CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 12 juillet 2016

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BULGARIA   (Applications nos. 33502/07, 30599/10, 8241/11 and 61863/11)                 JUDGMENT             STRASBOURG   12 July 2016   FINAL   12/10/2016   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Marinova and Others v. Bulgaria, The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   Angelika Nußberger, President ,   Khanlar Hajiyev,   Erik Møse,   Faris Vehabović,   Yonko Grozev,   Carlo Ranzoni,   Mārtiņš Mits, judges , and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 21 June 2016, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in four applications (nos. 33502/07, 30599/10, 8241/11 and 61863/11) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by five Bulgarian nationals. The first application was lodged by Mrs Rositsa Valkova Marinova on 26 June 2007. The second application was lodged by Mr   Ventsislav Tsvetkov Zlatanov on 18 May 2010. The third application was lodged by Mr Petar Georgiev Findulov on 4 January 2011. The fourth application was lodged by Mr Ivan Petrov Dinchev and Mrs Margarita Radoeva Dincheva on 19 September 2011. 2.     Mrs Marinova was represented by Mr M. Ekimdzhiev and Ms   K.   Boncheva, lawyers practising in Plovdiv. Mr Zlatanov was represented by Mr Y. Mitev, a lawyer practising in Dobrich. Mr Findulov was represented by Mr S. Arnaudov, a lawyer practising in Plovdiv. Mr   and   Mrs Dinchevi were not legally represented. The Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Ms   I.   Stancheva-Chinova, of the Ministry of Justice. 3.     The applicants alleged, in particular, that their conviction and punishment for making complaints against public officials, coupled with the orders to pay damages to those officials, were in breach of their right to freedom of expression. 4.     On 25 September 2012 the Government were given notice of the applications. After they submitted their observations, by letters of 4 March 2013 the applicants were invited to submit observations in reply and any claims for just satisfaction. Mr and Mrs Dinchevi did not do so within the time-limit fixed by the Court, or request an extension of time. Two months earlier, on 7 January 2013, they had informed the Court that the Chief Prosecutor had requested that criminal proceedings against them be reopened (see paragraph 39 below). Accordingly, by letter dated 15 May 2013, sent by registered mail with acknowledgement of receipt, the Court’s Registry reminded Mr and Mrs Dinchevi of their failure to submit observations and claims, and drew their attention to the terms of Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention. The acknowledgement of receipt has not arrived back at the Court. There have been no further communications from Mr and Mrs   Dinchevi. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE A.     The case of Mrs Marinova 5.     Mrs Marinova was born in 1972 and lives in Tervel. 6.     In February 2006 she complained to the Child Protection Agency that the school teacher of her son, then aged fourteen, had on several occasions ill-treated and humiliated him. In particular, she alleged that the teacher had hit the child three years earlier and had since then often insulted him, had made remarks about his parents in front of other pupils, and had belittled his performance at school. Mrs Marinova argued that this had amounted to harassment, and said that her son had become demotivated. The Agency examined the complaint, heard the teacher, Mrs Marinova’s son and other witnesses, and concluded that the allegation of ill-treatment had not been made out. It found that relations between Mrs Marinova and the teacher had been strained since 2003, when the father of her son had threatened the teacher in front of other pupils. The teacher had brought a private criminal prosecution against the father in relation to that, and the proceedings were pending. 7.     In April 2006 Mrs Marinova complained to the school’s headmaster and the police that the teacher had taken her son’s mobile telephone in class and had later refused to give it back. 8 .     The prosecuting authorities opened criminal proceedings against an unknown perpetrator in connection with this allegation and in August 2006 suspended them on the ground that the perpetrator had not been identified. 9 .     In July 2006 the teacher brought a private criminal prosecution against Mrs Marinova in connection with these three complaints. She submitted that she had not read them because the authorities dealing with them had not shown them to her. However, she had been asked to give explanations and from the questions put to her she had inferred that Mrs   Marinova had accused her of having stolen a mobile telephone and described her as a biased and incompetent teacher using inappropriate disciplinary methods. At the first hearing of the case in September 2006, the teacher brought a civil claim against Mrs Marinova, seeking 5,000 Bulgarian levs (BGN) (2,556 euros (EUR)), plus interest, in non-pecuniary damages. 10.     