CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 26 avril 2016

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TURKEY   (Application no. 62649/10)                 JUDGMENT         STRASBOURG   26 April 2016         This judgment is final. Table of contents   PROCEDURE THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE A.     The background to the case B.     Legal and historical background to the creation of a religious public service 1.     The Religious Affairs Department 2.     Status of the other religions 3.     Alevis, cemevis and the Alevi initiative 4.     The Government’s stance regarding the Alevi faith, and the academic opinion submitted by them II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     The Constitution B.     The functions of the Religious Affairs Department C.     Status of places of worship in Turkish law 1.     Regulation no. 2/1958 of the Council of Ministers 2.     Decision no. 2002/4100 of the Council of Ministers D.     Closure of the Dervish monasteries and abolition and prohibition of certain titles E.     Final report issued following the Alevi workshops III.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS A.     Council of Europe 1.     Texts adopted by the European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) 2.     European Commission against Racism and Intolerance B.     United Nations 1.     International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 2.     United Nations Human Rights Committee 3.     Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief of 22   December 2011 IV.     COMPARATIVE LAW THE LAW I.     ADMISSIBILITY II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 9 OF THE CONVENTION A.     Preliminary remarks B.     The parties’ submissions 1.     The applicants 2.     The Government C.     The Court’s assessment 1.     Whether the case should be examined from the standpoint of the State’s negative or positive obligations 2.     Whether the interference was justified III.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONVENTION TAKEN IN CONJUNCTION WITH ARTICLE   9 A.     The parties’ submissions 1.     The applicants 2.     The Government B.     The Court’s assessment 1.     General principles 2.     Approach taken by the Court in cases concerning relations between the State and religious communities 3.     Application of these principles to the present case IV.     APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION A.     Damage B.     Costs and expenses C.     Default interest FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING AND PARTLY CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES VILLIGER, KELLER AND KJØLBRO Article 9 of the Convention Article 14 of the Convention taken in conjunction with Article 9 DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SILVIS DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE VEHABOVIĆ STATEMENT OF JUDGE SPANO LIST OF APPLICANTS   In the case of İzzettin Doğan and Others v. Turkey, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   Guido Raimondi, President ,   Dean Spielmann,   András Sajó,   Işıl Karakaş,   Josep Casadevall,   Mark Villiger,   Ledi Bianku,   Julia Laffranque,   Helen Keller,   André Potocki,   Paul Lemmens,   Johannes Silvis,   Faris Vehabović,   Robert Spano,   Iulia Antoanella Motoc,   Jon Fridrik Kjølbro,   Yonko Grozev, judges , and Johan Callewaert, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 3 June 2015 and 22 February 2016, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last- mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 62649/10) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by 203 Turkish nationals, whose names are annexed to the judgment (“the applicants”), on 31 August 2010. 2.     The applicants were represented by Mr N. Sofuoğlu (a lawyer practising in Istanbul), Ms İ. Savaşır (expert), Ms S. Topçu, Ms F. Kama, Ms   J. Sucuoǧlu Gönen and Mr İ. Şahbaz (lawyers practising in Istanbul), and Mr M. Aydın (expert). The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr H.A. Açıkgül, Head of Department in the Ministry of Justice, Mr H. Mert, Director General in the Ministry of Justice, Mr   A.   Metin Gökler, Ms A. Onural, Mr S.A. Aşkın, Mr B. Karaca and Mr   M.   Çiçek (Ministry of Justice), and Mr H. Yaman (expert). 3.     Relying on Article 9, taken alone and in conjunction with Article   14, the applicants contended that their right to manifest their religion had not been adequately protected in domestic law. They complained in that connection of the refusal of their requests seeking, among other matters, to obtain for the followers of the Alevi faith, to which they belong, the same religious public service hitherto provided exclusively to the majority of citizens, who adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam. They maintained that this refusal implied an assessment of their faith on the part of the national authorities, in breach of the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality with regard to religious beliefs. They further alleged that they had been the victims of discrimination on the ground of their religion as they had received less favourable treatment than followers of the Sunni branch of Islam in a comparable situation, without any objective and reasonable justification.   4.     