CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 12 mai 2015

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GEORGIA   (Application no. 73235/12)             JUDGMENT         STRASBOURG   12 May 2015         FINAL   12/08/2015   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Identoba and Others v. Georgia, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Päivi Hirvelä, President,   George Nicolaou,   Ledi Bianku,   Nona Tsotsoria,   Paul Mahoney,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek,   Faris Vehabović, judges, and Françoise Elens-Passos, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 14   April   2015, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 73235/12) against Georgia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Identoba, a non-governmental organisation, and fourteen Georgian nationals on 17 November 2012. The applicants are listed in the attached annex. 2.     The applicants were represented by Mr L. Asatiani and Mrs   N.   Bolkvadze, lawyers practising in Tbilisi. The Georgian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr L. Meskhoradze, of the Ministry of Justice. 3.     The applicants alleged, in particular, that the violence perpetrated against them by private individuals and the lack of police protection during the peaceful demonstration of 17 May 2012 had constituted a breach of their various rights under Articles 3, 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention. 4.     On 18 December 2013 notice of the application was given to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     With the exception of the first applicant, a legal entity registered under Georgian law on 8 November 2010, the remaining fourteen applicants live in Tbilisi. Their dates of birth are indicated in the attached annex. A.     Peaceful demonstration of 17 May 2012 1.     Prior arrangements 6.     The first applicant, a Georgian non-governmental organisation set up to promote and protect the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people in Georgia, planned to organise a peaceful march on 17   May 2012 in the centre of the capital city to mark the International Day Against Homophobia. 7.     In advance of the march, on 8 May 2012 the first applicant gave the Tbilisi City Hall and the Ministry of the Interior prior notice of its intention to hold a peaceful demonstration on the above-mentioned date. It informed the authorities of the planned route of the march, which would start from the grounds of the Tbilisi Concert Hall and proceed to Orbeliani Square, and the approximate number of participants. In addition, in the light of a foreseeable protest from those opposed to the LGBT community in Georgia, given the general background of hostility towards the sexual minorities, the applicant organisation specifically requested that the authorities provide sufficient protection from possible violence. 8.     On 14 May 2012 the Tbilisi City Hall acknowledged receipt of the first applicant’s request and explained, in reply, the rights and responsibilities of demonstrators, as provided for by the relevant law. 9.     On 15 May 2012 the applicant organisation was contacted by a senior officer of the Ministry of the Interior, who clarified the details of the planned march and confirmed to the organiser that police forces would be deployed to ensure that the procession took place peacefully. 2.     Clashes with counter-demonstrators 10.     The second to fourteenth applicants submitted written statements describing the exact circumstances surrounding the incident.   At around 1   p.m. on 17 May 2012, members of the LGBT community, staff members of Identoba and other LGBT activists, including the thirteen above ‑ mentioned applicants – approximately thirty people in total (“the LGBT marchers”) – gathered in the grounds adjacent to the Tbilisi Concert Hall. They were holding banners with slogans such as “I am gay”, “I love my gay friend”, “Love is love” and “Get colourful”, as well as rainbow flags and umbrellas. A police patrol was present, as agreed, near the Tbilisi Concert Hall. 11.     Shortly before the beginning of the demonstration, members of two religious groups, the Orthodox Parents’ Union and the Saint King Vakhtang Gorgasali’s Brotherhood, arrived in the Tbilisi Concert Hall area. Journalists were also present, recording interviews with the LGBT marchers. 12.     Approximately 200 metres from the starting point of the march, members of the two above-mentioned religious groups (“the counter ‑ demonstrators”) stopped some of the LGBT marchers and started arguing with them. The counter-demonstrators claimed that nobody was entitled to hold a Gay Pride Parade or to promote “perversion”, as it was against moral values and Georgian traditions. In reply, the marchers tried calmly to explain that it was not a Gay Pride Parade but a public event dedicated to supporting the fight against homophobia, and continued to walk. 13.     When the LGBT marchers reached Rustaveli Avenue, they were met there by a hundred or more counter-demonstrators, who were particularly aggressive and verbally offensive. The counter-demonstrators blocked the marchers’ way, made a human chain and encircled the marchers in such a way as to make it impossible for them to pass. The marchers were subjected to threats of physical assault and to insults, accused of being “sick” and “immoral” people and “perverts”. Further pejorative name-calling such as “fagots” and “sinners” was also repeated. At that moment, the police patrol cars which had been escorting the marchers from the Tbilisi City Hall suddenly distanced themselves from the scene. 