CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 23 mars 2016

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s2E932ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s4667C756 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:19.85pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-19.85pt; text-align:left; page-break-inside:avoid } .s275CCCF2 { width:5.86pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s61E420C2 { font-family:Arial; font-variant:small-caps } .s62B44140 { width:83.93pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s20FC8552 { font-family:Arial; font-size:11.5pt } .s109B0633 { width:1.33pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sFC1F2909 { width:0.52pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s4AC9A02C { width:188.03pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s8E5ACCDF { width:123.91pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s98FBE5B1 { width:3.85pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sC0E27F52 { width:228.14pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s79DE5897 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s34D46E87 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sF7876111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:11pt } .sAADB120E { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .sC36A6361 { font-family:Arial; color:#000000 } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sD6845F38 { font-family:Arial; color:#0072bc } .sA20670C4 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s59DEA84 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:59.5pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s4BAE41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt } .sD102E79F { font-family:Arial; color:#984806 } .sD4EAAB82 { font-family:Arial; font-size:11.5pt; font-style:italic } .s9AA93F26 { font-family:Arial; font-size:11.5pt; color:#000000 } .s583D00FA { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt } .s26FF04E7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17.3pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA7C1495E { margin-top:30pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s6E8303AC { width:184.61pt; display:inline-block } .sA2E62387 { width:204.97pt; display:inline-block } .sA23A4EB0 { margin-top:24pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s66E9FC38 { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#000000 } .s44D84940 { page-break-before:left; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s32563E28 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s3133A7C8 { font-family:Arial; color:#0069d6 } .sA89582B { font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt; color:#0069d6 } .s4B8D41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt }       GRAND CHAMBER             CASE OF F.G. v. SWEDEN   (Application no. 43611/11)                   JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   23 March 2016           This judgment is final.   In the case of F.G. v. Sweden, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   Guido Raimondi, President ,   Dean Spielmann,   András Sajó,   Josep Casadevall,   Ineta Ziemele,   Elisabeth Steiner,   George Nicolaou,   Ledi Bianku,   Vincent A. De Gaetano,   Julia Laffranque,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,   Helena Jäderblom,   Aleš Pejchal,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek,   Dmitry Dedov,   Robert Spano, judges , and Johan Callewaert, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 3 December 2014 and 7   January   2016, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 43611/11) against the Kingdom of Sweden lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Iranian national, Mr F.G. (“the applicant”), on 12 July 2011. The President of the Grand Chamber acceded to the applicant’s request not to have his name disclosed (Rule 47 § 4 of the Rules of Court). 2.     The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Mr D. Loveday, member of the Bar of England and Wales, practising in Sweden. The Swedish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr A. Rönquist, Ambassador and Director General for Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that his expulsion to Iran would entail a violation of Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention. 4.     The application was allocated to the Fifth Section of the Court (Rule   52 §   1). On 25 October 2011 the President of the Section to which the case had been allocated decided to apply Rule 39, indicating to the Government that the applicant should not be expelled to Iran for the duration of the proceedings before the Court. On 16 January 2014 a Chamber composed of Mark Villiger, President, Angelika Nußberger, Boštjan M. Zupančič, Ann   Power-Forde, André Potocki, Paul Lemmens, Helena Jäderblom, judges, and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar, delivered its judgment. It held that the implementation of the expulsion order against the applicant would not give rise to a violation of Articles   2 or 3 of the Convention. The joint dissenting opinion of Judges Zupančič, Power-Forde and Lemmens was annexed to the judgment. 5.     On 16 April 2014 the applicant requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention, and a panel of the Grand Chamber accepted the request on 2 June 2014. 6.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24. 7.     The applicant and the Government each filed further observations (Rule 59 § 1) on the merits. 8.     