CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 1 septembre 2015

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ITALY   (Application no. 16483/12)               JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   1 September 2015     THIS CASE WAS REFERRED TO THE GRAND CHAMBER WHICH DELIVERED JUDGMENT IN THE CASE ON 15/12/2016         This judgment may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Işıl Karakaş, President,   Guido Raimondi,   András Sajó,   Nebojša Vučinić,   Helen Keller,   Paul Lemmens,   Robert Spano, Judges, and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 16 June 2015, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 16483/12) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Tunisian nationals, Mr Saber Ben Mohamed Ben Ali Khlaifia, Mr Fakhreddine Ben Brahim Ben Mustapha Tabal and Mr   Mohamed Ben Habib Ben Jaber Sfar (“the applicants”), on 9 March 2012. 2.     The applicants were represented by Mr L. Masera and Mr S.   Zirulia, lawyers practising in Milan. The Italian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms E. Spatafora. 3.     The applicants alleged that their placement in a reception centre for illegal entrants had been in breach of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention. They also argued that they had been subjected to a collective expulsion and that, under Italian law, they had had no effective remedy by which to complain of the violation of their fundamental rights. 4.     On 27 November 2012 notice of the application was given to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicants were born in 1983, 1987 and 1988 respectively. Mr   Khlaifia (the “first applicant”) lives in Om Laarass (Tunisia); Mr   Tabal and Mr Sfar (the “second applicant” and the “third applicant”) live in El   Mahdia (Tunisia). A.     The applicants’ arrival on the Italian coast and their removal to Tunisia 6 .     On 16 and 17 September 2011 the applicants – the first, then the second and third, respectively – left Tunisia with others on board rudimentary vessels heading for the Italian coast. After several hours at sea, their vessels were intercepted by the Italian coastguard, which escorted them to a port on the island of Lampedusa. The applicants arrived on the island on 17 and 18   September 2011 respectively. 7 .     The applicants were transferred to an Early Reception and Aid Centre ( Centro di Soccorso e Prima Accoglienza – “CSPA”) at Contrada Imbriacola where, after giving them first aid, the authorities proceeded with their identification. 8 .     They were accommodated in a part of the centre reserved for adult Tunisians. According to the applicants, they were held in an overcrowded and dirty area and were obliged to sleep on the floor because of the shortage of available beds and the poor quality of the mattresses. Meals were eaten outside, sitting on the ground. The centre was kept permanently under police surveillance, making any contact with the outside world impossible. 9 .     The applicants remained in that centre until 20   September, when a violent revolt broke out among the migrants. The premises were gutted by fire and the applicants were taken to a sports complex on Lampedusa for the night. At dawn on 21   September they managed, together with other migrants, to evade the police surveillance and walk to the village of Lampedusa. From there, with about 1,800 other migrants, they started a demonstration through the streets of the island. After being stopped by the police, the applicants were taken first back to the reception centre and then to Lampedusa airport. 10 .     On the morning of 22 September 2011 the applicants were flown to Palermo. After disembarking they were transferred to ships that were moored in the harbour there. The first applicant was placed on the Vincent , with some 190 individuals, while the second and third applicants were on board the Audace , holding about 150. 11 .     The applicants described the conditions as follows. All the migrants on each vessel were confined to the restaurant areas, access to the cabins being prohibited. They slept on the floor and had to wait several hours to use the toilets. They could only go outside onto the balconies twice a day for a few minutes at a time. They were allegedly insulted and ill-treated by the police who kept them under permanent surveillance and they claimed not to have received any information from the authorities. 12 .     The applicants remained on the ships until 27 and 29 September, respectively, when they were taken to Palermo airport pending removal. 13.     Before being put on the aircraft, the migrants were received by the Tunisian Consul. According to the applicants, the Consul merely recorded their identities in accordance with agreements between Italy and Tunisia of April 2011 (see paragraphs 28-30 below). 14 .     