CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 17 mars 2016

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THE UNITED KINGDOM   (Application no. 6287/10)                     JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   17 March 2016   FINAL   12/09/2016   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.   In the case of Hammerton v. the United Kingdom, The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska, President,   Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,   Paul Mahoney,   Aleš Pejchal,   Robert Spano,   Armen Harutyunyan,   Pauliine Koskelo, judges, and André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 23 February 2016, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 6287/10) against the United   Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a British national, Mr William Hammerton (“the applicant”), on 15 December 2009. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr A. Guile, a lawyer practising in London. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agents, Ms A. Sornarajah and Ms R. Tomlinson of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that his committal to prison for civil contempt, and the subsequent civil proceedings by which he sought to obtain redress, violated his rights under Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. 4.     On 15 March 2012 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1954 and lives in London. A.     The contempt 1.     The contempt finding 6.     The applicant married in 1977. He separated from his wife in 2002. On 9 January 2004 he issued an application in the County Court for contact with two of his five children. 7.     The applicant and his wife divorced on 27 August 2004. His legal aid certificate was withdrawn following a financial award made as part of the divorce. 8.     Meanwhile the contact proceedings continued. The applicant’s former wife alleged that he had harassed her and applied to the County Court for protection. On 21 December 2004 the applicant gave an undertaking to Wandsworth County Court: “Not to contact, or communicate with, [his former wife], [her] mother or father, nor her solicitors in any way whatsoever ... except through his own solicitors.” 9.     On 23 February 2005 Woolwich County Court granted the applicant’s former wife an injunction which inter alia prevented him from using or threatening violence towards her. 10.     On 6 July 2005 the applicant’s former wife issued an application for him to be committed to prison for breach of the undertaking and injunction. 11.     His Honour Judge Collins, sitting in the Central London Civil Justice Centre, chose to hear the applicant’s application for contact and his former wife’s application for him to be committed for contempt at the same time. He heard the applications on 26 and 27 July 2005. 12.     The applicant was unrepresented during the proceedings before Judge   Collins. His position as regards legal aid was due to be reviewed shortly after the hearing. The judge made no inquiries into why the applicant was unrepresented or whether he wanted representation. 13.     On 27 July 2005 the judge made an order for indirect contact. He also committed the applicant to prison for three months because he had breached the undertaking and the order and was therefore in contempt of court. 14 .     The applicant contacted lawyers from prison in order to appeal his committal but, having accepted instructions, they failed to assist him. He subsequently lodged a complaint against them and received five hundred pounds sterling (“GBP”) in compensation. 15.     The applicant was released on 9 September 2005, after approximately six and a half weeks’ imprisonment, pursuant to provisions permitting early release. 2.     Appeal against the contempt finding 16 .     On around 14 September 2005 the applicant lodged an appeal out of time against the finding that he had been in contempt of court. He subsequently obtained legal aid and legal representation to pursue those proceedings. 17 .     On 23 March 2007 the Court of Appeal quashed both the finding of contempt and the sentence imposed. It found that the County Court’s errors of procedure were grave ones. Lord Justice Moses, delivering the first judgment, began by setting out a number of well-established principles relevant to committal hearings. The need to observe the Human Rights Act 1998 (see paragraphs 50 to 55 below) was central to the practice direction on committal proceedings, which had applied to the proceedings before the County Court (see paragraph 41 below). Such proceedings concerned a “criminal charge” for the purpose of Article 6 of the Convention and the defendant therefore benefited from the right to legal assistance set out in Article   6 §   3   (c). A defendant to committal proceedings was not obliged to give evidence and enjoyed a right against self ‑ incrimination and, referring to Article 6 § 2, the burden of proving guilt lay on the person seeking committal. 18.     In the applicant’s case, Moses LJ observed that these matters had not been drawn to the attention of the judge. He continued: “11.   Untutored and unassisted as the judge was, matters went wrong from the beginning. The judge noted, at the outset, that Mr Hammerton was acting in person. He made no comment about it whatever. In particular, he did not ask anything as to the circumstances in which he was unrepresented. Had he done so, he would have learnt that earlier legal representation had been withdrawn by the Legal Services Commission after he received a sum of money on his divorce ... That was the subject matter of a review panel which was due to sit two weeks later. This emerged at the outset of the cross-examination by counsel for Mrs Hammerton on the second day of the hearing.” 