14.     The LGBT marchers, feeling threatened, immediately telephoned the police, alerting them to the danger and requesting the immediate dispatch of additional forces. While waiting for the arrival of the requested police support, the marchers noticed a few police officers present at the scene. However, when they approached them and asked for help, the officers replied that they were not part of the police patrol and it was not their duty to intervene. 15.     The aggression towards the LGBT marchers continued to escalate and after approximately twenty to thirty minutes, the counter-demonstrators grabbed the banners from the hands of several activists and tore them apart. The counter-demonstrators then resorted to physical attack by pushing and punching the marchers in the front row. As a result of that assault, the sixth applicant (Mr G. Demetrashvili), who was in the front line of the march, was knocked down, beaten and kicked. Shortly afterwards, several police patrol cars arrived at the scene. Some of the law-enforcement officers intervened by stopping the beating of the sixth applicant. The police officers then separated the opposing parties by standing between them. At that time, the aggressive and agitated counter-demonstrators were still making particularly vitriolic threats, including that the marchers “should be burnt to death” and “crushed”. 16.     The third applicant (Mr L. Berianidze), who was standing on the pavement with other LGBT marchers, asked the police to take more active measures to protect the demonstration. The police responded by forcing him into a patrol car and driving him to the Old Tbilisi Police Department of the Ministry of the Interior, where he was detained for some twenty minutes. He was given no official explanation for his arrest at that time. However, as subsequently explained by the Government, the police had simply sought to distance him from the scene in order to protect him from the angry counter-demonstrators. 17.     Three other employees of Identoba – the sixth, seventh and tenth applicants (Mr G. Demetrashvili, Ms G. Dzerkorashvili and Ms   M   Kalandadze) – were also arrested by the police when they moved from the pavement to the road. They were forced into police patrol cars and driven around the city for some twenty minutes before being returned to Rustaveli Avenue. As subsequently explained by the Government, the aim of the applicants’ short-term retention was twofold: to prevent them from committing an administrative offence – impeding road traffic – and to protect them from the counter-demonstrators’ assault. 18.     Later on 17 May 2012, the third and sixth applicants (Mr   L.   Berianidze and Mr G. Demetrashvili) sought medical help for their injuries. The third applicant had a bruised left knee, grazes on his left palm and fingers, a haemorrhagic forearm and a haematoma on the right eyebrow. The sixth applicant had a closed head trauma, cerebral contusions, and bruises on the left side of his chest. Two days later, on 19 May 2012, the fourteenth applicant (Ms M. Tsutskiridze) also visited a doctor. She was diagnosed with a contusion of the left wrist. 19.     The clashes between the marchers and counter-demonstrators were recorded by journalists present at the scene and broadcast in the evening of 17 May 2012 by a number of national television channels. The faces of the applicants who had been attacked and the assailing counter-demonstrators were clearly recognisable. B.     Subsequent investigation 20.     On 18 May 2012 members of the board of the applicant organisation filed several complaints with the Ministry of the Interior and the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office concerning the violent acts committed during the march of 17 May 2012 by representatives of the two religious groups. The complaints were mostly based on the account of the circumstances as described in the thirteen individual applicants’ written statements (see paragraphs 10-19 above). 21.     On 19 May 2012 a criminal investigation was launched into the infliction of light bodily harm on the fourteenth applicant (Ms   M.   Tsutskiridze) by unidentified persons. When questioned as a witness the same day, she stated that unidentified men had grabbed her poster and hit her with the handle of the poster. On 23 May 2012 the eighth applicant (Ms E. Glakhashvili) was also questioned about the fourteenth applicant’s injury to her hand. Subsequently, on 21 June 2012 a forensic medical examination was commissioned by the investigation, the results of which suggested that the bruising and excoriation the fourteenth applicant had sustained on her wrist represented light bodily injuries. The fourteenth applicant was not granted victim status within the framework of that criminal investigation at that time. 22.     On 26 June 2012 the first applicant received a letter from the deputy director of the police patrol department of the Ministry of the Interior in response to the board members’ complaints of 18 May 2012. The response stated that, as there were no signs of illegality in the actions of the police during the demonstration, there was no need to launch an investigation against them for abuse of power. As to the counter-demonstrators’ actions, two of them had indeed been arrested for transgression under Article 166 of the Code of Administrative Offences – minor breach of public order – and fined 100 Georgian laris (some 45 euros (EUR)) each. 23.     