On 29 November 2006 the Tervel District Court found Mrs   Marinova guilty of defaming a public official, contrary to Articles 147 and 148 §§ 1 (3) and 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 49 and 50 below). The court replaced Mr Marinova’s criminal liability with an administrative fine of BGN 500 (EUR 256). It partly allowed the teacher’s claim for damages, ordering Mrs Marinova to pay her BGN 1,000 (EUR   511), plus interest. It also ordered Mrs Marinova to pay the teacher’s costs, amounting to BGN 164 (EUR 84), and part of the court fee paid by the teacher, amounting to BGN 40 (EUR 20). The court noted that relations between the teacher and Mrs Marinova had for a long time been bad. Having examined the findings of the Child Protection Agency and the prosecuting authorities in relation to Mrs Marinova’s complaints, the court concluded that her allegations, the first of which had become known to the school’s headmaster and a pedagogical counsellor in the school, had been false and therefore defamatory. The court also held, without specifying the basis for its conclusion on this point, that Mrs Marinova had acted with direct intent. In fixing the amount of the fine, the court noted, inter alia , her poor financial situation. 11 .     Mrs Marinova appealed, arguing, inter alia , that complaining about a public official to the authorities did not amount to “dissemination” within the meaning of Article 147 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 49 below). Such complaints could, in some cases, be seen as false accusation contrary to Article 286 of the Code (see paragraph 54 below). Mrs   Marinova also emphasised that she had not made her allegations publicly. 12.     In a final judgment of 18 April 2007, the Dobrich Regional Court upheld the lower court’s judgment. It found that Mrs Marinova’s allegations that the teacher had ill-treated her son were not supported by the findings of the Child Protection Agency or her son’s or the headmaster’s testimony, and held that information was “disseminated” within the meaning of Article 147 § 1 of the Criminal Code even if only one person had become privy to it. The court found that the allegations in relation to the mobile telephone were false as well. It agreed that the statements in this respect in Mrs Marinova’s complaint to the police had amounted to a false accusation, and that the lower court had been wrong to characterise them as defamation. However, it stated that in the absence of an appeal by the teacher, it could not quash this part of the lower court’s judgment. It upheld, without giving any details, the lower court’s finding that Mrs Marinova had acted with direct intent. 13.     To obtain payment of the award of damages and costs, the teacher brought enforcement proceedings against Mrs Marinova. It is unclear how these ended. B.     The case of Mr Zlatanov 14.     Mr Zlatanov was born in 1963 and lives in Sofia. 15.     On 28 July 2008 he was stopped by two road traffic police officers. One of them recorded that Mr Zlatanov had failed to obey a stop sign. Mr   Zlatanov objected, noting down in the record that the officer had refused to present himself, smelled of alcohol and staggered. In written explanations which he filed with the Shabla District Police Department on 5 August 2008, Mr Zlatanov reiterated his allegations and said that the officer had behaved aggressively. 16 .     Mr Zlatanov’s allegations triggered an internal inquiry which exonerated the officer of any wrongdoing. 17 .     In December 2008 the officer brought a private criminal prosecution against Mr Zlatanov in relation to these allegations. He also claimed BGN   5,000 (EUR 2,556) in non-pecuniary damages. 18.     In a judgment of 6 March 2009, the Kavarna District Court found Mr   Zlatanov guilty of defaming a public official, contrary to Articles 147 and 148 §§ 1 (3) and 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 49 and 50 below). The court replaced his criminal liability with an administrative fine of BGN 500 (EUR 256). It partly allowed the officer’s claim for damages, ordering Mr Zlatanov to pay him BGN 1,500 (EUR 767), plus interest. It also ordered Mr Zlatanov to pay BGN 60 (EUR 30) in court fees. The court examined in detail the results of the internal inquiry carried out pursuant to Mr Zlatanov’s allegations, tests carried out several hours after the incident on 28 July 2008 and showing that the officer had not consumed alcohol, and the oral evidence of the other officer present at the scene and the officers’ superior. It concluded that Mr Zlatanov’s allegations did not correspond to the truth. It went on to find that Mr Zlatanov had not been certain of the truthfulness of his allegations, but had nevertheless chosen to make them, both in the record drawn up by the officer in the course of the incident on 28   July 2008 and in his subsequent written explanations. 19 .     Mr Zlatanov appealed. He argued, inter alia , that his statements, made in the exercise of his constitutional rights and only addressed to the officer’s superior, had not amounted to “dissemination” within the meaning of the Article 147 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 49 below). He also relied, inter alia , on Article 10 of the Convention and this Court’s case ‑ law under this provision. 20 .     In a final judgment of 20 November 2009, the Dobrich Regional Court upheld the lower court’s judgment. It found it established that the officer had not displayed any signs of inebriation, which in the court’s view meant that Mr Zlatanov had been fully aware that the officer had not been drunk but had nevertheless chosen to make his allegations, thus acting with a direct intent to discredit the officer. Those allegations, whose purpose had been to smear the officer and at the same time exonerate Mr Zlatanov from liability for the road traffic offence recorded by the officer, could not be justified by the right to defend oneself against administrative-penal charges or the right to freedom of expression. The court ordered Mr Zlatanov to pay the officer’s costs for the appellate proceedings, amounting to BGN 512 (EUR 262). C.     