The application was assigned to the Second Section of the Court (Rule   52 §   1 of the Rules of Court). On 7 May 2013 notice of the application was given to the Government. On 25 November 2014 a Chamber of the Second Section composed of Guido Raimondi, President, Işıl Karakaş, András Sajó, Helen Keller, Paul Lemmens, Robert Spano, Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, judges, and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar, relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, neither of the parties having objected to relinquishment within the time allowed (Article   30 of the Convention and Rule 72). 5.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24. 6.     The applicants and the Government each filed observations on the admissibility and merits of the case. 7.     A hearing was held in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 3 June 2015 (Rule 59 § 3).   There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Mr   H.A. Açikgül ,   Agent , Mr   H. Mert ,   Counsel , Ms   A. Onural , Mr   S.A. Aşkin , Mr   M. Çiçek , Mr   B. Karaca, Mr   H. Yaman ,   Advisers ; (b)     for the applicants Mr   N. Sofuoğlu , Ms   İ. Savaşir ,   Counsel , Ms   S. T opçu , Ms   F. K ama , Ms   J. S ucuoğlu G önen , Mr   İ. Ş ahbaz , Mr   M. A ydin ,   Advisers .   Mr İzzettin Doǧan, one of the applicants, also attended. The Court heard addresses by Mr Açıkgül, Mr Sofuoǧlu and Ms   Savaşır, and their replies to questions put by Judges Villiger, Laffranque, Motoc, Sajó, Karakaş, Spano and Lemmens. It also heard replies from Mr   Yaman and Mr   Doǧan. 8.     Each of the parties also submitted written observations on the questions put to them by judges at the hearing. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 9.     The applicants, whose names are listed in the Annex to the present judgment, are followers of the Alevi faith. A.     The background to the case 10.     On 22 June 2005 the applicants individually submitted a petition to the Prime Minister, the relevant parts of which read as follows. “1.     ... I am a citizen of the Republic of Turkey and adherent of the Alevi ‑ Islamic (Alevi, Bektashi, Mevlevi-Nusayri) faith. The Alevi faith is a Sufi and rational interpretation and practice of Islam based on the unity of Allah, the Prophecy of Muhammad and the Koran as Allah’s Word ... 2.     Freedom of conscience and religion is recognised by Articles 2, 5, 10, 12, 17 and   24 of the Constitution, and by Articles 9 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, which take precedence over domestic law by virtue of Article 90 of the Constitution ... The State is required to take the necessary measures to guarantee the effective exercise of the right to freedom of conscience and religion. It must comply with that obligation by ensuring that everyone can effectively exercise those freedoms on an equal footing. In the constitutional order this obligation is regarded as a public service and this concept is enshrined in the Constitution. 3.     Under the terms of Article 136 of the Constitution, ‘[t]he Religious Affairs Department [“the RAD”], which is part of the general administration, shall carry out the functions assigned to it under the special law by which it is governed’, in conformity with the principle of secularism, while remaining detached from all political views or ideas and with the aim of promoting national solidarity and union. The RAD was set up with a view to achieving those objectives. Section 1 of the RAD (Creation and Functions) Act ... provides that ‘the RAD, operating under the Prime Minister, is responsible for dealing with matters of Islamic beliefs, worship and moral tenets and administering places of worship’. Under the terms of that Act, the RAD is invested with powers to manage all matters relating to Islam as a religion and is also responsible for administering places of worship. In practice, the RAD confines itself to cases concerning only one theological school of thought [ mezhep ] pertaining to Islam and disregards all the other faiths, including ours, which is the Alevi faith. Although the State has an obligation under the Constitution and supranational provisions to take all the necessary measures to ensure that the right to freedom of conscience and religion can be freely exercised, the rights of Alevis are disregarded, their places of worship, namely the cemevis , are not recognised as such, numerous obstacles prevent them from being built, no provision is made in the budget for running them, and the exercise of their rights and freedoms is subject to the good will of public officials. To date, all the demands made by the Alevi community with regard to practising their religion have been rejected as a result of the RAD’s biased approach, which is divorced from scientific and historical fact and based on one theological school of thought alone. As has been emphasised by the European Court of Human Rights, ‘the State’s duty of neutrality and impartiality, as defined in its case-law, is incompatible with any power on the State’s part to assess the legitimacy of religious beliefs’. ... In the light of the foregoing, we request that (a)     services connected with the practice of the Alevi faith constitute a public service, (b)     Alevi places of worship ( cemevis ) be granted the status of places of worship, (c)     Alevi religious leaders be recruited as civil servants, (d)     special provision be made in the budget for the practice of the Alevi faith, ...” 11.     