In addition, third-party comments were received from the European Centre for Law and Justice, the Alliance Defending Freedom assisted by Jubilee Campaign, the Centre for Advice on Individual Rights in Europe, the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, the International Commission of Jurists, and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, which had been granted leave by the President of the Grand Chamber to intervene in the written procedure (Article 36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3). 9.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 3 December 2014 (Rule 59 § 3).   There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Mr   A. Rönquist , Ambassador and Director General for Legal Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,   Agent ; Ms     H.   Lindquist , Ms   M. Westman-Clément , Ms   L. Öman Bristow ,   Advisers ; (b)     for the applicant Mr   D. Loveday , member of the Bar of England and Wales, practising in Sweden,   Counsel , Ms   H. Pettersson , Ms   A. Evans ,   Advisers .   The Court heard addresses by Mr Rönquist and Mr   Loveday as well as their replies to questions from Judges Spano, Jäderblom, Bianku, Pinto   de   Albuquerque and De   Gaetano. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 10.     The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Sweden. 11.     He entered Sweden on 16 November 2009 and applied for political asylum. 12.     On 19 February 2010, counsel appointed the applicant made written submissions to the Migration Board ( Migrationsverket ) in which he developed the grounds for the applicant’s request for political asylum. 13.     On 24 March 2010 the Migration Board held an oral interview with the applicant in the presence of his counsel and an interpreter. The applicant handed over a declaration of 15 March 2010 from a pastor in Sweden certifying that the applicant had been a member of his congregation since December 2009 and had been baptised. The Migration Board official therefore started the interview by asking about that matter. The applicant replied that it was a private matter “in [his] heart”, adding: “It has nothing to do with this but if you want to ask questions you may. All problems in my home country are caused by Islam entering Iran ...” The Migration Board official explained that the reason he was asking questions about it was that he had interpreted the certificate as though the applicant had relied on his conversion as a ground for asylum. The applicant stated: “No, it is not something I want to rely on. It is something private.” The Migration Board official then suggested a break in the interview in order for the applicant and his counsel to confer. After a ten-minute break, counsel stated: “The applicant wants to underline that he has not changed religion in order to enhance his chances of obtaining a residence permit but out of personal conviction.” When asked when he had converted, the applicant replied that this had happened after he had arrived in the Swedish town of X, where there were not many Iranians. He had got to know a person who went to church four times a week. This person knew that the applicant hated Islam. The applicant continued: “I do not regard Christianity as a religion.” When asked why that was so, the applicant replied: “If regarded as a religion, it would be like Islam, but Christianity is about a kind of love you have for God.” He explained that he had been going to the congregation’s gatherings two to four times per week and that he read the Bible. The applicant gave examples of miracles and prophecies from the Bible which had attracted him to Christianity. The Migration Board official asked why, if the applicant did not wish to rely on his conversion as a ground for asylum, he had nevertheless handed in the certificate from the pastor, to which the applicant replied: “I don’t know. I never asked for it and I had not even considered handing it in, but you wanted it. They gave all converts a certificate like that.” 14.     The rest of the interview dealt with the applicant’s political past. The applicant explained that in Iran he had worked with persons connected to different universities who were known to oppose the regime. He had mainly worked on creating and publishing web pages. He and one of the other persons had been arrested in April 2007. He had been released after twenty-four   hours and then hospitalised for ten days due to high blood pressure. 15.     Before the elections on 12 June 2009, the applicant had worked with the Green Movement, who had supported Mousavi for the presidential position, by spreading their message via the Internet. The day before the elections, he and his friends had been arrested, questioned and detained in the polling station overnight. 16.     After the elections, the applicant had participated in demonstrations and other activities. He had been arrested once again in September 2009 and imprisoned for twenty days. He had been ill-treated in prison. In October 2009 he had been taken before the Revolutionary Court, which had released him after a day on condition that he cooperate with the authorities and spy on his friends. He had agreed to the demands and given his business premises as a guarantee. He had also assured them that he would not participate in any demonstrations and that he would respond to their summons. Following his release in a park, he had found out that his business premises had been searched. He had kept politically sensitive material there, which the authorities must have noticed, and his passport and other documents were missing. 17.     