The case of Mr Findulov 21.     Mr Findulov was born in 1955 and lives in Burgas. 22 .     On 12 July 2009 Mr Findulov, who was driving his lorry, was stopped by two road traffic police officers. One of them allegedly requested a bribe. Mr Findulov promised to bring him the money in ten minutes and left his identity card and the vehicle’s documents with the officers. He then called the police and informed the officer on duty of the incident. 23.     On 23 July and 3 and 14 August 2009 Mr Findulov made complaints to the Inspectorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ombudsman of the Republic and the Minister of Internal Affairs, alleging that one of the officers who had stopped him, whose identity was not known to him, had requested a bribe and had withheld his documents. 24.     On 13 August 2009 the Burgas Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs replied to Mr Findulov that his complaint was ill ‑ founded. 25.     According to Mr Findulov, on 14 September 2009 he found his identity card in his mail box. The vehicle’s documents were never recovered. 26.     In a decision of 12 August 2009, the Road Traffic Police Department of the Burgas Regional Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs found, on the basis of a report by the two traffic police officers issued in Mr   Findulov’s absence, that he had not used a seatbelt, that one of the tyres of his lorry had been worn out, that he had refused a breathalyser test, and that he had driven away in an unknown direction. It gave Mr Findulov two administrative fines of BGN 50 and one administrative fine of BGN 500, stripped him of twenty-five control points from his driving licence, and barred him from driving a motor vehicle for twelve months. 27.     Mr Findulov sought judicial review of that decision. On 30   November 2009 the Burgas District Court found that no appeal lay against the BGN 50 fines and discontinued the proceedings in that part. It quashed the remainder of the decision of 12 August 2009, finding that the report of the traffic police officers had not been communicated to Mr   Findulov. In a final judgment of 25 March 2010 the Burgas Administrative Court upheld that judgment. 28 .     On an unspecified date in 2009, the officer accused by Mr Findulov of soliciting a bribe brought a private criminal prosecution against him in relation to that allegation. He also sought BGN   10,000 (EUR 5,113) in non ‑ pecuniary damages. 29.     In a judgment of 11 May 2010, the Burgas District Court found Mr   Findulov guilty of defaming a public official, contrary to Articles 147 and 148 §§ 1 (3) and 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 49 and 50 below). It sentenced him to a fine of BGN 5,000 (EUR 2,556) and a public reprimand. It partly allowed the officer’s claim for damages, ordering Mr   Findulov to pay him BGN 3,000 (EUR 1,534). It also ordered Mr   Findulov to pay BGN 120 (EUR 61) in court fees. The court noted that in his complaints Mr Findulov had not named the officer, but found that he had been identifiable from the complaints, which clearly alleged that he had requested a bribe, thus accusing him of an offence before third parties. The offence of defamation did not require that those third parties – the officer’s hierarchy – had actually believed the allegations or taken any action in relation to them. Mr Findulov, who under Article 147 § 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraph 49 above) bore the burden of proof in this respect, had failed to establish that the officer had in fact solicited a bribe. The court went on to say, without explaining the reasons for this conclusion, that Mr   Findulov had acted with direct intent. When fixing the sentence, the court noted that it could not replace Mr Findulov’s criminal liability with an administrative punishment as this was a one-off possibility and Mr Findulov had previously benefited from a waiver of his criminal liability in relation to a road traffic offence. In fixing the award of non-pecuniary damages to the officer, the court noted that Mr Findulov’s allegations had been particularly damning. 30.     Mr Findulov appealed. 31 .     In a final judgment of 14 July 2010, the Burgas Regional Court upheld the lower court’s judgment. It entirely agreed with the reasons given by that court, adding that Mr Findulov had been fully aware that his allegations against the officer were false but had nevertheless chosen to defame him. The court also ordered Mr Findulov to pay BGN 250 (EUR   128) incurred by the officer in costs for the appeal proceedings. 32.     The public reprimand was executed, as ordered by the court, by announcing Mr Findulov’s conviction and sentence on the local radio station. To obtain payment of the award of damages and costs, the officer brought enforcement proceedings against Mr Findulov. It is unclear how these ended. D.     The case of Mr and Mrs Dinchevi 33.     Mr Dinchev was born in 1943. Mrs Dincheva was born in 1947. Both of them live in Lovech. 34.     The two of them had a long-running conflict with neighbours of theirs. On 14 November 2009 tensions escalated and Mr and Mrs Dinchevi called the police, complaining that they had been assaulted by the neighbours. Two officers came and warned one of the neighbours not to harass the applicants. 35.     