CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 9 juin 2015

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margin-bottom:0pt }   FIRST SECTION DECISION Application no. 26562/07 Emma TAGAYEVA and others against Russia and six other applications (see list appended) The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 9   June   2015 as a Chamber composed of:   Isabelle Berro, President,   Elisabeth Steiner,   Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,   Julia Laffranque,   Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,   Erik Møse,   Dmitry Dedov, judges, and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar , Having regard to the above applications set out in the Appendix, lodged between 25 June 2007 and 28 May 2011, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants, Having regard to the parties’ oral submissions made at the hearing on   14   October 2014, Having deliberated on   14   October 2014 and on 9 June 2015, decides as follows: PROCEDURE A.     The applicants 1.     Between 25 June 2007 and 28 May 2011, 447 Russian nationals lodged seven applications. A complete and updated list of applicants and their representatives is set out in the Appendix. 2.     The applicants raised various issues related to the terrorist attack, siege and storming of school no. 1 in Beslan, North Ossetia, Russia, on 1 ‑ 3   September 2004. Some applicants were held hostage and/or injured; others had family members among those taken hostage, killed or injured. Several applicants lodged complaints also in respect of their family members. Information in respect of each applicant is summarised in the Appendix. They invoked Articles 2, 3, 6, 8, 10 and 13 of the Convention. B.     Representatives and application forms 3 .     The applicants in the seven cases grouped in the present report have submitted powers of attorneys to several representatives. The details are summarised in the Appendix. 4.     The applicants in the four cases listed below submitted two application forms. 5.     The applicants in case no.   26562/07 Tagayeva and Others : the first application form was submitted on 21 January 2008 (date of postmark), although the applicants’ signatures were submitted separately and are dated between December 2007 and June 2008 (complaint lodged on 25   June 2007). 6.     The applicants in case no.   49380/08 Savkuyev and Others submitted their first application form on 10 February 2009 (complaint lodged on 4   September 2008). 7.     The applicants in case no   21294/11 Kokova and Others submitted the first application form and lodged their complaint on 12 March 2011. 8.     The applicants in case no   37096/11 Nogayeva and Others submitted their first application form and lodged their complaint on 28 May 2011. 9 .     The second application form common to cases nos.   26562/07 Tagayeva and Others , 49380/08 Savkuyev and Others , 21294/11 Kokova and Others and 37096/11 Nogayeva and Others was submitted on 18   October 2011 through Mr S. Kay. 10.     The applicants in case no. 14755/08 Dudiyeva and Others submitted their application form on 28 August 2008 (complaint lodged on 14   February 2008). 11.     The applicants in case no. 49339/08 Albegova and Others submitted their application form on 30 March 2009 (complaint lodged on 4   September 2008). 12 .     The applicants in case no. 51313/08 Aliyeva and Others submitted their application form on 2 April 2009 (complaint lodged on 22   September 2008). C.     The Government 13.     The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G.   Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights. D.     Proceedings at the Court 14.     On 10 April 2012 the Court decided to communicate the applications to the respondent Government, inviting them to submit written observations. The parties exchanged written observations. The Government requested to hold an oral hearing and to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber. 15.     On 25 June 2013 the Court decided to hold a hearing on the admissibility and merits (Rule 54 § 5 of the Rules of Court). It also decided to invite the parties to respond in writing to a list of questions prior to the date of the hearing. The parties’ answers were received in September and October 2013. 16.     A hearing was held in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 14 October 2014. At the hearing, one group of applicants (“the first group of applicants”, applications nos.   26562/07, 49380/08, 21294/11 and 37096/11) were represented by Mr Kirill Koroteev, a lawyer of EHRAC/Memorial Human Rights Centre, an NGO with offices in Moscow and London, assisted by Ms Jessica Gavron, advisor; and the remaining applicants (“the second group of applicants”, applications nos.   14755/08, 49339/08 and 51313/08) by Mr Sergey Knyazkin, a lawyer practicing in Moscow. The Court heard addresses by Mr Matyushkin and Ms Gavron, Mr Koroteyev and Mr Knyazkin. 17.     The Court decided, after examining the request of the Government, that there was no need to relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber under Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. THE FACTS A.     The circumstances of the case 18.     