On their application form the applicants claimed that at no time during their stay in Italy had they been issued with any document. Annexed to their observations, the Government, however, produced three refusal-of-entry orders dated 27 and 29 September 2011 that had been issued against the applicants. Those orders, which were basically identical and drafted in Italian with a translation into Arabic, read as follows: “The Commissioner of Police ( Questore ) for the Province of Agrigento Having regard to the documents in the file, showing that (1)     on 17 [18] September 2011 members of the police force found in the province of Agrigento, near the border of island of Lampedusa, Mr [surname and forename] born ... on [date] ... Tunisian national ... not fully identified, being undocumented ( sedicente ); (2)     the alien entered the territory of the country by evading the border controls; (3)     the identification ( rintraccio ) of the alien took place on/immediately after his/her arrival on national territory, and precisely at: island of Lampedusa; WHEREAS none of the cases [indicated in] Article 10 § 4 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998 is at issue; CONSIDERING that it is appropriate to proceed in accordance with Article 10 § 2 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998; ORDERS that the above-mentioned person be REFUSED LEAVE TO ENTER AND RETURNED INFORMS [AS FOLLOWS] - An appeal may be lodged against the present order within a period of sixty days from the date of its service, with the Justice of the Peace of Agrigento. - The lodging of an appeal does not suspend the enforcement ( efficacia ) of the present order. - The director of the Migration Office will proceed, for the enforcement of the present order, with its service, together with a summary translation into a language spoken by the alien or into English, French or Spanish; and with its transmission to the diplomatic or consular delegation of the State of origin, as provided for by Article 2 § 7 of Legislative Decree no. 286 of 1998; and with its registration under Article 10 § 6 of the said Legislative Decree. To be escorted to the border at: Rome Fiumicino [Issued at] Agrigento [on] 27[29]/09/2011 on behalf of the Commissioner of Police   [Signature]” 15 .     These orders were accompanied by a record of service, each with the same date, also drafted in Italian with an Arabic translation. In the space reserved for the applicants’ signatures, both documents contain the handwritten indication “[the person] refused to sign or to receive a copy” ( si rifiuta di firmare e ricevere copia ). 16.     On their arrival at Tunis airport, the applicants were released. B.     Decision of the Palermo preliminary investigations judge 17.     Anti-racism associations filed a complaint about the treatment to which the migrants had been subjected, after 20   September 2011, on board the ships Audace , Vincent and Fantasy . 18.     Criminal proceedings for abuse of power and unlawful arrest (Articles 323 and 606 of the Criminal Code) were opened against a person or persons unknown. On 3 April 2012 the public prosecutor sought to have the charges dropped. 19 .     In a decision of 1 June 2012 the preliminary investigations judge ( giudice per le indagini preliminari ) of Palermo granted the public prosecutor’s request. 20 .     In his reasoning the judge emphasised that the purpose of placing the migrants in the CSPA was to accommodate them and to cater for their hygiene-related needs for as long as was strictly necessary, before sending them to an Identification and Removal Centre ( Centri di Identificazione ed Espulsione – “CIE”) or taking any measures in their favour. At the CSPA the migrants could obtain legal assistance and information about asylum application procedures. The judge shared the public prosecutor’s view that the interpretation of the conditions concerning the grounds for and duration of the confinement of migrants in a CSPA was sometimes vague. He found, however, that a range of factors were to be taken into consideration, leading to the conclusion that the facts of the case could not be characterised as a criminal offence (“ una tendenziale forzatura dei requisiti della ‘strumentalità’ e della ‘ristrettezza temporale’ è spesso causata da una molteplicità di fattori che escludono con sicurezza la possibilità di configurare, in tali fattispecie, illeciti di rilievo penale ”). He noted that the Office of the Commissioner of Police ( Questura ) of Agrigento had merely registered the presence of the migrants at the CSPA without taking any decisions ordering their placement. 21 .     According to the judge, the precarious balance on the island of Lampedusa had been upset on 20   September 2011, when a group of Tunisians had carried out an arson attack, seriously damaging the CSPA of Contrada Imbriacola and rendering it incapable of fulfilling its purpose of accommodating and assisting migrants. The authorities had then organised transfer by air and sea to evacuate migrants from Lampedusa. The following day, clashes had taken place in the island’s port between the local population and a group of foreigners who had threatened to explode gas bottles. There had thus been a situation which was likely to degenerate, and which was covered by the notion of “state of necessity” ( stato di necessità ) as provided for in Article 54 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 32 below). It was thus an imperative, according to the judge, to organise the transfer of some of the migrants by using, among other means, the ships. As to the fact that, in the emergency situation, no formal decision had been taken to place the migrants on board the ships, the judge found that this could not be regarded as an unlawful arrest and that the conditions for the migrants’ transfer to CIEs were not satisfied. Firstly, the CIEs were overcrowded; secondly, the agreements with the Tunisian authorities suggested that their return was supposed to be prompt. The fact that a refusal-of-entry measure ( respingimento ) had been taken against the migrants, without judicial scrutiny, a few days after their arrival, was not unlawful in the judge’s view. The calculation of a “reasonable time” for the adoption of that measure and for the migrants’ stay in the CSPA had to take account of logistical difficulties (state of the sea, distance between Lampedusa and Sicily) and of the number of migrants concerned. In those circumstances, the judge concluded, there had been no breach of the law. Moreover, the judge was of the view that no malicious intent could be attributed to the authorities, whose conduct had been prompted first and foremost by the public interest. The migrants had not sustained any unfair harm ( danno ingiusto ). 