Subsequently, the applicant was summoned to appear on 2   November 2009 before the Revolutionary Court. He had contacted a friend who, in turn, had obtained the help of a smuggler to enable him to leave the country. The applicant submitted a summons from the Revolutionary Court dated 21 October 2009 stating that he should present himself at Evin Prison in Teheran on 2 November 2009. 18.     The interview before the Migration Board lasted approximately two hours and the record was subsequently sent to the applicant and his counsel for comment. Counsel commented that the applicant had not read the certificate from the congregation’s pastor before the interview as it had not been translated and that the applicant intended to submit the formal baptism certificate. 19.     On 29 April 2010 the Migration Board rejected the applicant’s request for asylum. By way of introduction, it stated that, while the applicant had not proven his identity or citizenship, he had established the probability thereof. 20.     As regards the request for political asylum, the Migration Board held that participation in demonstrations or affiliation with the Green Movement could not, of itself, give rise to a risk of persecution, ill-treatment or punishment on his return to Iran. The Migration Board noted that the applicant had changed his story in some parts during the proceedings, and in particular he had changed his statements concerning the number of times he had been arrested. Furthermore, he had not been able to name the park where he had been released in October 2009. Thus, the Migration Board found reason to question whether he had been arrested at all. The Migration Board further considered that the applicant’s political activities had been limited. After the questioning in 2007 and until the elections in 2009, he had been able to continue working on the web pages that contained the critical material, even though, according to the applicant, the authorities were already at that time aware of his activities. For these reasons, the Migration Board found that the applicant’s activities or the material he had in his possession could not have been of interest to the authorities. 21.     As to the applicant’s conversion to Christianity, the Migration Board noted that the conversion and baptism had not taken place in the Church of Sweden and that the applicant had not handed in any proof of his baptism. The certificate from the congregation’s pastor could be regarded only as a plea to the Migration Board that the applicant should be granted asylum. The applicant had not initially wished to invoke his conversion as a ground for asylum and had stated that his new faith was a private matter. Pursuing his faith in private was not found to be a plausible reason for believing that he would risk persecution upon return. In conclusion, the Migration Board found that the applicant had not shown that he was in need of protection in Sweden. 22.     The applicant appealed to the Migration Court ( Migrationsdomstolen ), maintaining his claims and relying on both political and religious grounds for asylum. As regards the latter he handed in a baptism certificate dated 31 January 2010. He reacted against the decision of the Migration Board, which in his view implied that a conversion within a “free church” was of less relevance than if it had been within the Church of Sweden. He explained that the reason he had not initially wished to rely on his conversion was that he did not want to trivialise the seriousness of his beliefs. 23.     On 16 February 2011 the Migration Court held an oral hearing in the presence of the applicant, his counsel, an interpreter and a representative of the Migration Board. 24.     The Migration Court did not question the fact that the applicant, at the time, professed the Christian faith, but found that this, by itself, was not enough to consider him in need of protection. It referred to the United Kingdom Home Office’s operational guidance note of January 2009. 25.     The applicant stated that he did not wish to rely on his conversion as a reason for asylum as he considered it something personal. He added that “it would, however, obviously cause [him] problems upon return”. 26.     In respect of his political past he explained, inter alia , that he had had contact with the student movement and quite a lot of students and had helped them with their home pages. His computer had been taken from his business premises while he was in prison. Material that was critical of the regime was stored on his computer. While he had not personally criticised the regime, or President   Ahmadinejad, or the highest leaders, the applicant had visited some websites and had received cartoons via email. Therefore, in his view, there was enough evidence to prove that he was an opponent of the system. It was much the same as the material he had had on his computer in 2007. 27.     The summons to appear before the Revolutionary Court on 2   November 2009 was also submitted to the Migration Court. The applicant explained that the summons had been served at his home and that his sister had brought it to him. He had left the summons with a friend when he left Iran. Subsequently, the said friend had sent it to another friend, who was going to Ukraine, and who had made sure that the summons was sent to the applicant in Sweden. He had not been summoned again and his family had not been targeted. Something might have happened, though, that he was not aware of and that his family did not wish to burden him with. 28.     On 9 March 2011 the Migration Court rejected the appeal. It observed that the applicant was no longer relying on his religious views as a ground for persecution and it did not refer further to this issue in its conclusions. 29.     