other than in temporary cases of force majeure )”. Section 8 continues: “A minor shall continue to be considered abandoned ... even if he or she is in a children’s home or has been placed in a foster home.” Lastly, section   8 provides that a case of force majeure shall be deemed to have ceased where the parents or other members of the minor’s family responsible for providing support refuse assistance from the authorities and the court considers their refusal unjustified. The fact that a minor has been abandoned may be reported to the authorities by any member of the public or noted by a court of its own motion. Furthermore, any public official and any member of the minor’s family who is aware that a child has been abandoned must report the situation to the authorities. Children’s homes must keep the judicial authorities regularly informed of the situation of minors whom they take into their care (section 9). Section 10 then provides that, pending a minor’s placement in a foster home before adoption, the court may order any temporary measure which is in the minor’s interests, including, if necessary, the suspension of parental responsibility. Sections 11 to 14 provide that enquiries shall be made so as to clarify the minor’s situation and determine whether he or she has been abandoned. In particular, section 11 provides that where, in the course of these enquiries, it transpires that the child does not have contact with any member of his or her family up to the fourth degree, the court may issue a declaration that he or she if available for adoption, unless an adoption application has been made within the meaning of section 44. If, at the end of the procedure provided for in the above sections, the minor is still abandoned within the meaning of section 8, the Youth Court shall declare him or her available for adoption if: (a) the parents or other members of the family have not appeared in the course of the proceedings; (b) it is clear from interviews with them that they are still failing to provide the child with emotional and material support and are unable or unwilling to remedy the situation; and (c) measures ordered under section 12 have not been implemented through the parents’ fault (section 15). Section 15 also provides that a declaration that a minor is available for adoption shall be made in a reasoned decision of the Youth Court sitting in chambers, after it has heard State Counsel, the representative of the children’s home in which the minor has been placed or any foster parent, the guardian, and the minor if aged over twelve or, if under twelve, where necessary. Section 17 provides that an objection to a decision declaring a child available for adoption must be lodged within thirty days of the date of notification to the requesting party. Under section 19 parental responsibility is suspended while a minor is available for adoption. Lastly, section 20 provides that a minor shall no longer be available for adoption once he has been adopted or has come of age. Moreover, a declaration that a child is available for adoption may be annulled, either by the court of its own motion or at the request of the parents or State Counsel’s Office, if the conditions laid down in section 8 have in the meantime ceased to apply. However, if the minor has been placed with a family with a view to adoption ( affidamento preadottivo ) within the meaning of sections 22–24, the declaration that he or she is available for adoption cannot be annulled. Section 44 provides for certain cases of special adoption: adoption is possible for minors who have not yet been declared available for adoption. In particular, section 44 (d) provides for adoption when it is impossible to place the child [in alternative care] pending adoption. 40.     Section 37 bis of this law provides that Italian law applies to foreign minors who are in Italy with regard to adoption, placement and urgent measures. Within the meaning of section 72 of the International Adoption Act, any person who brings into the territory of the State a foreign minor in violation of the provisions of the said law, in order to obtain money or other benefits, and in order that the minor be entrusted permanently to Italian citizens, is committing a criminal offence punishable by a prison term of between one and three years. This sentence is also applicable to those who, in exchange for money or other benefits, accept the “placement” of foreign minors on a permanent basis. Conviction for this offence entails disqualification from fostering children on placement ( affidi ) and from becoming a guardian. E.     Appeal on points of law/ under Article 111 of the Constitution 41.     Under Article 111 § 7 of the Italian Constitution, appeals to the Court of Cassation to allege violations of the law are always admissible against judgments or measures affecting personal freedom. The Court of Cassation extended the scope of this remedy to civil proceedings where the decision to be challenged has a substantial impact on situations ( decisoria ) and it cannot be varied or revoked by the same judge/court which delivered it ( definitiva ). Decisions concerning urgent measures with regard to an abandoned child, taken by the youth court on the basis of section   10 of the Adoption Act (Articles 330 et seq. of the Civil Code,   Article   742 of the Code of Civil Procedure) may be varied and/or revoked. They may be the subject of a complaint before the court of appeal. No appeal on points of law can be made in respect of decisions that can be varied and revoked at any time (Court of Cassation, Civil Division, Sec. I, judgment of 18 October 2012, no. 17916). III.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE A.     The Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents 42.     