CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 20 octobre 2015

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FINLAND   (Application no. 11882/10)                     JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   20 October 2015       This judgment is final. In the case of Pentikäinen v. Finland, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   Dean Spielmann, President ,   Guido Raimondi,   Mark Villiger,   Boštjan M. Zupančič,   Khanlar Hajiyev,   Päivi Hirvelä,   Kristina Pardalos,   Angelika Nußberger,   Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,   André Potocki,   Paul Lemmens,   Aleš Pejchal,   Johannes Silvis,   Dmitry Dedov,   Egidijus Kūris,   Robert Spano,   Iulia Motoc, judges , and Lawrence Early, Jurisconsult , Having deliberated in private on 17 December 2014 and 3 September 2015, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 11882/10) against the Republic of Finland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Finnish national, Mr Markus Veikko Pentikäinen (“the applicant”), on 19 February 2010. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr J. Salokangas, a lawyer practising in Helsinki. The Finnish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr A. Kosonen, of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3.     The applicant alleged that there had been an interference with his right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention because the police had asked him to leave the scene of a demonstration, he had been unable to transmit information during his detention of seventeen and a half hours, and due to the fact that he had been suspected, charged and convicted of a crime, which constituted a “chilling effect” on his rights and work. 4.     The application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule   52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 4 February 2014 a Chamber composed of Ineta Ziemele, President, Päivi Hirvelä, George Nicolaou, Ledi   Bianku, Vincent A. De Gaetano, Paul Mahoney, Faris Vehabović, judges, and Françoise Elens-Passos, Section Registrar, delivered its judgment. It decided unanimously to declare the application admissible and held, by five votes to two, that there had been no violation of Article 10 of the Convention. The joint dissenting opinion of Judges Nicolaou and De   Gaetano was annexed to the judgment. On 30 April 2014 the applicant requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention and a panel of the Grand Chamber accepted that request on 2 June 2014. 5.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24. At the final deliberations, Mark Villiger continued to sit in the case following the expiry of his term of office but Isabelle Berro was replaced by Paul Lemmens, substitute judge (Article 23 § 3 of the Convention and Rule 24 §   4). Josep Casadevall and Elisabeth Steiner were unable to take part in the final deliberations of the case and were replaced by Khanlar Hajiyev and Angelika Nußberger, substitute judges. 6.     The applicant and the Government each filed further observations (Rule 59 § 1) on the merits. 7.     On 15 December 2014 the Grand Chamber viewed DVD material provided by the parties. 8.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 17 December 2014 (Rule 59 § 3).   There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Mr   A. Kosonen, Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,   Agent , Ms   S. Heikinheimo, Police Director, Ministry of the Interior, Ms   T . Majuri , Senior Adviser, Ministry of Justice, Ms   M. Spolander , Legal Officer, Ministry of Foreign   Affairs, Mr   P . Kotiaho , Legal Officer, Ministry of Foreign   Affairs,   Advisers ; (b)     for the applicant Mr   J . Salokangas , Mr   V . Matilainen ,   Counsel .   The applicant was also present. The Court heard addresses by Mr Kosonen, Mr Salokangas and Mr   Matilainen as well as their replies and those of Ms Majuri and Mr   Pentikäinen to questions put by Judges Hirvelä, Potocki, Silvis, Motoc, Sicilianos, Spano, Kūris and Dedov. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 9.     The applicant was born in 1980 and lives in Helsinki. 10.     He is a photographer and journalist who is employed by the weekly magazine Suomen Kuvalehti. On 9 September 2006 he was sent by his employer to take photographs of the demonstration which was being held in protest against the ongoing Asia ‑ Europe Meeting (ASEM) in Helsinki. The demonstration was an exceptionally large one in the Finnish context and all the media were following it closely. The applicant was to conduct an extensive report on the demonstration for the paper version of the magazine and also to publish it online immediately, once the demonstration had ended. 11.     The following account of the circumstances of the case is based on the parties’ submissions, including the DVD material covering the Smash ASEM event (see paragraph 7 above) as well as the Helsinki District Court judgment (see paragraph 37 below). A.     The Smash ASEM demonstration 12.     On 30 August 2006, before the demonstration took place, the Finnish Security Intelligence carried out an assessment of the risk levels inherent in the upcoming Smash ASEM demonstration and alerted the Helsinki Police Department that the demonstration would be a hostile one and would not aim to highlight any clear political message. At that time the Police Department did not manage, despite all efforts, to establish contact with the organisers of the demonstration. The police based their subsequent actions, inter alia , on these grounds. 