22 .     In so far as the complainants had alleged that the way in which the migrants had been treated had been detrimental to their health, the judge noted that the investigations had found that nobody on the ships had applied for asylum. Those who, at the Lampedusa CSPA, had expressed an intention to do so, together with any vulnerable individuals, had been transferred to the centres of Trapani, Caltanissetta and Foggia. Unaccompanied minors had been placed in temporary accommodation and no pregnant women were transferred to the ships. The migrants on board had been able to receive medical assistance, hot water, electricity, meals and hot drinks. Moreover, as recorded in a press agency note of 25   September 2011, a member of parliament had boarded one of the ships in the port of Palermo, and had observed that the migrants were in good health, that they were receiving assistance and were sleeping in cabins containing bed linen or reclinable chairs ( poltrone reclinabili ). Some of the Tunisians had been taken to hospital, others had been treated on board by medical staff. Accompanied by the Deputy Commissioner of Police ( vice questore ) and by police officers, the MP in question had talked with some of the migrants. He had thus been able to observe that they had access to prayer rooms, that the food was satisfactory (pasta, chicken, vegetables, fruits and water) and that the Civil Protection authority ( Protezione civile ) had provided them with clothing. Some of the migrants had complained of a lack of razors, but the MP had observed that this could be explained by a measure taken to prevent self-harm. 23 .     The judge noted that, even though the migrants had not been in custody or under arrest, a photograph published in a newspaper had shown one of them with his hands bound by black ribbons and in the company of a police officer. He had been part of a small group of individuals who, fearing immediate removal, had engaged in acts of self-harm and had caused damage to buses. In the judge’s view, the restraint in question had been necessary to guarantee the physical well-being of the persons concerned and to avoid aggressive acts against police officers who were neither armed nor equipped with any means of coercion. In any event, the conduct of the police officers had been justified by a “state of necessity”, within the meaning of Article 54 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 32 above). 24 .     In the light of the foregoing, the preliminary investigations judge took the view that the file contained no evidence of the physical and mental elements of the offences provided for in Articles 323 and 606 of the Criminal Code. C.     Decisions of the Agrigento Justice of the Peace 25.     Two of the migrants against whom a refusal-of-entry order had been issued challenged those orders before the Justice of the Peace for Agrigento. 26 .     In two decisions ( decreti ) of 4 July and 30 October 2011, respectively, the Justice of the Peace annulled those orders. In his reasoning the Justice of the Peace observed that the complainants had been found on Italian soil on 6   May and 18   September 2011, respectively, and that the orders at issue had been adopted only on 16 May and 24   September 2011. Admittedly, Article 10 of Legislative Decree no.   286 of 1998 (paragraph 27 below) did not indicate any time-frame for the adoption of such orders. Nevertheless, in his view, a measure which by its very nature restricted the freedom of the person concerned had to be taken within a reasonably short time after the identification ( fermo ) of the unlawful migrant. To find otherwise, concluded the judge, amounted to allowing de facto detention of the migrant in the absence of any reasoned decision of the authority, which would contravene the Constitution. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND INSTRUMENTS A.     Legislation on the removal of unlawful migrants 27 .     Legislative Decree ( decreto legislativo ) no. 286 of 1998 (“Consolidated text of provisions concerning immigration regulations and rules on the status of aliens”), as amended by Laws no. 271 of 2004 and no.   155 of 2005, and by Legislative Decree no. 150 of 2011, provided in particular as follows: Article 10 (refusal of entry) “1.     The border police refuses entry ( respinge ) to aliens who seek to cross the border without meeting the conditions laid down in the present consolidated text governing entry into the territory of the State. 2.     Refusal of entry combined with removal shall, moreover, be ordered by the Commissioner of Police ( questore ) in respect of aliens: (a) who have entered the territory of the State by evading border controls, when they are arrested on entry or immediately afterwards; (b) or who have been granted temporary leave to remain for purposes of public assistance. ... 4.     The provisions of paragraphs 1 [and] 2 ... do not apply to the cases provided for in the applicable provisions governing political asylum, the grant of refugee status or the adoption of temporary protection measures on humanitarian grounds. ...” Article 13 (administrative deportation and removal) “1.     For reasons of public order or national security the Minister of the Interior may order the deportation of an alien, even if he or she [does not reside] in the territory of the State, giving prior notice thereof to the Chair of the Council of Ministers and the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 2.     