CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 26 novembre 2015

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FRANCE   (Application no. 64846/11)                 JUDGMENT   STRASBOURG   26 November 2015       FINAL   26/02/2016         This judgment is final. In the case of Ebrahimian v. France, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Josep Casadevall, President ,   Ganna Yudkivska,   Vincent A. de Gaetano,   André Potocki,   Helena Jäderblom,   Aleš Pejchal,   Síofra O’Leary, judges , and Milan Blaško, Deputy Section Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 20 October 2015, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 64846/11) against the French Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a French national, Ms Christiane Ebrahimian (“the applicant”), on 12 October 2011. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr W. Word, a lawyer practising in Paris. The French Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr François Alabrune, Director of Legal Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3.     The applicant alleged that the failure to renew her employment contract as a social worker, on the ground that she refused to stop wearing her veil, amounted to a violation of Article 9 of the Convention. 4.     On 10 June 2013 notice of the complaint concerning Article 9 was given to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Paris. 6.     The applicant was recruited on a three-month fixed-term contract, from 1 October to 31 December 1999, extended for one year from 1 January to 31 December 2000, as a contracted employee of the hospital civil service, to carry out the duties of a social worker in the psychiatric unit of Nanterre Hospital and Social Care Centre (“the CASH”) a public health establishment administered by the City of Paris. 7.     On 11 December 2000 the Director of Human Resources informed the applicant that her contract would not be renewed with effect from 31   December 2000. The reason given for the decision – which had been taken following complaints by certain patients being treated at the CASH – was that the applicant refused to stop wearing her head covering. 8.     On 28 December 2000, in response to a letter from the applicant alleging the illegality of the refusal to renew her contract in that it was motivated by her convictions and her affiliation to the Muslim faith, the Director of Human Resources indicated that at the meeting of 30   November 2000 which had preceded the administration’s decision, she had not been criticised for her religious beliefs, but merely reminded of the rights and duties of public employees, namely the ban on manifesting such beliefs. He continued as follows. “I emphasised that I had been required to have a meeting with you following complaints made to Ms M., manager of the welfare and education unit, both by patients who were refusing to meet you on account of this display [of your beliefs] and by social workers for whom it was becoming increasingly difficult to operate in this very delicate situation. It should be noted that Ms M. raised these difficulties with you and tried to persuade you not to manifest your religious beliefs, even before the complaints reached HR. Indeed, it was only shortly before the meeting with you on 30   November that the unit managers were officially informed of the problem created by the fact of your head covering. With regard to your head covering at the time of recruitment: as you are aware, the recruitment interview lasts, at the most, one hour. Individuals attend wearing ordinary “street” clothes, and do not necessarily have to remove their coats or scarves. The fact that your head was covered during that interview was not interpreted as a possible sign of [religious] affiliation, but simply as a form of attire. The termination of your contract has a legal basis, and does not result from a discriminatory situation.” The Director of Human Resources further reminded the applicant in this letter of the Opinion issued by the Conseil d’État on 3 May 2000. That Opinion stated that the principle of freedom of conscience, the principle of State secularism and the principle that all public services must be neutral prevented employees in the public sector from enjoying the right to manifest their religious beliefs; lastly, it pointed out that the wearing of a symbol intended to indicate their religious affiliation constituted a breach by employees of their obligations (see paragraph   26 below). 9.     By an application registered on 7 February 2001, the applicant asked the Paris Administrative Court to set aside the decision of 11 December 2000. 10.     By letters of 15 and 28 February 2001, the applicant was informed of the decision of the Director of Human Resources at the CASH to include her on the list of candidates for a recruitment test for social workers and to permit her to take part. This decision was taken on the basis of the decree of 26   March 1993 granting special status to social workers employed by State hospitals. That text stated that the social worker’s task was to assist patients and their families who were experiencing difficulties in their dealings with social services, by helping to draw up and implement the relevant programme in the establishment to which they were attached and also other social and educational programmes, in coordination, inter alia , with other institutions or social services. The applicant did not take part in the recruitment test. 11.     