On 3 and 5 July 2012 the first applicant and thirteen individual applicants in the present case (from the second to the fourteenth) filed additional criminal complaints with the Chief Public Prosecutor and the Minister of the Interior. The applicants specifically requested that criminal investigations be launched on account of two factual situations: firstly, the verbal and physical attacks perpetrated against them by the counter-demonstrators with clear discriminatory intent; and, secondly, the acts and/or omissions of the police officers who had failed to protect them from the assaults. The applicants emphasised that criminal inquiries should be conducted with due regard to Article 53 of the Criminal Code, which provided that the existence of homophobic intent was an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a criminal offence. 24.     The criminal complaints of the third, sixth, seventh and tenth applicants focussed on the attacks against them by the counter ‑ demonstrators and the lack of police protection. Those applicants did not request an inquiry into the alleged restriction of their liberty by the police during the incident of 17 May 2012 (Article 147 of the Criminal Code, see paragraph 33 below). 25.     By a letter of 17 July 2012, the Ministry of the Interior replied to the first applicant and the relevant thirteen individual applicants that during the incident of 17 May 2012 the police had called upon both the LGBT marchers and the counter-demonstrators to exercise their right to demonstrate in a peaceful manner. The Ministry’s letter then reiterated the information concerning the imposition of administrative sanctions on two of the counter-demonstrators (see paragraph 22 above). 26.     On 24 October 2012 a criminal investigation was opened into the alleged beating of the sixth applicant (Mr G. Demetrashvili) by unidentified persons on 17 May 2012. On the same day that applicant was interviewed as a witness. He stated that he had been encircled and insulted by five or six counter-demonstrators. The attackers then started kicking and hitting him. The ill-treatment lasted for a few minutes, until a police officer finally intervened and removed him from the scene. On 6 November 2012 a forensic medical expert issued an opinion confirming that the sixth applicant had sustained a contusion and closed head trauma. He was not granted victim status at that time. 27.     In September 2014 the two counter-demonstrators who had previously been fined for administrative misconduct were examined as witnesses in relation to the beating of the sixth applicant.   The latter, questioned again in September 2014 about the incident of 17 May 2012, stated that he could no longer remember certain circumstances due to the significant lapse of time. Nevertheless, he confirmed that he would still be able to recognise the faces of those individuals who had assaulted him. 28.     According to the latest information available in the case file, the two criminal investigations opened on 19 May and 24 October 2012 into the light bodily injuries sustained by the sixth and fourteenth applicants are still pending, and the two applicants have never been granted victim status. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW. INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS AND OTHER MATERIALS A.     Criminal Code, as in force at the material time 29.     On 27 March 2012 an amendment to Article 53 of the Criminal Code of Georgia was adopted, pursuant to which discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity was recognised as a bias motive and an aggravating circumstance in the commission of a criminal offence. The provision read as follows: Article 53 § 3(1) “The commission of any offence listed in the present Code on the grounds of any type of discrimination, such as, for instance and not exclusively, that linked to race, skin colour, language, sex, sexual orientation and gender identity, age, religion, political and other views, disabilities, citizenship, national, ethnic or social background, origin, economic status or societal position or place of residence shall be an aggravating circumstance.” 30.     Articles 117, 118 and 120 of the Criminal Code proscribed the offences of intentional infliction of, respectively, severe, less serious and light physical injuries. 31.     Article 125 of the Criminal Code provided for punishment for the offence of battery or other physical assault entailing physical pain of a lower intensity, not amounting to the level of injury associated with the offence prosecuted under Article 120 (intentional infliction of light physical injuries). 32.     Article 126 of the Criminal Code proscribed the act of regular battery or any other violence entailing the victim’s physical or mental suffering of a level not amounting to that associated with the offences under Articles 117 and 118 (intentional infliction of severe or less serious physical injuries). 33.     Article 147 made the intentionally abusive restriction of a person’s physical liberty by a State agent – “premeditated false arrest” – a criminally punishable offence. 34.     