CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 21 juin 2016

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MALTA   (Application no. 76136/12)                   JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   21 June 2016     FINAL   17/10/2016     This judgment is final.   In the case of Ramadan v. Malta, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   András Sajó, President ,   Boštjan M. Zupančič,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek,   Egidijus Kūris,   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, judges ,   David Scicluna, ad hoc judge , and Marialena Tsirli, Section Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 24   May 2016, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 76136/12) against the Republic of Malta lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by Mr Louay Ramadan (“the applicant”), on 21   November 2012. Currently the applicant appears to be stateless. He was originally an Egyptian citizen. He obtained authorisation to renounce his Egyptian citizenship after acquiring Maltese citizenship following his marriage to a Maltese citizen. 2.     The applicant was represented by Prof. I. Refalo and Dr S. Grech, lawyers practising in Valletta. The Maltese Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Dr P. Grech, Attorney General. 3.     The applicant alleged that the order depriving him of his Maltese citizenship amounted to a breach of his rights under Article 8 of the Convention. 4.     On 6 November 2014 the Government were given notice of the complaint concerning Article 8 and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court. 5.     Mr Vincent A. De Gaetano, the judge elected in respect of Malta, was unable to sit in the case (Rule 28). Accordingly, the President decided to appoint Mr David Scicluna to sit as an ad hoc judge (Rule   29 § 1(b)). THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 6.     The applicant was born in 1964 in Egypt and currently lives in Hamrun, Malta. A.     Background to the case 7.     The applicant had a Maltese tourist visa, which had been issued in 1991 and had been valid for three months. Having overstayed this visa, he remained in Malta illegally. 8.     In 1993, when the applicant was 29   years of age and still living in Malta illegally, he met MP, a Maltese citizen, who at the time was 17   years of age. Three months later, on 13 October 1993, they married in a civil ceremony. On 26 February 1994 they also married in accordance with the Catholic rite. 9.     On 18 November 1993 the applicant enquired about his “exempt person status” (see paragraph 34 below) and on 23 November 1993 started the process to obtain Maltese citizenship on the basis of his marriage to a Maltese national. 10.     The applicant’s exempt person status was confirmed on 2 March 1994. On 19 April 1994, following the processing of his application and consequent to the marriage, he was registered as a Maltese citizen. On 12   September 1994, he therefore lodged an application to renounce his Egyptian nationality (a copy of the relevant application form has not been submitted to the Court). It transpires from a letter issued by the Consul of the embassy of the Arab Republic of Egypt in Malta that on 29 September 1994 the applicant’s request was approved and his Egyptian passport withdrawn. At the relevant time, dual nationality was not possible under either Egyptian or Maltese law. 11.     According to the Government, in 1994 the applicant and MP had various marital problems, which led the applicant to leave the matrimonial home on two occasions. The applicant had behaved aggressively, and in particular on 5 June 1994 he had physically assaulted his pregnant wife, causing her a permanent disability. MP left the matrimonial home thereafter. 12.     The applicant was charged, remanded in custody, and eventually tried and found guilty in respect of the act of assault. He was given a suspended sentence. 13.     In the meantime, on 13 December 1994 a child, LR, was born of the marriage. LR is a Maltese citizen. The various family disputes continued between the couple. 14.     On 8 February 1995 MP instituted court proceedings to annul the marriage. Following adversarial proceedings where both parties were represented by a lawyer, the applicant’s marriage was annulled by a judgment of 19 January 1998. The court delivering the judgment was satisfied (to the degree necessary in civil proceedings, namely on a balance of probabilities) that the applicant’s only reason for marrying had been to remain in Malta and acquire citizenship; thus he was positively excluding marriage itself, and there had been a simulation of marriage. Since no appeal was lodged against the judgment, it became final. 15.     The applicant did not inform the authorities of the judgment concerning the annulment of his marriage and he remained resident in Malta and retained his Maltese citizenship. 16.     On 30 June 2003 the applicant married VA, a Russian citizen, four months after their first encounter. The applicant enquired about the exempt person status of his Russian wife and was asked to produce a copy of the judgment of annulment of his first marriage. On 4 July 2003 the applicant produced a copy of the judgment and it was only at this point that the authorities became aware of the reason for the annulment of his first marriage. 17.     