By a judgment of 17 October 2002, the Administrative Court held that the decision not to renew the contract had been compatible with the principles of secularism and the neutrality of public services. “... In view of Law no. 83-634 of 13 July 1983 [laying down the rights and duties of civil servants, see paragraph 25 below] ... Although civil-service employees, like all citizens, enjoy the freedom of conscience and of religion laid down in the constitutional, legislative and convention texts, which prohibit any discrimination based on their religious beliefs or their atheism, particularly in terms of access to positions, career progress and the disciplinary system, the principles of the secular nature of the State and the bodies to which its powers are delegated and of neutrality in public services preclude those employees, in the exercise of their duties, from being entitled to manifest their religious belief, especially through external sartorial expression; this principle, which is intended to protect the users of the service from any risk of influence or of interference with their own freedom of conscience, concerns all public services and not only the education service; this obligation must be applied with particular stringency in those public services where the users are in a fragile or dependent state;” It dismissed the applicant’s action, pointing out that the decision not to renew her contract had been taken on account of her refusal to remove her veil “following complaints submitted by certain patients in the care centre and in spite of repeated warnings by her line managers and friendly advice from her colleagues”. The court considered that on the basis of the above-mentioned principles concerning the expression of religious opinions within the public services, the administrative authorities had not committed an error of assessment in refusing to renew the contract on the implied ground of her wearing of “attire manifesting, in an ostensible manner, allegiance to a religion”. It concluded “thus, even though [the applicant’s] employer tolerated the wearing of this veil for several months and [her] conduct cannot be considered as deliberately provocative or proselytising, the hospital has not acted illegally in deciding not to renew the contract following her refusal to stop wearing the veil”. 12.     By a judgment of 2 February 2004, the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal held that the contested decision was disciplinary in nature, in that “it transpires from both the letter of 28 December from the CASH’s Director of Human Resources and the hospital’s defence pleadings that [the decision] was taken on account of [the applicant’s] persistence in wearing a veil for religious reasons during her working hours”. It therefore quashed the decision on procedural grounds, given that the applicant had not been informed of the reasons for the envisaged measure prior to its adoption, nor given an opportunity to consult her case file. 13.     In execution of the Court of Appeal’s judgment, the Director of the CASH invited the applicant to inspect the case file. By a reasoned judgment of 13 May 2005, he confirmed that her contract would not be renewed in the following terms. “As a result of the judgment of the Paris Administrative Court of Appeal dated 2   February 2004, which held that the non-renewal of your fixed-term contract which expired on 31 December 2000 had been disciplinary in nature, we invited you again to inspect your administrative file on 10 May 2005, in order to bring the procedure into line with the regulations. As required in execution of the same judicial decision, we hereby inform you that the disciplinary basis for the non-renewal of your contract is your refusal to remove your veil, in that it ostensibly manifests your religious affiliation. In application of the principles of the secular nature of the State and the neutrality of public services, which underlie the duty of discretion imposed on every State employee, even those employed under contract, your refusal to remove your head covering when carrying out your duties effectively amounts to a breach of your obligations, thus exposing you to a legitimate disciplinary sanction, as the Conseil d’État held, with regard to the principle, in its Opinion concerning Ms Marteaux, dated 3 May 2000. Our decision not to renew the contract is all the more justified in the present case in that you were required to be in contact with patients when carrying out your duties.” 14.     By a letter of 29 June 2005, the Administrative Court of Appeal informed the applicant that the CASH had taken the measures required by the judgment of 2   February 2004. It advised her that, where a decision was set aside on procedural grounds, the administrative body could legally take new decisions that were identical to those that had been set aside, provided that they complied with the relevant procedure, and that the new decision of 13   May 2005 could be challenged before the administrative court. 15.     In January 2006 the applicant asked the Versailles Administrative Court to set aside the decision of 13 May 2005. She argued, in particular, that the Conseil d’État ’s Opinion of 3 May 2000, relied upon by her employer, was intended to apply only to teachers. 16.     