Article 151 of the Criminal Code provides that an act of making threats of death or damage to health or destroying property was criminally punishable. A qualifying condition for the offence was that the victim, the addressee of the threat, must have perceived, from his or her subjective standpoint, the threat as real. 35.     Pursuant to Article 161 of the Criminal Code, illicit obstruction, perpetrated with recourse to violence, threat of violence or abuse of official capacity, of the exercise of the right to peaceful demonstration was a criminally punishable offence. B.     Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)5 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to member States on measures to combat discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity 36.     The relevant excerpts from Recommendation CM/Rec (2010)5 adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 31 March 2010 read as follows: “1. Member states should ensure effective, prompt and impartial investigations into alleged cases of crimes and other incidents, where the sexual orientation or gender identity of the victim is reasonably suspected to have constituted a motive for the perpetrator; they should further ensure that particular attention is paid to the investigation of such crimes and incidents when allegedly committed by law enforcement officials or by other persons acting in an official capacity, and that those responsible for such acts are effectively brought to justice and, where appropriate, punished in order to avoid impunity. 2. Member states should ensure that when determining sanctions, a bias motive related to sexual orientation or gender identity may be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance. ... 13. Member states should take appropriate measures to ensure, in accordance with Article 10 of the Convention, that the right to freedom of expression can be effectively enjoyed, without discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity, including with respect to the freedom to receive and impart information on subjects dealing with sexual orientation or gender identity. 14. Member states should take appropriate measures at national, regional and local levels to ensure that the right to freedom of peaceful assembly, as enshrined in Article 11 of the Convention, can be effectively enjoyed, without discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation or gender identity. 15. Member states should ensure that law enforcement authorities take appropriate measures to protect participants in peaceful demonstrations in favour of the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons from any attempts to unlawfully disrupt or inhibit the effective enjoyment of their right to freedom of expression and peaceful assembly. ... 17. Public authorities at all levels should be encouraged to publicly condemn, notably in the media, any unlawful interferences with the right of individuals and groups of individuals to exercise their freedom of expression and peaceful assembly, notably when related to the human rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons.” C.     Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 37.     A study on Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Europe was conducted under the auspices of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe. A second edition of the study was published in September 2011. Relevant excerpts relating to the situation in Georgia read as follows (footnotes omitted): “In Georgia 84% of respondents expressed negative attitudes towards homosexuality. ... In 2010, before a debate in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on a report focusing on LGBT human rights, different religious communities in Georgia collaboratively protested about ‘abnormalities, such as homosexuality, bisexuality and other sexual perversions, that are considered not only by Christianity but also by all other traditional religions as the greatest sin, causing degeneration and physical and mental illnesses. ...’ In Georgia, NGO research demonstrates that 87% of LGB persons conceal their sexual orientation to their families. ...” 38.     On 12 September 2014 a report was published on the visit to Georgia by the Commissioner of Human Rights from 20 to 25 January 2014. Excerpts containing the Commissioner’s observations and recommendations on the situation of the LGBT community read as follows (footnotes omitted): “68. Due to prevailing negative attitudes, many Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Intersex (LGBTI) persons conceal their sexual orientation or gender identity for fear of harassment and discrimination, including in the workplace and by public institutions. The Public Defender informed the Commissioner that his Office had received over 30 complaints in 2013 about attacks against LGBTI persons. ILGA-Europe, an umbrella organisation of NGOs dealing with the human rights of LGBTI persons, had collected information on seven hate crimes perpetrated against LGBTI persons during 2013, which included various types of attacks, including rape, and threats of violence, including death threats. In its report submitted to the UN Human Rights Committee in September 2013, the local NGO Identoba referred to a murder with evidence of a possible hate motive which occurred in western Georgia in April 2013. The numbers cited are most certainly lower than the actual occurrence of bias-motivated attacks against LGBTI persons, due to the reluctance of victims to report violence to police, inter alia because of fears that their sexual orientation would be disclosed to family members. NGOs have also expressed serious concerns regarding the lack of effective investigation and adequate punishment for perpetrators of attacks. ... 