CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 27 août 2015

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clear:both } .sE208486F { font-family:Arial; color:#ff0000 } .s7940ED5C { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline } .s4BAE41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 } .s5AA03353 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; page-break-inside:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s8EB5F569 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super } .s3DC36BA9 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } .s3C4DB099 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left; font-size:10pt }     GRAND CHAMBER             CASE OF PARRILLO v. ITALY   (Application no. 46470/11)                     JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   27 August 2015       This judgment is final. In the case of Parrillo v. Italy, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   Dean Spielmann, President ,   Josep Casadevall,   Guido Raimondi,   Mark Villiger,   Isabelle Berro,   Ineta Ziemele,   George Nicolaou,   András Sajó,   Ann Power-Forde,   Nebojša Vučinić,   Ganna Yudkivska,   Vincent A. De Gaetano,   Julia Laffranque,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Helen Keller,   Faris Vehabović,   Dmitry Dedov, judges , and Johan Callewaert, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 18 June 2014 and 22 April 2015, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 46470/11) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Italian national, Ms Adelina Parrillo (“the applicant”), on 26 July 2011. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr N. Paoletti, Ms C. Sartori and Ms N. Paoletti, lawyers practising in Rome. The Italian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their co ‑ Agents, Ms P. Accardo and Mr   G. Mauro Pellegrini. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that the ban (under section 13 of Law no. 40 of 19 February 2004) on donating to scientific research embryos conceived through medically assisted reproduction was incompatible with her right to respect for her private life and her right to the peaceful enjoyment of her possessions guaranteed under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. She also complained of a violation of freedom of expression guaranteed under Article 10 of the Convention, of which scientific research was, in her submission, a fundamental aspect. 4.     The application was allocated to the Second Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). 5.     On 28 May 2013 notice of the complaints under Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was given to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible. 6.     On 28 January 2014 a Chamber of the Second Section composed of Işıl Karakaş, President , Guido Raimondi, Peer Lorenzen, Dragoljub Popović, András Sajó, Nebojša Vučinić and Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque, judges, and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar, relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, neither of the parties having objected to relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72). 7.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24. 8.     The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the admissibility and merits of the application. 9.     The European Center for Law and Justice, the associations Movimento per la vita, Scienza e vita, Forum delle associazioni familiari, Luca Coscioni, Amica Cicogna Onlus, L’Altra Cicogna Onlus, Cerco Un Bimbo, VOX – Osservatorio italiano sui Diritti, SIFES (Society of Fertility, Sterility and Reproductive Medicine) and Cittadinanzattiva and forty-six members of the Italian Parliament were given leave to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3). 10.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 18 June 2014 (Rule 59 § 3).   There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Ms   P. Accardo ,     Mr   G. Mauro Pellegrini ,   Co-Agents , Ms   A. Morresi , member of the National Bioethics   Committee and professor of   physical chemistry at the Department of   Chemistry, Biology and Biotechnology,   Perugia University, Ms   D. Fehily , inspector and technical adviser at the   National Transplantation Centre, Rome   Advisers ;   (b)     for the applicant Mr   N. Paoletti , Ms     C. Sartori , Ms     N. Paoletti ,   Counsel ; Mr   M. De Luca , professor of biochemistry and Director of the Centre for Regenerative Medicine “Stefano   Ferrari”, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia   Adviser .   The Court heard addresses by Ms Accardo, Ms Morresi, Mr Paoletti, Mr   De Luca and Ms Sartori, and answers to questions by judges from Ms   Accardo, Mr Mauro Pellegrini, Mr De Luca, Ms Paoletti and Mr   Paoletti. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 11.     The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in Rome. 12.     In 2002 she had recourse to assisted reproduction techniques, undergoing in vitro fertilisation (IVF) treatment with her partner at the Centre for reproductive medicine at the European Hospital (“the centre”) in Rome. The five embryos obtained from the IVF treatment were placed in cryopreservation. 