By a judgment of 26 October 2007, the court dismissed her request, basing its decision on the principles of State secularism and the neutrality of public services. “... However, while the Conseil d’État ’s Opinion of 3 May 2000 specifically concerns the case of an employee in the public education service, it also clearly states that the constitutional and legislative texts show that the principles of freedom of conscience, State secularism and the neutrality of public services apply to the public services in their entirety; although civil-service employees, like all citizens, enjoy the freedom of conscience and of religion laid down in the constitutional, legislative and convention texts, which prohibit any discrimination based on their religious beliefs or their atheism, particularly with regard to access to positions, career progress and also the disciplinary system, the principles of the secular nature of the State and the bodies to which its powers are delegated and of neutrality in public services preclude those employees, in the exercise of their duties, from being entitled to manifest their religious belief, especially through external sartorial expression; this principle is intended to protect the users of the service from any risk of influence being exerted or of interference with their own freedom of conscience. In view of the above-mentioned principles concerning the manifestation of religious opinions within the public service, the administrative body did not act illegally in refusing to renew the [applicant’s] contract on the implied ground of her wearing attire manifesting, in an ostensible manner, allegiance to a religion.” 17.     The applicant lodged an appeal against that judgment. 18.     By a judgment of 26 November 2009, the Versailles Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the judgment, reiterating the reasons given by the lower courts. 19.     The applicant appealed on points of law to the Conseil d’État . In her submissions, she emphasised that the Administrative Court of Appeal had deprived its judgment of any legal basis in that it had failed to specify the nature of the item of attire worn by her which had justified the sanction. She referred to the disproportionate nature of that sanction, and alleged that it had been incompatible with Article 9 of the Convention. 20.     By a judgment of 9 May 2011, the Conseil d’État declared the appeal inadmissible. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Principles of secularism and neutrality in public services 21.     In the case of Dogru v. France (no. 27058/05, 4 December 2008), which concerned the wearing of religious signs at school, the Court had occasion to elucidate the concept of secularism in France. It reiterated in that connection that the exercise of religious freedom in public society is directly linked to the principle of secularism. Arising out of a long French tradition, this principle has its origins in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789, Article 10 of which provides that “[n]o one shall be disquieted on account of his opinions, including his religious views, provided their manifestation does not disturb the public order established by law”. It also appears in the key Education Acts of 1882 and 1886, which introduced State primary education on a compulsory and secular basis. The real keystone of French secularism, however, is the Act of 9 December 1905, known as the Law on the separation between Church and State, which marked the end of a long conflict between the republicans, born of the French Revolution, and the Catholic Church. Section 1 provides: “The Republic shall ensure freedom of conscience. It shall guarantee free participation in religious worship, subject only to the restrictions laid down hereinafter in the interest of public order.” The principle of separation is affirmed in section 2 of the Act: “The Republic may not recognise, pay stipends to or subsidise any religious denomination ...” This “secular pact” entails a number of consequences both for public services and for users. It implies an acknowledgement of religious pluralism and State neutrality towards religions. The principle of secularism, the requirement of State neutrality and its corollary, equality, are enshrined in Article l of the Constitution of 4   October 1958, which reads as follows: “France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs. It shall be organised on a decentralised basis.” 22.     From the 1980s, the practice of wearing religious signs at school and in hospitals developed in France, giving rise to reactions based on the principle of secularism (see paragraph 29 below). On 3 July 2003 the President of the Republic set up “a commission to study the application of the principle of secularism in the Republic”, which was instructed “to reflect in an in-depth and serene manner ... on the practical requirements which should result for everyone from compliance with the principle of secularism”. The commission’s report, submitted to the President of the Republic on 11 December 2003, described the threat to secularism in schools and public services. The law of 15 March 2004, regulating the wearing of signs or dress by which pupils overtly manifest a religious affiliation, was adopted as a consequence of this report (see Dogru , cited above, §§ 30-31). 23.     