19.     Moses LJ considered that once the judge had learnt that the issue of legal aid was the subject of an imminent review panel, there was no reason why the committal hearing should not have been adjourned until the issue of legal representation had been resolved. He was of the view that the judge had been obliged to ask appropriate questions and to consider, at the very outset of the hearing, whether there should be an adjournment so as to enable the defendant to be represented. In the absence of evidence of intransigence on the part of the applicant, and he noted that there was none, there was no reason why the applicant should not be represented. 20.     Moses LJ further found that the decision to hear the application for committal at the same time as the application for contact led to inescapable errors in procedure. He noted that it was for the applicant to establish his claim for contact, and for his former wife to prove breaches of the undertaking and the court order. The applicant should have been warned that he did not need to give evidence; he received no such warning. 21.     Moses LJ concluded that the decision of the judge to hear both applications at the same time had placed the applicant in an impossible position, noting that there was no hint at any stage in the transcript of the proceedings of anyone advising the applicant of his rights in respect of the committal proceedings, nor of the judge reminding himself of the different burden and standard of proof in the two applications. Further, the judge had given no explanation as to why he considered it essential to deal with both applications at the same time. 22.     Finally, Moses LJ considered that the judge again fell into error at the sentencing stage. He noted that the judge never paused, even at that stage, to consider whether the applicant should have legal representation or to remind himself of the relevant principles. He observed that the judge had paid no heed to the purpose of punishment in contempt proceedings. Since he had not been represented and had never been given an opportunity to mitigate, the sentencing phase of the committal was “fatally flawed”. 23 .     Moses LJ then assessed whether it was necessary for the court to consider whether legal representation would have made a difference in the applicant’s case. He commented that it was almost impossible to envisage a case where such representation would not be needed, if only, as this case demonstrated, to remind a judge of the principles which applied. Even in a case where a defendant admitted every breach alleged, representation would be needed so as to assist the judge in considering the appropriate disposal. The case was certainly not one where the court would decline to take action despite a violation of Article 6. There was ample material to suggest that legal representation would have made a difference. Quite apart from the question of the appropriate sentence, there was material relevant to the facts of the breaches to which the judge’s attention ought to have been drawn. 24.     Lord Justice Wall fully agreed with Moses LJ, noting: “35.   There are, of course, many cases in the books in which this court has upheld committal orders even although they have been made in proceedings which were procedurally flawed ... Provided the contemnor has had a fair trial and the order has been made on valid grounds, the existence of a defect in the committal application or in the order served will not result in it being set aside except in so far as the interests of justice require that to be done ... 36.   The instant case, however, is plainly not in that category, and I am in complete agreement with Moses LJ that the defects in the process in the instant case are so serious that the interests of justice plainly require both the committal order and the consequential sentence of imprisonment to be set aside.” 25.     Specifically on the question of access to legal advice, he added: “52.     ... Even more important, however, in my view is the proposition that in the absence of exceptional circumstances, it is a breach of a party’s ECHR Article 6 rights to be sent to prison for contempt of court without the benefit of legal representation. No magistrates’ court would impose a custodial sentence on an unrepresented defendant, and in my judgment, no family court should send a litigant in person to prison for contempt without first making arrangements for that litigant to be legally represented.” B.     The claim for damages 26.     On 20 March 2008 the applicant commenced proceedings for damages under common law for the tort of wrongful imprisonment and under the Human Rights Act 1998 (see paragraphs 50-55 below), relying on Articles 5 and 6 of the Convention. He sought an extension of time for lodging his claim. 27.     On 25 February 2009 the High Court dismissed his claim and refused the extension of time. However, Mr Justice Blake made it clear that had he considered there to be merit in the claim, he would have extended time. He had therefore considered the merits of the applicant’s claim. 28 .     