CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 3 novembre 2015

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s20FC8552 { font-family:Arial; font-size:11.5pt } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .sC36A6361 { font-family:Arial; color:#000000 } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5F897A7E { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s7E985A65 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; font-size:1pt } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s8F016750 { width:131.63pt; display:inline-block } .sA149F1D5 { width:182.32pt; display:inline-block } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt }   FIRST SECTION DECISION Application no. 61815/13 Behruz VAZVAN against Finland The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting on 3   November 2015 as a Chamber composed of:   Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, President,   Päivi Hirvelä,   Ledi Bianku,   Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,   Aleš Pejchal,   Robert Spano,   Armen Harutyunyan, judges, and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar , Having regard to the above application lodged on 25 September 2013, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS 1.     The applicant, Mr Behruz Vazvan, is a Finnish national who was born in 1961 and lives in Vantaa. He was represented before the Court by Mr   Risto Rouvari, a lawyer practising in Helsinki. 2.     The Finnish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Arto Kosonen of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. A.     The circumstances of the case 3.     The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. Background of the case 4.     The applicant made a technical invention, for which he applied for a patent on 28 October 1994. Subsequently, on 14 December 2001, he received a patent for his invention which was, however, later withdrawn. 5.     On 1 November 1994 the applicant joined a big telecommunications company in Finland. He told the company early on about his invention and proposed cooperation with the company. The company apparently learned about his patent application on 12 July 1995 but was not interested in cooperation. On 18 October 1995 the applicant’s employment with the company ended. 6.     In 2002 the applicant noticed that the company was infringing his patent and informed the company of this. The company initiated civil proceedings against the applicant, claiming ownership of the applicant’s invention. On 9 February 2006 the Helsinki District Court ( käräjäoikeus, tingsrätten ) rejected the company’s claim to ownership of the applicant’s invention but accepted its alternative claim and confirmed that the applicant had made the invention in question while working for the company. The court also confirmed that the company held a licence for the invention and that it had to pay the applicant reasonable compensation for this patent licence. On 31 January 2008 the Helsinki Appeal Court ( hovioikeus, hovrätten ) upheld the District Court judgment. This judgment became final. Impugned proceedings 7.     As the applicant and the company could not agree on reasonable compensation for the patent licence, the applicant initiated civil proceedings against the company in the Helsinki District Court on 27 November 2006. He claimed, inter alia , compensation of 924,720,000 euros (EUR) for the use of the patent licence. 8.     On 6 October 2010 the Helsinki District Court accepted the applicant’s claims partly and ordered the company to pay him EUR   12,000 in compensation. The applicant was also ordered to pay the company’s costs and expenses before the District Court, which after mitigation amounted to EUR 60,000. The court found that the applicant had not been able to show that the company had actually used the invention for which it held the licence. The invention had thus had no greater value for the company. The fact that the company held the patent licence had not prevented the applicant from patenting the invention or giving further licences to it, as the applicant still held all rights. As there were six separate patents, the court estimated the proper compensation to be EUR 2,000 for each patent and thus EUR   12,000 in total. At the same time as the judgment, the parties also received, for information, a statement drafted by the technical experts appointed by the court and given to the court in the present case. 9.     By letter dated 16 December 2010 the applicant appealed to the Helsinki Appeal Court requesting, inter alia , that the company be ordered to pay him EUR 924,720,000 in compensation for the holding of the patent licence and that he be freed from the obligation to pay the company’s costs and expenses. He requested that an oral hearing be held and that the technical experts attend this hearing. Moreover, the applicant complained about the fact that the obligation to pay costs and expenses completely cancelled out his right to compensation and asked to be dispensed from paying. The company lodged a counter appeal, requesting that the compensation be reduced to EUR 2,000 and that the applicant be ordered to pay the company’s costs and expenses. 10.     On 17 October 2012 the Helsinki Appeal Court, after having held an oral hearing, accepted the company’s claims and reduced the amount of compensation payable to the applicant to EUR 2,000. It also ordered the applicant to pay the company’s costs and expenses before the District Court and the Appeal Court to a total of EUR 444,471.08 plus interest. The court found that as the compensation concerned just one patent, to which the company held only a licence, EUR 2,000 was proper compensation. As to the costs and expenses, the court found that the different material positions of the applicant and the company spoke for the mitigation of the payment obligation in the applicant’s favour. However, even though the invention had been important to the applicant, he had requested compensation equal to 4% to 8% of the annual turnover of the whole company-group. His claims had, from the outset, been manifestly ill-founded and non-itemised, and no evidence had been presented to support them. The grounds for mitigation were not therefore fulfilled and the applicant was ordered to pay the costs and expenses of the company in full. 11.     By letter dated 11 December 2012 the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court ( korkein oikeus, högsta domstolen ), reiterating the grounds of appeal already presented before the Appeal Court. Moreover, he stressed the fact that the technical experts had not attended the Appeal Court hearing and requested that they be asked to present a further statement on the matter at hand. If that option was not available, he requested that the case be referred back to the Appeal Court for the hearing of the experts. 12.     