Following an application to that effect, on 27 September 2004 VA was granted exempt person status and thus had full freedom of movement (see “Relevant domestic and international law and practice” below). According to the Government, although this was contested by the applicant, attention was drawn to the fact that the benefit of such status would cease if the applicant lost his citizenship. Two sons were born of this marriage, VR and VL, in 2004 and 2005 respectively. They are both Maltese citizens. 18.     On 8 May 2006 the applicant was informed that an order was to be made to deprive him of his Maltese citizenship (under Article 14 § 1 of the Maltese Citizenship Act – “the Citizenship Act”; see “Relevant domestic and international law and practice” below), which, according to the judgment of 19   January 1998, appeared to have been obtained by fraud. He was informed of his right to an inquiry. 19.     The applicant challenged that decision, claiming that it was not true that he had obtained his marriage by fraud and stressing that he had three Maltese children. 20.     In consequence, proceedings were instituted to investigate the applicant’s situation and if necessary divest him of his Maltese citizenship. A committee was set up for this purpose in accordance with Article 14 § 4 of the Citizenship Act. A number of hearings were held before the committee where the applicant was assisted by a lawyer. He was allowed to make oral and written submissions and submit evidence, including witness testimony. It appears from the documents available that the applicant contested the basis of the annulment decision and claimed that he had not been aware that he could have appealed against it. He also contested the findings of a court of criminal jurisdiction that had found him guilty of injuring his wife and causing her a permanent disability. 21.     The applicant’s ex-wife and an official from the Department of Citizenship and Expatriate Affairs, as well as a priest, also gave testimony. 22.     The committee’s final recommendation to the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs was not made available to the applicant. Requests by the applicant’s lawyer for a copy of the records of those proceedings remained unsatisfied. 23.     On 31 July 2007 the Minister ordered that the applicant be deprived of his citizenship with immediate effect, in accordance with Article 14 § 1 of the Citizenship Act. 24.     By a letter of 2 August 2007 from the Director of the Department of Citizenship and Expatriate Affairs, the applicant was informed that the Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs had concluded that the applicant had obtained citizenship by fraudulent means and that therefore on 31 July 2007, in accordance with Article   14 § 1 of the Citizenship Act, the Minister had ordered that he be immediately divested of his citizenship. He was required to return his certificate of registration as a Maltese citizen and his passport. B.     Constitutional redress proceedings 25.     The applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings, complaining under Articles 6, 8 and 14 of the Convention. He claimed that he had not had a fair trial and appropriate access to a court for the determination on his right to citizenship. Moreover, the revocation of his citizenship had not been in accordance with the law. The prerequisites for such action had not existed, as his first marriage had not been one of convenience. 26.     By a judgment of 12 July 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall) in its constitutional jurisdiction rejected the applicant’s complaint under Article   6, finding that the committee set up for that purpose had not been a tribunal, but solely an investigative body capable of giving recommendations but not making final decisions. The court, however, found that the applicant’s Article 8 rights would be breached if, as a result of his being divested of his citizenship, he became an alien. His de jure family (in respect of the second marriage) would suffer irremediable harm if, as a father (of the two Maltese children of that marriage), he were required to move to another country. Thus, the revocation of citizenship in the present case was in breach of Article 8. Consequently, the court annulled the order of 31   July 2007 and considered that it was not necessary to rule on any further complaints. 27.     On appeal, by a judgment of 25 May 2012 the Constitutional Court overturned the first-instance judgment in part. It rejected the Article   6 complaint on the basis that the provision was not applicable in the absence of a civil right. In that connection, it rejected the applicant’s contention that the revocation of citizenship affected his right to a family life and therefore was civil in nature, as citizenship was a matter of public law and fell under the prerogatives of the State. It also reversed the part of the judgment in respect of Article 8, commenting that it had not been established that the applicant had a family life in Malta, and, even if this were so, the revocation of his citizenship would not necessarily result in his having to leave Malta. Indeed, it had not transpired that the applicant would be denied the right to reside in Malta or that he had applied to reside in Malta and been refused, nor had a removal order been issued. C.     Other developments 28.     Following the lodging of the application with the Court, on 16   November 2012 the applicant’s lawyer wrote to the relevant authorities informing them that the case was pending before the Court and that therefore no action should be taken on the basis of the order of 31   July 2007. No feedback, apart from an acknowledgment of receipt, was received concerning that letter. However, although the order to deprive the applicant of his citizenship with immediate effect remains in force, no action has been taken to date in pursuit of the order and no removal order has been issued. 29.     Although the applicant considers that the implementation of the order is only a matter of time, he is currently still residing and carrying out his business in Malta. He has a trading licence, which is renewed periodically. He continued using a Maltese passport to travel until 2014, when it expired, as he had failed to return it to the authorities despite their request. 30.     The applicant does not appear to have any contact with his first son, but claims to be in a family environment with his second wife and their children. Following the revocation of his citizenship, the applicant’s second wife lost her exempt person status and the attached rights to freedom of movement. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Domestic law 1.     The Constitution 31.     Article 44 of the Maltese Constitution concerns the right to freedom of movement. Its sub-paragraphs (1) and (4) read as follows. “(1)     No citizen of Malta shall be deprived of his freedom of movement, and for the purpose of this Article the said freedom means the right to move freely throughout Malta, the right to reside in any part of Malta, the right to leave and the right to enter Malta.” “(4)     For the purposes of this Article, any person - ( a )     who has emigrated from Malta (whether before, on or after the appointed day) and, having been a citizen of Malta by virtue of Article 3(1) or of Article 5(1) of the Maltese Citizenship Act as in force upon the coming into force of the Maltese Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2000, has ceased to be such a citizen; or ( b )     who emigrated from Malta before the appointed day and, but for his having ceased to be a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies before that day, would have become a citizen of Malta by virtue of Article 3(1) of the Maltese Citizenship Act as in force upon the coming into force of the Maltese Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2000; or ( c )     who is the spouse of a person mentioned in paragraph ( a ) or ( b ) of this sub-Article or of a person who is a citizen of Malta by virtue of Article 3(1) or of Article   5(1) of the Maltese Citizenship Act as in force upon the coming into force of the Maltese Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2000, and who has been married to that person for at least five years and is living with that person, or is the child under twenty-one years of age of such a person; or ( d )     who is the widow or the widower of a person mentioned in paragraph ( a ) or paragraph ( b ) of this sub-Article or of a person who at the time of his or her death was a citizen of Malta by virtue of Article 3(1) or of Article 5(1) of the Maltese Citizenship Act as in force upon the coming into force of the Maltese Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2000, and who was still living with him or her at the time of his or her death and had been married to that person for at least five years or who would, but for the death of that person, have been so married for at least five years, or is the child under twenty-one years of age of such a person, shall be deemed to be a citizen of Malta by virtue of Article 3(1) or of Article 5(1) of the Maltese Citizenship Act as in force upon the coming into force of the Maltese Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2000: Provided that if the Minister responsible for matters relating to Maltese citizenship at any time by order declares that it is contrary to the public interest that a spouse as is mentioned in paragraph ( c ), or a widow or widower as is mentioned in paragraph   ( d ) or a child over eighteen years of age as is mentioned in paragraph ( c ) or ( d ) is to be so deemed, or to continue to be so deemed, such spouse, widow, widower or child, as the case may be, shall thereupon cease to be deemed to be a citizen of Malta as aforesaid: Provided further that the Minister responsible for matters relating to Maltese citizenship shall not be required to assign any reason for the issue of any order referred to in the immediately preceding proviso, and the decision of the Minister on any such order shall not be subject to appeal to or review in any court.” 2.     The Citizenship Act 32.     The relevant Articles of the Citizenship Act, Chapter 188 of the Laws of Malta, read as follows. Article 14 – previously Article 9 (prior to the amendments in 2000) “(1)     Subject to the provisions of this Article, the Minister may by order deprive of his Maltese citizenship any citizen of Malta who is such by registration or naturalisation if he is satisfied that the registration or certificate of naturalisation was obtained by means of fraud, false representation or the concealment of any material fact. (2)     Subject to the provisions of this Article, the Minister may by order deprive of his Maltese citizenship any citizen of Malta who is such by registration or by naturalisation if he is satisfied that the citizen— ( a )     has shown himself by act or speech to be disloyal or disaffected towards the President or the Government of Malta; or ( b )     has, during any war in which Malta was engaged, unlawfully traded or communicated with an enemy or been engaged in or associated with any business that was to his knowledge carried on in such a manner as to assist an enemy in that war; or ( c )     has, within seven years after becoming naturalised, or being registered as a citizen of Malta, been sentenced in any country to a punishment restrictive of personal liberty for a term of not less than twelve months; or ( d )     has been ordinarily resident in foreign countries for a continuous period of seven years and during that period has neither— (i)     been at any time in the service of the Republic or of an international organisation of which the Government of Malta was a member; or (ii)     given notice in writing to the Minister of his intention to retain citizenship of Malta. (3)     The Minister shall not deprive a person of citizenship under this Article unless he is satisfied that it is not conducive to the public good that that person should continue to be a citizen of Malta and, in the case referred to in sub-Article (2)( c ), it appears to him that that person would not thereupon become stateless. (4)     Before making an order under this Article, the Minister shall give the person against whom the order is proposed to be made notice in writing informing him of the ground on which it is proposed to be made and of his right to an inquiry under this Article; and if that person applies in the prescribed manner for an inquiry, the Minister shall refer the case to a committee of inquiry consisting of a chairman, being a person possessing judicial experience, appointed by the Minister and of such other members appointed by the Minister as he thinks proper. (5)     The Minister may make rules for the practice and procedure to be followed in connection with a committee of inquiry appointed under this Article, and such rules may, in particular, provide for conferring on any such committee any powers, rights or privileges of any court, and for enabling any powers so conferred to be exercised by one or more members of the committee.” Article 15 “(1)     A citizen of Malta who is deprived of his citizenship by an order of the Minister under Article 14 shall, upon the making of the order, cease to be a citizen of Malta. ...” Article 19 “The Minister shall not be required to assign any reason for the grant or refusal of any application under this Act and the decision of the Minister on any such application shall not be subject to appeal to or review in any court.” Article 27 “(1)     The acquisition or retention of Maltese citizenship by any person under the Constitution of Malta or any other law, prior to the enactment of the Maltese Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2000 shall not be affected in any way by the provisions of the said Act. (2)     This Act shall not apply with regard to any application for registration as a citizen of Malta filed before the 15th day of August, 1999.” 33.     The above-mentioned committee of inquiry is regulated by Subsidiary Legislation 188.02, the Deprivation of Maltese Citizenship (Committee of Inquiry) Rules. 34.     Among others, the non-Maltese spouse of a citizen of Malta is eligible for “exempt person status”, which may be enjoyed as long as the spouse is still married to and living with that person. Under the provisions of the Immigration Act (Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta), an exempt person is entitled to freedom of movement. In accordance with the Maltese Constitution, this means the right to move freely throughout Malta, the right to reside in any part of Malta, and the right to leave and the right to enter Malta. In 2004 Malta joined the European Union and the relevant directives became applicable, including Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of EU citizens and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. 35.     Under Article 5 of the Citizenship Act, every person born in Malta becomes a Maltese citizen on his date of birth. The Citizenship Act also provides, however, and in so far as relevant, that a person born in Malta on or after 1   August 1989 may not become a citizen of Malta unless, at the time of his birth, his father or his mother was a citizen of Malta or a person who, having been a citizen of Malta, emigrated from Malta (Article 44 §   4   (a) and   (b) of the Constitution). The two provisos do not apply in the case of a new-born infant found abandoned anywhere in Malta, who would by virtue thereof be stateless. Any such infant remains a citizen of Malta until his right to any other citizenship is established. 3.     The Immigration Act 36.     The relevant parts of Article 14 of the Immigration Act, Chapter 217 of the Laws of Malta, read as follows. “(1)     If any person is considered by the Principal Immigration Officer to be liable to removal as a prohibited immigrant under any of the provisions of Article 5, the said Officer may issue a removal order against such person who shall have a right to appeal [before the Immigration Appeals Board] against such order in accordance with the provisions of Article 25A: ... (2)     Upon such order being made, such person against whom such order is made, shall be detained in custody until he is removed from Malta: ... (3)     Nothing in this Article shall affect the obligation of any person who does not fulfil or who no longer fulfils the conditions of entry, residence or free movement to leave Malta voluntarily without delay. (4)     Removal of a person shall be to that person’s country of origin or to any other State to which he may be permitted entry, in particular under the relevant provisions of any applicable readmission agreement concluded by Malta and in accordance with international obligations to which Malta may be party. (5)     Nothing in this Article shall preclude or prejudice the application of Maltese law on the right to asylum and the rights of refugees and of Malta’s international obligations in this regard. ...” 4.     The Immigration Regulations 37.     The relevant part of Subsidiary Legislation 217.04 provides the following rules. “12. (1)     A third country national shall only be entitled to reside in Malta if a uniform residence permit for a specific purpose is issued in his regard. (2)     The provisions of subregulation (1) shall not apply to a third country national who has been given temporary permission to reside in Malta for the purpose of the processing of an application for asylum or an application for a uniform residence permit. (3)     [Not yet in force] Without prejudice to Regulation 7(3), the provisions of Regulations   5, 6, 8, 9 and   10 shall mutatis mutandis apply to this Part, so however that a third country national cannot apply for a licence or a uniform residence permit for the purpose of seeking or taking up employment; nor may he apply to change the nature of the uniform residence permit into one empowering him to seek or take up employment, while he is already in Malta, save as the Minister may direct in exceptional circumstances. ” 38.     Regulations 5, 6, 8, 9 and 10 refer to residence and employment with regard to citizens of the European Union. 39.     Regulation 12(3) has not yet come into force but will do so on such date as the Minister may by notice in the Government Gazette of Malta appoint. B.     International materials 1.     United Nations 40.     Malta is not a party to the 1954 United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, nor is it a party to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. A report by the United Nations Refugee Agency Office in Malta, entitled “Mapping Statelessness in Malta” (2014), recommended, inter alia , that Malta consider acceding to the two above-mentioned conventions and establishing an effective statelessness determination procedure, as well as ensuring the rights of stateless persons and awareness about statelessness among relevant government institutions. 2.     Relevant Council of Europe instruments 41.     To promote the progressive development of legal principles concerning nationality, as well as their adoption in internal law, and to avoid, as far as possible, cases of statelessness, the Council of Europe drew up the 1997 European Convention on Nationality. One of the principles of this Convention, provided for in Article 4, is that “statelessness shall be avoided”. Article 6 provides that each State Party must facilitate in its internal law the acquisition of its nationality for stateless persons. Article   7, however, specifies that a State Party may not provide in its internal law for the loss of its nationality if the person concerned would thereby become stateless, with the exception of cases of acquisition of the nationality of the State Party by means of fraudulent conduct, false information or concealment of any relevant fact attributable to that person. 42.     This Convention was signed by Malta on 29 October 2003 but has not been ratified. 43.     On 15 September 1999 the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation No. R (99) 18 on the avoidance and reduction of statelessness. In particular, concerning the avoidance of statelessness as a consequence of loss of nationality, it recommends, in its relevant part, the following: “c.     In order to avoid, as far as possible, situations of statelessness, a State should not necessarily deprive of its nationality persons who have acquired its nationality by fraudulent conduct, false information or concealment of any relevant fact. To this effect, the gravity of the facts, as well as other relevant circumstances, such as the genuine and effective link of these persons with the state concerned, should be taken into account;” 3.     Relevant EU law and case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union 44.     Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) reads as follows. “1.     Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship. 2.     Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to the duties provided for in the Treaties. They shall have, inter alia: (a)     the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States; (b)     the right to vote and to stand as candidates in elections to the European Parliament and in municipal elections in their Member State of residence, under the same conditions as nationals of that State; (c)     the right to enjoy, in the territory of a third country in which the Member State of which they are nationals is not represented, the protection of the diplomatic and consular authorities of any Member State on the same conditions as the nationals of that State; (d)     the right to petition the European Parliament, to apply to the European Ombudsman, and to address the institutions and advisory bodies of the Union in any of the Treaty languages and to obtain a reply in the same language. These rights shall be exercised in accordance with the conditions and limits defined by the Treaties and by the measures adopted thereunder.” (a)     Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 2   March 2010 in Rottmann , C-135/08, EU:C:2010:104 45.     Dr Rottmann was born a citizen of Austria. After being accused in Austria of serious fraud in the exercise of his profession, he moved to Germany, where he applied for naturalisation. By acquiring German citizenship, he lost his Austrian citizenship by operation of law. Following information from the Austrian authorities that Dr Rottmann was the subject of an arrest warrant in their country, the German authorities sought to annul his acquisition of German citizenship on the grounds that he had obtained it fraudulently. Such a decision, however, had the effect of rendering him stateless. The referring court wished to know if this was a matter that fell within the scope of EU law, as Dr Rottmann’s statelessness also entailed the loss of EU citizenship. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled that an EU member State’s decision to deprive an individual of citizenship, in so far as it implied the loss of the status of EU citizen and the deprivation of the attached rights, fell within the ambit of EU law and, therefore, had to be compatible with its principles. 46.     The CJEU concluded that it was legitimate for a member State to revoke naturalisation on account of deception, even when the consequence was that the person lost their EU citizenship, in addition to citizenship of that member State. Such a decision, however, must comply with the principle of proportionality, which, among other things, required a reasonable period of time to be granted in order for the person to recover the citizenship of his or her member State of origin. (b)     Judgment of the CJEU of 8   March 2011 in Ruiz Zambrano , C-34/09, EU:C:2011:124 47.     Mr and Ms Zambrano, of Colombian nationality, were refused refugee status in Belgium but were not sent back to Colombia on account of the civil war in that country. From 2001, Mr and Ms Zambrano were then registered as resident in Belgium and Mr Zambrano worked there for a certain time, even though he did not hold a work permit. Mr and Ms   Zambrano had two children – one born in 2003, the other in 2005 – who acquired Belgian nationality in accordance with the Belgian legislation applicable at that time. The competent authorities refused to accede to Mr   and Ms Zambrano’s application to regularise their situation and to take up residence as ascendants of Belgian nationals. 48.     According to the CJEU, Article 20 of the TFEU precluded national measures which had the effect of depriving citizens of the European Union of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights conferred by virtue of their status as EU citizens. The CJEU concluded that Article   20 of the TFEU precluded a member State from refusing a work permit and the right of residence within its territory to a third-country national upon whom his minor children, who were nationals and residents of that member State, were dependent, in so far as such decisions deprived those children of the genuine enjoyment of the substance of the rights attaching to the status of citizen of the Union. THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION 49.     The applicant complained that the decision to divest him of his Maltese citizenship had not been made in accordance with the law. It had interfered with his right to respect for his private and family life and exposed him to the risk of being separated from his family. The decision had not been accompanied by the relevant procedural safeguards as required under Article 8 of the Convention and the State had failed to fulfil its positive obligation to protect his rights under that provision. Lastly, the applicant complained that the decision had left him stateless. He thus had to live in a state of uncertainty, where he could not even leave the country for fear of not being let back in. The provision reads as follows. “1.     Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2.     There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 50.     The Government contested that argument. A.     Admissibility 1.     Victim status (a)     The parties’ submissions 51.     The Government submitted that the applicant could not claim to be a “victim” for the purposes of Article 34 of the Convention. They contended that an applicant could be considered a victim only if the State had already decided to take steps against him, and interference would come about only upon the execution or implementation of that decision. In the present case, despite the lack of any interim measure by the Court, no removal order was awaiting execution or implementation, as no such order had been issued, and no practical steps had been taken by the authorities in order to remove the applicant from Malta. The Government referred to Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France (27 August 1992, § 46, Series A no. 241 ‑ B), in which the Court had distinguished the applicants’ case from that of the applicant in Soering v. the United Kingdom (7 July 1989, Series A no. 161), since in the former case no expulsion order had been made in respect of the applicants. They explained that deprivation of Maltese citizenship did not mean that the person so deprived would be removed from Malta. In order for the person to be removed from Malta, a removal order would have to be issued. Such an order had not been issued in the case of the applicant in the present case. 52.     The applicant submitted that he was a victim under Article 34 of the Convention, since the revocation of his Maltese citizenship threatened the very basis of his ability to reside in Malta. He was directly affected by the impugned measure, in line with the Court’s case-law. In this connection, he referred to Groppera Radio AG and Others v. Switzerland (28 March 1990, §   47, Series A no. 173). The applicant submitted that even though a deportation or removal order was not in force, the threat of such an order was imminent. Indeed, the Government had not stated that a deportation or removal order would not be issued and had expressed the view that, following the annulment of his first marriage, “the applicant’s stay in Malta was precarious”. It was probable that no such action had been taken by the authorities only because they had been informed that the case was pending before the Court and that therefore no further steps were to be taken. The applicant submitted that once the Maltese Government had accepted that he could establish his second family in Malta, as he had in fact done, any subsequent curtailment of his status in Malta would directly affect that family life. (b)     The Court’s assessment 53.     The Court reiterates that the word “victim” in the context of Article   34 of the Convention denotes a person directly affected by the act or omission in issue (see, among many other authorities, Nsona v. the Netherlands , 28 November 1996, § 106, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 ‑ V, and Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, §   50, ECHR 1999 ‑ VII). In other words, the person concerned must be directly affected by it or run the risk of being directly affected by it (see, for example, Norris v. Ireland , 26 October 1988, §§   30 ‑ 31, Series A no. 142, and Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria , 20   September 1994, § 39, Series   A no.   295 ‑ A). It is not therefore possible to claim to be a “victim” of an act which is deprived, temporarily or permanently, of any legal effect (see Sisojeva and Others v. Latvia (striking out) [GC], no. 60654/00, §   92, ECHR 2007 ‑ I). With reference to the specific category of cases involving the deportation of non-nationals, the Court has consistently held that an applicant cannot claim to be the “victim” of a deportation measure if the measure is not enforceable (see Vijayanathan and Pusparajah , cited above, § 46; see also Pellumbi v. France (dec.), no.   65730/01, 18 January 2005, and Etanji v. France (dec.), no.   60411/00, 1   March 2005). The Court has adopted the same stance in cases where execution of the deportation order has been stayed indefinitely or otherwise deprived of legal effect, and where any decision by the authorities to proceed with deportation can be appealed against before the relevant courts (see Sisojeva and Others , cited above, §   93, with further references to Kalantari v. Germany (striking out), no.   51342/99, §§   55 ‑ 56, ECHR 2001 ‑ X, and Mehemi v. France (no. 2) , no.   53470/99, §   54, ECHR 2003 ‑ IV; see also Andric v. Sweden (dec.), no.   45917/99, 23   February 1999; Benamar and Others v. France (dec.), no.   42216/98, 14   November 2000; A.D. v. Switzerland (dec.), no.   13531/03, 18   January 2005; and Yildiz v. Germany (dec.), no. 40932/02, 13   October 2005). 54.     Regarding the applicant’s victim status in relation to the complaint that his removal from Malta would affect his private and family life, the Court notes that the authorities have not issued a removal order. Indeed, no steps towards such action have been taken at any point since 2007, when the order to revoke his citizenship was issued and was thus enforceable. Although during the intervening period proceedings concerning the applicant’s complaints have been pending before the domestic courts and subsequently before the Court, neither the domestic courts nor the Court have ordered interim measures (capable of giving any legitimacy to the letter sent to the authorities by the applicant’s legal representative – see paragraph 28 above). It follows that the authorities were under no obligation to desist from deporting the applicant, had they intended to do so. 55.     Furthermore, even if such a removal order were to be issued, the applicant may appeal against it to the Immigration Appeals Board (see paragraph 36 above). The Court reiterates that where expulsions are challenged on the basis of alleged interference with a person’s private and family life (unlike complaints concerning Articles 2 and 3), it is not imperative, in order for a remedy to be effective, that it should have automatic suspensive effect (see De Souza Ribeiro v. France [GC], no.   22689/07, §   83, ECHR 2012). However, domestic courts must seriously examine the circumstances and legal arguments in favour of or against a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in the event of the removal order being enforced. Haste in the execution of a removal order may have the effect of rendering the available remedies ineffective in practice and therefore inaccessible (ibid., § 95). At this stage there is no indication that any eventual removal would be executed in a perfunctory manner and with such haste that it would have the effect of rendering the available remedies ineffective in practice and therefore inaccessible (contrast De Souza Ribeiro , cited above, § 96). 