13.     A similar risk assessment had also been carried out in the context of two earlier demonstrations which had taken place in Helsinki during the same year, both of which had turned violent. The first one was the EuroMayDay demonstration of 30 April 2006, when a march of approximately 1,500 persons evolved into a riot with projectiles being thrown and property damaged. Consequently, the District Court found eight persons guilty of violent rioting and resisting the police by violence and imposed suspended prison sentences. A similar incident took place during the Helsinki Night of the Arts on 24 August 2006 which also resulted in the destruction of property and violence and led to the detention of fifty-six persons. 14.     On 8 September 2006 the so-called Dongzhou Coalition notified the police of the Smash ASEM demonstration. According to the report of the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman (see paragraph 34 below), the police did not have any information on the Dongzhou Coalition and it was thus unclear to them who the organiser was in reality. It appears from public sources that the said “coalition” was an informal group open to anyone who agreed with the idea behind the Smash ASEM demonstration and who undertook not to bring any party emblems to the demonstration site. 15.     The demonstrators announced that they were planning to march on 9   September 2006 between 5.45 p.m. and 9 p.m. from the Kiasma Museum of Contemporary Art – an area of dense traffic – to the Helsinki Exhibition and Convention Centre where the ASEM Summit was to be held, a distance of 4.9 kilometres. The announced march route was as follows: Mannerheimintie – Kaivokatu – Siltasaarenkatu – Agricolankatu – Kaarlenkatu – Helsinginkatu – Läntinen Brahenkatu – Sturenkatu – Aleksis Kivenkatu – Ratapihantie – Asemapäällikönkatu – Ratamestarinkatu – Rautatieläistenkatu, ending at the park next to the velodrome which is close to the Summit venue. The theme of the demonstration was opposition to the ASEM Summit, with some focus on human rights issues. In posters inviting people to take part in the demonstration, the demonstrators were asked to wear black clothing. The posters also portrayed a demonstrator throwing a Molotov cocktail and they encouraged would-be participants, inter alia , to “bring even a little bit of mayhem to the streets of Helsinki” (“ tuoda edes hieman sekasortoa myös Helsingin kaduille ”, “ att få även en liten bit av kaos också på gatorna i Helsingfors ”). 16.     According to the Government, the police were able to make telephone contact with one of the organisers named as the contact person for the event. However, that person, acting on behalf of the organisers, refused to discuss matters relating, inter alia , to the conditions in which the demonstrators would be able to march from the site of the demonstration to the vicinity of the exhibition centre where the ASEM Summit was being held. This refusal extended also to police efforts to establish contact with the organisers at the site of the demonstration itself. 17.     According to the Government, there was a separate area reserved by the police for media representatives to cover the event. It was located at Paasikivi Square, opposite the Kiasma Museum of Contemporary Art, on the other side of Mannerheimintie. The police, as was standard procedure, had notified major Finnish media organisations of the Smash ASEM event and included the contact details of the police’s public-relations unit, which was available to discuss any questions the media might have about covering the event, including information on an area reserved for the media’s convenience. Furthermore, the Helsinki District Police public-relations unit had charged a senior officer to be present at that very same area to answer any questions media representatives might have, as well as to give interviews on the events that unfolded during the day. 18.     The demonstration was to start at 6 p.m. on 9 September 2006. Some 500 bystanders, a core group of about fifty demonstrators and some fifty journalists congregated at the starting-point of the march. The police had made security preparations for the event by deploying 480 police and border-guard officers. By Finnish standards, the scale of the police preparations was exceptional. 19.     At the start of the demonstration, bottles, stones and jars filled with paint were thrown at the public and police officers. Some demonstrators kicked and hit police officers. Apparently, at around 6.05 p.m., police officers surrounded the area of the demonstration. At this point people were free to pass through the line of officers. The police announced several times over loudspeakers that a peaceful demonstration was allowed to take place on the spot but that the crowd was not allowed to demonstrate by marching. 20.     After the escalation of violence, the police considered at 6.30 p.m. that the event had turned into a riot. From 6.30 p.m. to 7.17 p.m. the police sealed off the area in an effort to contain the rioting. The crowd tried to break through the police cordon. However, during this time, the police did allow families with children, and representatives of the media, to pass through. This passage was, at times, subject to bottles and other projectiles being thrown at the spot where people were leaving. 