It was also following this report that, on a referral by the Prime Minister, the Supreme Council for Integration ( Haut conseil à l’intégration ) submitted in January 2007 an opinion containing a “draft charter for secularism in public services”. This draft was included in the Prime Minister’s circular no. 5209/SG of 13 April 2007 on the Charter for secularism in public services, which reiterates the rights and duties of public-sector employees and also of persons using public services. “ Public-sector employees All public officials have a duty of strict neutrality. They must treat all persons equally and respect their freedom of conscience. The fact of a public official manifesting his or her religious convictions in the exercise of his or her duties shall amount to a breach of his or her obligations. It shall be for the managers of public services to ensure that the principle of secularism is applied in these services. Freedom of conscience shall be guaranteed to public officials. They shall be granted authorisations for absence to participate in religious festivals where this is compatible with the requirements of the normal running of the service. Users of public services All users shall be equal before the public service. The users of public services shall be entitled to express their religious convictions in so far as this is compatible with respect for the neutrality of the public service, its smooth running and the requirements of public order, security, health and hygiene. The users of public services shall refrain from any form of proselytism. The users of public services may not request the removal of a public official or of other users, or demand that the functioning of the public service or of a public facility be modified. However, the service shall attempt to take into consideration users’ convictions, in compliance with the rules to which it is subject and its smooth functioning. Where necessary to verify identity, users must comply with the attendant obligations. Users who are accommodated on a full-time basis by a public service, particularly within medico-social establishments, hospitals or prisons, shall be entitled to respect for their beliefs and may participate in practising their religion, subject to the restrictions necessary to ensure the smooth running of the service.” 24.     The Constitutional Council recently indicated that the principle of secularism is one of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution and that it must be defined as follows. “... pursuant to the first three sentences of the first paragraph of Article 1 of the Constitution, ‘France shall be an indivisible, secular, democratic and social Republic. It shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion. It shall respect all beliefs.’ The principle of secularism is one of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution; it follows that the State is neutral; it also follows that the Republic does not recognise any religious denomination; the principle of secularism requires, in particular, respect for all beliefs and the equality of all citizens before the law irrespective of religion, and requires that the Republic guarantee free participation in religious worship; it implies that the Republic does not pay stipends to any religious denomination;” (Decision no. 2012-297 QPC, 21   February 2013, Association for the Promotion and Expansion of Secular Thought [remuneration of pastors in the consistorial churches in the départements of Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin and Moselle]). 25.     The civil service includes all public officials, that is, all of the members of staff employed by a public entity, assigned in principle to an administrative public service and subject to a public-law regime. The civil service and the general rules applicable to it are organised into three branches: the State civil service, the local and regional civil service, and the hospital-based civil service. Public employees’ freedom of opinion, including religious opinion, is guaranteed by section 6 of the Law of 13 July 1983 laying down the rights and duties of civil servants. Allegiance to a religion may not be recorded in a public employee’s file, and it cannot be used as a discriminatory criterion against a candidate or a contractual employee seeking to obtain a permanent post; certain adjustments to working time are authorised in the name of religious freedom, provided that they are compatible with the smooth running of the service. At the same time, these employees’ freedom of conscience must be reconciled with the requirement of religious neutrality which is a distinctive feature of the public service. Public employees have a professional duty of neutrality. In carrying out his or her duties, a public employee must ensure equal treatment of citizens, whatever their convictions or beliefs. The principle of State neutrality implies that “the authorities and the public services must [not only] provide all the guarantees of neutrality; they must also give every appearance of that neutrality, so that the user can be in no doubt of it. It follows that every employee of a public service is subject to a particularly strict obligation of neutrality” (National Advisory Commission on Human Rights, Opinion on Secularism, Official Gazette no.   0235 of 9   October 2013). The duty of neutrality incumbent on public employees has been set out in detail in the case-law (see paragraph 26 below). However, a bill on the professional ethics and rights and obligations of civil servants, currently under discussion, was adopted by the National Assembly at its first reading on 7   October 2015. This text seeks to introduce into the Law of 13   July 1983 an obligation on civil servants to exercise their functions in compliance with the principle of secularism, by refraining from manifesting their religious opinion while carrying out their duties. The Constitutional Council has also held on several occasions that neutrality is a “fundamental principle of the public service” and that the principle of equality is its corollary (Constitutional Court decisions nos.   86 ‑ 217 DC of 18 September 1986, and 96-380 DC of 23 July 1996). 26.     