73. [T]he Commissioner encourages increased efforts to enhance tolerance and non-discrimination among the majority population. He strongly emphasises the importance for the authorities, public actors and community leaders to send an unambiguous message in favour of human rights and tolerance, and against violence, hate speech and discrimination. It should be made clear that violence against LGBTI persons is unacceptable and will not be tolerated. 74. The Commissioner welcomes the plans to develop comprehensive anti ‑ discrimination legislation. He strongly encourages the establishment of an equality body with the power to sanction instances of discrimination, including on actors from the private sector. ... 75. Hate crimes should be effectively investigated and qualified as such by law enforcement bodies. The bias motive should be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance, as already provided for by national legislation, and perpetrators should receive punishment commensurate to the gravity of the offence.” D.     The International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) on the LGBT community’s problems in Georgia 39.     In its 2013 (Annual) Review of the situation of the LGBT community in Georgia, the International Lesbian and Gay Association (ILGA) made the following comments about bias-motivated crime in the country: “In March [2012], an amendment to Article 53 of the Criminal Code was adopted to tackle intolerance on the grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity. Homophobic or transphobic motivation is now considered an aggravating factor in sentencing perpetrators of crimes. This legislative change was adopted as a response to the recommendations from the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance. However, the government did not take measures to ensure effective implementation of these provisions, such as training the relevant police officers or actions to build confidence between law enforcement forces and the LGBT community, in order to allow victims to feel confident enough to report incidents. ILGA-Europe collected information on seven hate crimes perpetrated during the year. These crimes included various types of attacks, including rape, and various types of physical violence threats, including death threats. Some of the attacks targeted the organisers and participants of the IDAHO demonstration that took place in May. ...” THE LAW I.     PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS AS REGARDS THE VICTIM STATUS OF THE FIRST AND FIFTEENTH APPLICANTS A.     As to the first applicant 1.     The parties’ submissions 40.     The first applicant, non-governmental organisation Identoba, complained, together with the fourteen individual applicants, that the attack by the counter-demonstrators during the march of 17 May 2012 and the authorities’ failure duly to investigate the incident had amounted to a violation of its rights under Articles 3 and 8. It invoked the “private life” aspect of the latter provision, as well as Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention. It also invoked, as complementary provisions, Article 14 of the Convention in relation to its rights under Articles 3, 8, 10 and 11, in order to denounce the discriminatory nature of the violations, and Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 3 and 8, in order to emphasise the alleged ineffectiveness of the relevant criminal investigation. 41.     The Government objected that the first applicant did not have standing under the Convention to claim a violation of its rights on account of facts which had affected some of its individual members. They stated, in particular, that a legal entity could not by its very nature claim, either in its own name or on behalf of its individual members, to have been subjected to ill-treatment or a breach of the right to respect for private life and to freedom of peaceful assembly, within the meaning of Articles 3, 8 and 11 of the Convention. 42.     The first applicant disagreed with the Government’s position as regards Articles 8, 10 and 11 only, without contesting the objection in relation to its victim status under Article 3 of the Convention. It submitted, in particular, that the dispersal of the march which it had organised, as part of its activities, with the aim of celebrating the International Day Against Homophobia – an assault which had been perpetrated with discriminatory intent – had significantly impeded it in its corporate mission and tasks. In the first applicant’s view, its organisational activities should be understood as its “private life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention. 2.     The Court’s assessment 43.     