On 19 August 2005 the Prime Minister’s public relations department sent the applicants a letter in reply saying that it was impossible to grant their requests. The relevant parts of the letter read as follows. “1.     ...   The services provided by the Religious Affairs Department in accordance with the legislation in force are available to everyone and are general and supradenominational. Everyone has a right to benefit from these general religious services on an equal footing. 2.     Having regard to [the current legislation] and to the courts’ case-law, it is impossible to grant the status of place of worship to cemevis . 3.     Everyone has the right to be recruited as a civil servant, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant legislation. In that regard no group of persons can be granted a privilege on the basis of their faith or beliefs and be recruited according to those criteria. As the functions carried out by the Religious Affairs Department constitute a public service, its staff are recruited on the basis of nationality and objective criteria. 4.     It is impossible to make provision in the budget for services that are not provided for in the Constitution or the law.” 12.     Following receipt of that letter, 1,919 people, including the applicants, lodged an application with the Ankara Administrative Court (“the Administrative Court”) for judicial review of the decision refusing to grant their requests. The relevant parts of their notice of application are worded as follows. “... It is estimated that there are currently between twenty and twenty-five million followers of the Alevi faith (Alevi, Bektashi, Mevlevi-Nusayri) in our country. Up until the 1950s almost all Alevi citizens lived in rural areas. Subsequently, they started migrating to the towns and began practising their faith there. With regard more particularly to cemevis , before migrating to the towns, Alevis, who led a reclusive lifestyle, practised their religious worship in the largest house in their village ... Mass migration made it impossible to practise religious worship in houses ... Moreover, the cemevis which used to exist in the cities, for example in Istanbul, could no longer meet the growing needs of the community. Today’s cemevis , which were built before the conquest of Istanbul, such as Karacaahmet Sultan Dergahı and Şahkulu Sultan Dergahı, can no longer meet the increasing demands of the Alevi community. ... [C]itizens of the Alevi faith have used their own funds to acquire land on which to build cemevis . However, these places of worship have given rise to numerous instances of arbitrary conduct. Whilst certain municipalities had made provision for the construction of cemevis in their urban development plans, many others rejected applications for planning permission, with the RAD continuing to consider that cemevis could not be regarded as places of worship. That attitude has been adopted not only by the municipalities, but by the administration as a whole. As a result of this arbitrary attitude on the part of the authorities, which is not based on any historical fact, cemevis have not been recognised as places of worship in the Republic of Turkey. Consequently, they are not eligible for any of the advantages linked to that status ... Citizens who have built their cemevis also pay the religious leaders whom they have recruited to officiate in these places of worship. These religious leaders, who follow a Sufi interpretation of Islam, train and teach the faith using their own means. Like all religious leaders, they play a crucial role in the moral and social progress of society. Yet the authorities do not contribute in any way towards their training ... As can be seen from the position briefly described above, the authorities almost completely disregard Alevi citizens; their places of worship – the cemevis – are regarded as cultural centres, with the result that they lack the status of places of worship and the attendant advantages. Likewise, the semah , which is one of the basic rituals of Alevi religious ceremonies, is reduced to a picturesque show. Thus, in determining the manner in which citizens must practise their religion, which places are considered as places of worship and the very nature of the faith itself (a belief or culture), the authorities are manifestly infringing the right to freedom of conscience and religion. Further, the Ministry of Education continues to disregard the Alevi faith and to offer religious education based on one particular Islamic theological doctrine. In doing so, it undermines peaceful coexistence and encourages discrimination from a very young age. In conclusion, no service is provided to citizens of the Alevi, Bektashi or Mevlevi ‑ Nusayri faith, which constitutes a serious oversight ... ... According to the Constitution and the relevant legislation, the RAD carries out the functions assigned to it under the special law by which it is governed (a) in conformity with the principle of secularism, (b) while remaining detached from all political views or ideas, and (c) with the aim of promoting national solidarity and union. In that connection, if regard is had to the RAD (Creation and Functions) Act (Law no.   633) it can be concluded that this body was set up not only for the needs of the Muslim religion (the majority religion), but for those of all religions. However, the present application sets out to challenge the practice of the authorities, of which the RAD is an integral part, with regard to the Muslim religion. ... The principle of equality requires that no distinction be made between users regarding either access to public services or the benefit of those services. Where a public service is concerned, equality must be observed in every sphere ... Otherwise, it is a privilege and not a public service ... Under section 1 of Law no.   633, the RAD is responsible for (a) dealing with matters of Islamic beliefs, worship and moral tenets, (b) enlightening society about matters pertaining to religion, and (c) administering places of worship. It should be pointed out in this regard that the legislature did not seek to legislate for one particular branch of Islam or one theological doctrine or movement within Islam, but for the Muslim religion as a whole. Accordingly, the RAD is responsible for providing a public service to all citizens who are followers of Islam. ... We now come to the facts regarding the practices of the RAD ... The RAD employs approximately 113,000 people, administers some 100,000 mosques and masdjids [prayer rooms for religious practice] and has a budget of several billion Turkish liras set aside in the general budget to carry out the functions assigned to it. In carrying out its functions, the RAD, although its powers encompass the Muslim religion as a whole, confines itself to the demands of the Sunni schools of thought, and in particular the Hanafi school, while disregarding all the other movements and branches of Islam. The general budget is funded mainly by revenue from the taxes paid by all citizens. No distinction on grounds of religion or membership of a religious movement is made where tax collection is concerned. On the contrary, this is based on nationality. However, the RAD, which receives billions of Turkish liras from the general budget, offers a public service only to the followers of one particular theological school of thought ... It is entirely normal for a religion to encompass several different theological doctrines, movements, beliefs ...” Referring to the case-law of the Court, the applicants further contended that, contrary to the position of the RAD describing the Alevi faith as a cultural asset and considering mosques as the only place of Muslim worship, cemevis were places of worship where cems , that is, Alevi religious ceremonies, were conducted. In their submission, it was not for the RAD to decide whether   cems   were or were not religious ceremonies. Relying on examples taken from speeches by the head of the RAD, they submitted that it was a matter exclusively for followers of the Alevi faith, and not for a State body, to determine what should be regarded as a religious ceremony. 13.     On an unspecified date the Prime Minister’s Legal Department submitted its memorial in reply. It disputed, first of all, the standing of the applicants to act, submitting that they could not lodge an application on behalf of all Alevis. They observed in that connection that, according to some sources, the number of Alevis in Turkey varied from between four to five million and twenty to twenty-five million and that there was no uniform approach regarding either the definition of the faith or the demands of its followers. With regard to the merits, the Legal Department went on to dispute the claimants’ arguments. The relevant passages of its memorial read as follows. “Law no. 677 ... prohibits the bearing of certain religious titles such as sheikh , dedelik [an Alevi religious leader], dervichlik , and so forth, the practices connected with those titles, and the designation of a venue for ceremonies conducted by Sufi orders [ tarikat ayini ]. Failure to comply with these prohibitions is punishable by a term of imprisonment and a fine. Moreover, the same Law orders the closure of tekke and zaviye and their conversion into mosques or masdjids ... The Department carries out its functions in accordance with Articles 10, 136 and   174 of the Constitution and Laws nos. 633 and 677. In carrying out its functions, it encompasses all Islamic beliefs, modes of worship and moral tenets and extends to all people on an equal footing. It is accordingly incorrect to claim that the Department, which carries out its functions in a supradenominational manner, confines itself to the Sunni branch of Islam ... It is impossible to offer a service to banned Sufi orders [ tarikat ]; this would also be contrary to the principle of secularism and national solidarity. Article 3 of the Regulation implementing the Law governing the wearing of certain dress defines places of worship as follows: ‘Places of worship [ mabedler ] are closed areas created in accordance with the relevant procedure and designed in the case of each religion for the practice of religious worship’ ... Having regard to the foregoing, a place cannot be regarded as a place of worship unless it is associated with a religion. In that regard, churches, synagogues and mosques or masdjids are the places of worship of the Christian, Jewish and Muslim faiths respectively. It is clear that everyone has the right to practise his or her faith in private in his or her own home or elsewhere. Accordingly, there is no prohibition or obstacle preventing Alevi citizens from saying their prayers, the zikir or the semah in cemevis . However, the creation, in addition to mosques and masdjids , of places of worship for the followers of a particular interpretation or movement of Islam is not in conformity with religion. Furthermore, an application for designation of a place of worship, appointment of religious functionaries and allocation of a budget on the basis of belief in an opinion or interpretation of the Muslim religion or adherence to a particular theological doctrine would inevitably create an insoluble problem and chaos within that religion ... Moreover, history has shown that the namaz [five compulsory prayers] are never said collectively in the tekke , dergah and zaviye [Dervish monasteries], but that they are said in the mosques or masdjids that are invariably located alongside such places ... As specified in the notice of application, the Alevi faith [ Alevilik ] ... is an interpretation and practice of Islam. The Alevi and Bektashi faith is a Sufi interpretation superficially containing elements pertaining to belief in twelve imams and mystical elements [ batini ]. In the past it was practised in dergah in towns. As there were no dergah in the villages, the most appropriate house was chosen. Nowadays, places such as Şahkulu Sultan and Karacaahmet Sultan are the dergah of the Bektashi, that is, tekke ... To recognise cemevis as places of worship would be contrary to Law no.   677 ... Moreover, a development of that kind would lead to the legalisation of other Sufi orders, and many of them that are banned ( Naqshbandi , Qadiri , Rufai , Cerahi , and so on) would request legal status ... A number of sectarian groups would then be likely to start appearing around a sheikh ...” 14.     On 4 July 2007 the Administrative Court dismissed the preliminary objections of the authorities and examined the application on the merits. It dismissed the application on the ground that the refusal by the respondent authorities was in conformity with the legislation in force. In its reasoning, referring to Articles 2, 90, 136 and 174 of the Constitution and to Laws nos. 633 and 677, and also to the international instruments concerning freedom of religion and the prohibition of discrimination and to the judgment in Hasan and Eylem Zengin v.   Turkey (no.   1448/04, 9 October 2007), the Administrative Court observed at the outset that the Alevi faith attained a certain level of cogency, seriousness and cohesion and, as an interpretation of Islam, enjoyed the protection of Article 9 of the Convention. It considered, further, that the object of the application did not relate solely to the State’s negative duty of non ‑ interference but that the applicants were also claiming privileges which, in their view, were granted to the Sunni branch of Islam (allocation of a budget, status of civil servant for Alevi religious leaders, recognition of cemevis as places of worship). It stressed the importance of the principle of neutrality in public services. However, the court found that it had not been established that all Alevis supported the claims submitted by the applicants. Moreover, in the court’s view, the provision of a public service to all interpretations of Islam could hardly be reconciled with the principle of secularism. The Administrative Court also found that the allocation to the RAD of funds from the general budget was not contrary to the law, as it would be unrealistic to link the payment of general taxes to citizens’ convictions or beliefs. In that connection it stressed that the European Court of Human Rights had not judged it contrary to the Convention to allocate a budget to the secular activities of a Church (keeping registers of marriages and deaths, and so forth) or to levy a general tax without specifying how it would be used. The relevant parts of the judgment read as follows. “... It is clear from the examination of the file that the Administrative Court is being asked in the present case to set aside the Prime Minister’s refusal of the request made in a petition of 22 June 2005 to have religious services provided to Alevi citizens in the form of a public service; to have the cemevis , where Alevi citizens practise their faith, granted the status of places of worship; to have a sufficient number of competent individuals, recognised as such by Alevis, recruited as civil servants for the purpose of the religious rites required by the Alevi faith; to have funds set aside in the general budget to pay for the services required in that regard; to have provision made in the Finance Act for the funds concerned, while taking the necessary action to that end; and to take all the necessary measures in order to grant the requests set out in the above ‑ mentioned petition. Assessing the case in the light of the relevant provisions of domestic law, it can be seen that part of the general budget is allocated to the Religious Affairs Department created under Law no. 633; that the Department does not establish , but rather administers , the mosques ... recognised as ‘ places of worship ’; that the staff assigned to manage them are religious leaders who are recruited and paid as civil servants to administer religious services in connection with the beliefs, worship and moral tenets of the Muslim religion; and that application of the prohibitions introduced by Law   no.   677 is guaranteed by the Constitution. Hence, it is clear from the interpretation of the provisions of Law no. 633 and Article   128 of the Constitution that it is not possible to recognise a place other than a mosque as a ‘place of worship’ ..., to recruit civil servants for the purpose of the religious rites required by the Alevi faith, or even to make provision in the Finance Act for the funding of the services to be provided in that regard. This would be contrary to the statutory provisions governing the civil service and it is therefore not possible, in accordance with the only statutory provisions of domestic law in force, to grant the requests made in that connection without amending the legislation. Nevertheless, under the terms of Article 90 of the Constitution, the issue must also be examined from a legal standpoint in the light of the provisions of the international conventions to which the Republic of Turkey is a Party ... [Reference is made to Article 18 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.] In principle, freedom of religion and belief – which may be defined as adherence to a religion or belief (internally) and the observance, in the place of the individual’s choosing (externally), of the precepts of that religion or belief, alone or in community with others, in so far as this does not disturb public order – is governed by the above-mentioned Articles 10, 14 and 24 of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey ..., which must be interpreted in a manner consistent with the provisions of the international treaties. Thus, it must be assessed to what extent Laws nos. 633 and 677, which are in force in Turkey, and existing practices as regards freedom of religion and belief, which are in issue in this case, can be said to be consistent with the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights concerning Article 9 in similar cases. ... In the present case it [is generally accepted] that the Alevi faith [enjoys the protection afforded] by Article 9. There can be no doubt in this regard, especially in the light of the practice prevailing in Turkey (see Hasan and Eylem Zengin ). Further, while the European Court of Human Rights considers that the existence of a State Church system is not in itself contrary to the Convention, and while it does not require the State to treat the different religions and beliefs in absolutely identical fashion and does not criticise the existence of an official State religion (see Kokkinakis v. Greece , 25 May 1993, Series A no. 260-A), it nevertheless regards compulsory membership of such a Church as a violation of the Convention (see Darby v.   Sweden , 23 October 1990, Series A no. 187). The Administrative Court is of the view that, where criticism of or attacks against a religion or belief attain a level liable to jeopardise the exercise of freedom of religion and belief ..., indifference in this regard on the part of the public authorities engages the responsibility of the State. Furthermore, where those same authorities restrict the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief in the public sphere, the restriction in question must be examined in the light of the following criteria: whether there was interference and, if so, whether the measure in question was lawful, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a democratic society. There is no provision of the Constitution establishing a State religion. Moreover, in the present case, no specific examples have been provided suggesting that Alevis encounter obstacles in exercising their right to freely manifest their religion or that they are subjected to pressure to adopt a different form of belief. As to the issue of taxpayers contributing to the funding of the religious activities of a Church to which they do not belong, the European Court of Human Rights considers it contrary to Article 9 to collect a tax which directly benefits a Church to which the taxpayers do not belong. However, it has found there to be no such violation where the tax is used to fund the Church’s secular activities (the keeping of registers of marriages and deaths, and so forth – see Kustannus Oy Vapaa Ajattelija AB and Others v. Finland , no. 20471/92, Commission decision of 15 April 1996, Decisions and Reports 85-A, p.   29) or where it is levied as a general tax without it being clear how it is to be used. Furthermore, a portion of the revenue collected in general taxation from the citizens of the Republic of Turkey is allocated to the Religious Affairs Department. Accordingly, not only can there be no question of any contradiction or inconsistency with the Court’s judgments, but also, if the applicants’ request had to be granted, persons opposed to armaments, war, nuclear power or technology because of their beliefs could not be taxed individually, as it would be impossible to determine who was liable for the tax and public order could no longer be ensured. As to the argument that the officials recruited by the State to deal with religious matters are not the same individuals as the religious leaders whom other belief communities have themselves chosen, the European Court of Human Rights has held that the State is the ultimate guarantor of the freedom to manifest a religion or belief and that in a situation of this kind the State in a pluralist democracy has a duty, in view of the tensions that are liable to arise, to promote tolerance between the parties and may not subject the different groups to pressure or interfere with their rights and freedoms (see Serif v. Greece , no. 38178/97, ECHR 1999-IX; Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria [GC], no. 30985/96, ECHR 2000-XI; and Kokkinakis ). As is clear from the provisions of the above-mentioned international treaties and from the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, the State, fundamentally and ideally, has a negative obligation in the sphere of freedom of religion and belief to refrain as far as possible from hindering those freedoms. In other words, the ideal system is one in which the State is neutral. Accordingly, seeking to achieve equality does not mean eliminating differences but rather preventing privileges from being granted to certain groups. In the present case, however, the applicants are claiming a number of measures of positive discrimination on behalf of the Alevi community by arguing that, although they are Muslims, Alevis interpret and practise Islam in a different way, and are requesting the Religious Affairs Department to grant them the privileges which, they contend, are granted to Sunni Muslims. There is no doubt that Alevism is a serious and coherent set of beliefs, that it is an interpretation of Islam, and that a large section of the population claims adherence to it. However –   and bearing in mind also the general principles set forth in the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief   – while it is true that there are indeed differences amongst Alevis as regards the forms of belief and practice and the manner in which they define themselves, and while the applicants also recognise this, there is no specific evidence that all Alevis support the claims made in the present case. Accordingly, from the perspective of freedom of belief, this Court reiterates that the ideal is a neutral State which undertakes to protect individuals against being forced to participate against their will in the religious activities of a religious group to which they do not belong. In the light of all these considerations, examination of the facts from the standpoint of the constitutional principles of the Republic of Turkey demonstrates that –     as regards freedom of religion and belief seen from a normative viewpoint, Articles   10, 14, 15 and 24 of the Constitution were drafted in a manner consistent with the provisions of the relevant international treaties, since no provision of the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey establishes a State religion; –     a portion of the revenue in the general budget is allocated to the Religious Affairs Department, which is part of the general administration; –     the Religious Affairs Department is generally acknowledged to carry out its administrative functions pertaining to matters of Islamic belief, worship and moral tenets by taking as its basis the shared identity of all Muslims and, in accordance with the Constitution and the principle of secularism, while remaining detached from all political views or ideas and with the aim of promoting national solidarity and union; and –     as regards the State practices complained of, the European Court of Human Rights has held in its judgments that these are not contrary to the above-mentioned applicable legislation, which does not overstep the limits of Article   9. Further, if the State were to respond to all expectations and demands by providing the corresponding public service, for instance by recognising places of worship for groups professing forms of belief linked to the various Islamic schools of law [ mezheb ], the various Sufi orders [ tarikat ] and the various understandings and interpretations of Islam that have emerged in the course of history, granting the status of civil servants to the religious leaders of those groups, setting aside a portion of the budget for them and placing them under the authority of a public body, there would be a risk not only of engendering debate on the extent to which State action and the discretion exercised by the Religious Affairs Department in its activities in the public sphere satisfy the spiritual needs of the different groups of believers, but also of breaching the principle of State secularism by upsetting the balance to be struck between religious and legislative rule-making, and of exacerbating different forms of belief. This could ultimately lead to restrictions on freedom of religion and belief, and thus to an outcome that runs counter to the very aim which the applicants sought to achieve in lodging their claims, which were based precisely on their difference. In these circumstances, the administrative decision refusing the applicants’ requests   ... cannot be said to be in breach of the statutory provisions.” 15.     The applicants appealed against the first-instance judgment. They submitted that provision of a public service exclusively to Muslims adhering to Sunni theological doctrines was incompatible with the constitutional principles of secularism and neutrality of public services. They rejected any suggestion that they were requesting the State to grant them positive privileges, arguing that the basis of their claims was the principle of equality. They added that the Turkish State could not be regarded as neutral with regard to religions as it took measures which favoured one religious interpretation to the detriment of others. In the applicants’ view, the courts did not have the right to rule on the legitimacy of a belief or its practices. They furnished expert reports in support of their submissions. 16.     In a judgment of 2 February 2010, served on the applicants on 24 March 2010, the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the first-instance judgment as being in conformity with the procedure and laws. B.     