Blake J noted at the outset that the Court of Appeal had identified three main errors in the applicant’s case: the failure to inquire into why he was not represented and to consider whether to adjourn the committal proceedings to enable him to obtain representation; the joinder of the committal proceedings and the contact order application, which undermined the burden of proof and the applicant’s right not to give evidence in the committal proceedings; and the fact that he was not given the opportunity to mitigate before sentence was passed. Blake J considered it plain from the judgment of the Court of Appeal that although it had granted no formal declaration that the committal hearing had breached the applicant’s human rights, it had been of the view that it had and that had been the tenor of its findings. 29.     As to the false imprisonment claim, Blake J referred to the long ‑ standing recognition in the case-law that there was immunity from suit for a claim based on alleged errors of a circuit judge of competent jurisdiction that resulted in detention, in the absence of malice. The applicant’s claim accordingly failed. 30.     He considered equally hopeless the applicant’s claim that any violation of an Article 6 § 1 right gave rise to a right to damages under the Human Rights Act 1998. He found that section 9(3) of the Act, which precludes damages in respect of a judicial act done in good faith, with the exception of damages required by Article 5 § 5 of the Convention (see paragraph   55 below), was inconsistent with the applicant’s claim. He also referred to the fact that just satisfaction under the Convention was a matter of discretion. 31 .     As to the claim under Article 5 of the Convention, Blake J referred to this Court’s judgments in the cases of Benham v. the United Kingdom [GC], 10 June 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ III, Perks and Others v. the United Kingdom , nos. 25277/94 and others, 12 October 1999 and Lloyd and Others v. the United Kingdom , nos. 29798/96 and others, 1 March 2005. He decided that the applicant’s claim that his detention was a violation of Article   5 §   1 because any hearing in which a violation of Article 6 occurred was not in accordance with law was: “a slightly more modest reworking of the article 6 submission that has been already considered and summarily rejected. Again I reject this reworking of the submission for similar reasons to those already given, but more particularly for the principles spelt out in the trio of Community charge cases.” 32 .     Blake J concluded that the applicant’s detention pursuant to the order of Judge Collins was not so gross or obvious an irregularity, within the meaning of § 115 of the Court’s judgment in Lloyd and Others , cited above, as to be not in accordance with the law. In reaching this conclusion, he noted, inter alia , that the County Court was a court of competent jurisdiction; that proper notice of the hearing and of the committal application had been given; that the record of proceedings did not appear to reveal any application by the applicant for an adjournment to seek legal representation; that there was no failure to follow a statutory prerequisite because the general requirement to observe Article 6 imposed by the Human Rights Act 1998 was not the same as a precise rule prohibiting committal unless a condition was complied with; that, similarly, the practice direction (see paragraph   41 below), which set out the need to observe the Human Rights Act, was in general terms and did not amount to a condition precedent; that the Court of Appeal, at the time of the County Court’s decision, had not made an unambiguous finding that a lack of representation at a committal hearing would always violate Article 6, although its finding in the present case meant that Article 6 might be considered a condition precedent in future cases; and that there was no hint of malice or bad faith by the judge. 33 .     Blake J also found that the Court of Appeal’s three principal criticisms all suggested that the County Court had erroneously exercised its judgment. Erroneous exercises of judgment did not make decisions not in accordance with law or arbitrary in the sense indicated in the Article   5   §   1 case-law. 34 .     Having thus concluded, Blake J explained that, had he reached the contrary conclusion, it would have been necessary to consider what the causal nexus between the unfairness and the detention resulting from the unfairness was. He accepted that where detention was in violation of Article   5 § 1 it was necessary and appropriate to visit it with a measure of damages, however modest. He found that, if the family-law applications had been separated correctly and the applicant had been represented, a finding of contempt would nevertheless have been inevitable. However, whilst custody was the more probable outcome, the length of sentence would have been significantly shorter and approximately fourteen days, so the applicant would not have served six weeks in prison. He indicated that, had a violation of Article 5 been established, he would have awarded damages in the sum of GBP 6,000, on an equitable basis. 35.     The applicant sought leave to appeal out of time. On 27 August 2009 leave to appeal was refused on the papers. The judge commented that he might consider extending time if there was a real prospect of success, but in his view the judgment would be upheld. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Contempt of court 1.     Legislation 36 .     