The Migration Court found that the applicant’s story in support of his request for political asylum had been coherent and trustworthy on the most essential points. It found that the uncertainties that had been pointed out by the Migration Board had been satisfactorily explained. However, as regards the summons to appear before the Revolutionary Court, the Migration Court found, regardless of the authenticity of the document, that it could not by itself substantiate a need for protection. The Migration Court pointed out in this respect that the document was merely a summons and that no reason had been given as to why the applicant should present himself at Evin Prison. Moreover, the information concerning the applicant’s political activities had generally been vague and lacking in detail. The applicant had only stated that he had participated in the campaign for the opposition before the elections in 2009 by joining demonstrations and having contact with the student movement and students in order to help them with their web pages. Furthermore, the applicant had stated that the material he had had in his possession when he was questioned in 2007 had not differed from the material he had in 2009. These circumstances, together with the fact that he had not been summoned again to appear before the Revolutionary Court after November 2009 and that his family had not been targeted, made the Migration Court doubt that his political activities had been of such a nature and extent as to have resulted in the consequences alleged. The Migration Court found that the applicant had exaggerated the importance of his political activities and their consequences and therefore also the authorities’ interest in him. For these reasons, it considered that the applicant had not proved that the Iranian authorities had a special interest in him and that therefore he was in need of protection. 30.     On 30 March and 19 April 2011 the applicant requested leave to appeal to the Migration Court of Appeal ( Migrationsöverdomstolen ). He maintained his need for political asylum. He also alleged that before the Migration Court he had relied on his conversion. He submitted that the latter issue had been sensitive for him, that he had considered it a private matter and had not wanted to tarnish the seriousness of his belief. This was why he, in response to a direct question by the Migration Court, had stated that he was no longer relying on his conversion as a ground for asylum. After the oral hearing before the Migration Court he had become a member of another Christian congregation and had taken part in an initiation ceremony broadcast on the Internet. His fear that his conversion had become known to the Iranian authorities had therefore increased. He enclosed a letter of 13   April 2011 from his new congregation which supported his explanation. In particular it stated that the applicant had converted shortly after his arrival in Sweden, that he had shown with honest intent and interest that he was willing to learn more about Christianity, and that he took part in church services, prayer meetings and social activities. It also stated that he became a member of the congregation in February 2011 and that his Christian beliefs were no longer private as the services he attended were broadcast on the Internet. 31.     On 8 June 2011 the Migration Court of Appeal refused the applicant’s request for leave to appeal. The removal order thus became enforceable. 32.     On 6 July 2011 the applicant requested the Migration Board to stay the enforcement of his expulsion and to reconsider its previous decision in the light of new circumstances. He stated, inter alia , that the act of conversion from Islam to another religion was taboo and punishable by death in Iran. The applicant submitted the above-mentioned letter of 13   April 2011 from his new congregation. 33.     On 13 September 2011 the Migration Board refused to re-examine the applicant’s request for asylum based on his conversion. The Migration Board noted that, in the original asylum proceedings, the applicant had stated that he had been baptised and had converted to Christianity. He had also stated that his conversion was a personal matter which he did not wish to rely on as a ground for asylum. The Migration Board found it noteworthy that the applicant now raised the question of conversion, when he had been given the chance to elaborate on it during the oral hearing before the Migration Court but had declined to do so. It thus concluded that the applicant’s conversion could not be regarded as a new circumstance, which was a precondition for the Migration Board to re-examine the request. 34.     The applicant appealed against the decision to the Migration Court, maintaining his claims. He submitted that since he had not previously relied on his conversion, it should be regarded as a new circumstance. 35.     On 6 October 2011 the Migration Court rejected the appeal. It observed that the authorities had already been aware of the applicant’s conversion in the original proceeding leading to the decision to expel him. Therefore, the conversion could not be considered as a “new circumstance”. The fact that the applicant had previously chosen not to rely on his conversion as a ground for asylum did not change the court’s assessment in this regard. 36.     The applicant’s request for leave to appeal was refused by the Migration Court of Appeal on 22 November 2011. 37.     Since under Chapter 12, section 22, of the Aliens Act, the validity of a deportation order expires four years after the date on which it acquired legal force, in the present case the deportation order in issue expired on 8   June 2015. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE 38.     