According to the Conseil d’État ’s case-law, the principle of the neutrality of public services justifies placing limitations on the manifesting of religious beliefs by employees in exercising their functions. The Conseil d’État took a stand on this issue in the area of education many years ago: the fact of an employee in the State education service manifesting his or her religious beliefs while carrying out his or her duties is a breach of the “duty of strict neutrality that is required of every employee working in a public service” ( Conseil d’État (CE), 8 December 1948, Ms Pasteau , no. 91.406; CE, 3 May 1950, Ms Jamet , no. 98.284). In its Opinion of 3 May 2000 (CE, Opinion, Ms Marteaux , no. 217017), concerning the decision by a Director of Education to dismiss a secondary-school study supervisor who wore a headscarf, it affirmed that the principles of secularism and neutrality applied to all public services and gave a detailed explanation of the prohibition on employees’ manifesting their religious beliefs while carrying out their duties. “1.     It follows from the constitutional and legislative texts that the principle of freedom of conscience and that of the secular nature of the State and the neutrality of public services apply to all those services; 2.     Although employees of the State education service, like all public-sector employees, enjoy the freedom of conscience which prohibits any discrimination in access to posts and in career development based on their religion, the principle of secularism means that, in the context of the public service, they do not have the right to manifest their religious beliefs; It is not appropriate to distinguish between employees in this public service on the basis of whether or not they carry out teaching duties; 3.     It follows from the above considerations that the fact of employees of the State education service manifesting their religious beliefs while carrying out their duties, in particular by wearing a sign intended to indicate their allegiance to a religion, amounts to a breach of their obligations; The consequences of this breach, especially with regard to disciplinary measures, must be assessed by the authorities with due regard to the nature and degree of ostentatiousness of the sign in question, and of the other circumstances in which the breach is found, and are subject to judicial review;” This case-law has been extended to all public services. In a thematic file entitled “The administrative courts and the expression of religious convictions” published on its Internet site in November 2014, the Conseil d’État indicates with regard to the ban prohibiting employees from manifesting their religious convictions while on duty, in addition to what is stated in its Opinion of 3 May 2000, as follows. “The administrative courts are generally required to examine these questions in the context of disciplinary proceedings. The lawfulness of the sanction will then depend on how the religious convictions were expressed, the hierarchical level of the employee and the duties carried out by him or her, and also the warnings which he or she may have received. The sanction must also be proportionate. The Conseil d’État has thus upheld the sanction imposed on a public-sector employee who displayed his professional email address on the site of a religious association (CE, 15 October 2003, M.O. , no. 244428), and against another who had distributed religious documents to users during his working hours (CE, 19 February 2009, M.B. , no.   311633).” 27.     The requirement of neutrality is applicable to public services even if they are managed by private-law entities (CE, Sect., 31 January 1964, CAF de l’arrondissement de Lyon ). This aspect was also reiterated recently by the Court of Cassation in a case concerning the Seine-Saint-Denis Health Insurance Office ( Caisse primaire d’assurance maladie ), in respect of an employee working as a “health benefits administrator” who had been dismissed on the ground that she was wearing an Islamic headscarf in the form of a turban, in breach of the provisions of the internal rules. The Social Division of the Court of Cassation held that “the principles of neutrality and of the secular nature of the public service are applicable to the public services as a whole, including where they are provided by private-law entities” and that “the employees of health insurance offices ... are ... subject to specific constraints arising from the fact that they are engaged in a public-service mission, constraints which forbid them, inter alia , from manifesting their religious beliefs by external signs, especially through their attire;” (Cass. soc., 19   March 2013, no.   12 ‑ 11.690): “... having noted that the employee carries out her duties in a public service, and given the nature of the activity carried out by the Insurance Office, which consists, in particular, of providing sickness benefits to persons insured under the social security scheme in the Seine-Saint-Denis département , and that she works, specifically, as a ‘sickness benefits administrator’ in a centre which receives an average of 650 users per day, it being irrelevant whether or not the employee was in direct contact with the public, the Court of Appeal was able to conclude that the restriction imposed by the Insurance Office’s internal rules was necessary in order to implement the principle of secularism, in order to guarantee the neutrality of the public service to the centre’s users;” 28.     