Section 14 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981, as amended, provides in relevant part: “(1)   In any case where a court has power to commit a person to prison for contempt of court ..., the committal shall ... be for a fixed term, and that term shall not on any occasion exceed two years in the case of committal by a superior court, or one month in the case of committal by an inferior court. ... (4A)   For the purposes of the preceding provisions of this section the county court shall be treated as a superior court and not as an inferior court.” 37.     Section 258(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, as then in force, provided that the section applied, inter alios , to persons committed to prison for contempt of court. Section 258(2) of the Act provided that as soon as a person to whom the section applied had served one-half of the term for which he was committed, the Secretary of State’s duty was to release him unconditionally. 2.     Case-law and other relevant legal materials (a)     The nature of civil contempt 38 .     In R v. O’Brien [2014] UKSC 23, Lord Toulson, giving judgment on behalf of the Supreme Court, observed that English law had long recognised a distinction between “civil contempt”, which was conduct not in itself a crime but which was punishable by the court to ensure that its orders were observed, and “criminal contempt”. Lord Toulson stated: “38.   Breach of an order made (or undertaking obtained) in the course of legal proceedings may result in punishment of the person against whom the order was made (or from whom the undertaking was obtained) as a form of contempt ... However, a contempt of that kind does not constitute a criminal offence. Although the penalty contains a punitive element, its primary purpose is to make the order of the court effective. A person who commits this type of contempt does not acquire a criminal record.” (b)     The power to commit for contempt for failure to respect an undertaking 39 .     In Roberts v. Roberts [1990] 2 F.L.R. 111, the Court of Appeal accepted that an individual could be committed for contempt where he had failed to abide by an undertaking made to a court. 40 .     Subsequent cases, including R v O’Brien (see paragraph 38 above), have continued to accept the validity of committal for such failures. (c)     The domestic law application of Article 6 to contempt (i)     The 2001 Practice Direction on committal applications in family proceedings ([2001] 1 WLR 1253) 41 .     The practice direction, as then in force, set out that Article 6 of the Convention was to be fully applicable to family proceedings. (ii)     Re   K   (Children) [2002] EWCA Civ 1559 42 .     In Re   K   (Children) , the Court of Appeal was asked to consider the appeal of a mother against an order committing her to prison for contempt which was made in a hearing in which she was not represented. Lady Justice Hale (as she then was), with whom the other judges agreed, decided that the proceedings were “undoubtedly” a criminal charge for the purposes of Article 6 of the Convention and that, accordingly, the additional protections of Article 6 § 3 applied. The warrant for the appellant to go to prison was set aside. (iii)     PG v. LMR [2003] EWCA Civ 489 43 .     In PG v. LMR , the Court of Appeal was asked to consider the appeal of a father against a suspended committal order made by a County Court. Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss, as she then was, giving the judgment of the court, decided, inter alia , that the County Court should have ensured by granting an adjournment that the appellant had the opportunity to obtain representation and that it should have informed him that he was not compelled to give evidence. Dame Butler-Sloss decided that the County Court’s procedure had been seriously flawed and substantially unfair and set aside the committal order. B.     Immunity of justices of the peace 1.     In Re McC. (A Minor) [1985] AC 528 44 .     In In Re McC the House of Lords was asked to consider whether Northern Irish magistrates were immune from liability for false imprisonment relating to their unlawful order by which they sent a fourteen ‑ year ‑ old boy to a training school without informing him, as required by statute, of his right to apply for legal aid. Lord Bridge, with whom the other Law Lords agreed, decided that it was necessary to establish the meaning of acting “without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction” as that term was used in the relevant Northern Irish legislation on magistrates’ immunity from liability. Only where the actions of magistrates were “without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction” would there be no immunity. 45 .     Lord Bridge decided that the Court of Appeal of Northern Ireland’s decision that every error of law by magistrates amounted to acting without or in excess of jurisdiction so as to deprive them of immunity was incorrect. He decided that magistrates acted without or in excess of jurisdiction if (i)   they acted without having jurisdiction of the cause, that is to say at the outset of the proceedings the court had no jurisdiction to entertain the proceedings at all; (ii) a statutory condition precedent to their having jurisdiction of the cause was never satisfied; or (iii) something quite exceptional occurred in the course of proceedings to oust their jurisdiction. 46.     