Legal and historical background to the creation of a religious public service 1.     The Religious Affairs Department (“the RAD”) 17.     Although Turkey is a “secular State” according to Article 2 of the 1982 Constitution, the Muslim faith as practised by the majority of citizens enjoys special status for historical reasons. 18.     In Turkey, after the proclamation of the Republic on 29 October 1923, separation of the public and religious spheres was achieved through a series of revolutionary reforms: on 3 March 1924 the caliphate –   supreme institution of Muslims   – was abolished; on 10 April 1928 the constitutional provision declaring Islam the State religion was repealed; and, lastly, on 5 February 1937 a constitutional amendment was passed according constitutional status to the principle of secularism (see Article 2 of the 1924 Constitution –   as amended in 1937   – and Article 2 of the 1961 and   1982 Constitutions). Article 24 of the 1982 Constitution also guarantees the right to freedom of religion and conscience. 19.     Following the abolition of the caliphate, the Unification of Education Act ( Tevhidi Tedrisat ) was passed, abolishing the traditional religious educational institutions. In parallel, the Ministry of the Sharia and Religious Foundations ( Şeriye ve Evkaf Vekâleti ) and all the religious courts were abolished, and the Diyanet İşleri Reisliği (governing body of the RAD), as it was called at the time, was founded by Law no. 429 of 3 March 1924. By virtue of section 1 of that Law, this body, which was responsible for implementing “all the provisions relating to Islamic worship and faith and the administration of religious institutions”, was placed under the authority of the Prime Minister. The Law provided that this body had no powers in terms of religious education, which was transferred to the Ministry of Education. 20.     In 1950 the administration of mosques and prayer rooms, which had initially been transferred to the Department of Religious Foundations in 1931, was brought back under the supervision of the governing body of the RAD. 21.     The RAD (Creation and Functions) Act (Law no. 633) was enacted on 22 June 1965 and published in the Official Gazette on 2 July 1965 (see paragraph 46 below). 22.     Section 36 of the Civil Servants Act (Law no.   657) of 20 July 1965 introduced a category of civil servants dealing with religious matters. That category includes all civil servants who have received religious training and carry out a religious function, namely the muezzin (those who call the faithful to prayer from the top of the minaret), imam-hatip , vaiz (preacher) and mufti (jurisconsult who interprets Muslim laws and Koranic law). 23.     In its judgment of 21 October 1971 (E. 1970/53, K.   1971/76), published in the Official Gazette on 15 June 1972, the Constitutional Court held that the creation of a category of civil servants dealing with religious matters was compatible with the constitutional principle of secularism. In its reasoning it considered that secularism meant the separation between temporal power and spiritual power. Neither of those powers could interfere in the affairs of the other. The Constitutional Court found that the existence of a clergy and a religious service in the Catholic religion, and the acceptance by Catholics of the Pope as spiritual leader, had played an important role in that conception of secularism. However, in the Muslim religion there was no clergy, and the staff responsible for places of worship had no spiritual power. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court held that, as the two religions were different, their religious functionaries could not have the same status. In that connection it observed that it was only in Christian countries that a separation could be imagined between religious functionaries and the State. In the Constitutional Court’s view, the principle of secularism sought to promote the progress of the Turkish nation and did not allow the creation of religious movements pursuing aims that were incompatible with that purpose. 24.     Consequently, and despite the “secular” nature of the Turkish State, the “Islamic religious service” is regarded as a “public service”. In accordance with Article 136 of the Constitution, the RAD –   which is in charge of this public service   – is part of the general administration and is therefore endowed with public powers, despite not having the status of a public ‑ law entity. According to the statistics published by the RAD (www.diyanet.gov.tr/tr/kategori/istatistikler/136), in 2013 –     the number of civil servants assigned to the department was 121,845; –     the number of mosques was 85,412; and –     the number of Koranic schools ( Kuran kursu ) managed by the RAD was 13,021. 25.     In Turkey there is no religious tax. Accordingly, since the RAD was created, its revenue has always come from the State budget. In that connection, the documents submitted by the parties show that, in 2013, the amount allocated to the RAD was 4,604,649,000 Turkish liras (TRY) (approximately 1,960,000,000 euros (EUR) on the basis of the exchange rate at the time). In 2014 the budget came to TRY   5,552,000,000 (approximately EUR 1,933,670,000). For the year 2015 a budget of TRY   5,743,000,000 (approximately EUR 2,036,524,800) was set aside. In their observations the applicants also provided in