On 30 May 2013 the Supreme Court refused the applicant leave to appeal. B.     Relevant domestic law and practice Patents Act 13.     According to sections 65 and 66 of the Patents Act ( patenttilaki, patentlagen , Act no. 550/1967, as in force at the material time), t he Helsinki District Court is competent to hear patent matters. W hen examining a patent matter, the District Court is to be assisted by two technical experts appointed by the court. The experts are to give their views on the matters submitted to them by the court. Their views are entered in the record and they are entitled to question the parties and witnesses. 14.     Section 67 of the Patents Act provides the following: “The District Court shall appoint an appropriate number of experts as referred to in section 66 for each calendar year. Before making the appointments, the Court shall request the opinion of the Technical Research Centre of Finland. Such appointment may not be refused without statutory justification. Before taking up his appointment, an expert shall be required to take the prescribed oath. Experts shall be paid a reasonable fee for each case as laid down by the Court together with compensation for travelling expenses as prescribed by the Government.” 15.     It appears from the Government proposal HE 124/2012 vp that the practice at the relevant time was that the experts practically always gave their statement after the conclusion of the oral hearing. The parties to the proceedings were not given a possibility to comment on the experts’ statement. 16.     This state of affairs changed when the Patents Act was amended with effect from 1 September 2013 (Act no. 101/2013). According to the new section 66c of the Act, the District Court shall provide the parties a possibility to comment on the statement of the experts before deciding the case. According to the transitional provisions, if such a matter has already become pending in a District Court before the entry into force of the amendment, the previous provision is applicable. Code of Judicial Procedure 17.     Chapter 17, section 46, of the Code of Judicial Procedure ( oikeudenkäymiskaari, rättegångsbalken , Act no. 571/1948) provides that: “Before an expert witness is appointed, the parties shall be heard on this. If the parties agree on an expert witness, that person shall be used if he or she is deemed to be suitable and there is no impediment to the same. In addition, the court may appoint one expert witness. No one may be appointed an expert witness against his or her will, unless he or she is under the obligation to serve as an expert witness by virtue of public office or function or on the basis of a special provision.” 18.     Chapter 17, section 50, of the same Act (as amended by Act no.   1052/1991) further provides that: “An expert shall give a detailed account on the findings in his or her investigation and, on the basis of the account, a substantiated statement on the question put to him or her. The statement shall be compiled in writing, unless the court deems there to be reason to allow for its being given orally. When a person is appointed as an expert witness not on the basis of his or her official position or function, the court shall determine the time within which the statement is to be given. An expert witness who has given a written statement shall be orally heard in court, if a party so requests and the hearing is not evidently irrelevant, or if the court deems the hearing of the expert witness necessary. If there are several expert witnesses, one or several of them may be called to be heard.” COMPLAINT 19.     The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that he had not had a fair hearing as he had not been able to comment on the expert statement drafted by the technical experts, used by the District Court. This statement had been given to the parties only together with the District Court judgment and the experts had not attended the Appeal Court hearing. THE LAW 20.     The applicant complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention of the lack of a fair hearing. 21.     Article 6 § 1 of the Convention reads, in relevant parts, as follows: “In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...” 22.     The Government argued that the applicant was not put in a position of significant disadvantage vis-à-vis the other party to the civil proceedings as the expert statement was presented to both parties at the same time and, consequently, both parties had the same opportunity to have it assessed at later judicial stages. The principle of equality of arms was thus respected. 23.     Moreover, the Government maintained that the impugned expert statement and the concomitant role of the experts formed a part of the internal deliberations of the District Court. According to the Patents Act, technical experts appointed by the Helsinki District Court were not ordinary expert witnesses but rather considered as assistants of that court. They were appointed yearly by the Helsinki District Court to their positions on the basis of their relevant technical expertise. The Helsinki District Court appointed yearly some one hundred expert assistants, representing tens of areas of technical expertise. When compared to the provisions concerning expert witnesses, in particular in Chapter 17, sections 46 and 50, of the Code of Judicial Procedure, it was clear that the appointment of expert assistants under the Patents Act differed drastically from the calling of expert witnesses under the Code of Judicial Procedure. Expert assistants were a part of the composition and could put questions to parties and witnesses. They had no right to vote but were considered as non ‑ voting ad   hoc expert members of the court. Their role was thus to strengthen the District Court’s own expertise when dealing with cases that required specialist technical knowledge. 24.     The Government further maintained that statements of expert assistants reflected their replies given to the court’s questions and served as a basis for the court’s deliberations in which the expert assistants also took part. During deliberations, expert assistants could be asked to reply to further enquiries made by judges or to comment on the draft judgment, as far as technical aspects of the case were concerned. Their statements, which did not, however, turn on the legal aspects of the case, were recorded in the minutes of the court’s deliberations. The domestic law did not require the communication of such statements to the parties but such a practice had evolved through domestic case-law. 25.     The Government noted that the deliberations of a District Court were secret. For this reason conversations and clarification requests between the composition of the court and the expert assistants were never made public. For the same reason also, written statements of the expert assistants were not communicated to the parties. However, as the written expert statements were not cited in their entirety in patent law decisions of the District Court, a practice had evolved to notify the parties of such statements at the same time as the decision was made public, reflecting thus maximal transparency. If the parties then appealed, they were able to assess the information provided by the expert assistants, as required by the Court’s case-law. In any event, there was no record of the applicant having requested an opportunity to comment on the expert statement during the District Court proceedings. Therefore, expert assistants were to be considered as members of the composition and the publication of their statements, together with the District Court judgments, did not breach the fairness requirements under Article 6 of the Convention as they formed a part of internal deliberations. The application was thus manifestly ill-founded and should be declared inadmissible under Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. 26.     The applicant disagreed with the Government. He argued that technical experts were not members of the court and their statements did not form a part of the internal deliberations. They were not a part of the quorum and did not belong to the composition of the court. At the time of the facts, the applicant had no possibility to comment on the expert statement, even though he had made such a request. However, the law had changed on 1   September 2013, after which parties had such a possibility during the District Court proceedings. The preparatory works to this amendment clearly indicated that the earlier practice had not fulfilled the fair trial requirements and that there was a need to amend the law in that respect. 27.     The applicant maintained that judges had no technical training and that in technical cases they were dependent on technical experts’ opinions. An error or misunderstanding in the latter’s statement could result in a mistake in the legal reasoning. For this reason it was important for parties to be able to comment on such statements in advance. By referring to the possibility to appeal, the Government accepted that the District Court proceedings had not been fair. The applicant stressed that the District Court proceedings needed to fulfil the fair trial criteria. As he had received the expert statement only after the District Court judgment, his only possibility to comment on it was to appeal to the Appeal Court, which represented a financial risk. Had the parties been able to comment on the statement before the District Court, he would have considered the need to appeal from a different standpoint. There had thus been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. 28.     The Court reiterates that one of the elements of a fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 is the right to adversarial proceedings; each party must in principle have the opportunity not only to make known any evidence needed for his claims to succeed, but also to have knowledge of and comment on all evidence adduced or observations filed with a view to influencing the court’s decision (see, among many other authorities, Korošec v. Slovenia , no. 77212/12, § 46, 8 October 2015; Eskelinen and Others v. Finland , no. 43803/98, § 31, 8 August 2006; Mantovanelli v.   France , 18 March 1997, § 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 ‑ II; and Nideröst-Huber v. Switzerland , 18 February 1997, § 23, Reports 1997-I. 29.     The Court further reiterates that the appointment of experts is relevant in assessing whether the principle of equality of arms has been complied with. In ascertaining the expert’s procedural position and his role in the proceedings, one must not lose sight of the fact that the opinion given by a court-appointed expert is likely to carry significant weight in the court’s assessment of the issues within that expert’s competence (see Shulepova v. Russia , no. 34449/03, § 62, 11 December 2008; Sara Lind Eggertsdóttir v. Iceland , no. 31930/04, § 47, 5 July 2007; and Bönisch v.   Austria , 6 May 1985, § 33, Series A no. 92). 30.     The Court observes that the present case concerns in essence the status of the experts appointed under the Patents Act and, in particular, whether their statement given to the Helsinki District Court in a patent matter formed, under the domestic law, a part of the case file which needed to be communicated to the applicant for possible comments, or a part of the internal deliberations of that court. The Court reiterates in the first place that it is not its function to deal with errors of fact or law allegedly made by a national court, unless and insofar as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see García Ruiz v. Spain [GC], no.   30544/96 , § 28, ECHR 1999 ‑ I). In any event, it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of national legislation. This applies in particular to the interpretation by the courts of rules of a procedural nature (see Pekinel v. Turkey , no. 9939/02 , §   53, 18 March 2008). The Court’s role is confined to ascertaining whether the effects of such an interpretation are compatible with the Convention in general and with the fair trial principles, guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention, in particular. 31.     Turning to the facts of the present case, the Court notes that the applicant’s complaint relates to the alleged non-communication by the District Court, during the proceedings before it, of the statement drafted by patent law experts appointed by that court. It is not in dispute between the parties that the applicant received the statement in question together with the District Court judgment. It is equally clear from the case file that the applicant had the statement at his disposal when he appealed to the Appeal Court and that he specifically challenged its content before both the Appeal Court and the Supreme Court. 32.     The Court notes that the applicant was able to challenge the content of the expert statement before both the Appeal Court and the Supreme Court. Had there been a procedural mistake in the proceedings before the first instance court, such a mistake would in any event have been corrected on appeal as the expert statement was clearly a part of the case file both before the Appeal Court and the Supreme Court, and both parties to the case had equal opportunity to comment on it. 33.     In the light of the above, the Court finds that the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 of the Convention must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded and declared inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible.   Done in English and notified in writing on 26 November 2015. André Wampach   Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska Deputy Registrar   President