Whilst an error of law or fact in deciding a collateral issue on which jurisdiction depended or an absence of any evidence to support a conviction would not be sufficient to oust jurisdiction in the sense of (iii), if in the course of hearing a matter within their jurisdiction the justices were guilty of a gross and obvious procedural irregularity such as one justice absenting himself and relying on another to inform him of what had happened in his absence or refusing to allow a defendant to give evidence, jurisdiction would be ousted. 47.     Lord Bridge also found that justices might act in excess of jurisdiction even though they had jurisdiction of the cause and tried a case impeccably if their conviction of a defendant did not provide a proper foundation in law for the subsequent sentence or order made against him. 48 .     Lord Bridge concluded that the justices’ failure to inform the claimant of his right to legal aid was a failure to observe a statutory condition precedent to passing sentence in the circumstances of the case and was analogous to a failure to observe a statutory condition precedent to jurisdiction of the cause. 2.     Regina v. Manchester City Magistrates’ Court, Ex parte Davies, [1989] QB 631 49.     In Ex parte Davies the Court of Appeal was asked to consider the appeal of three magistrates found liable in damages for unlawful imprisonment following their committal of an individual for failure to pay local taxes. The Court of Appeal, in deciding to uphold the magistrates’ liability, found that In Re McC (see paragraphs 44 to 48 above) applied in England and Wales. C.     Human rights protection under domestic law 1.     The Human Rights Act 1998 50 .     Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998 (“the Human Rights Act”) provides that primary and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with Convention rights so far as it is possible to do so. Section 1(1) of the Act defines “Convention rights” as the rights and fundamental freedoms set out in Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention, Articles 1 to 3 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 1 of Protocol   No.   13. 51 .     Section 4(2) of the Human Rights Act provides that domestic courts may make a declaration of incompatibility if they are satisfied that a provision of primary legislation is incompatible with a Convention right. 52.     Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act provides that it is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. Section 6(3) clarifies that “public authority” includes a court or tribunal and any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature. 53.     Section 7(1) provides that a person claiming that a public authority has acted in a manner which is unlawful pursuant to section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act, or that it proposes to act in such a manner, may bring proceedings against the public authority or rely on the Convention right(s) concerned in any legal proceedings. He may only bring proceedings or rely on the Convention right(s) if he is, or would be, a victim of the unlawful act. 54.     Section 8 of the Act sets out available remedies and provides: “(1)   In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public authority which the court finds is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate. ... (3)   No award of damages is to be made unless, taking account of all the circumstances of the case, ... the court is satisfied that the award is necessary to afford just satisfaction to the person in whose favour it is made. (4)   In determining– (a)   whether to award damages, ... the court must take into account the principles applied by the European Court of Human Rights in relation to the award of compensation under Article 41 of the Convention.” 55 .     Section 9(3) limits the possibility of claiming damages where the act or failure of which an individual complains is a judicial act or failure: “In proceedings under this Act in respect of a judicial act done in good faith, damages may not be awarded otherwise than to compensate a person to the extent required by Article 5(5) of the Convention.” 2.     The nature of the Convention in the domestic law of the United Kingdom 56 .     In R v. Lyons and Others [2002] UKHL 44, Lord Hoffman stated: “Parliament may pass a law which mirrors the terms of the treaty and in that sense incorporates the treaty into English law. But even then, the metaphor of incorporation may be misleading. It is not the treaty but the statute which forms part of English law. And English courts will not (unless the statute expressly so provides) be bound to give effect to interpretations of the treaty by an international court, even though the United Kingdom is bound by international law to do so.” 57.     In In Re McKerr [2004] UKHL 12, Lord Nicholls stated: “26. ... I respectfully consider that some of these courts ... fell into error by failing to keep clearly in mind the distinction between (1) rights arising under the Convention and (2) rights created by the Human Rights Act by reference to the Convention. These two sets of rights now exist side by side. But there are significant differences between them. The former existed before the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 and they continue to exist. They are not as such part of this country’s law because the Convention does not form part of this country’s law. That is still the position. These rights, arising under the Convention, are to be contrasted with rights created by the Human Rights Act. The latter came into existence for the first time on 2 October 2000. They are part of this country’s law. The extent of these rights, created as they were by the Human Rights Act, depends upon the proper interpretation of that Act.” 58.     