The Court reiterates that the word “victim”, in the context of Article 34 of the Convention, denotes the person or persons directly or indirectly affected by the alleged violation (see SARL du Parc d’Activités de Blotzheim v. France , no. 72377/01, § 20, 11 July 2006). Hence, Article   34 concerns not just the direct victim or victims of the alleged violation, but also any indirect victims to whom the violation would cause harm or who would have a valid and personal interest in seeing it brought to an end (see, mutatis mutandis , Defalque v. Belgium , no. 37330/02, § 46, 20 April 2006; and Tourkiki Enosi Xanthis and Others v. Greece , no. 26698/05, §   38, 27   March 2008). (a)     As regards the first applicant’s complaints under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention taken separately or in conjunction with Articles 13 and 14 44.     Having regard to the first applicant’s submissions, the Court observes that it is not clear whether the applicant organisation intended to complain on behalf of its individual members who had participated in the march of 17 May 2012 or in its own corporate name. 45.     The Court notes, first, that the circumstances that constituted the alleged violations under both Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention are the same and consist of the intentional attacks on the physical and mental integrity of individual persons, coupled with the relevant State authorities’ associated failure to protect those people. However, it is inconceivable that physical integrity, susceptible to be enjoyed by human beings, could be attributed to the first applicant, a legal person (compare with Verein “Kontakt-Information-Therapie” (KIT) and Siegfried HAGEN v. Austria , no. 11921/86, Commission decision of 12 October 1986, Decisions and Reports (DR) No. 57-A, p. 81). Even assuming that the first applicant intended to complain on behalf of those of its individual members whose physical integrity had been compromised during the incident of 17   May 2012, the Court would still not be able to attribute to it the necessary standing. Indeed, associations cannot be allowed to claim, under Article   34 of the Convention, to be a victim of the acts or omissions which affected the rights and freedoms of its individual members who themselves are adult persons with full legal capacity to act and can thus lodge complaints with the Court in their own name (see, among others, Vallianatos and Others v.   Greece [GC], nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, § 47, ECHR 2013 (extracts); Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands (dec.), no.   65542/12, §§ 115-116, ECHR 2013 (extracts); Fédération chrétienne des témoins de Jéhovah de France v. France (dec.), no.   53430/99, ECHR   2001-XI; and Association des Amis de Saint-Raphaël et de Fréjus and Others v. France (dec.), no. 45053/98, 29 February 2000). 46.     It follows that the first applicant cannot validly claim on the facts of the present case to be either a direct or indirect victim, within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention, of a breach of Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention, taken either separately or in conjunction with Articles 13 and 14. This part of the application is thus incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 35 §   3   (a) and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 § 4. (b)     As regards the first applicant’s complaints under Articles 10, 11 and 14 of the Convention 47.     As to the first applicant’s complaints under Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention, taken separately or in conjunction with Article 14, the Court observes that legal entities can, in principle, be affected in the exercise of their own right to freedom of expression and to freedom of peaceful assembly (see, for instance, Ukrainian Media Group v. Ukraine , no.   72713/01, §§ 38-70, 29 March 2005, and Christians against Racism and Fascism v. the United Kingdom , no. 8440/78, Commission decision of 16   July 1980, Decisions and Reports 21, p. 138). The Court further observes that, in the particular circumstances of the present case, the factual core of which is based on the attacks on a peaceful assembly, the scope of the protection under Article 10 of the Convention is not autonomous but rather contingent upon that of Article 11 (compare with Kakabadze and Others v.   Georgia , no. 1484/07, § 83, 2 October 2012). 48.     In this connection, the Court specifically reiterates that freedom of peaceful assembly is capable of being exercised not only by individual participants, but also by those organising it, including legal entities (see Hyde Park and Others v. Moldova (nos. 5 and 6) , nos. 6991/08 and 15084/08, § 32, 14 September 2010; Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v.   Austria , 21 June 1988, Series A no. 139; and Christians against Racism and Fascism , cited above). That being so, the Court accepts that the assault on the peaceful march of 17 May 2012, apart from constituting a possible encroachment on the various rights of individual members’ of the first applicant under the Convention, also resulted in the disruption of the demonstration as such. That disruption in its turn affected the organiser of the event, the first applicant, in its own corporate interest of having messages relating to the situation of the LGBT community in Georgia expressed by means of the planned public procession. 49.     In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that the first applicant has standing to claim a violation of Article 11 of the Convention in its own name. Furthermore, having regard to the interplay between the latter provision and Article 10, as well as the complementary role of Article   14, the Court considers that the Government’s objection with respect to all those provisions must be dismissed. B.     