While most events are relevant for all applicants, their situation in the domestic proceedings has somewhat differed. However, given the number of applicants, the extent of the domestic procedures and difficulties associated with the establishment of each applicant’s procedural role, the present decision refers to them collectively as the “applicants”. This is based on the assumption that their position in the domestic proceedings has been relatively similar, whether or not each of them participated in the given procedural step, either directly or through their representatives (see Abuyeva and Others v. Russia , no. 27065/05, § 181, 2 December 2010). 19.     The voluminous materials of the case files lodged by the applicants and submitted by the Government include documents from four criminal investigation proceedings, three criminal trials, two sets of civil proceedings for compensation, two reports by the parliamentary groups and one dissenting opinion, books and articles written in the aftermath, copies of forensic and expert reports in respect of each applicant and/or their relatives, and the applicants’ own statements to the Court. The statement of facts below is a succinct summary of the documents mentioned above as well as other publicly available information. 1.     Situation prior to the hostage-taking on 1 September 2004 (a)     Terrorist attacks in 2004 20.     The year 2004 saw a surge of terrorist acts in Russia entailing numerous civilian victims. Mr Shamil Basayev, the underground leader of the Chechen separatist movement, either claimed or was attributed responsibility for these acts. 21.     On 6 February 2004 a suicide bomber killed over forty persons and wounded over 250 in a crowded underground train in Moscow. 22.     In February and March 2004 several explosions in the Moscow Region damaged gas pipelines, a water-heating station and electricity pylons. 23.     On 9 May the President of Chechnya, Mr Akhmat Kadyrov, and several senior officials were killed by a bomb placed under their tribune in a stadium in Grozny. 24.     On 21-22 June a large group of armed rebel fighters attacked Nazran, Ingushetia’s largest town. They primarily targeted police stations and security offices; over ninety persons were killed and an ammunition warehouse was looted. 25.     On 24 August two civilian planes which had departed from the Moscow Domodedovo airport simultaneously exploded in mid-air; ninety persons lost their lives. 26.     On 31 August a suicide bomber exploded at the entrance to an underground station in Moscow, killing ten and wounding about fifty persons. (b)     Evaluation of the terrorist threat in North Ossetia 27 .     On 18 August 2004 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior issued the following telex no.   1751 to all local departments of the interior: “[The North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior] has received information indicating movements of participants of [illegal armed groups] from the plains of [Ingushetia] and [Chechnya] to the mountainous and forested area along the border of [Ingushetia] and [North Ossetia]. The fighters’ meeting is presumably planned for mid-August of the current year, following which they are intending to commit in [North Ossetia] a terrorist act similar to that in Budennovsk. According to the available data, the fighters envisage capturing a civilian object with hostages in the territory of [North Ossetia], and then submitting demands to the country’s leadership for withdrawal of troops from [Chechnya]. A large sum of money in [foreign] currency has apparently been transferred from Turkey. [This information is] transmitted in order for preventive measures to be taken.” 28.     On 27 August 2004 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior issued decree no. 500 “About the protection of public order and security during the Day of Knowledge in the educational facilities of North Ossetia”, which was sent to all district police stations. The plan provided for heightened security awareness and an increase in the number of mobile posts and police officers near public gatherings, as well as ordering a series of measures aimed at the prevention of terrorist acts and hostage-taking during public gatherings on the Day of Knowledge in the settlements situated along the administrative border with Ingushetia. The plan further stipulated that each head of the district departments of the Interior should inform accordingly the administrations of educational facilities, put in place working plans for every such gathering and personally instruct the police staff about their functions, to carry out hourly updates of the situation at public gatherings, to ensure immediate feedback to the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior and to provide for contingency staff in each police department. 29 .     On 25, 27 and 28 August 2004 the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior issued three other telexes to the local departments, concerning security measures to be taken during the Day of Knowledge, heightened terrorist risks in the region and the prevention of possible attacks. The personnel of the Ministry of the Interior had been put on high alert (“ усиленный режим несения службы” ). (c)     Preparations for the hostage-taking in Beslan 30.     As revealed by subsequent investigations, in the last days of August 2004 a sizeable group of terrorists (no less than thirty persons) camped and trained between the villages of Psedakh and Sagopshi in the Malgobek district of Ingushetia. Early in the morning on 1 September 2004 this group crossed the administrative border between Ingushetia and North Ossetia, driving a GAZ-66 utility truck. 31.     