Recently, in the course of judicial proceedings that were widely reported in the media, the Social Division of the Court of Cassation, in a judgment of 19   March 2013, initially declared illegal the dismissal of an employee in a private nursery whose internal rules called for “compliance with the principles of secularism and neutrality” on account of her refusal to remove her Islamic headscarf. Faced with the resistance of the Paris Court of Appeal, to which the case had been remitted, the plenary Court of Cassation ultimately upheld those proceedings in a judgment of 25 June 2014. On the occasion of the judgment of 19 March 2013 and of the judgment of the same date described in paragraph 27 above, the “Defender of Rights” (the French Ombudsman) asked the Conseil d’État to prepare a report (Report adopted by the General Assembly of the Conseil d’État on 19   December 2013). The Ombudsman wished to have the Conseil d’État ’s opinion on various matters relating to the application of the principle of religious neutrality in the public services, in order to respond to complaints raising the question of the line between a public-service mission, participation in a public service, a mission in the general interest for which certain private structures had responsibility, and the application of the principle of neutrality and secularism. In its report, the Conseil d’État reiterated, inter alia , as follows. “1.     Freedom of religious convictions is general. However, restrictions may be placed on their expression in certain circumstances. The principle of the secular nature of the State, which concerns the relations between the public authorities and private persons, and the principle of the neutrality of public services, a corollary of the principle of equality which governs the operation of the public services, give rise to a particular requirement of religious neutrality in these services. This requirement applies in principle to all the public services, but does not apply, as such, outside these services ... 2.     Labour law respects employees’ freedom of conscience and prohibits discrimination in any form. It may, however, authorise restrictions on the freedom to manifest religious opinions or beliefs provided that these restrictions are justified by the nature of the task to be carried out and are proportionate to the aim pursued ... 4.     The requirement of religious neutrality prohibits employees of public bodies and employees of private-law entities to which the State has entrusted the management of a public service from manifesting their religious convictions while carrying out their duties. This prohibition must, however, be reconciled with the principle, arising from Article   9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, that any infringements of freedom of religious expression must be proportionate. ...” B.     Principles of neutrality in the public hospital service 29.     The 2013-14 annual report by the Secularism Observatory, in the section entitled “Overview of secularism in health establishments” stated that, following the report by the Commission on the application of the principle of secularism in the Republic (see paragraph 22 above), legislation on secularism in hospitals had been envisaged. That Commission’s report indicated as follows. “... Nor are hospitals exempt from such matters. They have already been confronted with certain religious prohibitions, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ refusal to accept transfusions. More recently, an increasing number of husbands or fathers have refused on religious grounds to have their wives or daughters cared for or delivered in childbirth by male doctors. In consequence, some women have been deprived of epidurals. Nurses have been refused on the grounds of their supposed religious affiliation. More generally, certain religious concerns on the part of patients may disrupt the functioning of a hospital: corridors are transformed into private prayer areas; parallel canteens have been organised alongside the hospital canteens to serve traditional food, in breach of the health regulations. ... Certain religious claims are now being made by public employees. Public-service employees have demanded the right to wear a kippa or a veil indicating their denominational allegiance in the workplace. Trainee doctors have recently expressed the same wish. Such conduct, which is contrary to the principle of neutrality underlying the public service, is a matter of serious concern. ...” The Secularism Observatory explained that the Ministry of Health had “in fact regulated the issue by means of a circular” (see paragraph 30 below) and that, at this stage, the existing legal arsenal was sufficient. It specified that the information obtained from health-care establishments indicated that the situation had become more peaceful and was under control. With regard to hospital staff, the most frequent problems were veil-wearing, prayers at certain times of the day and requests for adjustments to working schedules in order not to have to work on religious holidays. It noted that the information available “show[ed] that, with appropriate dialogue, these situations are resolved by a settlement that complies with the principle of public employees’ neutrality”. 30.     The circular of 6 May 1995 on the rights of hospitalised patients, which includes a Charter of Hospitalised Patients, stated that the rights of patients “are to be exercised in compliance with the freedom of others” (circular DGS/DH/95, no. 22). In addition to the guidance with regard to the users of the public hospital service described above (see paragraph 23 sbove), circular no. DHOS/G/2005/57 of 2 February 2005 on secularism in health institutions provides as follows. “... I.     