The relevant provisions concerning the right of aliens to enter and to remain in Sweden are laid down in the Aliens   Act ( Utlänningslagen , 2005:716), as amended on 1   January   2010. 39.     Chapter 5, section 1, of the Aliens Act stipulates that an alien who is considered to be a refugee or otherwise in need of protection is, with certain exceptions, entitled to a residence permit in Sweden. According to Chapter   4, section 1, of the Aliens Act, the term “refugee” refers to an alien who is outside the country of his or her nationality owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted on grounds of race, nationality, religious or political beliefs, or on grounds of gender, sexual orientation or other membership of a particular social group and who is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country. This applies irrespective of whether the persecution is at the hands of the authorities of the country or if those authorities cannot be expected to offer protection against persecution by private individuals. By “an alien otherwise in need of protection” is meant, inter alia , a person who has left the country of his or her nationality because of a well-founded fear of being sentenced to death or receiving corporal punishment, or of being subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (see Chapter 4, section 2, of the Aliens Act). 40.     Moreover, if a residence permit cannot be granted on the above grounds, such a permit may be issued to an alien if, after an overall assessment of his or her situation, there are such particularly distressing circumstances ( synnerligen ömmande omständigheter ) as to allow him or her to remain in Sweden (see Chapter 5, section 6, of the Aliens Act). 41.     As regards the enforcement of a deportation or removal order, account has to be taken of the risk of capital punishment or torture and other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. According to a special provision on impediments to enforcement, an alien must not be sent to a country where there are reasonable grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of suffering capital or corporal punishment or of being subjected to torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (see Chapter 12, section 1, of the Aliens Act). In addition, an alien must not, in principle, be sent to a country where he or she risks persecution (see Chapter 12, section 2, of the Aliens Act). 42.     Under certain conditions, an alien may be granted a residence permit even if a deportation or removal order has gained legal force. This applies, under Chapter 12, section 18, of the Aliens Act, where new circumstances have emerged that mean there are reasonable grounds for believing, inter alia , that enforcement would put the alien in danger of being subjected to capital or corporal punishment, torture or other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or there are medical or other special reasons why the order should not be enforced. 43.     If a residence permit cannot be granted under Chapter 12, section 18, of the Aliens Act, the Migration Board may instead decide to re-examine the matter. Such re-examination is to be carried out where it may be assumed, on the basis of new circumstances invoked by the alien, that there are lasting impediments to enforcement of the nature referred to in Chapter   12, sections 1 and 2, of the Aliens Act, and that these circumstances could not have been invoked previously, or the alien shows that he or she has a valid excuse for not doing so. Should the applicable conditions not be met, the Migration Board will decide not to grant re-examination (see Chapter 12, section 19, of the Aliens Act). 44.     Under the Aliens Act, matters concerning the right of aliens to enter and remain in Sweden are dealt with by three bodies: the Migration Board, the Migration Court and the Migration Court of Appeal. However, no appeal lies against a decision by the Migration Board not to grant a residence permit under Chapter 12, section 18, of the Aliens Act (see, a   contrario , Chapter 14 of the Aliens Act). According to Chapter 16, section   11, of the Aliens Act, leave to appeal is a condition for a case to be tried on the merits by the Migration Court of Appeal. Leave to appeal is granted if it is of importance for the guidance of the application of law that the Migrations Court of Appeal considers the appeal or there are extraordinary reasons for such a consideration. Pursuant to Chapter 12, section 22, of the Aliens Act, the validity of a deportation order, which has not been issued by a general court (that is, not as a consequence of a criminal conviction), expires four years after the date on which it acquired legal force. When a deportation order thus becomes statute-barred, the alien may apply anew for asylum and a residence permit. A new application entails a full examination by the Migration Board of the reasons put forward by the alien and the Board’s decision may, if negative, be appealed against to the Migration Court and the Migration Court of Appeal in accordance with the rules pertaining to the ordinary proceedings concerning asylum and residence permits. An appeal against a negative decision by the Board has suspensive effect and the alien may accordingly not be expelled while the proceedings are pending. 45.     