The Hague Convention Abolishing the Requirement of Legalisation for Foreign Public Documents was concluded on 5 October 1961. It applies to public documents – as defined in Article 1 – which have been drawn up in the territory of one Contracting State and which have to be produced in the territory of another Contracting State. Article 2 “Each Contracting State shall exempt from legalisation documents to which the present Convention applies and which have to be produced in its territory. For the purposes of the present Convention, legalisation means only the formality by which the diplomatic or consular agents of the country in which the document has to be produced certify the authenticity of the signature, the capacity in which the person signing the document has acted and, where appropriate, the identity of the seal or stamp which it bears.” Article 3 “The only formality that may be required in order to certify the authenticity of the signature, the capacity in which the person signing the document has acted and, where appropriate, the identity of the seal or stamp which it bears, is the addition of the certificate described in Article 4, issued by the competent authority of the State from which the document emanates.” Article 5 “The certificate shall be issued at the request of the person who has signed the document or of any bearer. When properly filled in, it will certify the authenticity of the signature, the capacity in which the person signing the document has acted and, where appropriate, the identity of the seal or stamp which the document bears. The signature, seal and stamp on the certificate are exempt from all certification.” The explanatory report on this Convention indicates that the certificate does not attest to the truthfulness of the content of the original document. This limitation on the legal effects deriving from the Hague Convention is intended to preserve the right of the signatory States to apply their own choice-of-law rules when they are required to determine the probatory force to be attached to the content of the certified document. B.     The relevant provisions of Russian law 43.     Section 55 of the Basic Law on the Protection of Citizens’ Health includes surrogate motherhood among the techniques for assisted reproduction. Both married and unmarried couples may have access to this type of technique, as may single persons. Surrogate motherhood is the fact of bearing and handing over a child on the basis of a contract concluded between the surrogate mother and the “potential” parents. The surrogate mother must be aged between 20 and 35, have already borne a healthy child and have given her written consent to the procedure, which may only be carried out in authorised clinics. Ministry of Health Decree no.   67 (2003) governs the procedures and conditions. If the relevant provisions have been complied with, the outcome of the surrogate motherhood is that a married couple is recognised as the parent couple of a child born to a surrogate mother. The latter must give her written consent in order for the couple to be recognised as parents (Article   51 §   4 of the Family Code of 29 December 1995). C.     Principles adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Progress in the Biomedical Sciences of the Council of Europe 44.     The Council of Europe Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on Progress in the Biomedical Sciences (CAHBI), which preceded the present Steering Committee on Bioethics, published in 1989 a series of Principles. Principle   15, on “Surrogate Motherhood”, is worded as follows: “1. No physician or establishment may use the techniques of artificial procreation for the conception of a child carried by a surrogate mother. 2.   Any contract or agreement between [the] surrogate mother and the person or couple for whom she carried the child shall be unenforceable. 3.   Any action by an intermediary for the benefit of persons concerned with surrogate motherhood as well as any advertising relating thereto shall be prohibited. 4.   However, States may, in exceptional cases fixed by their national law, provide, while duly respecting paragraph 2 of this principle, that a physician or an establishment may proceed to the fertilisation of a surrogate mother by artificial procreation techniques, provided that:     a.   the surrogate mother obtains no material benefit from the operation;     b.   the surrogate mother has the choice at birth of keeping the child.” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATIONS, RAISED ON BEHALF OF THE CHILD 45.     The applicants complained on behalf of the child that it had been impossible to obtain recognition of the legal parent-child relationship established abroad and about the removal and placement measures decided by the Italian courts. They alleged that there had been a violation of Articles   6, 8 and 14 of the Convention, and also of the Hague Convention and of the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 20 November 1989. 46.     According to the Government, the applicants could not represent the child before the Court, on the ground that he was already represented at domestic level by a guardian who had intervened in the proceedings before the domestic courts. Appointed on 20 October 2011 by the Campobasso Youth Court and confirmed by the Campobasso Court of Appeal on 21   February 2012, the guardian represented the child and administered his property. In conclusion, the part of the application lodged on behalf of the child by the applicants, who were defending their own interests and not those of the child, was incompatible ratione personae . 47.     The applicants contested the Government’s submission. 48.     The Court reiterates that it is necessary to avoid a restrictive and purely technical approach with regard to the representation of children before the Convention institutions; in particular, consideration must be given to the links between the child in question and his or her “representatives”, to the subject-matter and the purpose of the application and to the possibility of a conflict of interests (see Moretti and Benedetti v.   Italy , no. 16318/07, § 32, 27 April 2010; see also S.D., D.P., and T. v. the United Kingdom , no. 23714/94, Commission decision of 20   May 1996, unpublished). 49.     In the present case, the Court notes at the outset that the applicants have no biological ties with the child. Irrespective of the question of whether the birth certificate drawn up in Russia had legal effect in Italy, and if so, what effect, the child had been placed under guardianship since 20   October 2011 and had been represented by the guardian in the domestic proceedings. The proceedings to have the parent-child relationship recognised in Italy were unsuccessful and the child has a new identity and a new birth certificate. The applicants were also unsuccessful in the proceedings to adopt the child. The procedure to have the child adopted by another family is underway and the child has already been placed in a foster family. No signed form of authority has been submitted authorising the applicants to represent the child’s interests before the Court. This implies that, from a legal point of view, the applicants do not have standing to represent the minor’s interests in the context of judicial proceedings. 