21.     The police announced over loudspeakers that they were stopping the demonstration and that the crowd should leave the scene. This announcement was repeated several times. Hundreds of people then left voluntarily via several exit routes established by the police. When leaving, they were asked to show their identity cards and their belongings were checked. 22.     The applicant claimed that the line of policemen surrounding the cordon was extremely tight and multi-layered. The visibility from outside the cordon to inside was practically non-existent. The police minibuses and detention buses also impeded visibility. At 7.15 p.m. the police started to set up a second, wider cordon and fenced off the whole immediate downtown area. It was not possible to see the Kiasma area from nearby streets. 23.     Some demonstrators were apprehended within the cordoned-off area by force. The apprehensions by the police were effected using the “paint-chain” method, part of which includes the opening up of the police cordon to allow detaining officers to act, followed by that cordon’s immediate closure after the detained person has been secured. 24.     The police announced repeatedly that the crowd should disperse. The applicant claimed that he heard the police order that the area be cleared for the first time at 8.30 p.m. The applicant called his employer and they had a conversation about whether the applicant should leave the area. The applicant noted that on the basis of, inter alia , this conversation he came to the conclusion that his presence inside the cordon was necessary. 25.     Towards the end of the demonstration, the applicant maintained that he had placed himself between the police and the demonstrators. The police continued to order the crowd to disperse, stating that any person who did not leave would be apprehended. At about 9 p.m. a police officer told the applicant personally that he had one last chance to leave the scene. The applicant told the police officer that he was reporting for Suomen Kuvalehti and that he was going to follow the event to its end, after which the police officer had left him alone. The applicant thought that the police would not interfere with his work after he had given them this explanation. 26.     By 9 p.m., about 500 people had left the scene via the police checkpoints. According to the applicant, about twenty demonstrators were still sitting on the ground in the middle of the first cordoned-off area, closely encircled by the police. The demonstrators held on to one another and were holding each other’s arms. The situation inside the cordon had already been peaceful for an hour at this point. After this, the police broke up the crowd of demonstrators and apprehended the protesters. 27.     The applicant claimed that, before he was apprehended, he heard a police officer shout: “Get the photographer!” The applicant was standing next to a former member of parliament and taking photographs when he was apprehended. He told the apprehending officer that he was a journalist, which the police officer later confirmed. The apprehending officer stated during the pre-trial investigation that the applicant did not resist the apprehension and that he had asked to make a telephone call, which he had been allowed to do. The applicant called his colleague at the magazine, explaining that the police had detained him and that he did not know what was going to happen next. He thought that he would be released soon. The applicant had also told the apprehending police officer that he had cameras in his bag, which information was taken into account by the police officer: the applicant was allowed to put his camera equipment away in his camera bag. When the apprehending police officer had asked for identification, the applicant had presented his press card. Another police officer present during the applicant’s apprehension stated during the pre-trial investigation that the applicant did not resist apprehension but that he had not heard the applicant identify himself as a journalist. The apprehending officer also testified that he had filled in the apprehension document, giving the reasons for the applicant’s apprehension and recording his personal information. According to the pre-trial investigation report, the basis for the applicant’s apprehension was contumacy towards the police. 28.     The applicant was then taken to a bus for detainees. In the bus, he allegedly explained to the police again that he was a magazine photographer. The applicant was taken to the police station where he asked to speak with the chief constable. He allegedly explained again that he was a journalist but his requests were ignored. He claimed that he “held up” his press card and started to wear it visibly on his chest thereafter. The applicant also claimed that the receiving police officer at the police station had to remove his press card which was hanging around his neck. According to the applicant, the receiving police officer at the police station was therefore aware that he was a journalist. While in the custody cell, the applicant allegedly shouted also to passing police officers that they had apprehended a journalist, but he was ignored. 29.     