On 30 November 2011 the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal delivered a judgment (MIG 5 (25) 2011:29) ruling on the assessment of the risk of persecution in cases of sur place conversion. It held that, when assessing whether an alien had plausibly demonstrated that his or her conversion from one religion to another was genuine in the sense that it was based on a genuine personal religious conviction, an individual assessment should be made in accordance with the the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and the UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection regarding Religion-Based Refugee Claims. An overall assessment should be made based on the circumstances in which the conversion took place and whether the claimant could be expected to live as a convert upon returning to his or her home country. Furthermore, in the case of individuals who had converted after leaving their country of origin (conversion sur place ), the credibility issue required particular attention. In a case where conversion was invoked shortly after the decision to expel the claimant became final and non-appealable, particular attention should be paid to the credibility of the statements made concerning the conversion. A complainant whose conversion was not deemed to have been based on genuine conviction had not plausibly demonstrated that, upon returning to his or her country of origin, he or she had the intention of living there as a convert and consequently attracting the interest of the authorities or individuals. 46.     On 12 November 2012 the Director General for Legal Affairs at the Swedish Migration Board issued a “general legal position” concerning religion as a ground for asylum, including conversion ( Rättsligt ställningstagande angående religion som asylskäl inklusive konvertering, RCI 26/2012). It was based on the above-mentioned judgment by the Migration Court of Appeal (MIG 5 (25) 2011:29), the UNHCR Guidelines and the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) of 5   September 2012 in Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y and Z (C-71/11 and C-99/11, EU:C:2012:518 – see paragraph 50 below). According to the legal position, the credibility of a conversion must be carefully assessed in order to determine whether a genuine conversion has taken place; a person whose conversion is not based on genuine conviction will most likely not practise his or her new religion upon returning to his or her country of origin. Furthermore, if the complainant is not credible, an assessment must be made of whether adherence to the new religion is attributed to the individual upon return to his or her country of origin. In this assessment it is relevant to consider whether the conversion may have or will come to the attention of the authorities or any other actor which could constitute a threat. Finally, a person who has undergone a genuine change in his or her faith or who risks being attributed a new religious belief and who therefore risks persecution should not be compelled to hide his or her faith solely in order to avoid persecution. 47.     On 10 June 2013 the Director General for Legal Affairs at the Swedish Migration Board issued a “general legal position” concerning the methodology for assessing the reliability and credibility of applications for international protection ( Rättsligt ställningstagande angående metod för prövningen av tillförlitlighet och trovärdighet , RCI 09/2013), which was based on, inter alia , the assessment by the UNHCR in its report “Beyond Proof; Credibility Assessment in EU Asylum Systems”, of May 2013. It sets   out that it is the duty of the applicant to submit all relevant elements needed to substantiate his or her application for international protection, and that the initial burden of proof rests on the applicant. However, responsibility for the assessment of an application for international protection lies jointly with the applicant and the examining authority. Furthermore, it also follows from the legal position that the evidence in an asylum case consists not only of the applicant’s statements but also of supporting evidence, such as documents, testimony and country information. III.     RELEVANT EUROPEAN UNION LAW AND CASE-LAW OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 48.     Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted (the Qualification Directive), replaced by Council Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13   December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, which applies from 9 January 2012, provided, in so far as relevant, as follows. Article 4: Assessment of facts and circumstances “1.     Member States may consider it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all elements needed to substantiate the application for international protection. In cooperation with the applicant, it is the duty of the Member State to assess the relevant elements of the application. 2.     The elements referred to in of paragraph 1 consist of the applicant’s statements and all documentation at the applicant’s disposal regarding the applicant’s age, background, including that of relevant relatives, identity, nationality(ies), country(ies) and place(s) of previous residence, previous asylum applications, travel routes, identity and travel documents and the reasons for applying for international protection. 3.     