The prefect shall give directions for removal where the alien: (a) has entered the territory of the State by evading border controls and has not already been refused entry under Article 10 hereof; ... 8.     An appeal may be lodged against a deportation or removal order with the judicial authority ...” Article 14 (execution of removal measures) “1.     Where, in view of the need to provide assistance to an alien, to conduct additional checks of his or her identity or nationality, or to obtain travel documents, or on account of the lack of availability of a carrier, it is not possible to ensure the prompt execution of the removal measure by escorting the person to the border or by refusing entry, the Commissioner of Police ( questore ) shall order that the alien be held for as long as is strictly necessary at the nearest Identification and Removal Centre [CIE], among those designated or created by order of the Minister of the Interior in collaboration ( di concerto ) with the Minister for Social Solidarity and the Treasury, the Minister for the Budget, and the Minister for Economic Planning. ...” B.     Bilateral agreement with Tunisia 28 .     On 5 April 2011 the Italian Government concluded an agreement with Tunisia on measures to control the flow of unlawful migrants from that country. 29 .     The text of the agreement has not been made public. According to a press release on the website of the Italian Ministry of the Interior dated 6 April 2011, Tunisia undertook to strengthen its border controls with the aim of avoiding fresh departures of clandestine migrants, using logistical resources made available to it by the Italian authorities. 30 .     In addition, Tunisia undertook to accept the immediate return of Tunisians who had unlawfully reached the Italian shore after the date of the agreement. Tunisian nationals could be returned by means of simplified procedures, involving the mere identification of the person concerned by the Tunisian consular authorities. C.     Italian Senate 31 .     On 6 March 2012 the Italian Senate’s Special Commission for Human Rights (the “Senate’s Special Commission”) approved a report “on the state of [respect for] human rights in prisons and reception and detention centres in Italy”. Visited by the Commission on 11 February 2009, the Lampedusa CSPA is described particularly in the following passages: “The reception at the Lampedusa centre should have been limited to the time strictly necessary to establish the migrant’s identity and the lawfulness of his presence in Italy or to decide on his removal. In reality, as already denounced by the UNHCR and a number of organisations operating on the spot, the duration of such stays has sometimes extended to over twenty days without there being any formal decision as to the legal status of the person being held. Such prolonged confinement, combined with an inability to communicate with the outside world, and the lack of freedom of movement, without any legal or administrative measure providing for such restrictions, has led to heightened tension, often manifested in acts of self-harm. Numerous appeals by organisations working on the island have been made concerning the lawfulness of the situation there.” “The rooms measure about 5 x 6 metres: they are supposed to accommodate 12 persons. In them can be found, next to each other, bunk beds with four levels, occupied by up to 25 men per room ... In many of the blocks, foam-rubber mattresses are placed along the corridor. In many cases the foam-rubber from the mattresses has been torn away to be used as a cushion. In some cases, double mattresses, protected by improvised covers, have been placed on the landings, outside ... On the ceiling, in many rooms, the plastic shade around the light has been removed and the bulb has disappeared. At the end of the corridor, on one side, there are toilets and showers. There is no door and privacy is ensured by cloth or plastic curtains placed in an improvised and haphazard manner. There are no taps and water flows from the pipes only when centrally activated. The pipes sometimes get blocked; on the floor, water or other liquids run as far as the corridor and into the rooms where the foam-rubber mattresses lie. The smell from the toilets pervades the whole area. When it starts to rain, those on the metal staircases, who have to go up to the floor above, get wet and take dampness and dirt into the living quarters.” D.     Criminal Code 32 .     Article 54 § 1 of the Criminal Code reads, in its relevant part, as follows: “Acts committed under the constraint of having to save [the perpetrator or a third party] from an instant danger of serious bodily harm shall not be liable to punishment, provided that such danger has not been voluntarily caused [by the perpetrator] and cannot otherwise be avoided, and provided that the said act is proportionate to the danger.   ...” III.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL LAW MATERIAL 33.     The facts of the case are connected with the large-scale arrival of unlawful migrants on the Italian coast in 2011 following, in particular, the uprisings in Tunisia and the conflict in Libya. A.     Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly 34 .     In that context the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) set up an “Ad Hoc Sub-Committee on the large-scale arrival of irregular migrants, asylum-seekers and refugees on Europe’s southern shores” (the “PACE Ad Hoc Sub-Committee”), which carried out a fact-finding visit to Lampedusa on 23 and 24   May 2011. A visit report was published on 30 September 2011. Its relevant passages read as follows: “... II. History of Lampedusa as a destination for mixed migration flows ... 