As to the fifteenth applicant 1.     The parties’ submissions 50.     The fifteenth applicant, Mr Irakli Vatcharadze, complained that, together with the thirteen other individual applicants, he had been a victim of the violence that erupted during the march of 17 May 2012 and the inaction on the part of the police, in breach of his various rights under Articles 3, 8, 10, 11, 13 and 14 of the Convention. 51.     The Government objected that the fifteenth applicant had never participated in the march of 17 May 2012 so could not claim to be a victim of the violence perpetrated there. Thus, unlike the other thirteen individual applicants, he did not take the trouble to submit at least some kind of account of the events, which could arguably have shown that he had actually taken part in the march. In further support of their objection, the Government referred to the video material available in the case file. They emphasised that those recordings of the march showed images of the thirteen individual applicants (from the second to the fourteenth) only, with the notable exception of the fifteenth applicant. 52.     The fifteenth applicant did not reply to the Government’s objection. 2.     The Court’s assessment 53.     The Court observes that, unlike the remaining thirteen individual applicants, the fifteenth applicant neither submitted an individual account of what had happened during the march of 17 May 2012, showing how the attack by the counter-demonstrators had concerned him personally, nor lodged a criminal complaint with the relevant domestic authorities in his own name (see paragraphs 10, 20 and 23 above). Furthermore, he did not refute the Government’s objection calling into question his participation in the march. 54.     In such circumstances, the Court, upholding the Government’s objection, finds that the fifteenth applicant cannot be taken to have participated in the march of 17 May 2012, and his allegation that he had been subjected to discriminatory ill-treatment during that procession is unsubstantiated. 55.     Accordingly, the part of the application concerning the fifteenth applicant is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION 56.     The thirteen individual applicants (from the second to the fourteenth) complained under Articles 3 and 14 of the Convention that the relevant domestic authorities had failed to protect them from the violent attacks perpetrated by the counter-demonstrators during their peaceful march on 17   May 2012 and to investigate effectively the incident by establishing, in particular, the discriminatory motive of the attackers. The invoked provisions read as follows: Article 3 “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Article 14 “The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status.” 57.     The Government submitted that the applicants’ complaints of ill-treatment were largely unsubstantiated and exaggerated. Instead of providing sufficient details to illustrate in what manner each of the applicants had been individually ill-treated, they focused on the general events that had taken place during the march of 17 May 2012. Referring to the degree of the injuries that some of the applicants sustained during the altercation with the counter-demonstrators, as well as other circumstances surrounding the incident, the Government submitted that even if a certain amount of physical assault and verbal insults against some of the applicants had taken place, it had not reached the requisite threshold of severity under Article 3 of the Convention. They also added that two separate criminal investigations had been launched with respect to the alleged ill-treatment of the sixth and fourteenth applicants on 19 May and 24 October 2012, and a number of investigative measures had already been carried out. 58.     As regards the applicants’ complaints of a discriminatory intent behind the violence in breach of Article 14 of the Convention, the Government limited their response to arguing that that complementary provision did not apply, as the applicants’ allegations under Article 3 were either unsubstantiated by sufficient evidence and factual references, or ill ‑ founded given the absence of the requisite severity of the alleged treatment. 59.     In reply, the thirteen applicants, from the second to the fourteenth, referring to the video images of the incident of 17 May 2012, reiterated that all of them were on record as having participated in the march. As regards the severity of the ill-treatment, the applicants submitted that there existed a combination of sufficient and relevant factors – physical and mental abuse against them with clear discriminatory intent based on sexual orientation or gender identity, a lack of police presence, and so on – which rendered the treatment inflicted on them sufficiently severe to attain the relevant threshold under Article 3 of the Convention. Furthermore, the mere fact that two separate criminal investigations had been launched into the assaults on the sixth and fourteenth applicants could not be considered as a discharge of the respondent State’s procedural obligations, as those investigations had been pending since 2012 without any progress. A.     Admissibility 60.     