On 17 November 2009 Mr and Mrs Dinchevi complained to the head of the Lovech District Police Directorate against the officers, alleging that they had shown no interest in the incident and had failed to protect them, instead inviting the aggressors in the patrol car and “muttering with them”. Mr and Mrs Dinchevi sent copies of the complaint to the Lovech District Prosecutor’s Office, the head of the Lovech Fire Brigade, and the Minister of Internal Affairs. On 4 December 2009 the head of the Lovech District Police Directorate informed Mr and Mrs Dinchevi that an internal inquiry had established that their complaint was ill-founded. 36.     On an unspecified date in 2010 the officers brought a private criminal prosecution and claims for damages against Mr and Mrs Dinchevi. 37.     In a judgment of 20 October 2010, the Lovech District Court found Mr and Mrs Dinchevi guilty of defaming public officials, contrary to Articles 147 and 148 §§ 1 (3) and 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs   49 and 50 below). It sentenced each of them to a fine of BGN   2,500 (EUR   1,278) and a public reprimand. The reprimand was to be executed by announcing the conviction and sentence on the local radio station. The court also partly allowed the officers’ claims for damages, ordering the applicants to pay each of them BGN 400 (EUR 205). 38.     On appeal, in a final judgment of 18 April 2011 the Lovech Regional Court upheld the conviction with similar reasoning but reduced the fine imposed on each applicant to BGN 1,500 (EUR 764). 39.     After the Government were given notice of the application (see paragraph 4 above), they brought Mr and Mrs Dinchevi’s case to the attention of the Chief Prosecutor. In December 2012 the Chief Prosecutor ad interim asked the Supreme Court of Cassation to reopen the proceedings, set aside the judgments against Mr and Mrs Dinchevi, and acquit them. He submitted that the statements in their complaint against the officers had not been defamatory but simply an expression of their disapproval of the way in which the officers had carried out their duties. Under the case-law of this Court and the case-law of the Supreme Court of Cassation, public officials could legitimately be subjected to heightened criticism. Accepting, as the Lovech courts had, that critical statements in complaints against such officials were defamatory would mean that the vast majority of claims and complaints filed with the courts and the prosecuting authorities by non ‑ lawyers could lead to penal sanctions. 40.     In a final judgment of 7 March 2013 (реш. № 104 от 07.03.2013 г. по н. д. № 178/2013 г., ВКС, III н. о.), the Supreme Court of Cassation allowed the request, reopened the proceedings, set the two judgments aside, acquitted Mr and Mrs Dinchevi, and dismissed the claims for damages against them. It held that their actions had not amounted to an offence. The statements in their complaints had been an expression of their disapproval of the way in which the officers had carried out their duties, and an exercise of their constitutional rights to make complaints to the authorities, express their opinion, and defend their rights. The statements had been value judgments which could not be proved or disproved, and could not be regarded as defamatory. Defamation could only consist in the imputation of concrete negative facts. The statements did not give rise to liability in damages either. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW A.     Relevant constitutional provisions 41.     Article 45 of the Constitution of 1991 provides that the citizens have the right to make complaints, proposals and petitions to the authorities. 42.     Article 39 § 1 of the Constitution provides that everyone is entitled to express an opinion and publicise it through words, whether written or oral, sounds or images, or in any other way. By Article 39 § 2, that right cannot be exercised to the detriment of the rights or reputation of others. 43 .     Article 41 § 1 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to impart information, but that the exercise of that right may not be directed against the rights or the good name of others. 44.     Article 56 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to defence in cases where his rights or legitimate interests have been infringed or threatened. B.     Case-law of the Supreme Court of Cassation under those provisions in relation to complaints against public officials 45.     In a case in which a public prosecutor had brought a private criminal prosecution against an accused who had sought his recusal from a criminal case, the Supreme Court of Cassation, in upholding the acquittal of the defendant, said that the right under Article 45 of the Constitution (see paragraph 41 above) was separate from the right to freedom of expression under Article 39 of the Constitution (see paragraph 42 above) and Article 10 of the Convention, and that it outweighed the prosecutor’s right to protect his reputation by way of criminal law measures (see реш. № 421 от 14.11.2008 г. по н. д. № 446/2008 г., ВКС, III н. о.). 46.     In civil cases, the Supreme Court of Cassation has held that a complaint to a State authority, even if eventually turning out to be based on untrue facts, is not tortious because it is based on the right under Article 45 of the Constitution to make complaints and petitions, and the right under Article 56 of the Constitution to conduct one’s defence without fear of retaliation (see paragraphs 41 and 44 above). The court has also said that making such a complaint would only be wrongful if the complainant was aware that his allegations were false and lodged the complaint to cause harm to the person of whom he complained (see реш. № 1347 от 18.12.2008 г. по гр. д. № 5006/2007 г., ВКС, II г. о.; реш. № 758 от 11.02.2011 г. по гр. д. № 1243/2009 г., ВКС, II г. о.; and реш. № 245 от 05.11.2014 г. по гр. д. № 1734/2014 г., ВКС, III г. о.). C.     