Lord Hoffman stated: “65. ... Although people sometimes speak of the Convention having been incorporated into domestic law, that is a misleading metaphor. What the Act has done is to create domestic rights expressed in the same terms as those contained in the Convention. But they are domestic rights, not international rights. Their source is the statute, not the Convention. They are available against specific public authorities, not the United Kingdom as a state. And their meaning and application is a matter for domestic courts, not the court in Strasbourg.” 59.     Finally, in In Re P [2008] UKHL 38, Lord Hoffman observed: “33.   As this House affirmed in In re McKerr ... ‘Convention rights’ within the meaning of the 1998 Act are domestic and not international rights.” 60 .     Lord Mance also commented: “128. ... The Act creates as ‘part of this country’s law’ rights in the same terms as the Convention rights, and the interpretation and impact of those new domestic rights depends upon the 1998 Act: see In re McKerr ... ” D.     The effect of a violation of Article 6 on the lawfulness of a decision to detain 61 .     In Uday Ratra v. Department for Constitutional Affairs [2004] EWCA Civ 731, which concerned a claim for damages for false imprisonment following a committal for civil contempt, Lord   Justice   Tuckey, giving judgment for the court, observed: “25 ... It is clear from the decision in Benham itself that not every breach of Article   6 will constitute unlawfulness for the purposes of Article 5. The undecided question is whether serious breaches of Article 6 could have this effect. ... 26 ... I think this is a difficult and important issue which the courts will need to resolve in a case where it matters and with the benefit of full argument.” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION 62.     The applicant argued that his committal to prison following the hearing in July 2005 breached his right to liberty under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, which reads in relevant part as follows: “1.   Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: (a)   the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court; (b)   the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by law” 63.     The Government contested that argument. A.     Admissibility 64.     The Court is satisfied that the complaint raises arguable issues under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, so that it cannot be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. The Court further considers that the complaint is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ submissions (a)     The applicant 65.     The applicant argued that his detention should be considered under Article 5 § 1 (a). He observed that contempt was treated by domestic law as a criminal matter. 66.     The applicant argued that, because the Human Rights Act (see paragraphs   50 ‑ 55 above) incorporated Article 6 into the domestic law of the United Kingdom, any violation of Article 6 that occurred during his committal hearing automatically rendered his detention not “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” and therefore unlawful under Article   5 §   1. He relied on Nakach v. the Netherlands , no. 5379/02, §§   40 ‑ 43, 30 June 2005; Schenkel v. the Netherlands , no. 62015/00, 27   October 2005; and Bik v. Russia , no. 26321/03, 22 April 2010. 67.     The applicant contended in the alternative that there had been a gross and obvious irregularity within the meaning of Lloyd and Others , cited above. (b)     The Government 68 .     The Government argued that the applicant’s detention was covered by Article 5 § 1 (b) because he had been detained for non-compliance with an undertaking and a court order and/or the detention was to secure his compliance with the undertaking and court order. They relied on Benham , Perks and Others , and Lloyd and Others , all cited above. 69.     In the Government’s submission, violation of the applicant’s Article 6 rights did not necessarily mean that his detention was unlawful for the purpose of Article 5. They relied on Benham , cited above, § 47 and Lloyd and Others , cited above, § 114. Only if a violation of Article 6 amounted to a “flagrant disregard” of the applicant’s rights or led to a “gross or obvious irregularity” would the resultant deprivation of liberty be rendered unlawful. 70.     The Government adopted Mr Justice Blake’s conclusion that there was no irregularity and his reasons for arriving at it (see paragraphs 32-33 above). 71.     Referring to Winterwerp v. the Netherlands , 24 October 1979, §   40,   Series A no. 33, the Government contended that the Court should apply a margin of appreciation when it considered whether there had been compliance with domestic law. 72 .     Finally, the Government argued that the detention was not arbitrary because the County Court judge had not acted in bad faith or neglected to attempt to apply the law correctly. 2.     The Court’s assessment (a)     The applicability of Article 5 § 1 (a) and/or Article 5 § 1 (b) 73 .     Article 5 § 1 contains an exhaustive list of permissible grounds of deprivation of liberty. The applicability of one ground does not necessarily preclude that of another. Detention may, depending on the circumstances, be justified under more than one sub ‑ paragraph (see, for example, Eriksen v.   