It is not disputed by the Government that the thirteen individual applicants (from the second to the fourteenth) took part in the march of 17   May 2012 and were targeted by a counter-demonstration. Indeed, they submitted individual written statements describing the exact circumstances surrounding the incident, their participation in the event was recorded by video cameras, and all of them filed their individual criminal complaints with the relevant domestic authorities (see paragraphs see paragraphs 10, 20   and 23 above above). To this extent, the Court can draw inferences from the materials available in the case file to find the factual background, as it was alleged by the applicants, sufficiently convincing and established beyond reasonable doubt for the purposes of the present case. 61.     Whether the ill-treatment perpetrated against the applicants was discriminatory and reached the relevant severity threshold and whether the domestic authorities conducted an effective investigation of the incident, these questions raise complex issues of fact and Convention law calling for examination on the merits. 62.     Consequently, this part of the application cannot be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. Since it is not nor inadmissible on any other grounds, it must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     Scope of the case 63.     The Court considers that the authorities’ duty to prevent hatred-motivated violence on the part of private individuals, as well as to investigate the existence of a possible link between a discriminatory motive and the act of violence can fall under the procedural aspect of Article 3 of the Convention, but may also be seen to form part of the authorities’ positive responsibilities under Article 14 of the Convention to secure the fundamental value enshrined in Article 3 without discrimination. Owing to the interplay of the two provisions, issues such as those in the present case may indeed fall to be examined under one of the two provisions only, with no separate issue arising under the other, or may require simultaneous examination under both Articles. This is a question to be decided in each case in the light of its facts and the nature of the allegations made (see Bekos and Koutropoulos v. Greece , no.   15250/02, §   70, ECHR   2005 ‑ XIII (extracts); B.S. v. Spain , no. 47159/08, §§   59 ‑ 63, 24   July   2012; and compare with Begheluri and Others v. Georgia , no.   28490/02, §§   171 ‑ 79, 7   October 2014). 64.     In the particular circumstances of the present case, in view of the applicants’ allegations that the violence perpetrated against them had homophobic and transphobic overtones which rendered their ill-treatment sufficiently severe to attain the relevant threshold, and that the authorities failed both to protect them from and then sufficiently investigate that bias-motivated violence, the Court deems that the most appropriate way to proceed would be to subject the applicants’ complaints to a simultaneous dual examination under Article 3 taken in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention (compare with Abdu v. Bulgaria , no. 26827/08, § 31, 11   March 2014). 2.     General principles 65.     The Court reiterates that ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is relative: it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the nature and context of the treatment, its duration, its physical and mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom , 25 March 1993, § 30, Series A no. 247 ‑ C). Furthermore, Article 3 cannot be limited to acts of physical ill-treatment; it also covers the infliction of psychological suffering. Hence, the treatment can be qualified as degrading when it arouses in its victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them (see Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 103, 1 June 2010, and Eremia v. the Republic of Moldova , no. 3564/11, § 54, 28 May 2013). The Court further reiterates that discriminatory treatment as such can in principle amount to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 where it attains a level of severity such as to constitute an affront to human dignity. More specifically, treatment which is grounded upon a predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority may, in principle, fall within the scope of Article 3 (see Smith and Grady v.   the   United Kingdom , nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, §   121, ECHR   1999 ‑ VI). Discriminatory remarks and insults must in any event be considered as an aggravating factor when considering a given instance of ill-treatment in the light of Article 3 (see East African Asians v. the United Kingdom , nos. 4403/70 et al., Commission’s report of 14 December 1973, Decisions and Reports 78, p. 5, § 208, and Moldovan and Others v.   Romania (no. 2), nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01, § 111, ECHR 2005 ‑ VII (extracts)). In assessing evidence in a claim of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, the Court adopts the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”. Such proof may follow from the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of fact (see Farbtuhs v. Latvia , no. 4672/02, § 54, 2 December 2004). 66.     Article 1 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with Article   3, imposes on the States positive obligations to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are protected against all forms of ill-treatment prohibited under Article 3, including where such treatment is administered