The applicant claimed that his camera equipment and memory cards had been confiscated. However, the Government maintained that, as soon as the police had found out that the applicant was a member of the press, his camera, memory cards and other equipment were immediately treated as journalistic sources and were not confiscated. He had been able to retain the photographs and no restrictions on the use of the photographs had been imposed on him by any authority at any stage. According to the report of the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman (see paragraph 34 below), the police had checked the content of the detainees’ mobile telephones. However, it is not clear whether the applicant’s mobile telephone was checked or whether his memory cards were inspected. 30.     The police kept the applicant in detention from 9 September at 9.26   p.m. until 10 September at 3.05 p.m., that is, for seventeen and a half hours. He was interrogated by the police on 10 September between 1.32   p.m. and 1.57 p.m. 31.     The applicant’s employer, the editor-in-chief of the magazine, apparently learned about the applicant’s apprehension and that he was being held in police custody. It would appear that he telephoned the police station but was given no information concerning the applicant’s apprehension. According to the applicant, it was only when the editor-in-chief called a senior official (whose name the applicant did not mention in his submissions) at the Ministry of the Interior the following day that preparations were made for the applicant’s release. 32.     The police apprehended 128 persons altogether at the demonstration site. The police released minors (sixteen individuals) after a few hours’ apprehension. The majority of those who were apprehended were released on 11 September 2006. The applicant was the seventh detainee to be interrogated and the sixth to be released after minors. The last suspect was released on 12 September 2006 at 11.07 a.m. B.     Subsequent developments 33.     Both domestic and international media reported the event and the police measures widely. The matter was also the subject of a wide-ranging investigation by the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman in 2006 and 2007. However, due to procedural rules, the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman could not investigate the applicant’s case because the criminal proceedings were pending against him at that time. 34.     It appears from the report of the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman of 9 September 2006, inter alia , that the police did not have any information on the Dongzhou Coalition and that it was thus unclear to them who the organiser of the demonstration was in reality. It also appears that the police checked the content of the detainees’ mobile telephones. Moreover, the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman criticised, inter alia , the fact that there had been an insufficient number of checkpoints in relation to the number of people, and that the three-hour duration of holding people within the cordoned-off area was unnecessarily long. The Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman also questioned the legality of the security checks. 35.     On 5 February 2007 the police informed thirty-seven suspects that, for their part, the preliminary investigation was discontinued and that their cases would not be referred to the public prosecutor for the consideration of charges. The public prosecutor brought charges against eighty-six persons altogether. C.     The criminal proceedings against the applicant 36.     On 23 May 2007 the public prosecutor brought charges against the applicant for contumacy towards the police ( niskoittelu poliisia vastaan , tredska mot polis ) under Chapter 16, section 4(1), of the Penal Code ( rikoslaki, strafflagen) . 37.     On 17 December 2007 the Helsinki District Court ( käräjäoikeus , tingsrätten ) found the applicant guilty of contumacy towards the police under Chapter 16, section 4(1), of the Penal Code but did not impose any penalty on him. The applicant stated before the District Court that he had heard the orders to disperse at around 8.30 p.m. but had understood them as applying only to the demonstrators. The court found it established that the police actions had been legal and that the applicant had been aware of the orders of the police to leave the scene but had decided to ignore them. It appeared from the witness statements given before the court that the applicant had not said or indicated to a police officer standing nearby at the time of the apprehension that he was a journalist. According to this police officer, this fact only became known to him when the magazine relating the events at the demonstration came out. It appeared also from the witness statement of another journalist that he and a third photographer, who had been in the sealed-off area, had been able to leave the scene without consequences just before the applicant was apprehended. This last remaining journalist stated that he had taken his last photograph at 9.15 p.m. and left the area just two to three minutes before the applicant’s apprehension took place. The District Court found it further established that the police orders had been clear and that they had manifestly applied to everyone in the crowd, which consisted of demonstrators as well as bystanders and other members of the public. Moreover, the District Court examined the justification of the interference of the applicant’s right under Article 10 of the Convention in the following manner. “... It is disputed whether Mr Pentikäinen had, as a journalist and on the basis of his freedom of