50.     In those circumstances, the Court considers that the applicants do not have standing to act before the Court on behalf of the child (see Moretti and Benedetti , cited above, § 35). This part of the application must therefore be dismissed as incompatible ratione personae with the Convention’s provisions, in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 thereof. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION, RAISED BY THE APPLICANTS ON THEIR OWN BEHALF 51.     The applicants alleged that the Italian authorities’ refusal to register the birth certificate issued in Russia and the domestic courts’ decisions to remove the child were in breach of the Hague Convention of 5 October 1961 and infringed their private and family life as guaranteed by Article   8 of the Convention. They also alleged that there had been a violation of Article   6, on the ground that the proceedings relating to the minor’s removal had not been fair. 52.     The Government contested that argument. 53 .     According to settled case-law, a Contracting Party is responsible under Article 1 of the Convention for all acts and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international legal obligations. Article 1 makes no distinction as to the type of rule or measure concerned and does not exclude any part of a Contracting Party’s “jurisdiction” from scrutiny under the Convention. The Court reiterates that the Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum but must be interpreted in harmony with the general principles of international law. Account should be taken, as indicated in Article 31 § 3 (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969, of “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties”, and in particular the rules concerning the international protection of human rights (see, inter alia , Nada v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10593/08, §§ 168-169, ECHR 2012). Thus, although the right to have the particulars of a foreign birth certificate entered in the register of births, marriages and deaths is not, as such, included among the rights guaranteed by the Convention, the Court will examine the application under the Convention in the context of the other relevant international treaties. 54.     The Court, being master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, considers it appropriate to examine this part of the application solely under Article 8 of the Convention, which requires the decision-making process leading to measures of interference to be fair and to afford due respect for the interests safeguarded by that Article (see Moretti and Benedetti , cited above, § 49; Havelka and Others v. the Czech Republic , no. 23499/06, §§ 34-35, 21 June 2007; Kutzner v. Germany , no.   46544/99, § 56, ECHR 2002-I; Wallová and Walla v. the Czech Republic , no.   23848/04, § 47, 26 October 2006). The relevant parts of Article 8 of the Convention provide: “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his... family life... 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society... for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” A.     Admissibility 1.     Objection under Article 34 of the Convention 55.     The Government raised a preliminary objection, arguing that the applicants could not act before the Court for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention, since the child had been placed under guardianship. 56.     The applicants challenged that submission. 57.     The Court must examine whether the applicants can take part in the proceedings and whether they can claim to be victims, within the meaning of Article 34, of the alleged violations of the Convention. It notes in this regard that the Italian courts acknowledged the applicants’ standing to act in the proceedings, given that – according to the Russian birth certificate – they were the child’s parents and that, at least initially, the applicants had parental responsibility for the child. It follows that the applicants may raise their complaints before the Court within the meaning of Article   34 of the Convention. The Government’s objection must therefore be dismissed. 2.     Objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies 58.     The Government observed that the proceedings before the domestic courts were still pending. They referred, in particular, to the criminal proceedings brought against the applicants and to the proceedings before the Campobasso Youth Court. Having subsequently been invited (see paragraph   4 above) to specify whether there existed an effective remedy to challenge the Campobasso Court of Appeal’s decision upholding the refusal to enter the particulars of the birth certificate in the official register, and whether there existed an effective remedy to challenge the youth court’s decision to exclude [the applicants] from the proceedings, the Government replied in the affirmative. However, they did not submit any relevant case ‑ law. 59.     The applicants rejected the Government’s argument. 60.     The Court reiterates that under Article 35 § 1 it may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of international law (see Akdivar and Others v.   Turkey , 16 September 1996, §§ 65-69, Reports of Judgments and Decision 1996 ‑ IV). It must determine whether the applicants satisfied that condition. 61.     The Court notes firstly that the criminal proceedings brought against the applicants were pending at the time of submission of their application. However, it notes, on the one hand, that the civil courts adopted their decisions without waiting for the outcome of those proceedings, and, secondly, that the applicants’ complaints do not concern the criminal proceedings as such. In consequence, the issue of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies does not arise on this point and the Court considers that the Government’s preliminary objection i