The assessment of an application for international protection is to be carried out on an individual basis and includes taking into account: (a)     all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision on the application, including laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner in which they are applied; (b)     the relevant statements and documentation presented by the applicant including information on whether the applicant has been or may be subject to persecution or serious harm; (c)     the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant, including factors such as background, gender and age, so as to assess whether, on the basis of the applicant’s personal circumstances, the acts to which the applicant has been or could be exposed would amount to persecution or serious harm; (d)     whether the applicant’s activities since leaving the country of origin were engaged in for the sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for applying for international protection, so as to assess whether these activities will expose the applicant to persecution or serious harm if returned to that country; (e)     whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to avail himself of the protection of another country where he could assert citizenship. 4.     The fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution or serious harm or to direct threats of such persecution or such harm, is a serious indication of the applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated. 5.     Where Member States apply the principle according to which it is the duty of the applicant to substantiate the application for international protection and where aspects of the applicant’s statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects shall not need confirmation, when the following conditions are met: (a)     the applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his application; (b)     all relevant elements at the applicant’s disposal have been submitted, and a satisfactory explanation regarding any lack of other relevant elements has been given; (c)     the applicant’s statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter to available specific and general information relevant to the applicant’s case; (d)     the applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest possible time, unless the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not having done so; and (e)     the general credibility of the applicant has been established.” Article 5: International protection needs arising sur place “1.     A well-founded fear of being persecuted or a real risk of suffering serious harm may be based on events which have taken place since the applicant left the country of origin. 2.     A well-founded fear of being persecuted or a real risk of suffering serious harm may be based on activities which have been engaged in by the applicant since he left the country of origin, in particular where it is established that the activities relied upon constitute the expression and continuation of convictions or orientations held in the country of origin. 3.     Without prejudice to the Geneva Convention, Member States may determine that an applicant who files a subsequent application shall normally not be granted refugee status if the risk of persecution is based on circumstances which the applicant has created by his own decision since leaving the country of origin.” Article 9: Acts of persecution “1.     Acts of persecution within the meaning of article 1 A of the Geneva Convention must: (a)     be sufficiently serious by their nature or repetition as to constitute a severe violation of basic human rights, in particular the rights from which derogation cannot be made under Article 15(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; or (b)     be an accumulation of various measures, including violations of human rights which is sufficiently severe as to affect an individual in a similar manner as mentioned in (a). 2.     Acts of persecution as qualified in paragraph 1, can, inter alia, take the form of: (a)     acts of physical or mental violence, including acts of sexual violence; (b)     legal, administrative, police, and/or judicial measures which are in themselves discriminatory or which are implemented in a discriminatory manner; (c)     prosecution or punishment, which is disproportionate or discriminatory; (d)     denial of judicial redress resulting in a disproportionate or discriminatory punishment; (e)     prosecution or punishment for refusal to perform military service in a conflict, where performing military service would include crimes or acts falling under the exclusion clauses as set out in Article 12(2); (f)     acts of a gender-specific or child-specific nature. 3.     In accordance with Article 2(c), there must be a connection between the reasons mentioned in Article 10 and the acts of persecution as qualified in paragraph 1.” Article 10: Reasons for persecution “1.     Member States shall take the following elements into account when assessing the reasons for persecution: (a)     the concept of race shall in particular include considerations of colour, descent, or membership of a particular ethnic group; (b)     the concept of religion shall in particular include the holding of theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, the participation in, or abstention from, formal worship in private or in public, either alone or in community with others, other religious acts or expressions of view, or forms of personal or communal conduct based on or mandated by any religious belief; ...” 49.     Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee status (the Asylum Procedures Directive), was replaced by Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection, which applies from 19 July 2013. The former, stipulated, inter alia , as follows. “CHAPTER III: PROCEDURES AT FIRST INSTANCE ... SECTION II Article 25: Inadmissible applications 1.     In addition to cases in which an application is not examined in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 343/2003, Member States are not required to examine whether the applicant qualifies as a refugee in accordance with Directive 2004/83/EC where an application is considered inadmissible pursuant to this Article. 