expression, the right not to obey the orders given to him by the police. He had intended to use his freedom of expression as a photographer. The police orders to disperse therefore restricted his freedom of expression. The question is whether there was a justification for this restriction. Pursuant to Article 12 of the Constitution and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, everyone has the right to freedom of expression. It includes a right to publish and distribute information without interference by the authorities. Pursuant to the Constitution, more detailed provisions on the exercise of freedom of expression are laid down by an Act. In accordance with Article 10 § 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the exercise of freedom of expression may be subject to formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties which are prescribed by law. Pursuant to the said Article and the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, three requirements must be taken into account when assessing the restrictions: (1) the restriction must be prescribed by law; (2) it must have an acceptable reason; and (3) it must be necessary in a democratic society. First of all, the District Court notes that the police have the power, in accordance with sections 18 and 19 of the Police Act, to cordon off an area and to disperse a crowd. On the strength of this power, the police gave an order to disperse to the persons remaining in the Kiasma-Postitalo area, which order Mr Pentikäinen also refused to follow. The restriction was thus prescribed by law. Secondly, the District Court considers that the powers stipulated in sections 18 and   19 of the Police Act relate to the maintenance of public order and security and to the prevention of disorder or crime, and that in this case the order to disperse given to, among others, Mr Pentikäinen relates to the prevention of disorder. The restriction therefore has an acceptable reason. Thirdly, it must be examined whether the order to disperse given to Mr Pentikäinen and the obligation to follow it was necessary in a democratic society. The District Court finds that it was necessary to put an end to the situation in the Kiasma area by ordering the crowd to disperse and by asking the persons to leave the area. The District Court concludes that, in the case at hand, the conditions for restricting Mr Pentikäinen’s freedom of expression by ordering him to disperse along with the remaining crowd were fulfilled. The District Court has taken a stand on the elements having an effect on the punishability of Mr Pentikäinen’s act below. The case referred to by Mr Pentikäinen ( Dammann v. Switzerland , [no. 77551/01,] 25 April 2006) concerned a situation in which a journalist had been convicted in Switzerland of incitement to breach official secrecy because he had asked for and received information from an administrative assistant in the public prosecutor’s office about some registry entries. The [European] Court found that the applicant’s conviction could prevent journalists from participating in public discussions on questions of general interest. The conviction was not proportionate to the aims sought and Article 10 of the Convention had thus been violated. The District Court finds that the cited case is not similar to the case at hand. ...” However, relying on Chapter 6, section 12, of the Penal Code, no penalty was imposed on the applicant as the offence was comparable to “an excusable act” ( anteeksiannettavaan tekoon rinnastettava , jämförbar med en ursäktlig gärning ). The District Court found: “... The punishment of Mr Pentikäinen is waived in accordance with Chapter 6, section   12(3), of the Penal Code because the offence, due to special reasons related to the act, can be deemed comparable to an excusable act. As a journalist, Mr   Pentikäinen was forced to adapt his behaviour towards the situation due to the conflicting expectations expressed by the police, on the one hand, and by his profession and employer, on the other hand. ...” 38.     By a letter dated 23 January 2008, the applicant appealed to the Helsinki Court of Appeal ( hovioikeus , hovrätten ), claiming that the District Court should have dismissed the charges against him. He argued that his apprehension and the fact that he was found guilty were contrary to the Constitution and Article 10 of the Convention. The applicant was a journalist and he had not participated in the demonstration or caused any disorder. The District Court had not given reasons as to why his apprehension and conviction were “necessary in a democratic society” and had thereby failed to justify the interference. 39.     On 30 April 2009 the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal without giving any further reasons. 40.     By a letter dated 24 June 2009, the applicant further appealed to the Supreme Court ( korkein oikeus , högsta domstolen ), reiterating the grounds of appeal already presented before the Court of Appeal. 41.     On 1 September 2009 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     The Police Act 42.     