9. Because of its geographical location close to the African coast, Lampedusa has experienced several episodes in which it has had to cope with a large influx by sea of people wanting to go to Europe (31 252 in 2008; 11 749 in 2007; 18 047 in 2006; 15 527 in 2005). 10. The numbers arriving fell sharply in 2009 and 2010 (2 947 and 459, respectively) following an agreement between Italy and Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya. This agreement drew strong criticism because of the human rights violations in Libya and the appalling living conditions of migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers in the country. It also drew criticism, subsequently validated by UNHCR, that it risked denying asylum seekers and refugees access to international protection. It did however prove extremely effective in halting the influx and as a result, the island’s reception centres were then closed and the international organisations active in Lampedusa withdrew their field presence. 11. In 2011, following the uprisings in Tunisia and then in Libya, the island was confronted with a fresh wave of arrivals by boat. Arrivals resumed in two stages. The first to arrive on the island were Tunisians, followed by boats from Libya, among which many women and young children. The influx began on 29 January 2011 and the population of the island was quickly multiplied by two. 12. Following these arrivals, Italy declared a humanitarian emergency in Lampedusa and called for solidarity from the European Union member states. The Prefect of Palermo was given emergency powers to manage the situation. 13. As of 21 September 2011, 55 298 people had arrived by sea in Lampedusa (27 315 from Tunisia and 27 983 from Libya, mainly nationals of Niger, Ghana, Mali and the Côte d’Ivoire. ... V. The players on the ground and their responsibilities 26. The Prefecture of the province of Agrigento is responsible for all questions relating to the reception of persons arriving on the island until they are transferred elsewhere. The prefecture also oversees the Accoglienza private co-operative which manages the island’s two reception centres. The immigration police office of the province of Agrigento is responsible for identifying new arrivals, transferring them and repatriating them if necessary. Since 13 April 2011, the Italian civil protection department has been co-ordinating the management of migration flows from North Africa. 27. The international community is also active on the ground. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Red Cross, the Order of Malta and the NGO Save the Children have teams on the spot. 28. UNHCR, the IOM, the Red Cross and Save the Children are part of the ‘Praesidium Project’ and are helping to manage the arrivals of mixed migration flows by sea on Lampedusa. These organisations are authorised to maintain a permanent presence inside the Lampedusa reception centres and have interpreters and cultural mediators available. They dispatched teams to Lampedusa straight away in February 2011 (as noted earlier, their operation had been suspended when the arrivals decreased). The Praesidium Project, which has since been extended to other centres in Italy, stands as an example of good practice in Europe and the organisations involved have jointly published a handbook on management of mixed migration flows arriving by sea (for the time being in Italian only, but soon to be translated into English). 29. The members of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee found that all these players are working on good terms and are endeavouring to co-ordinate their efforts, with the shared priority of saving lives in sea rescue operations, doing everything possible to receive new arrivals in decent conditions and then assisting in rapidly transferring them to centres elsewhere in Italy. VI. Lampedusa’s reception facilities 30. It is essential for transfers to centres elsewhere in Italy to be effected as quickly as possible because the island’s reception facilities are both insufficient to house the number of people arriving and unsuitable for stays of several days. 31. Lampedusa has two reception centres: the main centre at Contrada Imbriacola and the Loran base. 32. The main centre is an initial reception and accommodation centre (CSPA). The Ad Hoc Sub-Committee was informed by the director of the centre that its capacity varies from 400 to 1000 places. At the time of the visit, 804 people were housed there. Reception conditions were decent although very basic. The rooms were full of mattresses placed side by side directly on the ground. The buildings, which are prefabricated units, are well ventilated because the rooms have windows and the sanitary facilities seem sufficient when the centre is operating at its normal capacity. 33. At the time of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee’s visit, the centre was divided in two. One part was reserved for persons arriving from Libya and unaccompanied minors (including unaccompanied Tunisian minors). The other part, a closed centre within the centre (itself closed), was reserved for Tunisian adults. ... VIII. Health checks 41. The many health teams of the various organisations present (Red Cross, MSF, Order of Malta) and the numerous regional teams are co-ordinate by the Head of the Palermo Health Unit. 42. As soon as coastguards become aware of a boat arriving, they advise the medical co-ordinator and inform him of the number of people on board. All the persons concerned are then immediately informed and put on alert whatever the time of day or night. 