Religious freedom, principles of neutrality and non-discrimination As reiterated in the Stasi Report submitted to the President of the Republic on 11   December 2003 (p. 22), the secularism which is enshrined in Article 1 of the 1958 Constitution requires the Republic to ensure ‘equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of origin, race or religion’. For hospitals, this implies that: –     all patients are dealt with in the same way, whatever their religious beliefs; –     patients must not have grounds to doubt the neutrality of hospital staff. A.     Equal treatment for patients ... ... The above-cited Charter of Hospitalised Patients, while reiterating patients’ freedom of action and of expression in the religious field, points out: ‘These rights are to be exercised with due respect for the freedom of others. Any proselytism is prohibited, whether by persons being treated in the establishment, volunteers, visitors or members of staff.’ In this respect, particular care must be taken to ensure that the expression of religious beliefs does not impair: –     the quality of care and hygiene regulations (the sick person must accept the clothing imposed in view of the treatment to be administered); –     the tranquillity of other hospitalised persons and of their relatives; –     the proper functioning of the service. ... B.     Neutrality of the public hospital service and of civil servants and public employees The duty of neutrality was laid down in the case-law more than half a century ago ( Conseil d’État , 8   December 1948, Ms Pasteau , and 3 May 1950, Ms Jamet ). In a dispute concerning a school, the Conseil d’État issued an Opinion dated 3   May 2000 ... [See paragraph 26 above.] ... In a judgment dated 17 October 2002 ( Ms E. ) [see paragraph 11 above], ..., the [Administrative] Court reiterated that the principle of neutrality applied to all public employees, and not only those working in the area of education: ... In a judgment dated 27 November 2003 ( Ms Nadjet Ben Abdallah ), the Lyons Administrative Court of Appeal held that: ‘The wearing by Ms Ben Abdallah ... of a scarf which she explicitly asserted as being religious in nature, and the repeated refusal to comply with the order to remove it, although she had been alerted to the unambiguous status of the applicable law ... amounted to a serious fault such as to provide legal grounds for the suspension measure imposed on her. ...’ These principles apply to all civil servants and public employees, with the exception of the ministers of the various religions mentioned in Article R. 1112-46 of the Code of Public Health. It is reiterated that public employees are employees who participate in the execution of a public service: contractual employees, interns ... You will ensure that in application of Article L. 6143-7 of the Code of Public Health the directors of public health establishments observe those principles strictly, by systematically imposing a sanction in the event of any failure to comply with these obligations or by informing the regional directors of Health and Social Affairs of any fault committed by an employee for whom the appointing body is the Prefect or the Minister. II.     Free choice of practitioner and discrimination against a public-service employee ... Lastly, this freedom of choice on the part of the patient does not enable the person being treated to object to a member of the care team performing a diagnosis or providing care on the basis of that individual’s known or supposed religion. ...” C.     Relevant case-law 31.     The relevant decisions regarding the wearing of the veil by public-service employees are cited in the above-mentioned circular (see paragraph   30 above). The Administrative Court judgment delivered on 17   October 2002 in the present case is very frequently cited, given that it confirms that the principle of neutrality is valid for all public services, and not only those operating in the area of public education. The judgment delivered on 27 November 2003 by the Lyons Administrative Court of Appeal in the case of Ms Ben Abdallah (see paragraph 30 above), which concerned a female employment inspector who refused to remove her veil, is also a leading judgment. However, no appeal was made to the Conseil d’État in that case. The judgment indicates that the decision on whether to suspend an employee pending a sanction was to be made in view of “all of the circumstances of the case and, among other factors, the nature and degree of the conspicuousness of the sign, the nature of the tasks entrusted to the employee, and whether he or she exercised powers conferred by public law, or representative functions”. In that judgment, the Government Commissioner emphasised that “... an individualised assessment of the duty of neutrality in the civil service, such as that recommended by the Strasbourg Court ( Dahlab v. Switzerland (dec.), no.   42393/98, ECHR 2001 ‑ V), would be fully compatible with the approach adopted by the case-law of the ordinary courts for private-sector employees. With regard to the specific case of wearing the Islamic veil, the ordinary courts already take account of the nature of the duties performed and of the company image that is transmitted by the fact of an employee wearing this symbol. Under this approach, assessment criteria would then be identified which, without reneging on the principle of neutrality, would lead to an arguably more pragmatic application of them, taking account of the nature of the duties performed (education, management functions) and the circumstances in which they are carried out (contact with the public, whether or not a uniform or