Under section 14 of the Police Act ( poliisilaki , polislagen ; Law no.   493/1995, as in force at the relevant time), at the request of the occupant of domestic or public premises or his or her representative, police officers had the right to remove anyone who unlawfully intruded, entered in secret or by diversion, or concealed himself or herself therein or neglected an order to leave. Police officers had the right to remove anyone with permission to be in an area or place referred to above if he or she disturbed the domestic or public peace of other persons or caused considerable disturbance in other ways and there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the disturbance would recur. If it was likely that removal would not prevent the disturbance from recurring, police officers had the right to apprehend the person causing the disturbance and keep him or her in custody. The apprehended person could be kept in custody only for as long as the disturbance was likely to recur, but no longer than twelve hours after being apprehended. 43.     Pursuant to section 18(1) of the Police Act, police officers had the right to cordon off, close or clear a place or area in public use, or to prohibit or restrict movement there, if this was necessary to maintain public order and security, to secure an investigation, or to protect measures taken at the scene of an accident, the privacy of persons subjected to those measures and any endangered property. 44.     Section 19 of the Police Act provided that police officers had the right to order a crowd to disperse or move if the gathering threatened public order and security or obstructed traffic. If an order to disperse or move was not obeyed, police officers had the right to use force to disperse the crowd and to apprehend non-compliant persons. Apprehended persons had to be released as soon as the purpose of the measure had been served, but no later than twelve hours after being apprehended. 45.     A new Police Act ( poliisilaki , polislagen ; Law no. 872/2011) came into force on 1 January 2014. Chapter 2, sections 5, 8 and 9, of the new Act contain the same regulations, including that an apprehended person may be kept in custody only for as long as the disturbance is likely to recur, but no longer than twelve hours after being apprehended. B.     The Coercive Measures Act 46.     Chapter 1, section 2, second paragraph, of the Coercive Measures Act ( pakkokeinolaki , tvångsmedelslagen ; Law no. 450/1987, as in force at the relevant time) provided that, if the prerequisites existed for arrest, a police officer could apprehend a person suspected of an offence even without an arrest warrant if the arrest could otherwise be endangered. The police officer had, without delay, to notify an official with the power of arrest of this apprehension. Said official had to decide, within twenty-four hours of the apprehension, whether the apprehended person was to be released or arrested. 47.     A new Coercive Measures Act ( pakkokeinolaki , tvångsmedelslagen ; Law no. 806/2011) came into force on 1 January 2014. Chapter 2, section 1, of the new Act provides as follows. “A police officer may, for the purpose of clarifying an offence, apprehend a person suspected of an offence who is caught in the act or trying to escape. A police officer may also apprehend a suspect whose arrest or remand has been ordered. In addition, a police officer may, during the main hearing of a court or during the consideration of the decision, apprehend a defendant whose remand has been requested in connection with the judgment, if the remand is necessary in order to prevent him or her from leaving. If the prerequisites exist for arrest, a police officer may apprehend a suspect even without an arrest warrant if the arrest may otherwise be endangered. The police officer shall notify without delay an official with the power of arrest of this apprehension. Said official with the power of arrest shall decide, within twenty-four hours of the apprehension, whether the apprehended person is to be released or arrested. Prolonging the apprehension for more than twelve hours requires the existence of the prerequisites for arrest.” C.     The Criminal Investigation Act 48.     According to section 21 of the Criminal Investigation Act ( esitutkintalaki , förundersökningslagen ; Law no. 449/1987, as in force at the relevant time), a suspect who had not been arrested or remanded could not be detained as part of the criminal investigation for longer than twelve hours at a time or, if the prerequisites for arrest under the Coercive Measures Act were fulfilled, for longer than twenty-four hours. 49.     Pursuant to section 24, second paragraph, of the same Act, questioning could be conducted between 10 p.m. and 7 a.m. only if, “1.     the person being questioned requests this; 2.     the matter is under simplified investigation for which the person being questioned is required to stay or to arrive immediately; or 3.     there is some other pressing reason for it.” 50.     The same rules are included in Chapter 6, section 5, subsection 2 and Chapter 7, section 5, second paragraph, of the new Criminal Investigation Act ( esitutkintalaki , förundersökningslagen ; Law no. 805/2011) which came into force on 1 January 2014. D.     The Penal Code 51.     Chapter 16, section 4 of the Penal Code ( rikoslaki , strafflagen ; Law no. 39/1889, as amended by Law no. 563/1998) provides as follows. “A person who (1)     fails to obey an order or prohibition issued by a police officer, within his or her competence, for the maintenance of public order or security or the performance of a duty; (2)     refuses to provide a police officer with the identifying information referred to in section 10, subsection 1, of the Police Act; (3)     fails to obey a police officer’s clearly visible signal or order for stopping or moving a vehicle, as referred to in section 21 of the Police Act; (4)     neglects the duty to provide assistance, as referred to in section 45 of the Police Act; or (5)     alerts the police without reason or, by providing false information, hinders police operations; shall be sentenced, unless a more severe penalty for the act has been provided elsewhere in the law, for contumacy towards the police to a fine or to imprisonment of at most three months.” 52.     Chapter 6, section 12, of the same Code provides the following. “A court may waive punishment if (1)     the offence, when assessed as a whole, taking into account its harmfulness or the culpability of the perpetrator, is to be deemed of minor significance; (2)     the perpetrator was under the age of 18 when the offence was committed and the act is deemed to be the result of lack of understanding or of imprudence; (3)     due to special reasons related to the act or the perpetrator the act is deemed to be an excusable act; (4)     punishment is deemed to be unreasonable or pointless in particular taking into account the factors referred to above in section 6, paragraph 3, and section 7, or action taken by the social security and health authorities; or (5)     the offence would not have an essential effect on the total sentence due to the provisions on sentencing to a joint punishment.” E.     The Criminal Records Act 53.     Section 2, first and second paragraphs, of the Criminal Records Act ( rikosrekisterilaki , straffregisterlagen ; Law no. 770/1993) provide as follows. “On the basis of notices by courts of law, data shall be entered in the criminal records on decisions whereby a person in Finland has been sentenced to unsuspended imprisonment; community service; suspended imprisonment; suspended imprisonment supplemented with a fine, community service or supervision; juvenile punishment; a fine instead of juvenile punishment; dismissal from office; or whereby sentencing has been waived under Chapter 3, section 4, of the Penal Code (no.   39/1889). However, no entries shall be made in the criminal records on the conversion of fines into imprisonment, nor on imprisonment imposed under the Civilian Service Act (no. 1723/1991). Data on fines imposed on the basis of the provisions governing corporate criminal liability shall also be entered in the criminal records. Furthermore, entries shall be made in the criminal records, as provided by Decree, on court decisions whereby a Finnish citizen or a foreigner permanently resident in Finland has been sentenced abroad to a penalty equivalent to one mentioned in paragraph 1.” III.     INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN STANDARDS 54.     In the information available to the Court concerning international and European standards, specific references to the conduct of journalists during demonstrations were scarce. However, some regulations or recommendations existed regulating the conduct of the police towards journalists covering demonstrations or similar events while also imposing a duty on journalists to refrain from hampering the police in maintaining public order and safety. 55.     For instance, the Guidelines drawn up by the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of the Organization for Co-operation and Security in Europe (OSCE) and the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) [1] provide as follows. “168.     If dispersal is deemed necessary, the assembly organiser and participants should be clearly and audibly informed prior to any intervention by law -enforcement personnel. Participants should also be given reasonable time to disperse voluntarily. Only if participants then fail to disperse may law enforcement officials intervene further. Third parties (such as monitors, journalists, and photographers) may also be asked to disperse, but they should not be prevented from observing and recording the policing operation ... 169.     Photography and video recording (by both law enforcement personnel and participants) should not be restricted, but data retention may breach the right to private life: During public assemblies the photographing or video recording of participants by the law enforcement personnel is permissible. However, while monitoring individuals in a public place for identification purposes does not necessarily give rise to an interference with their right to private life, the recording of such data and the systematic processing or permanent nature of the record kept may give rise to violations of privacy. Moreover, photographing or videoing assemblies for the purpose of gathering intelligence can discourage individuals from enjoying the freedom [to assemble] and should therefore not be done routinely. Photographing or video recording the policing operation by participants and other third parties should not be prevented, and any requirement to surrender film or digitally recorded images or footage to the law enforcement agencies should be subject to prior judicial scrutiny. Law enforcement agencies should develop and publish a policy relating to their use of overt filming/photography at public assemblies.” 56.     The European and international regulations, standards, recommendations or public announcements concerning the conduct of journalists are predominantly silent as to the coverage of demonstrations or similar events. The same holds true for the self-regulating codes of conduct or professional ethics of journalists. IV.     COMPARATIVE LAW 57.     From the information available to the Court, including a comparative-law survey of thirty-four Council of Europe member States (Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Ukraine and the United Kingdom), it appeared that all of the surveyed States applied general criminal-law provisions to journalists covering demonstrations. No special status regarding the arrest, detention and conviction of journalists emerged. Members of the media therefore remained liable for offences committed by them during demonstrations in the same way as participants in demonstrations. While case-law similar to the present case was found in five of the surveyed States   – Austria, Hungary, Spain, Sweden and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – it did not allow for the drawing of any general conclusions. 58.     Concerning police powers, the vast majority of surveyed States did not regulate the specific issue of news-gathering during violent demonstrations. General guidelines or regulations governing police and media relations were found in twelve member States (Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Republic of Moldova, the Netherlands, Russia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom) whereby, as a general rule, members of the media covering events were encouraged to identify themselves as such in order to be distinguished from participants. However, while this singling out of members of the media was aimed at enabling and facilitating journalistic activity, it did not have the effect of conferring any sort of immunity on journalists when they failed to comply with police orders to leave the scene of a demonstration. Only a limited number of member States (Georgia, the Republic of Moldova, Russia and Serbia) dealt with the issue of news-gathering during demonstrations by way of specific regulations. In these member States, journalists were either granted protected areas from which they could cover ongoing demonstrations or were informed of the safest area in which to carry out their activities. Nonetheless, the overall balance of interests appeared to be struck in favour of preserving public order and safety by following police instructions. 59.     While a large majority of the surveyed member States had professional codes of conduct or codes of ethics for journalists, they did not contain specific provisions relating to the relationship between journalists and the police during demonstrations. These codes rather focused on investigative techniques and journalistic sources as well as protecting third-party privacy. THE LAW ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 60.     The applicant complained under Article 10 of the Convention that his freedom of expression had been violated. Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows: “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema enterprises. 2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” A.     The Chamber judgment 61.     The Chamber considered that, since the applicant’s apprehension and conviction had been the consequence of his conduct as a newspaper photographer and journalist when disobeying the police, the presumption was that there had been an interference with his right to freedom of expression. The Chamber further found that the parties agreed that the impugned measures had a basis in Finnish law, in particular in Chapter 16, section 4, of the Penal Code. The interference was thus “prescribed by law” and it pursued several legitimate aims, namely the protection of public safety as well as the prevention of disorder and crime. 62.     As to its necessity in a democratic society, the Chamber noted that the applicant had waived his right to use the separate, secure area for the press when he had decided to stay with the demonstrators even after the orders to disperse. It was established that the applicant had been aware of the orders of the police to leave the scene but had decided to ignore them. The applicant could have left the scene and moved to the secure press area without any consequences at any time during the cordon. By not doing so, the applicant had knowingly taken the risk of being apprehended for contumacy. 63.     For the Chamber it was not entirely clear at what stage the police had learned that the applicant was a journalist. It appeared that the applicant had failed to make clear efforts to identify himself as a journalist. Moreover, it did not appear that the applicant had in any way been prevented from taking photographs of the demonstration. Nor had his camera or other equipment been confiscated and he had been allowed to keep all the photographs he had taken and to use them unrestrictedly. 64.     The Chamber considered that the demonstration had been a matter of legitimate public interest, having regard in particular to its nature. The District Court had analysed the matter from the Article 10 point of view, balancing the different interests against each other, and had found that there had been a pressing social need to take the impugned measures against the applicant. The Chamber also attached weight to the fact that no penalty was imposed on the applicant as his act had been considered “excusable” by the domestic courts. Having regard to all the factors, the Chamber considered that the domestic courts had struck a fair balance between the competing interests at stake. Accordingly, there had bee