On 1 September 2004 at 7.30 a.m. Major S.G. from the North Ossetian Ministry of the Interior stopped the vehicle for inspection at the administrative border in Khurikau. The terrorists unarmed him, placed him in the back seat of his own white VAZ-2107 and thus drove to Beslan. Major S.G. escaped there and later testified about these events. 2.     Hostage-taking 32.     At 9 a.m. on 1 September 2004 school no.   1 in Beslan, North Ossetia, held a traditional Day of Knowledge ceremony to mark the opening of the academic year. Over 1,200 persons gathered in the courtyard of the E ‑ shaped two-storey building located in Kominterna Street in the centre of the town, having a population of 35,000. The school was situated next door to the district police station of Pravoberezhny (the “Pravoberezhny ROVD”). The gathering included schoolchildren (859), teachers and staff of the school (about 60 persons) and members of their families. Dozens of children aged below six were present in the crowd with their parents, since several kindergartens in Beslan were closed on that day for various reasons. One unarmed police officer Ms Fatima D. was present at the ceremony. 33.     According to some sources, in the morning of 1 September 2004 Beslan’s traffic police were called to secure the passage of Mr Dzasokhov, the North Ossetian President, through the town. The applicants referred to the testimony of the traffic policemen and servicemen of the Pravoberezhny ROVD to the effect that they had been instructed to take various positions along the route of Mr Dzasokhov’s convoy, and thus leave the school unprotected. 34.     In the first minutes of the ceremony, at about 9.05 a.m., a group of at least thirty-two persons (the number of terrorists is disputed – see below), armed with various weapons, including machine guns, explosives and handguns, encircled the persons in the school courtyard and, shooting in the air, ordered them to enter the school through the main door and through the smashed windows on the ground floor. A GAZ-66 vehicle entered the yard through the main gates and a group of terrorists jumped out of it; according to some witnesses other terrorists came from behind the school and yet another group was already in the building. 35.     The terrorists in the main courtyard fired into the air and there was an exchange of fire with the local residents or police. At least two local residents were killed (Mr R. Gappoyev and Mr F. Frayev) and some were wounded during the skirmish. It also appears that two terrorists were wounded. About one hundred persons, mostly adults and senior students, managed to escape at this point. Another fifteen persons hid in the boiler building, from where they were rescued later in the day. 36.     Despite the initial chaos, the terrorists managed to round up the majority of those present in the courtyard – 1,128 persons (the exact figure is disputed by some sources), including about 800 children aged between several months and eighteen years. Several groups of hostages initially tried to hide inside the school or to escape through the fire exits, but the terrorists were in firm control of the building and escorted everyone to the gymnasium. 37.     The hostages were assembled in the gymnasium located on the ground floor in the central part of the building and measuring about 250 square metres. The terrorists informed them that it was a terrorist act and that they had to obey. The hostages’ personal belongings, mobile phones and cameras were confiscated, and they were ordered to sit on the floor. 38.     Then the attackers proceeded to arrange a system of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) around the gymnasium, using basketball hoops and gymnasium ladders for support. Male hostages were forced to assist them in this task, which was completed within about two hours. A single chain connected several smaller IEDs hanging above the hostages’ heads, two large IEDs attached to basketball hoops on the opposite walls of the gymnasium and several heavier ones placed on the floor. Some IEDs were filled with parts such as metal pellets, screws and bolts. They were connected by wire to pedal detonators (“dead man’s switch”) constantly held by two terrorists in turns. Two women wearing ample black clothes with explosive belts underneath – suicide bombers – remained in the gymnasium among the hostages. 39.     The attackers smashed the windows of the gymnasium, to allow air and probably to avoid the use of gas as a means of attack. Several rooms around the school building were turned into firing points, with windows smashed and stocks of food, water and ammunition arranged. During the day on 1   September 2004 the terrorists kept shooting out of school windows in the direction of military personnel and civilians gathered outside. 40.     At 9.25 a.m. the Ministry of the Interior in Vladikavkaz received information about the seizure of the school; it was immediately transmitted to the North Ossetian President Mr A. Dzasokhov and the Federal Security Service (the “FSB”). 3.     Events of 1-2 September 2004 (a)     The hostages’ situation 41.     The hostages were forced to sit in very cramped conditions on the floor of the gymnasium. During the first hours of captivity some families remained separated, but they were allowed to reunite later during the day of 1   September. 42.     