Norway , 27 May 1997, § 76, Reports 1997-III and Gatt v. Malta , no.   28221/08, § 35, ECHR 2010). In Gatt , § 35, the Court decided that the same reasoning applied to separate limbs of the same sub-paragraph. 74 .     Only a narrow interpretation of the permissible grounds is consistent with the aim of Article 5 § 1, namely to ensure that no one is arbitrarily deprived of his liberty (see Ostendorf v. Germany , no. 15598/08, §   65, 7   March 2013). 75 .     In Engel and Others v. the Netherlands , 8 June 1976, § 68, Series A no. 22, the Court decided that Article   5 §   1   (a) did not make any distinction based on the domestic legal character of the offence of which a person had been found guilty. Accordingly, Article   5 §   1   (a) applied to any “conviction”, whether the conviction was classified as criminal or disciplinary by the internal law of the State in question (see also more recently Galstyan v. Armenia , no. 26986/03, § 46, 15 November 2007). 76 .     “Conviction” has an autonomous meaning for the purposes of Article   5 §   1   (a) ( Engel , cited above, § 68). The Court has interpreted “conviction” as requiring both a finding of guilt after it has been established in accordance with the law that there has been an offence and the imposition of a penalty or other measure involving deprivation of liberty (see James,   Wells and Lee v. the United Kingdom , nos. 25119/09, 57715/09 and 57877/09, § 189, 18 September 2012 and Del Rio Prada v. Spain [GC], no.   42750/09, § 123, ECHR 2013). 77.     Under the first limb of Article 5 §   1   (b), as the Court has explained in its case-law, a person arrested or detained for “non-compliance” with a “lawful order of a court” must have had an opportunity to comply with such an order and have failed to do so (see Beiere v. Latvia , no. 30954/05, § 49, 29 November 2011 and O.G. v. Latvia , no. 66095/09, § 88, 23 September 2014). 78.     As regards the aim of the detention under the first limb of Article   5 §   1 (b), the Court observes that in Gatt , cited above, the respondent Government’s argument in that case clearly indicated that the purpose of the relevant detention involved a punitive element (ibid., § 33). In its own subsequent analysis (ibid., §§ 37-44), the Court decided that the first limb applied. Accordingly, the Court accepted that punishment was a permissible aim of the detention. 79.     The requirements of the second limb of Article 5 § 1 (b) were considered in detail in Ostendorf , cited above. Referring, inter alia , to Gatt , cited above, § 46, the Court held that, in order to be covered by that provision, the arrest and detention had to aim at, or directly contribute to, securing the fulfilment of the obligation and not be punitive in character. If the second limb of sub ‑ paragraph (b) could be extended to cover punishments, such punishments would be deprived of the fundamental guarantees of Article   5 §   1 (a) ( Ostendorf , cited above, § 71). Application of the principles on applicability to the facts of the case 80.     Although the applicant submits that civil contempt is criminal in nature under domestic law, in the recent case of R   v.   O’Brien (see paragraph   38 above) the Supreme Court decided that civil contempt did not constitute a criminal offence as such in domestic law. The Government had also argued, in the earlier case of Harman v. the United Kingdom , no.   10038/82, Commission decision of 11   May 1984, DR 38, p. 53, that Ms   Harman had not been convicted of a criminal offence when the domestic courts had found that she had committed a civil contempt. The Court is accordingly led to find that the County Court’s decision to hold the applicant in contempt of court did not amount to a conviction in domestic law. 81.     In order to decide whether Article   5   §   1   (a) applies in the present case, the Court must therefore determine whether the applicant was “convicted” within that term’s autonomous meaning under the Convention (see paragraph 76 above). 82.     As regards the first condition stated in the Court’s case-law for the existence of a “conviction” within the autonomous meaning of that term under Article 5 § 1 (a), namely a finding of guilt, the Court must first decide whether an adverse finding made against an individual in proceedings which are not classified in domestic law as criminal but to which the “criminal” limb of Article 6 applies amounts to a finding of guilt. If the Court decides that question of principle in the affirmative, it must then determine whether in the instant case the Court of Appeal was correct in ruling that the “criminal” limb of Article 6 applied to civil contempt proceedings. 83.     In relation to the first question, the Court observes that in Engel , cited above, Article   5 §   1   (a) was explained as being an autonomous provision whose requirements are not always co-extensive with those of Article 6 (ibid., §   68). The Court has also consistently stressed that the exceptions permitted by Article 5 should be narrowly interpreted (see paragraph 74 above). On the other hand it cannot be overlooked that Article   5 §   1   (a) applies to any “conviction” (see paragraph 75 above). 84.     