43. Initial checks on the state of health of persons arriving are carried out in the port, as soon as they have disembarked. Prior to that, Order of Malta members/doctors accompany the coastguard or customs services on interception and rescue operations at sea. They inform the medical teams on hand at the port of any cases possibly requiring specific and immediate medical treatment. 44. On reaching the port, the new arrivals are quickly classified according to their needs using a clear colour-coding system. People requiring hospital treatment are transferred by helicopter to Palermo or elsewhere. The hospitals are obliged to accept these patients, even if their capacity is exceeded. 45. Sometimes there is not enough time to carry out initial checks on all those arriving at the port, and checks therefore have to be continued at the reception centres. Emphasis has been placed on the need also to achieve maximum standardisation of the procedures used at the centres. 46. The most common problems are: sea sickness, disorders of the upper respiratory tract, burns (fuel, sea water, sun or a combination of the three), dehydration, generalised pain (due to posture in the boat), psychological disorders or acute stress (because of the high risk of losing one’s life during the crossing). Some people arriving from Libya were suffering from acute stress even before starting the crossing. New arrivals are extremely vulnerable people who may have suffered physical and/or psychological violence and their trauma is sometimes due to the way they have been treated in Libya. There are also many pregnant women who require closer examination. Some cases of tuberculosis have been detected. The persons concerned are immediately placed in quarantine in a hospital. 47. Only a general evaluation is made of the state of health of new arrivals in Lampedusa. An individual assessment is not possible on the island and is carried out elsewhere after transfer. Anyone wishing to be examined can be, and no request to this effect is refused. A regular inspection of the sanitary facilities and food at the centres is carried out by the Head of the Palermo Health Unit. 48. MSF and the Red Cross voiced concerns regarding health conditions in the centres when they are overcrowded. It was also pointed out that the Tunisians were separated from the other new arrivals by a closed barrier and did not have direct access to the reception centre’s medical teams. IX. Information about asylum procedures 49. The UNHCR team provides new arrivals with basic information about existing asylum procedures, but it was stressed that Lampedusa was not the place to provide potential refugees and asylum seekers with exhaustive information on this subject. Relevant information and help with asylum application procedures are provided once the new arrivals have been transferred to other, less provisional reception centres elsewhere in Italy. If people express the wish to seek asylum, UNHCR passes on the information to the Italian police. 50. However, when large numbers of people arrive at the same time (which is increasingly the case) and transfers are carried out very quickly, the new arrivals are sometimes not informed about their right to request asylum. They receive this information at the centre to which they are transferred. This shortcoming in the provision of information about access to international protection may present a problem insofar as people of some nationalities are liable to be sent straight back to their countries of origin. As a rule, however, new arrivals are not in a position to be provided immediately with detailed information about access to the asylum procedure. They have other priorities: they are exhausted and disoriented and want to wash, eat and sleep. X. Tunisians 51. In the recent spate of arrivals, they were the first to arrive in Lampedusa in February 2011. These arrivals were problematical for several reasons. As stated above, this was because arrivals by sea had decreased significantly in 2009 and 2010, and the island’s reception centres had been closed. Tunisian migrants therefore found themselves on the streets, in appalling conditions. When the centres re-opened, they were immediately saturated. The Tunisians were subsequently transferred to holding centres elsewhere in Italy, then, once these were saturated, to open reception centres designed for asylum-seekers. 52. The fact that the vast majority of Tunisians are economic migrants and the difficulty of organising immediate returns to Tunisia, prompted the Italian authorities to issue a decree on 5 April 2011 granting them temporary residence permits valid for 6 months. Although 25 000 Tunisians had already arrived in Italy on that date, only 12   000 took advantage of this measure (the other 13 000 having already disappeared from the centres). The consequences of this measure are well-known: tensions with France and a serious re-assessment of freedom of movement in the Schengen area. 53. On 5 April 2011, Italy signed an agreement with Tunisia providing for a certain number of daily returns of Tunisian migrants arriving in Italy after that date. The text of the agreement has never been made public, but quotas of between 30 and 60 returns per day have been mentioned. At the time of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee’s visit, returns to Tunisia were suspended. 54. As a result of this suspension of returns, some 190 Tunisians were being held on the island at the time of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee’s visit. Some of them had been there for more than 20 days, in a closed centre inside the closed Contrada Imbriacola centre. Despite the authorities’ claim that the Tunisians were not detainees because they were not in cells, the members of the Sub-Committee found that the conditions to which they were subjected were similar to detention and deprivation of freedom. 55. While the members of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee appreciate the Italian authorities’ concern to contain this wave of irregular immigration from Tunisia, some rules have to be observed where detention is concerned. The Contrada Imbriacola centre is not a suitable holding facility for irregular migrants. In practice, they are imprisoned there without access to a judge. As already pointed out by the Parliamentary Assembly in its Resolution 1707 (2010), ‘ detention shall be carried out by a procedure prescribed by law, authorised by a judicial authority and subject to periodic judicial review ’. These criteria are not met in Lampedusa and the Italian authorities should transfer irregular migrants immediately to appropriate holding facilities, with the necessary legal safeguards, elsewhere in Italy. 56. Another key point made in this resolution is access to information. All detainees must be informed promptly, in a language that they can understand, ‘ of the essential legal and factual grounds for detention, their rights and the rules and complaints procedure in detention ’. While it is true that the Tunisians interviewed by the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee were perfectly aware that they had entered Italian territory illegally (in fact, it was not the first attempt for some of them and a number had already been sent back to Tunisia on previous occasions), the same is not true of information about their rights and procedures. The Italian authorities themselves were unable to tell the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee when returns to Tunisia would resume. As well as being a significant stress factor, this uncertainty highlights the inappropriateness of holding Tunisians on Lampedusa for long periods without access to a judge. 57. As mentioned earlier, on 20 September a fire severely damaged the main reception centre. It is reported that Tunisian migrants carried out the arson in protest to their detention conditions and their forthcoming forced return to Tunisia. It should be noted that on 20 September, more than 1 000 Tunisians were kept in detention on the island, 5 times more than at the time of the visit of the ad-hoc Sub-Committee. 58. With less than 200 Tunisians on the island, the ad hoc Sub-Committee was already not allowed to visit the closed part of the reception centre in which the Tunisians were kept. The authorities informed the members of the ad hoc Sub-Committee that for security reasons such a visit was not possible. They reported tensions inside this part of the Centre, as well as attempt of self harm by some of the Tunisians. 59. Considering that the authorities were already worried by a tense situation with less than 200 Tunisians in the Centre, the question occurs as to why more than 1 000 were kept in this very Centre on 20 September. As a matter of fact, this centre is neither designed nor legally designated as a detention centre for irregular migrants. ... XIV. A disproportionate burden for the island of Lampedusa 77. The inadequate and belated management of the crisis early 2011 as well as the recent events will unquestionably have irreparable consequences for the inhabitants of Lampedusa. The 2011 tourist season will be a disaster. Whereas 2010 had seen a 25% increase in the number of visitors, from February 2011 onwards all advance bookings were cancelled. At the end of May 2011, none of the island’s hotels had a single booking. Tourism industry professionals conveyed their feeling of helplessness to the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee. They had incurred expenditure on renovating or improving tourist facilities using the money paid for advance bookings. They had had to repay these sums when the bookings were cancelled and now find themselves in a precarious position, in debt and with no prospect of little money coming in for the 2011 season. 78. The members of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee also saw the work involved in cleaning and in removal of the boats (or what remains of them, which is clogging up the harbour) and the potential danger that these boats or wrecks pose to water quality around the island, which has to meet strict environmental standards. These operations are also very costly (half a million euros for the 42 boats still afloat at the time of the visit, not to mention the 270 wrecks littering the island). Steps have been taken by the civil protection department to ensure that the boats are dismantled and any liquid pollutants are pumped out. 79. The dilapidated state of these boats reflects the degree of despair felt by people who are prepared to risk their lives crossing the Mediterranean on such vessels. The coastguards told the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee that only 10% of the boats arriving were in a good state of repair. 80. During the delegation’s visit, representatives of the island’s inhabitants (in particular people representing the hotel and restaurant trade) and the Mayor of Lampedusa put forward their ideas for remedying this disaster for the local economy. At no time did they say that they no longer intended to take in people arriving by boat - on the contrary. They did however ask for fair compensation for the losses entailed by their island’s role as a sanctuary. 81. They therefore drew up a document containing several proposals, which they forwarded to the delegation. The key proposal is for the island to be recognised as a free zone. The delegation took due note of this proposal and of that concerning a one-year extension of the deadline for the inhabitants’ tax payments. While recognising that these matters fall outside its mandate, the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee calls on the relevant Italian authorities to consider these requests in view of the heavy burden borne by the island and its inhabitants in the face of the influx of irregular migrants, refugees and asylum-seekers arriving by sea. XV. Conclusions and recommendations ... 92. On the basis of its observations, the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee calls on the Italian authorities: i. to continue to comply immediately and without exception with their obligation to rescue persons in distress at sea and to guarantee international protection, including the right of asylum and nonrefoulement; ii. to introduce flexible measures for increasing reception capacities on Lampedusa; iii. to improve conditions at the existing centres, and in particular the Loran base, while ensuring as a matter of priority that health and safety conditions meet existing standards – even when the centres are overcrowded – and carrying out strict and frequent checks to ensure that the private company responsible for running the centres is complying with its obligations; iv. to ensure that new arrivals are able to contact their families as quickly as possible, even during their stay on Lampedusa, particularly at the Loran base, where there are problems in this regard; v. to provide appropriate reception facilities for unaccompanied minors, ensuring that they are not detained and are kept separate from adults; vi. to clarify the legal basis for the de facto detention in the reception centres in Lampedusa; vii. where Tunisians in particular are concerned, only to keep irregular migrants in administrative detention under a procedure prescribed by law, authorised by a judicial authority and subject to periodic judicial review; viii. to continue to guarantee the rapid transfer of new arrivals to reception centres elsewhere in Italy, even if their number were to increase; ix. to consider the requests by the population of Lampedusa for support commensurate with the burden it has to bear, particularly in economic terms; x. not to conclude bilateral agreements with the authorities of countries which are not safe and where the fundamental rights of the persons intercepted are not properly guaranteed, as in Libya.” B.     Amnesty International 35 .     On 21 April 2011 Amnesty International published a report with the title “Amnesty International findings and recommendations to the Italian authorities following the research visit to Lampedusa and Mineo”. The relevant passages of the report read as follows: “ A humanitarian crisis of the Italian authorities’ own making ... Since January 2011, there has been an increasing number of arrivals on Lampedusa from North Africa. As of 19 April, over 27,000 people had arrived in Italy, mostly on the small island. Despite the significant increase in arrivals, and the predictability of ongoing arrivals in light of unfolding events in North Africa, the Italian authorities allowed the large number of arrivals on Lampedusa to accumulate until the situation on the island became unmanageable. Lampedusa is dependent on the mainland for provision of almost all basic goods and services and is not equipped to be a large reception and accommodation centre, albeit it does have the basics to function as a transit centre for smaller numbers of people. ... Lack of information about or access to asylum procedures Given that, at the time of Amnesty International’s visit on the island, UNHCR estimated that there were around 6,000 foreign nationals on Lampedusa, the number of people tasked with providing information regarding asylum was totally inadequate. As far as Amnesty International could determine, only a handful of individuals were providing basic information regarding asylum procedures, which was totally inadequate given the number of arrivals. Further, those arriving were provided with only a very brief medical assessment and a very basic screening. Moreover, there appeared to be an assumption that all Tunisian arrivals were economic migrants. The fact that, at the time of Amnesty International’s visit, foreign nationals had not been given proper information about access to asylum procedures, and were not being properly identified or screened, is a particular concern. The delegation spoke with people who had been given no, or very inadequate, information about asylum processes; in many cases they had been given no information about their situation at all. They had not been told how long they would have to stay on the island or what their eventual destination would be once moved off the island. Given that many of those arriving on Lampedusa had already endured extremely dangerous sea voyages, including some whose fellow travellers had drowned at sea, the appalling conditions on the island and the almost total absence of information were clearly leading to considerable anxiety and mental stress. In Amnesty International’s view the asylum and reception systems had completely broken down due to the severe overcrowding caused by the total failure to organize timely and orderly transfers off the island. Conditions in the ‘Centres’ of the island In Lampedusa, the Amnesty International delegation visited both the main centre at Contrada Imbriacola, registering and accommodating male adults, mainly from Tunisia, and the Base Loran Centre, accommodating children and ne