Relevant provisions of the Code of Administrative Procedure 47 .     By Article 108 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006, no-one may be persecuted for notifying the authorities of unlawful or incorrect actions or omissions by public officials. 48 .     The courts have recently started to apply that provision in cases relating to allegedly defamatory allegations against public officials. In one such case, the Sofia City Court relied on it to uphold the acquittal of a person accused of defaming a notary in a complaint to Parliament (see реш.   № 878 от 02.07.2013 г. по в. н. ч. х. д. № 1839/2013 г., СГС). In another case, the Sliven Regional Court likewise relied on it to uphold the acquittal of a person accused of defaming a mayor in complaints to the municipal council and the central authorities (see реш. № 127 от 10.10.2013 г. по в. н. ч. х. д. № 434/2013 г., ОС-Сливен). However, the Pernik Regional Court recently did not find it incompatible with that provision to uphold the conviction of a person who had alleged in a complaint lodged with the police that a traffic police officer had appeared drunk while on duty (see реш. № 33 от 24.04.2014 г. по в. н. ч. х. д. №   44/2014 г., ОС ‑ Перник). D.     The criminal offence of defamation 49.     Article 147 of the Criminal Code 1968 provides as follows: “1.     Any person who disseminates an injurious statement of fact about another or imputes an offence to him shall be punished for defamation by a fine ranging from three to seven thousand levs, as well as by public reprimand. 2.     The perpetrator shall not be punished if he proves the truth of the said statement or imputation.” 50.     By Article 148 §§ 1 (3) and 2 of the Code, the defamation of a public official in the course of or in connection with the performance of his duties is punishable by a fine ranging from five to fifteen thousand levs and public reprimand. 51 .     By Article 161 § 1 of the Code, as in force since March 2000, charges under any of those provisions may only be brought by the alleged victim of the offence. 52.     According to the case-law of the former Supreme Court and the current Supreme Court of Cassation (see реш. № 209 от 18.05.1982 г. по н.   д. №   209/1982 г. ВС, І н. о.; реш. № 347 от 25.09.2009 г. по н. д. №   372/2009 г. ВКС, І н. о.; реш. № 418 от 12.11.2009 г. по н. д. №   458/2009 г., ВКС, III н. о.; and реш. № 452 от 12.10.2010 г. по н. д. №   411/2010 г., ВКС, III н. о.), statements made in letters, complaints or depositions to the authorities cannot be considered as “dissemination” within the meaning of Article 147 § 1 of the Code because their authors do not intend to harm the reputation of the persons to whom they refer but to exercise their right to make complaints, report irregularities, or seek the authorities’ assistance. 53.     Many lower courts have adhered to that position (see прис. от 02.07.2009 г. по н. ч. х. д. № 111/2009 г., РС-Берковица; прис. № 696 от 30.11.2009 г. по н. ч. х. д. № 3103/2009 г., РС-Варна; реш. № 584 от 16.12.2009 г. по в. гр. д. № 909/2009 г., ОС-Добрич; реш. № 60 от 18.05.2010 г. по в. н. ч. х. д. № 209/2009 г., ОС-Габрово; реш. № 41 от 30.06.2010 г. по н. д. № 154/2010 г., ОС-Кърджали; реш. № 187 от 13.05.2011 г. по в. н. ч. х. д. № 179/2011 г., ОС-Плевен; and реш. № 878 от 02.07.2013 г. по в. н. ч. х. д. № 1839/2013 г., СГС). E.     The criminal offence of making a false accusation 54.     By Article 286 § 1 of the Criminal Code 1968, it is an offence falsely to allege before a competent authority that a person has committed a criminal offence when knowing that this is not the case. By Article 286 § 2, the offence carries a higher penalty if the person so accused has incurred criminal liability as a result of the accusation. 55 .     Charges under this Article may only be brought by the prosecuting authorities, not by the alleged victim of the offence. 56.     The former Supreme Court and the current Supreme Court of Cassation have explained that the defining characteristic of this offence is that the offender addresses his statement to an authority competent to bring criminal charges against the person mentioned in the statement, and the offender seeks that result (see реш. № 277 от 07.05.1975 г. по н. д. №   244/1975 г., ВС, I н. о.; реш. № 17 от 05.07.1978 г. по н. д. №   15/ 1978   г., ВС, ОСНК; реш. № 601 от 04.01.1988 г. по н. д. № 675/1987 г., ВС, II н. о.; реш. № 184 от 26.05.2009 г. по н. д. № 133/2009 г., ВКС, I   н. о.; and реш. № 100 от 22.03.2013 г. по н. д. № 74/2013 г., ВКС, II   н.   о.). The chief difference between the offences of defamation and false accusation is that the aim of a defamatory statement is to disparage a person’s reputation, whereas the aim – and possible result – of a false accusation is to see the criminal liability of that person engaged; the former is an offence against the personality rights of the statement’s target and the latter is an offence against the course of justice (see реш. № 1145 от 20.06.1955 г. по н. д. №   1839/1955 г., ВС, I н. о., and реш. № 209 от 18.05.1982 г. по н. д. №   209/1982 г., ВС, I н. о.). In practical terms, the difference can normally be drawn on the basis of whether or not the complaint has been addressed to an authority competent to bring criminal charges against the person against whom it is directed (see реш. № 327 от 15.07.2009 г. по н. д. № 336/ 2009   г., ВКС, I н. о.). 