56.     Moreover, on a more practical level, it appears that the applicant is currently stateless; thus, as the situation stands to date, it cannot be said that he is under threat of expulsion (see for instance, Okonkwo v. Austria (dec.), no. 35117/97, 22   May 2001) as there is no guarantee that the Egyptian authorities would accept him, nor is it likely that he could be removed to another country. In any event, such arrangements would take a certain amount of time, and in the event of a removal order being issued and steps being taken in respect of its execution, the applicant would still have a possibility of pursuing the relevant remedies. 57.     Thus, at this stage, the applicant cannot claim to be a “victim” of any actual or impending violation of his rights under Article 8 in connection with his potential removal, and the Government’s objection in this respect is upheld. 58.     On the contrary, the Court does not find it appropriate to reach the same conclusion in so far as the applicant complains of the revocation of his Maltese citizenship itself, the order for which has already been made and executed. It follows that in respect of this part of the complaint, the Government’s objection is dismissed. 2.     Significant disadvantage 59.     In their final observations (concerning comments on the applicant’s claims for just satisfaction and further observations) of 22 May 2015, the Government submitted that the applicant’s complaint was inadmissible, for the purposes of Article 35 of the Convention, on account of the fact that he had not suffered a significant disadvantage as a result of the alleged violation of the Convention. Although the applicant had been deprived of his Maltese citizenship, he still lived and worked in Malta. The applicant had not provided any evidence that he could not reacquire his Egyptian citizenship. 60.     The Court reiterates that, according to Rule   55 of the Rules of Court, any plea of inadmissibility must, in so far as its character and the circumstances permit, be raised by the respondent Contracting Party in its written or oral observations on the admissibility of the application. The Court notes that when the Government were invited to comment on the admissibility and merits of the application, they did not raise any objection to this effect in their observations of 2 March 2015. The Court finds it regrettable when new objections are raised by the Government at a stage where an applicant has in principle no further opportunity to reply. This is particularly so in the absence of exceptional circumstances which would explain the delay in raising such matters. Furthermore, while the Court may well decide to allow the applicant a right of reply, this would lengthen the procedure to the applicant’s detriment as a result of the Government’s untimely actions. In any event, the Court considers that this objection is to be dismissed for the following reasons. 61.     On the basis of the general principle de minimis non curat praetor , the new criterion of no significant disadvantage hinges on the idea that a violation of a right, however real from a purely legal point of view, should attain a minimum level of severity to warrant consideration by an international court. The assessment of this minimum level is, in the nature of things, relative and depends on all the circumstances of the case. The severity of a violation should be assessed taking account of both the applicant’s subjective perceptions and what is objectively at stake in a particular case (see Korolev v. Russia (dec.), no. 25551/05, ECHR 2010). Thus, the absence of any such disadvantage can be based on criteria such as the financial impact of the matter in dispute or the importance of the case for the applicant (see Ionescu v. Romania (dec.), no.   36659/04, § 34, 1 June 2010; Rinck v. France (dec.), no. 18774/09, 19   October 2010; and Kiousi v. Greece (dec.), no. 52036/09, 20 September 2011). Moreover, a violation of the Convention may concern important questions of principle and thus cause a significant disadvantage without affecting pecuniary interests (see Korolev , cited above). 62.     The Court has previously stated that although the right to citizenship is not as such guaranteed by the Convention or its Protocols, it cannot be ruled out that an arbitrary denial of citizenship might in certain circumstances raise an issue under Article 8 of the Convention because of the impact of such a denial on the private life of the individual (see Karassev v. Finland (dec.), no. 31414/96 , ECHR 1999-II; Slivenko and Others v. Latvia (dec.) [GC], no. 48321/99 , § 77, ECHR 2002-II; Savoia and Bounegru v. Italy (dec.), no. 8407/05, 11   July 2006; and Genovese v. Malta , no.   53124/09, § 30, 11 October 2011). Furthermore, the private life of an individual is a concept that is wide enough to embrace aspects of a person’s social identity (see Genovese , cited above, § 33). 63.     In the light of the issues raised, the Court does not find it appropriate to dismiss the present complaint with reference to Article 35 § 3 (b) of the Convention. The Government’s objection is therefore dismissed. 3.     Conclusion as to admissibility 64.     In respect of the complaint concerning the applicant’s potential removal from Maltese territory, the Court considers that the applicant cannot