13.     Before the embryos could be implanted the applicant’s partner died, on 12 November 2003, in a bomb attack in Nasiriya (Iraq) while he was reporting on the war. 14.     After deciding not to have the embryos implanted, the applicant sought to donate them to scientific research and thus contribute to promoting advances in treatment for diseases that are difficult to cure. 15.     According to the information provided at the hearing before the Grand Chamber, the applicant made a number of unsuccessful verbal requests for release of the embryos at the centre where they were being stored. 16.     In a letter of 14 December 2011, the applicant asked the Director of the centre to release the five cryopreserved embryos so that they could be used for stem-cell research. The Director refused to comply with her request on the ground that this type of research was banned and punishable as a criminal offence in Italy under section 13 of Law no. 40 of 19 February 2004 (“Law no.   40/2004”). 17.     The embryos in question are currently stored in the cryogenic storage bank at the centre where the IVF treatment was carried out. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Law no. 40 of 19 February 2004, in force since 10 March 2004 (“Rules governing medically assisted fertilisation”) Section 1 – Purpose “(1)     In order to remedy reproductive problems arising as a result of human sterility or infertility, recourse may be had to medically assisted reproduction in the conditions and in accordance with the procedures provided for by this Law, which guarantees the rights of all the persons concerned, including those of the subject thus conceived.” Section 5 – Conditions of access “... [only] couples [composed of persons] who have reached the age of majority, are of opposite sex, are married or cohabiting, are of reproductive age and living may have recourse to assisted reproduction techniques.” Section 13 – Experiments on human embryos “(1)     It is forbidden to experiment on a human embryo. (2)     Clinical and experimental research on a human embryo shall be authorised only on condition that it is performed exclusively for therapeutic or diagnostic purposes with the aim of protecting the health and development of the embryo and that no alternative methods exist. ... (4)     Anyone who infringes the prohibition provided for in subsection 1 shall be liable to a term of imprisonment ranging from two to six years and to a fine of 50,000 to 150,000 euros. ... (5)     Any health professional convicted of an offence provided for in this section shall be debarred from practising medicine for one to three years.” Section 14 – Limits on application of technology to embryos “(1)     The cryopreservation or destruction of embryos is forbidden, without prejudice to the provisions of Law no.   194 of 22 May 1978 [rules on social protection of maternity and voluntary termination of pregnancy]. (2)     Embryo production techniques shall not result in the creation of a higher number of embryos than that strictly required for a single and simultaneous implantation and in no circumstances shall more than three embryos be created. (3)     Where the embryos cannot be implanted into the uterus for reasons of serious and proven force majeure affecting the state of health of the woman concerned which were unforeseeable at the time of fertilisation, cryopreservation of the embryos shall be authorised until the date of transfer, which shall be effected as soon as possible.” 18.     By judgment no. 151 of 1 April 2009 (see paragraphs 29-31 below), the Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional the provision in section   14(2) of Law no. 40/2004 according to which embryo production techniques must not result in the creation of a higher number of embryos than that strictly required for “a single and simultaneous implantation and in no circumstances shall more than three embryos be created”. It also declared section 14(3) unconstitutional on the ground that it did not provide that the transfer of the embryos should be performed without jeopardising the woman’s health. B.     Opinion of the National Bioethics Committee on adoption for birth (“ADP”) (18 November 2005) 19.     Following the enactment of Law no.   40/2004, the National Bioethics Committee examined the issue of the fate of abandoned cryopreserved embryos, the Law making no specific provision in this regard but implicitly banning the use of surplus embryos for scientific research. 20.     In that connection the Committee issued an opinion in favour of “adoption for birth”, a practice enabling a couple or a woman to adopt surplus embryos for implantation and thus allowing the embryos in question to be used for the purposes of bringing them to life and starting a family. C.     Ministry of Health decree of 11 April 2008 (“Explanatory notes on assisted reproduction”) “... Cryopreservation of embryos: ... There are two categories of embryos amenable to cryopreservation: the first is embryos that are awaiting implantation, including those that were cryopreserved prior to the entry into force of Law no. 40 of 2004; the second is embryos that have been certified as abandoned ...” D.     