The hostages were ordered to keep quiet and not to speak in languages other than Russian. Mr Ruslan Betrozov, father of two sons present in the gymnasium, repeated the captors’ orders in Ossetian. One of the terrorists walked up to him and executed him in full view of the persons present in the gymnasium by shooting him in the head; his body was removed only several hours later. Mr Betrozov’s sons, Alan (born in 1988) and Aslan (born in 1990) witnessed the execution; both boys died on 3   September 2004 during the storming. Another father of three, Mr Vadim Bolloyev, was shot in the shoulder in the first hours of the crisis apparently because he refused to obey the terrorists’ orders. He died in the gymnasium by the end of 1 September. His younger son Sarmat (born in 1998) survived the attack; his two daughters Zarina (born in 1993) and Madina (born in 1995) died during the storming. 43.     During the day on 1 September 2004 the attackers allowed groups of children, under their escort and accompanied by adults, to access the toilets outside the sports hall, to drink tap water. They also ordered senior students to bring water into the hall in buckets and to distribute it among the hostages by small portions. Also on 1 September the terrorists brought into the gymnasium a large TV screen and on several occasions turned on the radio, so that some hostages could hear the news about the events. 44.     On 1 September the terrorists allowed the elderly and sick hostages, as well as some mothers with nursing babies, to stay in the smaller adjacent weights room, where they could stretch on the floor. Later these persons were brought into the sports hall. 45.     Starting from 2 September the terrorists refused to allow the hostages water and ordered them to use buckets to relieve themselves and to drink their own urine. They announced to the hostages that the tap water had been poisoned and that they had declared a “dry hunger strike” in support of their captors’ demands. Some of the hostages chewed leaves of the interior plants in order to relieve their thirst. The survivors later complained of exasperating thirst and heat prevailing on the 2nd and especially on the 3rd of September 2004. (b)     Execution of male hostages 46.     From the outset the terrorists separated most men and forced them to perform various tasks in order to fortify the building or to place IEDs. They were told that their disobedience would lead to execution of women and children in the hall. 47.     Thus, in the morning of 1 September, two male hostages were ordered to lift floorboards in the library. Floorboards were also lifted in the corners of the gymnasium. Others were ordered to move furniture and blackboards to the windows of various classrooms and corridors. 48.     In the afternoon of 1 September several men were lined up in the corridor of the ground floor. An explosion occurred there at 4.05 p.m., as a result of which several male hostages were killed or injured. One (or two) women suicide bombers and one terrorist of Arab descent were killed by this blast. Several explanations of that explosion were put forward; the criminal investigation accepted that the terrorist in charge of the operation, “ Polkovnik ” (Colonel), had executed the male hostages whom the terrorists no longer needed and at the same time activated the suicide bomber’s explosive belt because the women had objected to the treatment of children. Some of the surviving hostages testified that there had been an attack from the outside, as a result of which the explosive belt had detonated and killed the woman bomber, the Arab terrorist and several hostages. 49.     Male hostages who survived the explosion in the corridor were finished off by automatic rifles. Karen Mdinaradze survived the explosion as well as the ensuing execution. When the terrorists discovered that he was still alive, he was allowed to return to the gymnasium, where he fainted. He later testified about these events. At about 4.30 p.m. on 1 September the terrorists forced two men to throw the bodies out of a window on the first floor. One of them, Aslan Kudzayev, jumped out the window; he was wounded but survived. His wife is an applicant, she and her infant daughter were released on 2 September; their other daughter remained in the gymnasium and received injuries during the storming. 50.     According to the investigation, sixteen men were killed by the terrorists on 1 September. Another sixteen persons were wounded on 1   September as a result of shots fired by the terrorists. 51.     On 2 September at about 3 p.m. the terrorists fired several rounds from automatic weapons from the windows of the school, although it appears that no one was hurt and that no return fire followed. (c)     Negotiation attempts 52.     At around 11 a.m. on 1 September the terrorists transferred a note to the authorities via one of the hostages, ambulance doctor Mrs Larisa Mamitova. She walked to the school gates, handed the note to a man who approached her and returned; in the meantime her minor son was held at gunpoint inside the building. This note contained a mobile telephone number and the names of persons with whom the terrorists wanted to negotiate: the North Ossetian President Mr Dzasokhov, the Ingushetian President Mr Zyazikov and paediatrician Mr Roshal. The note also stated that the school building had been mined and would be blown up in case of an attempt to storm it and that the terrorists would shoot fifty hostages for any one of them killed. However, it appears that the mobile telephone number was either wrongly noted or had been switched off, and no telephone contact could be established at that time. 53.     At 1 p.m. on 1 September the Russian State TV programme “ Vesti ” announced that the attackers had transmitted a videotape to the authorities, containing their demands and images filmed inside the school. One hour later it was announced that the videotape was empty. Later on, the very existence of this videotape remained disputed. 54.     Around 4 p.m. on 1 September Mrs Mamitova brought out a second note, containing a corrected mobile telephone number and the name of another possible negotiator, aide to Russia’s President, Mr Aslakhanov. She also told the person who collected the note that there were over 1,000 hostages inside the building. 55.     The authorities contacted the terrorists through a professional negotiator, FSB officer Mr Z. His attempts to discuss proposals aimed at alleviating the hostages’ conditions, the possibilities of exit or surrender or the removal of the bodies from the school courtyard remained futile. 56.     Mr Roshal arrived in Beslan in the afternoon of 1 September 2004. When he called the hostage-takers, on 1 and 2 September, they were hostile and told him that they would enter into negotiations only if all four persons demanded by them arrived at the school. They told him that if he attempted to enter alone, he would be killed. They also refused to accept food, water or medicines, as well as to permit him to enter the building and examine the sick and wounded. 57.     On 2 September the former President of Ingushetia, Mr   Ruslan Aushev, arrived in Beslan on the invitation of the operative headquarters (OH). It appears that at about 3 p.m. he, for the first time, contacted by telephone Mr   Akhmed Zakayev, the head of the self-proclaimed Chechen separatist government, living in London. He told Mr   Zakayev about the siege and said that the number of hostages exceeded 1,000 persons. 58.     Following a telephone contact with the terrorists, at 3.30 p.m. on 2   September Mr Aushev was allowed to enter the school. He was the only person whom the terrorists agreed to let inside during the siege. Mr   Aushev was led to the gymnasium and then had a meeting with the leader of the terrorists, Mr Khuchbarov (“ Polkovnik ”). 59.     Following negotiations, Mr Aushev was permitted to leave with twenty ‑ six (other sources indicate twenty-four) persons – nursing mothers and their babies; all women had elder children in the school and were forced to leave them behind. 60.     Mr Aushev brought out a message addressed to the Russian President Mr   V. Putin from Mr Shamil Basayev. It demanded the pulling of troops out of Chechnya and the official recognition of Chechnya as an independent state. In return, it promised cessation of terrorist activities in Russia “for the ensuing ten or fifteen years”. It bore no mention of the school siege. It appears that the terrorists also gave Mr   Aushev a videotape depicting part of his visit, the gymnasium with the hostages, explosive devices and one terrorist holding his foot on the “dead man’s switch”. It also contained Mr   Khuchbarov’s statement that the negotiations should involve Mr Aslan Maskhadov, the President of the self-proclaimed independent Chechen State, who had been in hiding at the time. 61.     On 2 September and in the morning of 3 September the attackers tried to contact the authorities of North Ossetia with the assistance of the school director, Mrs   Tsaliyeva. Two hostages – children of the North Ossetian Parliament’s speaker, Mr   Mamsurov, – were allowed to call their father on his mobile telephone and to tell him that they were suffering without water and food. It appears that family members of other possible contacts among officials and public figures (district prosecutor, a well-known sportsman) were singled out by the terrorists but that no contact was established. 62.     In parallel to the negotiations carried out through Mr   Z., on 2   September direct contact with the terrorists was established through Mr   Gutseriyev, an influential businessman of Ingush origin. The latter supplied Mr   Aushev with the requisite telephone numbers, participated in the conversations with Mr Akhmed Zakayev and eventually tried to liaise with Mr   Maskhadov. 63.     Thus, as can be judged from various information sources, at around 5   p.m. on 2 September Mr   Aushev, Mr   Dzasokhov and Mr   Zakayev held a telephone conversation during which Mr   Zakayev promised to involve Mr   Maskhadov in the negotiations (see paragraphs 139, 321, 331, 339 below). Some sources indicated that these talks had apparently resulted in Mr   Maskhadov’s agreement to come to Beslan. (d)     Coordination of the authorities’ actions and involvement of army and security detachments 64.     At about 10.30 a.m. on 1 September 2004 the crisis OH was set up on the premises of the Beslan town administration. The exact composition, leadership and powers of this structure remain disputed. According to most sources, initially it was headed by Mr A.   Dzasokhov, the North Ossetian President, and as of 2 September by General V.   Andreyev, the head of the North Ossetian FSB. It was later established that the OH included the deputy head of the counter-terrorism commission of North Ossetia Mr   Tsyban, the head of the North Ossetian Ministry of Emergency Situations (“Emercom”) Mr   Dzgoyev, the North Ossetian Minister of Education Mrs   Levitskaya, deputy head of the Information programme departments of the State Telecommunication corporation Rossiya Mr   Vasilyev and the commander-in-chief of the 58th Army of the Ministry of Defence General Sobolev (see paragraphs 140, 168, 193, 312 - 333 below). 65.     The detachments of the 58th Army started to arrive in Beslan in the afternoon of 1 September. On 2 September 2004 eight armoured personnel vehicles (APCs) and several tanks of the 58th Army arrived in Beslan. They were placed under the command of the FSB special purpose units and positioned around the school but out of the terrorists’ sight. 66.     Early in the morning of 3 September the FSB special purpose units went to Vladikavkaz for joint training with the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence to prepare for a possible storming. (e)     Situation with the hostages’ relatives outside the school 67.     Thousands of people in Beslan were directly concerned with the crisis. 68.     Despite the attempts of the authorities to clear the area, local residents, as well as ethnic Ossetians from outside Beslan, some of them armed, remained around the school building throughout the siege. 69.     In the afternoon of 1 September the hostages’ relatives were invited to the building of the town Cultural Centre. Until the end of the siege the Cultural Centre remained a hub for communicating with the relatives and for the provision of medical and psychological assistance to them. 70.     At 7 p.m. on 1 September the North Ossetian President Mr   Dzasokhov, the deputy speaker of the North Ossetian parliament Mr   Kesayev and the North Ossetian Deputy Minister of the Interior Mr   Sikoyev met with the relatives in the Cultural Centre. During this meeting Mr Sikoyev informed them that the terrorists had not put forward any demands and that they had refused to accept food, water or medicine for the hostages. 71.     At about 9.30 p.m. on 1 September Mr Roshal participated in the meeting at the Cultural Centre. He assured the gathering that the conditions in the school were “acceptable” and that the hostages could survive several days without food or water. He also stated that the terrorists had not put forward any demands to the authorities. 72.     On 2 September a psychological aid unit was set up at the Cultural Centre. 73.     Late in the evening on 2 September Mr Dzasokhov held another meeting with the relatives at the Cultural Centre. 74.     At 11.15 a.m. on 3 September Mr Dzasokhov announced to the relatives that there would be no storming and that “new personalities” had appeared in the negotiation process. 75.     Some of the applicants were among the relatives who gathered outside the school building or stayed at the Cultural Centre and have submitted written statements describing these events. (f)     Information about the crisis 76.     From the outset the information about the hostage-taking was strictly controlled by the authorities. Mr Vasilyev, a member of the OH and senior employee of the State TV company Rossiya was put in charge of contacting the journalists. 77.     In the afternoon of 1 September the media announced referring to the official sources that about 250 persons had been taken hostage. Later on the same day the media reported a “corrected” number of hostages: 354 persons. According to some hostages, this news outraged the terrorists and prompted them to execute or at least throw out of the window the bodies of the executed men. It also transpires from the hostages’ statements that after these announcements the terrorists refused to allow them to drink or go to the toilet, saying that “there should anyway be no more than 350 of you left” (see paragraph 285 below). 78.     In the evening of 2 September Mr Roshal held a press-conference. He announced that he had talked on the telephone with a terrorist nicknamed “ Gorets ” (highlander) who had put forward no demands. 79.     At 1 p.m. on 3 September the State TV showed terrorists’ relatives of Ingush origin who asked them to release the hostages. One woman, the wife of a presumed hostage-taker, said that she and her children were being held somewhere “against their will” and asked her husband to do everything “to avoid harming the children”. 4.     Storming and rescue operation (a)     Morning of 3 September 2004 80.     The hostages in the gymnasium were extremely exhausted and suffered from thirst and hunger. They had spent two days without sleep, in cramped conditions and the physical state of many had worsened: people started to lose consciousness; some children were hallucinating, having seizures and vomiting. 81.     Early in the morning the terrorists lifted the IEDs in the gymnasium from the floor, hanging them along the walls. 82.     At 11.10 a.m. the terrorists agreed with Mr Aushev and Mr   Gutseriyev to allow “Emercom” to collect the bodies from the school courtyard. 83.     At about noon Mr Dzasokhov informed the OH that he had reached some sort of agreement with Mr Zakayev (see paragraph 331 below). According to some sources, that agreement could have extended to a possibility of Mr   Maskhadov’s arrival in Beslan. 84.     At 12.55 p.m. an “Emercom” truck and four officers entered the school courtyard. The men had Mr Gutseriyev’s mobile telephone to communicate with the terrorists. One of the terrorists came out and supervised their work. The explosions inside the gymnasium at 1.03 p.m. came unexpectedly to this group. The ensuing exchange of gun fire resulted in two officers’ deaths. (b)     The first three explosions in the gymnasium 85.     At 1.03 p.m. a powerful explosion occurred in the upper eastern part of the gymnasium. Part of the roofing was destroyed, the insulation caught fire, and fragments of the burning ceiling and roof fell into the gymnasium, killing and injuring people seated underneath. Many of the surviving hostages described the first explosion as a “fire ball”, or a “column of fire”, followed by white/silver powder falling from the ceiling. It appears that this explosion caused fire in the roof-space of the gymnasium (see paragraph 288 below). Twenty-two seconds later another explosion ripped through the lower part of the wall under the first window on the north-eastern side. The nature and origins of these explosions are disputed (see documents referred to below). 86.     These two explosions killed both terrorists holding the detonators; however most of the IEDs remained intact (see paragraph 307 below). Dozens of people were killed, others were wounded or received burns of varying degrees, and almost everyone was shell-shocked. Many applicants submitted witness statements about these events. 87.     Those hostages who could move and were able to reach the opening in the wall on the northern side started to climb through it and run outside. The terrorists fired at them from the upper floor, this prompted an exchange of gunfire between the terrorists and the security forces. 88.     At this point General Andreyev issued an order to storm the building and to proceed with the rescue operation and neutralisation of the terrorists. 89.     Several terrorists were killed or wounded during the first two explosions, however the majority of them survived, including “ Polkovnik ”. They rounded up the survivors in the gymnasium (about 300 persons) and forced them to walk to other premises of the main building, mostly in the southern wing: canteen, kitchen, meeting room and handicraft classrooms. Some hostages remained in the premises adjacent to the gymnasium (weights room, shower room). 90.     The dead, injured and shell-shocked remained in the gymnasium, where the fire continued to spread in the roof-space. 91.     At about 1.30 p.m. a third powerful explosion occurred in the southern part of the gymnasium. It appears that it was caused by one of the large IEDs which had caught fire. Soon afterwards flames spread around the gymnasium, taking to the floor and walls of the premises. Some hostages continued to escape through the openings in the walls. 92.     Between 1.30 p.m. and 2.50 p.m. servicemen of the security services and local residents broke the western wall of the gymnasium and entered the hall. They helped to evacuate survivors. Their movements were covered by an APC which came close to the school. No terrorists were found there, but the gymnasium was under fire, probably from terrorist snipers on the first floor. 93.     At about 1.40 p.m. part of the burning roofing collapsed. 94.     Hundreds of wounded hostages and servicemen were taken to the Beslan hospital in private cars and ambulances. An “Emercom” field hospital had been spread out in tents in the hospital courtyard in order to sort out the wounded and cope with the influx. Many injured were taken to the hospitals in Vladikavkaz. The hostages’ relatives were not allowed to enter the hospital. Over 750 civilians and over 50 servicemen received medical help on 3 September 2004 (see paragraphs 242 below and subsequent). (c)     Hostages in the southern wing 95.     Over 300 hostages who had survived the explosions and fire in the gymnasium were taken by the terrorists to the canteen and kitchen situated on the ground floor in the southern wing. Other hostages were taken to the main meeting room situated above the canteen on the first floor. There they found stocks of water and food and could relieve their thirst for the first time in two and a half days. 96.     The women and children in the canteen and meeting room were forced by the terrorists at gunpoint to stand in the windows and wave their clothes; some were killed or wounded by gunfire and explosions. (d)     Ensuing fighting 97.     As shown by many witness statements, but not corroborated by the results of the criminal investigation, after 2 p.m. a tank with hull number 320 entered the school yard and fired several rounds at the canteen. It appears that another tank, with hull number 325 or 328, also fired at the school from a distance of about 20-30 metres. Some of the rounds were fired with solid shots, while others were probably done with ammunition (see paragraphs 294, 298, 303, 411 below). 98.     Two APCs entered the school yard and took part in the fighting with their large-calibre machine guns. 99.     The army and FSB assault troops were positioned on the roofs of the five-storey apartment blocks, nos. 37, 39 and 41 of Shkolny Lane, located on the eastern side of the school. These servicemen fired at the school with portable grenade-launchers and fire-launchers, although the exact timing of these attacks is disputed (see paragraphs 152, 293, 300, 408, 410 below). Two MI-24 helicopters circled above the school. According to some sources, although not corroborated by the official investigation, at least one rocket was launched from a helicopter on the school’s roof (see paragraph 410 below). 100.     At 3.10 p.m. the OH ordered fire brigades with water cannons to intervene, by which time the gymnasium was ablaze and other parts of the building were on fire (see paragraphs 160, 209, 304 below). At the same time the head of the OH ordered the servicemen of the FSB special forces units Alfa and Vympel to enter the building. 101.     At about 3.30 p.m. the entire roof of the gymnasium collapsed. After 4.30 p.m. the fire was contained; the servicemen of the special forces and firefighters entered the gymnasium, but found no survivors there. 102.     It appears that the servicemen of the special forces entered the canteen at about 4 p.m. through the openings in the walls and through the windows, once the metal bars blocking them had fallen inside as a result of an explosion or had been pulled out with an APC. Amid fierce fighting they evacuated the surviving hostages. 103.     Numerous bodies of terrorists and hostages were found in the canteen, the meeting room and rooms and corridors of the southern wing. 104.     At about 5 p.m. a strict security perimeter was established around the school. All civilians, “Emercom” staff, firefighters and servicemen of the army were ordered to leave, leaving only the FSB special forces inside. At about 5.25 p.m. the servicemen of the FSB special units held a minute’s silence in the corridor of the southern wing in order to honour the memory of their comrades: ten members of the elite Vympel and Alfa units, including three group commanders, had lost their lives and about thirty were wounded – the biggest losses ever sustained by these units in a single operation. 105.     After 6 p.m. several shots were fired at the southern wing of the building from anti-tank missiles and flame-throwers. 106.     At about 9 p.m. two tanks fired at the school. There followed several powerful explosions which completely destroyed the walls and roofing of the handicraft classrooms in the southern wing. 107.     The gunfire and explosions at the school continued until past midnight. 108.     One terrorist, Nurpashi Kulayev, was captured alive. The rest, it appears, were killed during the storming. Consistent rumours circulated that some terrorists had escaped or were captured clandestinely. 5.     Events of 4 September 2004, identification of bodies and burials 109.     In the night of 4 September Russian President Putin arrived in Beslan for several hours. He visited the town hospital and administration. 110.     The school building remained encircled by soldiers throughout the day of 4   September. 111.     At 7 a.m. “Emercom” staff started to collect the bodies and to clear the debris. Between 112 and 116 charred bodies were found in the gymnasium, and about 80 bodies in the adjacent premises (changing rooms, weights room). It appears that between 106 and 110 bodies were found in the southern wing of the school and on other premises, although no exact information has been recorded in this respect (see paragraphs 130-133 below). 18 bodies of men were collected in the courtyard. About 330 bodies (including over 180 children) were placed in the school yard and then taken to the Vladikavkaz morgue. 112 .     During the day on 4 September bulldozers and trucks arrived at the school. The remaining debris was loaded onto trucks and taken to the town rubbish dump. The victims alleged that they and other locals later found a number of important items of evidence among this rubbish, including the terrorists’ personal belongings such as backpacks and razor blades, human remains, hostages’ clothes, parts of IEDs. 113.     At 6 p.m. on 4 September the security lines in Beslan were lifted. On the same day after 8 p.m. the units of the 58th army withdrew from the town. 114.     On 5 September 2004 the first funerals took place. Over the following days collective burials of over 100 people followed. The local cemetery was too small and had to be extended; later a special memorial was erected there (see paragraph 425 below). 115.     However, many bodies were charred beyond recognition. On 17   September 73 bodies were taken to the forensic laboratory in Rostov ‑ on ‑ Don for identification through DNA tests. The identification and burials continued throughout December 2004 (see paragraphs 340-341 below). 116.     The 5th and 6th of September 2004 were declared days of national mourning. On 6 September 2004 Russian President Putin spoke in a televised address to the nation announcing future measures to improve agencies’ cooperation in counter-terrorism measures. He called the attack a “direct intervention of international terrorism against Russia”. 6.     Assuming of responsibility for the terrorist act 117.     On 5 September 2004 the website Chechenpress.org published a message signed by “the President of Ichkeria” Mr Aslan Maskhadov, condemning the hostage-taking and terrorist attacks against civilians, but blaming the Russian authorities for the radicalisation of the Chechens. 118.     On 17 September 2004 the website Kavkazcenter.com disseminated an e ‑ mail, allegedly from Mr Shamil Basayev, a leader of the radical wing of the Chechen separatist movement, who used the titles of “ Amir of Riyad ‑ us Saliheen Brigade of Martyrs” and “the chief of the high military madjlisul shura of the united Caucasus mujahidin ”. Mr Basayev, who at the time lived clandestinely in the Russian Northern Caucasus, claimed that his “martyrs’ battalion” had carried out the attack in Beslan, as well as the explosions in Moscow and the plane crashes in August 2004. 119.     The e-mail alleged that the special forces had started the storming and that the IEDs set up by the att