57 .     According to the settled case-law of the former Supreme Court and the current Supreme Court of Cassation, a person can only commit the offence of false accusation if he is not acting in good faith, realises that the person that he is accusing has not committed an offence or is indifferent to that fact, but nevertheless alleges the opposite before the competent authority. The courts have explained that to hold otherwise would mean penalising any communication to the competent authorities in relation to potentially criminal actions that on examination turns out to be untrue, which would be contrary to the citizens’ civic duty to notify those authorities when they witness an offence (see реш. № 435 от 27.06.1955 г. по н. д. № 415/ 1955 г., ВС, в. о.; реш. № 441 от 10.08.1970 г. по н. д. №   397/1970 г., ВС, I н. о.; реш. № 108 от 26.02.2009 г. по н. д. №   41/2009 г., ВКС, II н. о.; реш. № 500 от 04.12.2009 г. по н. д. №   458/2009 г., ВКС, II н. о.; реш. № 453 от 12.10.2010 г. по н. д. №   431/2010 г., ВКС, III н. о.; реш. № 326 от 11.11.2010 г. по н. д. №   258/2010 г., ВКС, II н. о.; реш. № 505 от 24.11.2010 г. по н. д. №   517/2010 г., ВКС, III н. о.; реш. № 212 от 20.04.2011 г. по н. д. №   1235/2011 г., ВКС, III н. о.; реш. № 110 от 24.04.2015 г. по н. д. №   175/2015 г., ВКС, III н. о.; and реш. № 87 от 26.05.2015 г. по н. д. №   1902/2014 г., ВКС, III н. о.). F.     Possibility to appeal on points of law or seek revision in criminal defamation cases 58.     By Article 346 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 2005, an appellate judgment of a regional court is only subject to appeal on points of law before the Supreme Court of Cassation if the regional court itself convicts or acquits the accused. By Article 336 § 1, this is the case when the regional court applies a harsher criminal law rule than that applied by the district court, or convicts, respectively acquits, an accused who has been acquitted, respectively convicted, by the district court. In any event, regional court judgments in cases in which the convicted person has had his criminal liability replaced with administrative punishment are not subject to appeal on points of law (Article 346 § 2 in fine ). In application of these rules, the Supreme Court of Cassation has refused to examine an appeal on points of law against the part of a regional court judgment which had upheld a district court judgment in a defamation case (see реш. № 452 от 12.10.2010 г. по н. д. № 411/2010 г., ВКС, III н. о.). 59.     By Article 422 § 1 (5) read in conjunction with Articles 348 § 1, 420   § 2 and 421 § 3 of the same Code, a person convicted of an offence prosecutable by the prosecuting authorities who has not had his criminal liability replaced with an administrative punishment can, provided that he has not appealed on points of law, himself seek reopening of the proceedings within six months of the final judgment on the basis that the courts have seriously misapplied the substantive law or the rules of procedure, or have imposed a clearly disproportionate sentence. THE LAW I.     APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 37 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION TO THE APPLICATION OF MR AND MRS DINCHEVI 60.     The Government submitted that the application of Mr and Mrs   Dinchevi was inadmissible. They pointed out that after receiving notice of the application they had asked the Supreme Cassation Prosecutor’s Office to seek reopening of the proceedings against the two applicants. The Supreme Court of Cassation had allowed the request, fully acquitting Mr   and Mrs Dinchevi and dismissing the claims for damages against them. 61.     Mr and Mrs Dinchevi did not submit observations in reply. 62 .     The Government’s submission must be regarded as a request under Article 37 § 1 of the Convention that the application be struck out of the Court’s list (see Pisano v. Italy [GC] (striking out), no. 36732/97, § 39, 24   October 2002). 63 .     Article 37 § 1 of the Convention provides, in so far as relevant: “The Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that (a)     the applicant does not intend to pursue his application; or (b)     the matter has been resolved; ... ... However, the Court shall continue the examination of the application if respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto so requires.” 64 .     In this case, it is not necessary to decide whether the reopening of the proceedings against Mr and Mrs Dinchevi, which led to their acquittal and the dismissal of the claims for damages against them, has resolved the matter within the meaning of sub-paragraph (b) of that provision, as these applicants can in any event be regarded as not intending to pursue that application within the meaning of its sub-paragraph (a). 65 .     