2.     Member States may consider an application for asylum as inadmissible pursuant to this Article if: ... (f)     the applicant has lodged an identical application after a final decision; ... SECTION IV Article 32: Subsequent application 1.     Where a person who has applied for asylum in a Member State makes further representations or a subsequent application in the same Member State, that Member State may examine these further representations or the elements of the subsequent application in the framework of the examination of the previous application or in the framework of the examination of the decision under review or appeal, insofar as the competent authorities can take into account and consider all the elements underlying the further representations or subsequent application within this framework. 2.     Moreover, Member States may apply a specific procedure as referred to in paragraph 3, where a person makes a subsequent application for asylum: (a)     after his/her previous application has been withdrawn or abandoned by virtue of Articles 19 or 20; (b)     after a decision has been taken on the previous application. Member States may also decide to apply this procedure only after a final decision has been taken. 3.     A subsequent application for asylum shall be subject first to a preliminary examination as to whether, after the withdrawal of the previous application or after the decision referred to in paragraph 2(b) of this Article on this application has been reached, new elements or findings relating to the examination of whether he/she qualifies as a refugee by virtue of Directive 2004/83/EC have arisen or have been presented by the applicant. ... CHAPTER V: APPEALS PROCEDURES Article 39: The right to an effective remedy 1.     Member States shall ensure that applicants for asylum have the right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal, against the following: (a)     a decision taken on their application for asylum, including a decision: (i)     to consider an application inadmissible pursuant to Article 25(2), ...” 50.     On 5 September 2012 the Grand Chamber of the CJEU delivered its judgment in Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y and Z (cited above). It concerned two asylum-seekers from Pakistan, who claimed that they had been ill ‑ treated because of their membership of the Muslim Ahmadiyya community, an Islamic reformist movement, and for that reason had been forced to leave their country of origin. The German authorities had found that Y and Z were deeply committed to their faith and that their life had been actively shaped by it in Pakistan. They continued to practise their religion in Germany and considered that the public practise of their faith was essential in order for them to preserve their religious identity. The references for a preliminary ruling concerned the interpretation of Articles   2   (c) and 9 § 1 (a) of the Qualification Directive. The German Federal Administrative Court ( Bundesverwaltungsgericht) had asked the CJEU three questions. First, it asked to what extent an infringement of freedom of religion, and in particular the right of the individual to live his faith openly and fully, was likely to be an “act of persecution” within the meaning of Article 9 § 1 (a) of the Qualification Directive. Next, the national court asked the CJEU whether the concept of an act of persecution was to be restricted to infringements affecting only what was referred to as a “core area” of freedom of religion. Finally, it asked the CJEU whether a refugee’s fear of persecution was well founded within the meaning of Article 2 (c) of the Qualification Directive where the refugee intended, on his return to his country of origin, to perform religious acts which would expose him to danger to his life, his freedom or his integrity or whether it was, on the contrary, reasonable to expect that person to give up the practice of such acts. In its conclusion the CJEU held as follows. “1.     Articles 9(1)(a) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or Stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted must be interpreted as meaning that: –     not all interference with the right to freedom of religion which infringes Article   10(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is capable of constituting an ‘act of persecution’ within the meaning of that provision of the Directive; –     there may be an act of persecution as a result of interference with the external manifestation of that freedom, and –     for the purpose of determining whether interference with the right to freedom of religion which infringes Article 10(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union may constitute an ‘act of persecution’, the competent authorities must ascertain, in the light of the personal circumstances of the person concerned, whether that person, as a result of exercising that freedom in his country of origin, runs a genuine risk of, inter alia, being prosecuted or subject to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment by one of the actors referred to in Article 6 of Directive 2004/83. 2.     Article 2(c) of Directive 2004/83 must be interpreted as meaning that the Applicant’s fear of being persecuted is well founded if, in the light of the Applicant’s personal circumstances, the competent authorities consider that it may reasonably be thought that, upon his return to his country of origin, he will engage in religious practices which will expose him to a real risk of persecution. In assessing an application