In addition, as a matter of general principle, the Convention must be interpreted and applied in a manner which renders its guarantees practical and effective (see, for example, Artico v. Italy , 13 May 1980, § 33, Series A no. 37 and X v. Latvia [GC], no. 27853/09, § 94, ECHR 2013). Furthermore, the Convention must be read as a whole and interpreted in such a way as to promote internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions (see Klass and Others v. Germany , judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, pp. 30-31, § 68 and Stec and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.) [GC], nos. 65731/01 and 65900/01, § 48, ECHR 2005 ‑ X). 85.     In light of these principles, and giving a linguistically harmonious interpretation to the expressions “criminal charge” and “criminal offence” in Article 6 and “conviction” in Article 5 §   1   (a), the Court concludes, firstly, that, when a domestic court finds against an individual in proceedings which, although classified in domestic law as civil, fall under the criminal limb of Article 6, there has been the “determination of a criminal charge” in the sense of Article 6; and, secondly, that that determination amounts to a finding of guilt for the purposes of the application of Article   5 §   1   (a). 86.     As to the particular facts of the instant case, on the basis of all the material before it and having regard to its case-law (for example, Engel , cited above, §§ 82-83 and Ezeh and Connors v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39665/98 and 40086/98, §§ 82-86, ECHR 2003 ‑ X), the Court sees no reason to depart from the Court of Appeal’s conclusion on the applicability of the “criminal” limb of Article 6 to the family-law County Court proceedings in which the applicant was found to have committed a civil contempt of court. 87.     As regards the second condition stated under the Court’s case-law for the existence of a “conviction” in the autonomous meaning of that term under Article 5 § 1 (a), the applicant’s sentence of three months’ imprisonment must clearly be taken to constitute a penalty involving a deprivation of liberty. 88.     Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that the County Court’s finding that the applicant had committed civil contempt was a “conviction” and that Article   5 §   1   (a) is applicable. 89.     The applicant gave an undertaking to the County Court that he would not act in various ways including, inter alia , contacting or communicating with his ex-wife. The County Court also made an order requiring him, inter alia , not to use or threaten violence against his ex-wife. Given the nature of undertakings in domestic law (see paragraphs 39-40 above), there is no reason to distinguish between orders made by courts and undertakings given by individuals and accepted by those courts for the purposes of Article 5 § 1   (b). 90.     The County Court’s finding that the applicant had committed a civil contempt expressly related to his failure to abide by a court order, as well as an undertaking which had been accepted by the court. Accordingly, the Court finds that the first limb of Article   5 §   1   (b) (the lawful detention of a person for non-compliance with the lawful order of a court) is applicable to the applicant’s detention. 91.     In light of its clear case-law that deprivation of liberty to which the second limb of Article   5 §   1   (b) applies cannot have punishment as one of its aims, the Court finds that, because civil contempt includes punishment as one of its aims, the second limb of Article   5 §   1   (b) (the lawful detention of a person in order to secure the fulfilment of an obligation prescribed by law) is not applicable to the applicant’s detention. (b)     General principles relating to Article 5 § 1 92.     The object and the purpose of Article 5 § 1 are to ensure that no-one is dispossessed of his liberty in an arbitrary fashion (see Saadi v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 13229/03, § 66, 29 January 2008 and James, Wells and   Lee , cited above, § 187). (i)     “Lawfulness” of the detention 93.     The starting points for the requirement linked to the “lawfulness” of the detention are the introductory phrase to Article 5 § 1 “in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law” and the use of the adjective “lawful” in the subsequent, exhaustive list of permissible instances of deprivation of liberty in sub-paragraphs (a) to (f). 94.     The Court recalls the general principles which the Grand Chamber set out at paragraph 72-75 of Mooren , cited above: “72.     Where the ‘lawfulness’ of detention is in issue ... the Convention refers essentially to national law and lays down the obligation to conform to the substantive and procedural rules thereof. ... 73.     Although it is in the first place for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, under Article 5 § 1 failure to comply with domestic law entails a breach of the Convention and the Court can and should therefore review whether this law has been complied with ... 74.     However, the Court has clarified ... that not every fault discovered in a detention order renders the underlying detention as such unlawful for the purposes of Article 5 §   1. A period of detention is, in principle, ‘lawful’ if it is based on a court order. A subsequent finding of a superior domestic court that a lower court erred under domestic law in making the order will not necessarily retrospectively affect the validity of the intervening period of detention .... 75.     In its more recent case-law, the Court, referring to a comparable distinction made under English law ..., further specified the circumstances under which the de