Final report of the “Study Commission on embryos” of 8 January 2010 21.     By a decree of 25 June 2009, the Ministry of Health appointed a Study Commission on embryos stored in cryopreserved form in assisted reproduction centres. The following is a passage from the final report by that Commission, adopted by a majority on 8 January 2010. “The legal ban on the destruction of embryos is to be understood as prohibiting the interruption of cryopreservation other than in two cases: where the thawed embryo can be implanted in the uterus of the mother or another woman willing to have it implanted; or where natural death or permanent loss of viability as an organism can be medically certified. In the light of current [scientific] knowledge, the viability of an embryo cannot be certified unless it has been thawed, thus creating the paradoxical situation in which, once thawed, an embryo cannot be frozen a second time and if it is not immediately implanted into the uterus death will inevitably ensue. Hence, a tutiorist prospect of frozen embryos being stored for an indeterminate period. However, it can be assumed that advances in scientific research will make it possible to determine the criteria and methods for diagnosing death, or in any event loss of viability, of cryopreserved embryos. It will thus be possible to overcome the present – and legally inevitable – paradox of potentially indefinite cryopreservation. Pending those results, [it should be reaffirmed that] the explicit ban under section 14 of Law   no. 40 of 2004 on the destruction of embryos, including therefore frozen embryos, cannot be ignored. That is not all, for as regards the fate of surplus embryos, the authors of Law no. 40 opted for their storage and not their destruction, thus establishing as a principle that they should be kept alive even where their fate is uncertain.” E.     The Constitution of the Italian Republic 22.     The relevant Articles of the Constitution provide as follows. Article 9 “The Republic promotes the development of culture and of scientific and technical research. ...” Article 32 “The Republic safeguards health as a fundamental right of the individual and as a collective interest. ...” Article 117 “Legislative power is exercised by the State and the Regions in compliance with the Constitution and the constraints deriving from the Community legal order and international obligations. ...” F.     Constitutional Court judgments nos. 348 and 349 of 24 October 2007 23.     These judgments address questions raised by the Court of Cassation and an appellate court regarding the compatibility of Legislative Decree no.   333 of 11 July 1992 on the criteria for calculating expropriation compensation with the Constitution and with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. They take account of the Court’s Grand Chamber judgment in Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no.   36813/97, ECHR 2006 ‑ V. 24.     In these judgments, after reiterating the legislature’s obligation to comply with international obligations (Article 117 of the Constitution), the Constitutional Court defined the place assigned to the European Convention on Human Rights in the Italian legal system, stating that it was of intermediate rank between an ordinary law and the Constitution. The Constitutional Court also stated that the courts below had to interpret rules of domestic law in a manner compliant with the Convention and the Court’s case-law (judgment no. 349, point 6.2, see paragraph 26 below) and that, where such an interpretation was impossible or the courts below doubted the compatibility of the domestic law with the Convention, they had to raise a question of constitutionality before the Constitutional Court. 25.     The relevant passages of judgment no.   348 of 24 October 2007 read as follows. “4.2.     ... It is necessary to define the rank and role of the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights with a view to determining, in the light of [Article 117 of the Constitution], their impact on the Italian legal order. ... 4.3.     While on the one hand [these provisions] complement the protection of fundamental rights, and therefore supplement the values and fundamental principles protected by the Italian Constitution itself, on the other hand they maintain their formal status as simple sources of ordinary legislation. ... Today the Constitutional Court is called upon to clarify the normative and institutional question [referred to above], which has significant practical implications for the everyday work of legal practitioners. ... The ordinary courts do not have the power to set aside ordinary legislation conflicting with the European Convention on Human Rights, since the alleged incompatibility between the two raises a question of constitutionality regarding a possible violation of Article 117 § 1 of the Constitution and [thus] falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. ... 4.5.     ... The principle enshrined in Article 117 § 1 of the Constitution will only become operative in practice if ‘the international law obligations’ binding on the legislative powers of the State and the Regions are duly specified. ... 4.6.     Compared with other international law treaties, the European Convention on Human Rights has the particular feature of having instituted the jurisdiction of a court, the European Court of Human Rights, which is assigned the role of interpreting the provisions of the Convention. Article 32 § 1 [of the Convention] provides: ‘The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided in Articles 33, 34, 46 and 47.’ Since legal provisions acquire meaning [ vivono ] through the interpretation which is given to them by legal practitioners, and in the first place the courts, the natural consequence of Article 32 § 1 of the Convention is that the international law obligations undertaken by Italy in signing and ratifying the European Convention on Human Rights include the duty to bring its own legislation into line with the provisions of the Convention in accordance with the meaning attributed to these by the [European] Court [of Human Rights], which was specifically set up to interpret and apply those provisions. It is therefore not correct to speak of a jurisdictional competence that operates in addition to that of the Italian courts, but rather of a pre-eminent interpretative role which the signatory States have recognised in the European Court, thus contributing to clarifying their international law obligations in that particular area. 4.7.     It should not be inferred from the foregoing that the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the Strasbourg Court, have the force of constitutional law and thus escape scrutiny by this court of their constitutional legitimacy. It is precisely because the provisions in question supplement constitutional principles, while remaining of lower rank, that it is necessary that they be in conformity with the Constitution. ... Since, as stated above, the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights acquire meaning through the interpretation given to them by the European Court, scrutiny of their constitutionality must give consideration to the norms that result from that interpretation, and not the provisions considered in themselves. Moreover, the judgments of the Strasbourg Court are not unconditionally binding for the purposes of reviewing the constitutionality of national laws. This review must always be a balancing exercise between the constraints arising from international law obligations, as imposed by Article 117 § 1 of the Constitution, and the constitutionally protected interests enshrined in other Articles of the Constitution. ... 5.     In the light of the methodological principles set out above, the constitutional review requested by the referring court must be carried out in such a way as to ascertain: (a) whether there is actually a conflict that cannot be resolved through interpretation between the domestic provision in question and the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the European Court and regarded as a source supplementing the constitutional principle contained in Article   117 § 1, and (b) whether the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights integrating that principle, and understood according to their interpretation by the [European] Court, are compatible with the Italian constitutional order. ...” 26.     The relevant parts of judgment no.   349 of 24 October 2007 read as follows. “6.2.     ... [The principle laid down] in Article 117 § 1 of the Constitution [does not mean] that the provisions laid down in international agreements and implemented by ordinary legislation, as is the case for the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, must be regarded as having constitutional status. As the constitutional principle in issue imposes a duty on the legislature to comply with those provisions, any national provision incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights and thus with the ‘international law obligations’ referred to in Article 117 § 1 would ipso facto violate this constitutional principle. Article 117 § 1 ultimately creates a reference to Convention provisions which may be relevant in a particular case, giving life [ dà vita ] and substantive content to the international law obligations evoked generally and to the [underlying constitutional] principle, such as to be generally classified as ‘interposed provisions’, and which in turn are reviewed in terms of their compatibility with the Constitution, as will be discussed below. It follows that it is a matter for the ordinary courts to interpret national law in conformity with the international legal provision in question ... Where this is not possible, or where the court doubts the compatibility of the national law with the ‘interposed’ Convention provision, it must raise a question of constitutionality before the Constitutional Court in the light of Article 117 § 1 of the Constitution ... Regarding the European Convention on Human Rights, consideration must be given to its special nature compared with other international agreements since it goes further than simply listing reciprocal rights and duties of the signatory States. The latter have created a system for the uniform protection of fundamental rights. The application and interpretation of that system is naturally in the first instance a matter for the courts of the member States, which are the ordinary courts in relation to Convention law. Definitive uniformity in application is on the other hand guaranteed by the centralised interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights – a task assigned to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which has the last word and the jurisdiction of which ‘shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention and the Protocols thereto which are referred to it as provided [therein]’ (Article 32 § 1 of the Convention). ... The Constitutional Court and the Strasbourg Court ultimately have different roles, even though both share the same objective of protecting as effectively as possible fundamental rights. The interpretation of the Rome Convention and of the Protocols is a matter for the Strasbourg Court, which guarantees the application of a uniform level of protection throughout the member States. However, where a question is raised before the Constitutional Court regarding the constitutionality of a national provision in the light of Article 117 § 1 of the Constitution in respect of an incompatibility – insurmountable through interpretation – with one or more provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, it is incumbent on this Court to determine whether there actually is an incompatibility and [where one is found to exist] to verify whether the actual provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the Strasbourg Court, guarantee a protection of fundamental rights that is at least equivalent to the level guaranteed by the Italian Constitution. This does not require an assessment of the interpretation by the Strasbourg Court of a provision of the European Convention on Human Rights ... but verification as to whether that provision, as interpreted by the court expressly charged with that task by the member States, is compatible with the relevant constitutional provisions. Accordingly, a correct balance will be struck between the duty imposed by the Constitution to guarantee respect for international obligations and the need to prevent this resulting in a breach of the Constitution itself.” G.     The case-law of the Constitutional Court 1.     Constitutional Court Order no.   369 of 24 October 2006 27.     In this Order the Constitutional Court declared inadmissible a question of constitutionality raised by the Cagliari Court in respect of section 13 of Law no.   40/2004, which bans the use of pre-implantation diagnosis. 28.     In ruling thus the Constitutional Court observed that the court referring the question for a preliminary ruling had confined itself to raising the question of the constitutionality of section 13 alone of Law no.   40/2004 whereas, according to the terms of the application for a preliminary ruling, other provisions of the same Law also had the effect of banning pre ‑ implantation diagnosis, particularly section   14(3). 2.     Constitutional Court judgment no. 151 of 1 April 2009 29.     This judgment concerns the constitutionality of the provisions of section 14(2) and section 14(3) of Law no. 40/2004, which provide for the creation of a limited number of embryos (maximum of three) and the obligation to implant them simultaneously and also prohibit the cryopreservation of surplus embryos. 30.     The Constitutional Court held that the subsections in question were unconstitutional because they jeopardised women’s health by obliging them to undergo several cycles of ovarian stimulation and also to expose themselves to the risk of multiple pregnancies on account of the prohibition on selective abortion. 31.     The judgment does not make any reference to the European Convention on Human Rights. Nor was the Convention cited by the referring courts (Lazio Regional Administrative Court and Florence Court). 3.     Constitutional Court Order no. 97 of 8 March 2010 32.     In this Order the Constitutional Court declared inadmissible the questions of constitutionality that the Milan Court had raised before it, as those questions had already been dealt with in its judgment no.   151/2009. 4.     Constitutional Court Order no. 150 of 22 May 2012 33.     In this Order, which referred to S.H. and Others v.   Austria ([GC], no.   57813/00, ECHR 2011), the Constitutional Court remitted to the lower court the case brought before it concerning the ban on heterologous fertilisation laid down in Law no.   40/2004. 5.     Constitutional Court judgment no.   162 of 10 June 2014 34.     This judgment concerns the constitutionality of the blanket ban on access to heterologous fertilisation in the event of medically established sterility or infertility, as provided for in Law no.   40/2004. 35.     Three courts of ordinary jurisdiction had sought a preliminary ruling from the Constitutional Court regarding the question whether the Law in issue was compatible with Articles 2 (inviolable rights), 3 (principle of equality), 29 (rights of the family), 31 (State’s obligations to protect rights of the family) and 32 (right to health) of the Constitution. One of those courts – the Milan Court – had also asked the Constitutional Court to rule on the compatibility of the Law in issue with Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. 36.     The Constitutional Court ruled the relevant legislative provisions unconstitutional. 37.     It held in particular that the choice of the applicants in the proceedings to become parents and found a family with children was an aspect of their freedom of self-determination regarding the sphere of their private and family life which attracted the protection of Articles 2, 3 and 31 of the Constitution. It also observed that persons who were totally sterile or infertile had a right to protection of their health (Article 32 of the Constitution). 38.     It found that, while the rights in question could be the subject of restrictions based on ethical considerations, those restrictions could not amount to a blanket ban unless it were otherwise impossible to protect other constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. 39.     With regard to the compatibility of the legislative provisions in issue with Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention, the Constitutional Court confined itself to observing that the questions in that regard had been covered in the conclusions it had reached on the constitutionality of the provisions in issue (see above). H.     Orders of the domestic courts regarding access to pre-implantation diagnosis 1.     Cagliari Court Order of 22   September 2007 40.     In this Order the Cagliari Court observed that the claimants had first instituted urgent proceedings in the context of which a question of constitutionality had been raised. It added that this question had then been declared inadmissible by Order no.   369 of the Constitutional Court adopted on 24   October 2006 (see paragraphs 27-28 above), which had therefore not provided any guidance regarding the interpretation to be given to domestic law in the light of the Constitution. 41.     With regard to the civil proceedings brought before it, the court pointed out that there was no explicit ban under domestic law on access to pre-implantation diagnosis, and that interpreting the Law in such a way as to construe that a ban existed would have been contrary to the claimants’ right to be duly informed of the medical treatment that they sought to undergo. 42.     Furthermore, it noted that a ban on pre-implantation diagnosis had been introduced subsequently by secondary legislation, namely, Ministry of Health Decree no.   15165 of 21   July 2004 (particularly the part providing that “tests to determine the state of health of embryos created in vitro , within the meaning of section 14(5) [of Law no.   40 of 2004], cannot be carried out for purposes other than observation of those embryos (“ dovrà essere di tipo osservazionale ”). It held that this was contrary to the principle of legality and the Council of Europe’s Oviedo Convention. 43.     It observed, lastly, that interpreting Law no.   40/2004 so as to allow access to pre-implantation diagnosis was consonant with the right to health accorded to the mother. Consequently, it granted the claimants access to pre-implantation diagnosis. 2.     Florence Court Order of 17 December 2007 44.     In this Order the Florence Court referred to the Order of the Cagliari Court cited above and stated that it agreed with its interpretation of the domestic law. Accordingly, it granted the claimants access to pre-implantation diagnosis. 3.     Bologna Court Order of 29   June 2009 45.     In this Order the Bologna Court granted the claimants access to pre-implantation diagnosis, stating that this was consonant with the protection of women’s health recognised by the Constitutional Court’s interpretation of domestic law in its judgment no. 151 of 1 April 2009 (see paragraphs 29-31 above). 4.     Salerno Court Order of 9 January 2010 46.     In this Order, adopted following urgent proceedings, the Salerno Court referred to the new developments introduced by Ministry of Health Decree no.   31639 of 11 April 2008, namely the fact that tests to determine the state of health of embryos created in vitro were no longer limited to observation of those embryos and that access to assisted reproduction was authorised for couples where the man was a carrier of sexually transmitted viral diseases. 47.     It concluded that pre-implantation diagnosis had to be regarded as just one of the antenatal treatment techniques designed to determine the state of health of the embryo. 48.     Consequently, it authorised pre-implantation diagnosis of the claimants’ embryo in vitro . 5.     Cagliari Court Order of 9   November 2012 49.     In this Order the Cagliari Court referred to the reasoning in the above-cited Orders. It indicated, further, that judgments nos. 348 and 349 delivered by the Constitutional Court on 24   October 2007 showed that interpreting the law with a view to guaranteeing access to pre-implantation diagnosis was compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, especially having regard to the judgment delivered by the Strasbourg Court in Costa and Pavan v. Italy (no.   54270/10, 28   August 2012). 6.     Rome Court Order of 15 January 2014 50.     In this Order the court raised the question of the constitutionality of sections 1(1) and (2) and 4(1) of Law no.   40/2004, which prohibit couples who are neither sterile nor infertile from using assisted reproduction techniques with a view to obtaining a pre-implantation diagnosis. The court also considered the matter from the standpoint of Articles 8 and 14 of the Convention. 51.     While having regard to the judgment in Costa and Pavan (cited above), it found that the Law should not be interpreted extensively, since it did expressly provide that access to assisted reproduction techniques was reserved to sterile or infertile couples. I.     Question of the constitutionality of section 13 of Law no. 40/2004 raised by the Florence Court 52.     In a decision of 7 December 2012, the Florence Court raised the question of the constitutionality of the ban under section 13 of Law no.   40/2004 on donating surplus embryos to scientific research with regard to Articles 9 and 32 of the Constitution, which guarantee freedom of scientific research and the right to health respectively. 53.     On 19 March 2014 the President of the Constitutional Court adjourned its examination of the case pending the decision of the Grand Chamber in the present application, Parrillo v. Italy (no.   46470/11). III.     COUNCIL OF EUROPE DOCUMENTS A.     Recommendation 1046 (1986) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the use of human embryos and foetuses for diagnostic, therapeutic, scientific, industrial and commercial purposes “... 6.     Aware that the progress [of medical science and technology] has made the legal position of the embryo and foetus particularly precarious, and that their legal status is at present not defined by law; 7.     Aware that adequate provisions governing the use of living or dead embryos and foetuses do not at present exist; 8.     Convinced that, in view of scientific progress which makes it possible to intervene in developing human life from the moment of fertilisation, it is urgent to define the extent of its legal protection; 9.     Having regard to the variety of ethical opinions on the question of using the embryo or the foetus or their tissues, and to the conflicts between values which arise; 10.     Considering that human embryos and foetuses must be treated in all circumstances with the respect due to human dignity, and that use of materials and tissues therefrom must be strictly limited and regulated ... to purposes which are clearly therapeutic and for which no other means exist; ... 13.     Stressing the need for European co-operation, 14.     [The Parliamentary Assembly r]ecommends that the Committee of Ministers: a.     call on the governments of the member states: ... 14.1.2.     to limit the use of human embryos and foetuses and materials and tissues therefrom in an industrial context to purposes which are strictly therapeutic and for which no other means exist, according to the principles set out in the appendix, and to bring their legislation into line with these principles or to enact rules in accordance therewith which should inter alia specify the conditions in which removal and use may be undertaken for a diagnostic or therapeutic purpose; 14.1.3.     to forbid any creation of human embryos by fertilisation in vitro for the purposes of research during their life or after death; 14.1.4.     to forbid anything that could be considered as undesirable use or deviations of these techniques, including: ... research on viable human embryos; experimentation on living human embryos, whether viable or not; ...” B.     Recommendation 1100 (1989) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on the use of human embryos and foetuses in scientific research “... 7.     Considering that the human embryo, though displaying successive phases in its development ... displays also a progressive differentiation as an organism and none the less maintains a continuous biological and genetic identity; 8.     Recalling the need for European co-operation and for the widest possible regulation in order to overcome the contradictions, risks and foreseeable shortcomings of exclusively national standards in these fields, ...” 54.     The relevant passages of the Appendix to that Recommendation read as follows. “B.     On live pre-implantation embryos: 4.     In accordance with Recommendations 934 (1982) and 1046 (1986), investigations of viable embryos in vitro shall only be permitted: for applied purposes of a diagnostic nature or for preventive or therapeutic purposes ; if their non-pathological genetic heritage is not interfered with . 5.     ... research on living embryos must be prohibited, particularly: if the embryo is viable ; if it is possible to use an animal model ; if not foreseen within the framework of projects duly presented to and authorised by the appropriate public health or scientific authority or, by delegation, to and by the relevant national multidisciplinary committee ; if not within the time-limits laid down by the authorities mentioned above . ... H.     Donation of human embryological material 20.     The donation of human embryological material shall be authorised solely for scientific research on diagnostic, prevention or therapeutic purposes. Its sale shall be prohibited. 21.     The intentional creation and/or keeping alive of embryos or foetuses whether in vitro or in utero for any scientific research purpose, for instance to obtain genetic material, cells, tissues or organs therefrom, shall be prohibited. 22.     The donation and use of human embryological material shall be conditional on the freely given written consent of the donor parents. 23.     The donation of organs shall be devoid of any commercial aspect. The purchase or sale of embryos or foetuses or parts thereof by their donor parents or other parties, and their importation or exportation, shall also be prohibited. 24.     The donation and use of human embryological material for the manufacture of dangerous and exterminatory biological weapons shall be forbidden. 25.     For the whole of this recommendation, ‘viable’ embryos shall be understood to mean embryos which are free of biological characteristics likely to prevent their development; however, the non-viability of human embryos and foetuses shall be determined solely by objective biological criteria based on the embryo’s intrinsic defects.” C.     Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (Oviedo Convention) of 4 April 1997 Article 2 – Primacy of the human being “The interests and welfare of the human being shall prevail over the sole interest of society or science.” Article 18 – Research on embryos in vitro “1.     Where the law allows research on embryos in vitro , it shall ensure adequate protection of the embryo. 2.     The creation of human embryos for research purposes is prohibited.” Article 27 – Wider protection “None of the provisions of this Convention shall be interpreted as limiting or otherwise affecting the possibility for a Party to grant a wider measure of protection with regard to the application of biology and medicine than is stipulated in this Convention.” D.     Additional Protocol to the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine concerning Biomedical Research, of 25 January 2005 Article 2 – Scope “1.     This Protocol covers the full range of research activities in the health field involving interventions on human beings. 2.     This Protocol does not apply to research on embryos in vitro . It does apply to research on foetuses and embryos in vivo . ...” E.     Report by the Working Party on the Protection of the Human Embryo and Fetus of the Steering Committee on Bioethics, published on 19   June 2003 – Conclusion “This report aimed at giving an overview of current positions found in Europe regarding the protection of the human embryo in vitro and the arguments supporting them. It shows a broad consensus on the need for the protection of the embryo in vitro . However, the definition of the status of the embryo remains an area where fundamental differences are encountered, based on strong arguments. These differences largely form the basis of most divergences around the other issues related to the protection of the embryo in vitro . Nevertheless, even if agreement cannot be reached on the status of the embryo, the possibility of re-examining certain issues in the light of the latest developments in the biomedical field and related potential therapeutic advances could be considered. In this context, while acknowledging and respecting the fundamental choices made by the different countries, it seems possible and desirable with regard to the need to protect the embryo in vitro on which all countries have agreed that common approaches be identified to ensure proper conditions for the application of procedures involving the creation and use of embryos in vitro . The purpose of this report is to aid reflection towards that objective.” F.     Resolution 1352 (2003) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on human stem cell research “... 3.     Human stem cells may be derived from a growing number of tissues and fluids from humans of any age and are not limited to embryonic sources. ... 5.     The harvesting of embryonic stem cells for the time being necessitates the destruction of human embryos. ... 7.     The Assembly points out that a number of embryonic human stem cell lines suitable for scientific research are already available worldwide. ... 10.     The destruction of human beings for research purposes is against the right to life of all humans and against the moral ban on any instrumentalisation of humans. 11.     Therefore the Assembly calls on member states: 11.1.     to promote stem cell research as long as it respects the life of human beings in all states of their development; 11.2.     to encourage scientific techniques that are not socially and ethically divisive in order to advance the use of