Mr and Mrs Dinchevi did not submit observations in reply to those of the Government or claims for just satisfaction, as invited in a letter from the Registry dated 4 March 2013, or request an extension of time do so. Nor did they respond to the Registry’s further letter of 15 May 2013, sent by registered mail with acknowledgement of receipt, that reminded them of this failure and drew their attention to the terms of Article 37 § 1 (a) (see paragraph 4 above). It is true that the acknowledgement of receipt of that letter has not arrived back at the Court (ibid.), so as to confirm that the letter has reached the applicants and that their failure to reply to it, or the Registry’s previous letter, is due to their having lost interest in the case. The Court is nevertheless satisfied that this is so. On 7 January 2013, just two months before they were invited to submit their observations and claims, Mr   and Mrs Dinchevi had informed it of the Chief Prosecutor’s request that the criminal proceedings against them be reopened (ibid., as well as paragraph 39 above). There is no indication that they have attempted to contact the Court since then. This, coupled with the fact that the Supreme Court of Cassation allowed the reopening request, acquitted Mr   andMrs   Dinchevi, and dismissed the claims for damages against them on 7   March 2013 (see paragraph 40 above), just three days after they were invited to submit their observations and claims for just satisfaction, compels the conclusion that they regarded this as sufficient redress for their grievance and lost interest in pursuing their application to the Court. 66.     There is no reason relating to respect for human rights as defined in the Convention that requires the continued examination of the application under Article 37 § 1 in fine , especially bearing in mind that almost identical issues will be considered in the cases of the other three applicants (see Shesti   Mai Engineering OOD and Others v. Bulgaria , no. 17854/04, § 62, 20   September 2011, with further references). 67.     It follows that Mr and Mrs Dinchevi’s application must be struck out of the Court’s list under Article 37 § 1 (a) of the Convention. II.     JOINDER OF THE REMAINING THREE APPLICATIONS 68.     The cases of Mrs Marinova, Mr Zlatanov and Mr Findulov and their complaints are very similar. Their applications should therefore be joined under Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court. III.     ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION 69.     All three applicants complained that they had been convicted, fined and ordered to pay damages in relation to the complaints that they had made against public officials. Mrs Marinova relied on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, whereas Mr Zlatanov and Mr   Findulov relied on Article 10 of the Convention. 70.     The Court, as master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case, finds that these complaints are to be examined solely under Article 10 of the Convention, which provides, in so far as relevant: “1.     Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. ... 2.     The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” A.     The parties’ submissions 1.     The Government 71.     The Government submitted that the interferences with the applicants’ right to freedom of expression had been based on clear legal provisions and had sought to protect the reputation and rights of others. These interferences had moreover been proportionate, in particular because of the need to protect public officials against unjustified attacks. 72.     In the case of Mrs Marinova, the complaints against the teacher had to be seen in the context of the long-running acrimony between the two. The investigation of those complaints, addressed to three different authorities, had caused considerable damage to the teacher’s reputation, especially among her colleagues. Tervel, where the events had taken place, was a town with a population of less than seven thousand people that only had one school – that in which the teacher was employed. The teacher had had more than twenty-five years of service in that school, and Mrs Marinova’s allegations had seriously damaged her standing there. As evident from the findings of the criminal courts in the case against Mrs Marinova, she had been fully aware of that, and of the lack of any basis for her allegations, but had nevertheless chosen to make them and thus discredit the teacher. Even so, Mrs Marinova had been given the minimum administrative fine possible and ordered to pay the teacher a relatively low amount of damages. 73.     In the case of Mr Zlatanov, the allegations that the police officer had acted rudely and had been drunk while on duty could have led to his dismissal. The inquiry into those allegations, which had included submitting the officer to blood tests, had shown them to be entirely baseless. The courts hearing the case against Mr Zlatanov had found that he had made the allegations deliberately in an attempt to escape liability for a road traffic offence. In spite of that, he had been given the minimum administrative fine possible and ordered to pay the officer a reasonable amount of damages. 74.     In the case of Mr Findulov, his allegation that the police officer had solicited a bribe had become known to a very wide circle of people, not just the officer’s superiors or the authorities competent to investigate him. The allegation was very serious and could have led to grave consequences for the officer, including a criminal sanction and the loss of his job – something Mr Findulov could not have been unaware of. Even so, he had been given the minimum criminal fine possible – it had not been open to the courts to waive his criminal liability, which was a one-off possibility, because he had already profited from such a waiver – and ordered to pay the officer a reasonable amount of damages. 2.     The applicants 75.     Mrs Marinova submitted that her conviction of defamation had not been sufficiently foreseeable in view of the lack of clarity in the Bulgarian courts’ case-law as to what could amount to “dissemination” within the meaning of Article 147 § 1 of the Criminal Code, in particular when it came to complaints to the authorities, made in the exercise of the right to make such complaints under Article 45 of the Constitution. By Article 108 § 2 of the Code of Administrative Procedure 2006, no-one could be prosecuted for making allegations against public officials. The conviction had not been proportionate either, since the allegations against the teacher, which had not directly accused her of an offence, had been made by Mrs Marinova personally rather than by a lawyer acting on her behalf, had been addressed to the authorities rather than the media, and had been phrased in neutral terms. The Government’s assertion of a long-running acrimony between Mrs   Marinova and the teacher was not supported by enough evidence. Neither was their claim that the allegations against the teacher had become known to the whole town of Tervel. 76.     Mr Zlatanov submitted that he had not insulted the officer or abused him verbally. He had simply exercised his right to defend himself and his right to freedom of expression. His statements had been made in writing and before a limited number of people. He expressed doubts about the accuracy of the results of the blood tests carried out on the officer. Since under Bulgarian law the offence of defamation could not be committed by negligence and since under the prevailing case-law of the Bulgarian courts allegations made in complaints to the authorities did not amount to “dissemination” within the meaning of Article 147 § 1 of the Criminal Code, he could not have expected that he would incur liability for making his statements. 77.     Mr Findulov submitted that he had been extremely upset by the solicitation of a bribe by the officer, and even more so by the officer’s retaining his documents pending the payment of that bribe. His complaints had been made entirely in reaction to that, and had amounted to an exercise of his right under Article   45 of the Constitution. Such complaints were intended to safeguard not only the personal interest of those who made them, but also the public interest in good administration. Retaliating against such complaints by way of criminal law measures was pernicious for the possibility for citizens in a democratic society to scrutinise the authorities. These measures had been entirely disproportionate in his case, in particular because he had not made his allegations publicly but only before the competent authorities. B.     The Court’s assessment 1.     Admissibility 78.     The complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention or inadmissible on other grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible. 2.     Merits 79 .     The judgments against Mrs Marinova, Mr Zlatanov and Mr   Findulov, finding them guilty of defamation, subjecting them to fines – and in the case of Mr Findulov also to a public reprimand – and ordering them to pay damages (see paragraphs 10, 18 and 29 above), constituted an “interference”, in the form of a “penalty”, with their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention. Such interference will only be compatible with that Article if it was “prescribed by law” and was “necessary in a democratic society” for one of the aims set out in its second paragraph. 80 .     The Court finds, and it is not in dispute between the parties, that the interference in each of the three cases had a legal basis – Articles 147 and   148 §§ 1 (3) and 2 of the Criminal Code (see paragraphs 49 and 50 above) – and that the law was accessible. The only contentious point was whether the applicants could foresee, to a degree that was reasonable in the circumstances, that they could be found guilty of defamation in relation to the statements made by them. 81 .     In a previous case relating to statements made by a journalist in a newspaper article, the Court accepted that Article 147 § 1 of the Criminal Code was sufficiently precise (see Kasabova v. Bulgaria , no. 22385/03, §   52, 19 April 2011). But the situations at hand are quite different. That provision makes it an offence to “disseminate” injurious statements (see paragraph 49 above). It appears that under the case-law of the former Supreme Court and the current Supreme Court of Cassation, statements made in complaints or depositions to the authorities cannot be considered as such “dissemination” because their authors do not intend to harm the reputation of the persons to whom they refer but to exercise their right to make complaints, report irregularities, or seek the authorities’ assistance (see paragraph 52 above). Such statements can apparently rather be characterised, in appropriate cases, as false accusations contrary to Article   286 of the Code (see paragraph 56 above). It is therefore open to doubt whether the applicants could reasonably foresee that by making their complaints they were breaking Article 147 § 1 of the Criminal Code (see, mutatis mutandis , Siryk v. Ukraine , no. 6428/07, §§ 36-38, 31 March 2011). 82 .     The applicable rules of procedure did not make it possible for the applicants’ convictions to reach the Supreme Court of Cassation so that it could authoritatively rule on the manner of application of Article 147 § 1 of the Criminal Code in their circumstances (see paragraphs 58 and 59 above). For its part, this Court does not consider that it has to pronounce on this point, as it finds that the interferences were in any event not “necessary in a democratic society”, for th