regulation clothing is worn, the degree of vulnerability or sensitivity of users such as pupils or patients).” However, he suggested that the authorities refrained from going down that path, indicating that, ultimately, it did not appear possible to compromise on civil servants’ duty of neutrality. “First of all, it is a question of principle. Irrespective of their wishes, and also because they have to a certain extent chosen [this employment], civil servants belong primarily to the public sphere, the rationale for which is service in the general interest and the equal treatment of all users. As the Government Commissioner Rémy Schwartz has pointed out, the neutrality of the service is ‘designed above all for the users; it is with the aim of respecting their convictions that the State is neutral, in order to allow for their full expression’; it is this social role which justifies the fact that the individual who continues to exist within the public employee effaces himself or herself behind the depository of public authority, behind the persona of a civil servant who is entrusted with a public-service mission. While the concept of public service may indeed narrow in the future, it does not ultimately seem possible to compromise on the immutable principles which constitute its exceptionality, particularly the fact of its employees being subject, on account of their status, to a code of conduct and an ethical line. Equally, we will not dwell further on the fears already expressed concerning the gradual erosion, under the impetus of identity politics, of the essential coherence of the social fabric, characterised by adhesion to the universal values guaranteed by the State. Moreover, Rémy Schwartz’s conclusions also emphasise the impracticality of an individualised solution that would depend on the nature of the tasks and the degree of maturity of the public in question, given the variety and even the variability over time of the conceivable situations; in addition, it is not clear why an employee’s freedom of conscience, by dint of excessive demands in respect of religious convictions, would justify an infringement of the freedom of conscience which is also enjoyed by his or her colleagues: the interests of the service may thus also justify that, even in the absence of direct contact with the users, an employee’s freedom to express his or her convictions may be restricted. ... This reaffirmation of the principle of the absolute neutrality of the public service leads to the necessity of issuing a warning in respect of any deviation from the rules that in itself amounts to a disciplinary fault: on the basis of that finding, there would be nothing to prevent the disciplinary body, in the same wording as the Ms Marteaux Opinion, from assessing particular cases on an individual basis and from taking account of specific circumstances so that, having put an end to the culpable conduct, it can evaluate the consequences, necessarily including in its assessment the degree of compliance or, on the contrary, intransigence, on the part of the civil servant once he or she has been invited to adhere to the neutrality of the service. ...” III.     COMPARATIVE LAW 32.     In Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom (nos. 48420/10 and 3   others, § 47, ECHR 2013), the Court indicated that an analysis of the law and practice relating to the wearing of religious symbols at work across twenty-six Council of Europe Contracting States demonstrated that “... the majority of States the wearing of religious clothing and/or religious symbols in the workplace is unregulated. In three States, namely Ukraine, Turkey and some cantons of Switzerland, the wearing of religious clothing and/or religious symbols for civil servants and other public-sector employees is prohibited, but in principle it is allowed to employees of private companies. In five States – Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands – the domestic courts have expressly admitted, at least in principle, an employer’s right to impose certain limitations upon the wearing of religious symbols by employees; however, there are neither laws nor regulations in any of these countries expressly allowing an employer to do so. In France and Germany, there is a strict ban on the wearing of religious symbols by civil servants and State employees, while in the three other countries the attitude is more flexible. A blanket ban on wearing religious clothing and/or symbols at work by private employees is not allowed anywhere. On the contrary, in France it is expressly prohibited by law. Under French legislation, in order to be declared lawful any such restriction must pursue a legitimate aim, relating to sanitary norms, the protection of health and morals, the credibility of the company’s image in the eyes of the customer, and must also pass a proportionality test.” 33.     Recently, in a judgment of 27 January 2015, the German Constitutional Court held that a general prohibition on the wearing of the veil by female teachers in State schools was incompatible with the Constitution, unless it constitutes a sufficiently tangible risk to the State’s neutrality or a peaceful environment in schools (1 BvR 471/10, 1 BvR 1181/10). THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONVENTION 34.     The applicant alleged that the refusal to renew her contract as a social worker had been contrary to her freedom to manifest her religion as laid down in Article 9 of the Convention, which provides: “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 2.     Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall