CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 30 août 2016

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MALTA   (Application no. 46931/12)                   JUDGMENT             STRASBOURG   30 August 2016     FINAL   30/11/2016   This judgment has become final under Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Apap Bologna v. Malta, The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:   András Sajó, President,   Vincent A. De Gaetano,   Nona Tsotsoria,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Krzysztof Wojtyczek,   Iulia Motoc,   Gabriele Kucsko-Stadlmayer, judges, and Marialena Tsirli, Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 5 July 2016, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 46931/12) against the Republic of Malta lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Maltese national, Mr Louis Apap Bologna (“the applicant”), on 25 July 2012. 2.     The applicant was represented by Dr   I.   Refalo and Dr S. Grech, lawyers practicing in Valletta. The Maltese Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Dr P. Grech, Attorney General. 3.     The applicant alleged that he had suffered a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and Article 13 of the Convention on account of the requisition orders imposed on him which had not been annulled by the Constitutional Court. 4.     On 22 January 2015 the application was communicated to the Government. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 5.     The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in Sliema. A.     Background to the case 6.     The applicant is the owner of a property named “London” at 1 Moroni Street, Gzira, Malta (a two-storey house, with stairs allowing access to the second floor, each floor having two main rooms and a smaller room, as well as a terrace; and with further rooms on the roof (hereinafter “the property”)). Following the death of the applicant’s uncle on 16 July 1975, the applicant and another five heirs inherited his uncle’s estate, including the property. By a deed of partition of 30 April 1980 the property was assigned to the applicant as sole owner. 7.     In 1976 the property was requisitioned and allocated to P.S. In 1987 the applicant became aware that on an unspecified date P.S. had left the property and given the keys back to the authorities, and that the property had then become occupied by a certain C.C., who had no title to it (since it had not been allocated to him by the authorities). 8.     The applicant complained to the Housing Authority, which, instead of condemning the illegal occupation, on 23 May 1988 issued a new requisition order, assigning the property to C.C. Subsequently, C.C. obtained a development permit to carry out alteration work to the property. The work was carried out without the consent of the applicant, as owner. 9.     Throughout the years while the requisition order was in force, the applicant was meant to receive an annual rent of 40 Maltese Liras (MTL) (approximately 93 euros (EUR)) from the Housing Authority. That amount was increased to MTL 80 (approximately EUR 185) in 2010 or thereabouts. However, the Housing Authority has not been paying the applicant since 2003, nor does it transpire that the rent has been deposited in court. According to the Government, the applicant has never requested such payment from the authorities. 10.     The applicant considered that those amounts were far below the rental value of the property. B.     Constitutional redress proceedings 11.     After having written to the Housing Authority several times to no avail, on 20 October 2009 the applicant instituted constitutional redress proceedings against the Housing Authority and the Attorney General. He requested the court to find that the requisition orders had breached his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Consequently, he sought to annul the order, and requested the release of the property in his favour with free and vacant possession. He also sought an award of compensation for the occupation of the premises, as well as any other relevant redress. In so far as relevant, paragraph three of his application concerning the facts of the case reads as follows: “In 1987, after the applicant had inherited the property, he discovered that a certain PS had left the property ...”. It then specified in paragraph four that “on 23 May 1988 the same authority again requisitioned the same property by means of requisition order no. 16830”. In paragraph ten the applicant noted that his rights were being breached as a result of “the requisition order mentioned above”. Lastly, his first request to the court was to the effect that the court should “declare the abovementioned requisition ... as being in breach ...” and his second request read “to annul all requisition order issued against the applicants” ( tannulla l-ordni ta’ rekwizzjoni kollha rilevanti maħrugin kontra tagħhom ). 12.     According to the Government, when giving evidence in court on 30   November 2009, the applicant mentioned the deed of partition of 30   April 1980. At the same time he acknowledged that he did not contest the requisition order issued in 1976 (no record of this has been provided). 13.     Pending the outcome of the proceedings, the court appointed an expert to make a valuation of the property. According to a report of 21   January 2010 the expert considered that the annual rental value of the property on the market in 1987 was MTL 249 (approximately EUR 580), and that in 2010 it was MTL 1,223.50 (approximately EUR 2,850). Its sale market value was estimated at EUR 95,000. 14.     By a judgment of 14 July 2011 the Civil Court (First Hall), in its constitutional jurisdiction, found in favour of the applicant. It held that although the measure was lawful and pursued a legitimate aim, the applicant had suffered a breach of his property rights on account of the lack of proportionality of the measure, in so far as it made the applicant bear a disproportionate burden, given the low amount of rent applicable compared to the market rental value of the property. It held, however, that the measure was not abusive in so far as C.C. suffered from a physical disability and lived on social benefits. He thus required lodging compatible with his needs to avoid hardship and the property at issue was adequate for such purpose. 15.     The court further held that the Attorney General should not have been summoned as a defendant in the case ( m’huwiex leġittimu kontradittur ). The applicant was therefore ordered to pay his own costs of the proceedings as well as those of the Attorney General (in total approximately EUR   2,950). 16.     The court held that given that the violation had arisen solely from a lack of fair balance, it was not necessary to annul the requisition order and release the property. Referring to domestic case-law, it held: “... while this [constitutional] court has a wide latitude in giving any order it may consider relevant in order for it to safeguard Articles 33 to 45 of the Constitution and human rights and fundamental freedoms as defined in the Convention, such latitude was not unlimited and was circumscribed by the judicial system of the country, which did not allow this court [of constitutional jurisdiction] to amend national laws, nor could it make mandatory an action which according to domestic law was discretionary, nor could it order the Housing Authority to pay rent or compensation of a higher value than that provided for by the relevant law. Compensation, if any, which may be paid by this court [of constitutional jurisdiction] is that for the violation found.” 17.     The court awarded the applicant EUR 21,000. It considered the compensation fair and just in the circumstances of the case and on the basis of the evidence produced, having taken account in particular of the following factors: that the property had been subject to a requisition order since 1976 but it had affected the applicant since 1988 when he had inherited the property ( sic .); for a number of years C.C. had paid the Housing Authority MTL 40 per year and it was only recently ( sic .) that the rent had been increased to MTL 80; that the applicant had only received payment up until 2003; that the rental value of the property on the market in 1987 was MTL 249 (approximately EUR 580), and in 2010 it was MTL   1,223.50 (approximately EUR   2,850); and lastly, that the requisition order had been issued in the public interest to procure accommodation for those in need, and thus the compensation payable could be less than the full market value. 18.     The applicant appealed, complaining that the court had failed to annul the requisition order and return the property to him despite finding in his favour. He had thus remained a victim of the situation as the court had not given him an appropriate remedy for the violation. He also complained that the compensation was far too low and had not been determined in accordance with the applicable market value. He further argued that the Attorney General had been the correct defendant given that the amount of rent depended on the law, which in consequence was also an issue in the case. It does not transpire from the written pleadings that the applicant explicitly raised the issue of compensation in relation to the years before 1988, during which he had already been an owner of the property. 19.     The Housing Authority and the Attorney General also appealed. They agreed with the merits of the first-instance decision, but requested the court to reduce the award of compensation which had been awarded arbitrio boni viri and not on proper calculations, and this especially since the applicant had waited twenty years before instituting proceedings. 20.     A hearing was held on 14 November 2011. 21.     By a judgment of 24 February 2012 the Constitutional Court reduced the amount of compensation to EUR 16,000. It, too, considered that the applicant should be penalised for the delay (of twenty years since coming into possession of the property) in instituting proceedings, as had been done in other domestic cases. It noted that, according to European Court of Human Rights case-law, State control over levels of rent may often cause significant reductions in the amount of rent chargeable; in the circumstances of the present case it was therefore not appropriate to make awards in accordance with market values. It considered that the first ‑ instance court had been free to make an award equitably, and correct to make no award for the time prior to 1988, the date when the applicant had become the owner of the property ( sic .) and before which he had had no ties with it. The Constitutional Court also refused to annul the order, given that it had been issued lawfully and had pursued a legitimate aim. It considered that in such circumstances it was not appropriate ( mhux indikat ) to release the property and to evict the tenant (as also held in previous cases, namely Carmen Cassar vs Director of Social Accommodation , Constitutional Court judgment of 12 July 2011 and Gatt vs Attorney General , Constitutional Court judgment of 5 July 2011), nor could it impose a higher rent for the future, when such rent was not provided for by law (as also held in Cassar , cited above). It reiterated that its role was limited to awarding compensation for the violation found. The same had also been held by the European Court of Human Rights. Compensation in cases of a constitutional nature was not equivalent to civil damage, which could be pursued before the courts of ordinary jurisdiction. 22.     The Constitutional Court further confirmed that the proper defendant was solely the Housing Authority, and not the Attorney General, as the applicant was not contesting the constitutional validity of the law itself, but solely the requisition order issued in respect of his property. The Constitutional Court upheld the first-instance court’s order for the payment of costs and ordered the applicant to pay the costs of all the parties related to the appeal. 23.     As a result of this judgment, the applicant had to pay his share of the costs of the proceedings as well as those of the Attorney General at first instance, and those of all the parties on appeal. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Requisition orders 24.     The relevant domestic law and practice concerning requisition orders is to be found in, inter alia , Ghigo v. Malta (no. 31122/05, §§   18 ‑ 24, 26   September 2006). 25.   Further amendments were introduced in 2010 which allow for an increase in the applicable rents as per Article 1531C of the Civil Code, Chapter 16 of the Laws of Malta, and the Minimum Compensation for Requisitioned Buildings Regulations (Subsidiary Legislation 16.2). Article   1531C of the Civil Code, reads as follows: Article 1531C “(1) The rent of a residence which has been in force before the 1st June 1995 shall be subject to the law as in force prior to the 1st June 1995 so however that unless otherwise agreed upon in writing after the 1st January 2010, the rate of the rent as from the first payment of rent due after the 1st January 2010, shall, when this was less than one hundred and eighty-five euro (€185) per year, increase to such amount: Provided that where the rate of the lease was more than one hundred eighty ‑ five   euro (€185) per year, this shall remain at such higher rate as established.   (2) In any case the rate of the rent as stated in sub-article (1) shall increase every three years by a proportion equal to the increase in the index of inflation according to article 13 of the Housing (Decontrol) Ordinance; the first increase shall be made on the date of the first payment of rent due after the 1st January 2013: Provided that where the lease on the 1st January 2010 will be more than one hundred eighty-five euro (€185) per year, and by a contract in writing prior to 1 st   June 1995 the parties would have agreed upon a method of increase in rent, after 1 st   January 2010 the increases in rent shall continue to be regulated in terms of that agreement until such agreement remains in force.” 26.   In so far as relevant, the Minimum Compensation for Requisitioned Buildings Regulations read as follows: “2. (1) The provisions of article 1531C of the Civil Code shall, as from first (1st) payment of rent due after the 30 th September 2011, apply to buildings consisting of a residence which are requisitioned in terms of the Housing Act. (2) For the purposes of these regulations ‘rent’ shall also include compensation payable under the Housing Act for the requisition of a building consisting of a residence and in the case of such compensation being payable, the provisions of article 1531C of the Civil Code shall apply mutatis mutandis .” 27.     Section 8 of the Housing Act, Chapter 125 of the Laws of Malta, in so far as relevant, reads as follows: “(1) Where any persons have been accommodated in a building which is held by virtue of a requisition, the Director may at any time, by means of a judicial letter, require the requisitionee to recognize the persons so accommodated as tenants or as subtenants of the building, as the case may be. (2) Within thirty days of service on him of a judicial letter under the last preceding subsection, the requisitionee, by application before the First Hall of the Civil Court in contestation of the Director, may pray for an authorization of non-compliance with that request: Provided that, in the case where the building has been requisitioned from the tenant, the latter, by a judicial letter to be filed within fifteen days from service on him of the judicial letter provided for in the last preceding subsection, may inform the Director that he does not wish to retain the tenancy, and thereupon the Director shall be entitled to take action under the last preceding subsection against the landlord. (3) The court shall not grant the authorisation of noncompliance mentioned in the last preceding subsection unless the applicant shows to the satisfaction of the court that serious hardship would be caused to him by complying with that request: Provided that the assertion that the requisitionee wishes to take possession of the building for his own use or for the use of any member of his family shall not be considered of itself as a hardship for the purposes of this subarticle.” B.     Remedies 28.     Article 46 of the Constitution of Malta, in so far as relevant, reads: “(1) ... any person who alleges that any of the provisions of articles 33 to 45 (inclusive) of this Constitution has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, or such other person as the Civil Court, First Hall, in Malta may appoint at the instance of any person who so alleges, may, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter that is lawfully available, apply to the Civil Court, First Hall, for redress. (2) The Civil Court, First Hall, shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made by any person in pursuance of sub-article (1) of this article, and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing, or securing the enforcement of, any of the provisions of the said articles 33 to 45 (inclusive) to the protection of which the person concerned is entitled: Provided that the Court may, if it considers it desirable so to do, decline to exercise its powers under this sub-article in any case where it is satisfied that adequate means of redress for the contravention alleged are or have been available to the person concerned under any other law.   (4) Any party to proceedings brought in the Civil Court, First Hall, in pursuance of this article shall have a right of appeal to the Constitutional Court.” 29.     Articles 3 and 4 of the European Convention Act, Chapter 319 of the Laws of Malta, in so far as relevant, provide: Article 3 “(1) The Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms shall be, and be enforceable as, part of the Law of Malta. (2) Where any ordinary law is inconsistent with the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the said Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms shall prevail, and such ordinary law, shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void. (3) The Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms shall be enforceable subject to the Declaration and Reservations made by the Government of Malta on the signing of the Convention on the 12th day of December, 1966, which Declaration and Reservations are reproduced in the Second Schedule to this Act. (4) The Constitutional Court shall in addition to the jurisdiction conferred on it by article 95 of the Constitution, have jurisdiction to hear and determine all appeals under this Act and exercise all such powers as are conferred on it by this Act.” Article 4 “(1) Any person who alleges that any of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him, or such other person as the Civil Court, First Hall, in Malta may appoint at the instance of any person who so alleges, may, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter that is lawfully available, apply to the Civil Court, First Hall, for redress. (2) The Civil Court, First Hall, shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any application made by any person in pursuance of subarticle (1), and may make such orders, issue such writs and give such directions as it may consider appropriate for the purpose of enforcing, or securing the enforcement, of the Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to the enjoyment of which the person concerned is entitled: Provided that the court may, if it considers it desirable so to do, decline to exercise its powers under this subarticle in any case where it is satisfied that adequate means of redress for the contravention alleged are or have been available to the person concerned under any other ordinary law. (4) Any party to proceedings brought in the Civil Court, First Hall, in pursuance of this article shall have a right of appeal to the Constitutional Court.” 30.     Relevant case-law on the matter includes the judgment of Anthony Mifsud vs Superintendent Carmelo Bonello et , Constitutional Court, 18   September 2009. In that case the Constitutional Court held as follows: “There are two types of damage to which an applicant may be entitled: moral damage, for the breach suffered, and civil or material damage, which refers to the loss of future income as a result of a loss of earning capacity. Normally, the latter type of damage is requested by means of an ordinary remedy before courts of ordinary jurisdiction. This is so because as explained in the case of Emanuel   Ciantar, vs   Commissioner of Police, Constitutional Court, judgment of 2   November 2001: ‘The principle is always that constitutional and civil jurisdictions should remain separate and distinct, even because an application to a particular jurisdiction is regulated by the specific procedures and the aim of the remedy is not always the same’. Nevertheless, it is not excluded, in appropriate cases, that a person may request both types of damage from the courts of constitutional jurisdiction, and that these may be awarded by the said courts, if the proof of the loss is brought before it (see comment of the Constitutional Court in Fenech vs Commissioner of Land of 20   February 2009). Indeed, as held by this Court in Vella vs Commissioner of Police et , decided in 1991 ‘when the object of the case is complex – and related to matters some of which have a remedy in some other law and other which only have a constitutional remedy, the latter action shall prevail’.” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION 31.     The applicant complained that the requisition of his property had imposed on him an excessive burden, in violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which reads as follows: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.” A.     Requisition order of 1976 Admissibility 32.     The Government submitted that from their reading of the applicant’s application before the first-instance court, the domestic case concerned the requisition which had taken place in 1988. They referred to the applicant’s testimony of 30 November 2009 (see paragraph 12 above), as well as to the absence of written pleadings before the first-instance court. They also noted that subsequently the appeal application had focused on the compensation awarded and not on the ownership of the property. It was therefore likely that no mention had been made of this in the oral pleadings, which had not been recorded. It followed that the applicant had failed to exhaust domestic remedies in respect of the requisition order affecting the period before 1988. 33.     The applicant submitted that his constitutional application had referred to the entirety of the facts and had mentioned both requisition orders. It had only focused on the situation post 1987 owing to the specific situation of C.C., which merited deeper consideration. In particular, in his constitutional application of 20 October 2009 (to the first-instance court) the applicant had requested the court to “annul all requisition order” issued on the property (see paragraph 11). Indeed, the first-instance court had even taken into consideration, in awarding compensation, that the property had been first requisitioned in 1976. However, it had erroneously referred to the fact that the applicant had only started to be affected from 1988 ‑ despite the fact that he had become sole owner in 1980 following a deed of partition between the heirs. According to the applicant, under Article 946 of the Civil Code, however, the deed had retrospective effect, and thus he had been the owner since 1976. Given that both the first ‑ instance court and the appeal court had refused to annul both orders, it could not be said that the applicant had not exhausted domestic remedies. 34.     Having examined the applicant’s domestic applications (see paragraph 11 above), the Court observes that in his constitutional application of 20 October 2009 (to the first-instance court), the applicant briefly referred to the requisition order issued in 1976, and then to that issued in 1988, also giving the number of the latter requisition order. Following those initial paragraphs, the applicant focused on the facts related to the second requisition order and repeatedly referred to “the above-mentioned requisition/order”. Thus, while it is true that he concluded by requesting the court to “annul all requisition order”, the applicant’s incoherent use of plural and singular made his complaint to the first-instance court entirely unclear. More importantly, the Court notes that in his appeal application, the applicant complained about the remedy awarded in general but failed to specify that he should have been awarded compensation for the years prior to 1988. Indeed, despite a specific question by the Court, the applicant also failed to submit to the Court any relevant details showing that he had brought the matter to the attention of the Constitutional Court on appeal; nor do his submissions indicate any such action. 35.     In these circumstances the Court is not satisfied that the applicant has sufficiently raised in substance, at least on appeal before the Constitutional Court, the part of his complaint concerning the period from 1976 to 1988, in connection with the first requisition order. Consequently, this part of the application must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 §§   1 and   4 of the Convention, for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. B.     Requisition order of 1988 1.     Admissibility (a)     The Government’s objection of lack of victim status i.     The parties’ submissions 36.     The Government submitted that the applicant had lost his victim status as the domestic courts had expressly acknowledged the violation and awarded appropriate redress, namely compensation of EUR 16,000, as well as part of the costs of the proceedings. The Government relied on the case of Staykov v. Bulgaria (no. 49438/99, § 90, 12 October 2006), where the Court had accepted that the domestic courts which awarded compensation had acknowledged the relevant violations even though their reasoning could have been more precise. Nevertheless, in the present case the domestic courts had paid attention to various factors and finally was satisfied that the situation called for less than compensation at market value. In the Government’s view, in the present case there was no place for restitutio in integrum , especially since after 2010, in line with the amendments made to the law, the applicant started to receive EUR 185 per annum, and was no longer receiving EUR 93 per annum. 37.     The Government considered that this redress (which amounted to around EUR 800 per year for twenty years – since 1988) was sufficient, since the requisition had been lawful and pursued a legitimate aim. It was also not far from awards made by the Court in similar circumstances, which, when including non-pecuniary damage, had amounted to, for example, EUR   1,168 and 1,400 per annum respectively, in Edwards v.   Malta ((just satisfaction), no. 17647/04, § 22, 24, and 37, 17 July 2008), and Ghigo v.   Malta ((just satisfaction), no. 31122/05, §§ 19, 21 and 32, 17 July 2008). Moreover, the property had been requisitioned in order to provide social accommodation for a person with impaired mobility. In those circumstances, according to the Court, the amount of compensation awarded could be less than the market value of the property. Lastly, the Government argued that the cases referred to by the applicant concerned failure to award compensation in respect of expropriation, not requisition. 38.     The applicant for his part submitted that he could still claim to be a victim of the violation found by the domestic court, as the final judgment had only provided partial redress. 39.     The applicant contended that from the judgment of the Constitutional Court it appeared that the compensation of EUR 16,000 (lowering the first-instance court’s award of EUR 21,000) only represented non-pecuniary damage and that he should have sought civil damages elsewhere – which was indeed in contrast with the fact that the first ‑ instance court had calculated the compensation on the basis of pecuniary loss according to valuations made by experts specifically appointed by the court. In any event, even assuming that the global award covered both heads of damage, the applicant submitted that the sum awarded was not appropriate given what the property would have fetched on the open market over the years. The applicant also considered that it was incorrect to punish him for his alleged inactivity by reducing the compensation (see paragraph 21 above), as he had persistently solicited the authorities about the matter, but they had taken years just to acknowledge receipt of his correspondence. Moreover, he considered that it should be for the State to safeguard human rights, irrespective of the bringing of proceedings. Indeed, as the years had gone by, he had not been paid rent and nothing had changed in the law to date, so the point in time when he had actually instituted proceedings had been irrelevant. In addition, the applicant considered that the award of compensation had been rendered meaningless by the order to pay costs, despite the fact that he had been successful in the main object of the application. 40.     The applicant further submitted that his situation had not changed following the Constitutional Court judgment and that therefore he remained a victim of the same requisition order and rent restrictions existing in law. Although the 2010 amendments had slightly increased the rent, the sum of EUR 185 per annum could still not compare to appropriate rent. He relied, mutatis mutandis, on Chinnici v. Italy (no. 2) (no.   22432/03, 14 April 2015). Moreover, he had no prospects of having the property returned to him in his lifetime. Thus, despite the wide powers of the courts of constitutional jurisdiction in relation to redressing Convention violations, in practice no remedy had been given to put an end to a continuing violation which had persisted over time. This practice had become systemic, as evidenced by the various Court judgments, which continued to find that applicants in similar cases were still victims of the Convention, despite the domestic findings in their favour. In this connection, the applicant referred to Azzopardi v. Malta (no.   28177/12, 6   November 2014), Schembri and Others v. Malta (no.   42583/06, 10   November 2009) and Frendo Randon and Others v.   Malta (no.   2226/10, 22 November 2011). ii.     The Court’s assessment 41.     The Court reiterates that   the adoption of a measure favourable to the applicant by the domestic authorities will deprive the applicant of victim status only if the violation is acknowledged expressly, or at least in substance, and is subsequently redressed (see Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) [GC], no.   36813/97, §§ 178 et seq. and § 193, ECHR 2006 ‑ V, and Brumărescu v.   Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 50, ECHR 1999 ‑ VII). Whether the redress given is effective will depend, among other things, on the nature of the right alleged to have been breached, the reasons given for the decision and the persistence of the unfavourable consequences for the person concerned after that decision (see Oliari and Others v. Italy , nos.   18766/11 and 36030/11, § 78, 21 July 2015). The redress afforded must be appropriate and sufficient. Whether an individual has victim status may also depend on the amount of compensation awarded by the domestic courts and the effectiveness (including the promptness) of the remedy affording the award (see Paplauskienė v. Lithuania , no. 31102/06, § 51, 14   October 2014). 42.     In the present case the Court notes that the first criterion, namely acknowledgment of a violation, has been met. 43.     As to the second criterion, the Court notes that, as it transpires from its case-law, appropriate redress in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 cases requires an award in respect of both pecuniary damage (see Frendo Randon and Others , cited above, § 37 and Azzopardi , cited above, §   33) as well as non ‑ pecuniary damage, which would generally be required when an individual was deprived of, or suffered an interference with, his or her possessions contrary to the Convention (see Gera   de   Petri Testaferrata   Bonici   Ghaxaq v. Malta , no.   26771/07, § 53, 5   April 2011). 44.     The Court notes, firstly, that in the present case, it is unclear which heads of damage are covered by the award made by the Constitutional Court. From the wording of the judgment of the Constitutional Court, and irrespective of what the first-instance court’s intentions may have been, it would indeed appear that the Constitutional Court’s award covered solely non-pecuniary damage. If that is so – as appears likely – the applicant is still a victim of the said violation which has not been redressed, given the absence of any redress in the form of an award for the pecuniary losses suffered by the applicant. The Court reiterates that in cases under Article   1 of Protocol No.   1, an applicant who has suffered a violation over a long period of time should not be required to pursue a further remedy in order to obtain compensation (see, mutatis mutandis , Gera de Petri , cited above,   §   53). 45.     Secondly, even assuming that the award covered both heads of damage, the Court considers that in the present case, even though the market value is not applicable and the rent valuations may be decreased due to the legitimate aim at issue, an award of EUR 16,000 – from which around EUR   9,000 must be deducted, being the sum the applicant had to pay in costs (as shown by relevant documents), leaving an award of EUR   7,000 ‑ can hardly be considered sufficient in the light of the court ‑ appointed expert’s valuations (see paragraph 13 above). It is true that the Government contested those valuations (see paragraph 97 below); however, the Court cannot but note that the valuation was drawn up by a domestic court-appointed expert and that the Government’s arguments as well as their valuation are based on subjective opinions which are not supported by any expert valuation which could have been submitted in rebuttal. 46.     The Court also takes issue with the fact that in line with domestic case-law, such compensation awards are reduced on the grounds that the applicants have instituted constitutional redress proceedings several years after they started suffering the violation complained of. In this connection, the Court notes, first and foremost, that domestic law does not impose a time-limit for the institution of constitutional redress proceedings. The legislator leaves the choice of timing to the applicant. Moreover, in circumstances such as those of the present case, the violation complained of is a continuing one. The Court thus finds that such reasoning is questionable in the light of the circumstances of the case and the domestic legal framework, which appears to give great latitude to individuals seeking redress for human rights violations. 47.     Of further concern to the Court is the persistence of the unfavourable consequences for the applicant. Indeed, following the Constitutional Court judgment, the applicant has remained subject to the same laws which have breached his rights, as the Constitutional Court did not take any action in that respect. While it is true that the 2010 amendments to the Civil Code slightly ameliorated the applicant’s situation, the domestic courts did not consider that such a change struck a fair balance and that a violation of the applicant’s rights did not persist following that change. Thus, the applicant continues to suffer a violation of his rights to date. 48.     It follows that the redress provided by the Constitutional Court did not offer sufficient relief to the applicant, who continues to suffer the consequences of the breach of his rights, and thus retains victim status for the purposes of this complaint. 49.     The Government’s objection is therefore dismissed. (b)     Conclusion 50.     The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ submissions 51.     The applicant submitted that there had been a violation of Article   1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, as upheld by the domestic courts. That violation continued to persist, given that the amount of rent established by means of the 2010 amendments was still not reasonable. He maintained that such rent was still fifteen times inferior to the rental market value. 52.     The Government admitted that the applicant had suffered a violation of his property rights up to the judgment of the Constitutional Court. They considered, however, that the violation had not continued thereafter, given that in 2010 the rent increased to EUR 185 annually, and would continue to increase every three years. 2.     The Court’s assessment 53.     Having regard to the findings of the Constitutional Court relating to Article 1 of Protocol No.1 (see paragraphs 14 and 21 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary to re-examine in detail the merits of the complaint. It follows that, as established by the domestic courts the applicant was made to bear a disproportionate burden. 54.     However, in view of the parties’ arguments and the lack of any specific details in the assessment of the domestic courts concerning the period following the 2010 amendments – a period which was implicitly taken into consideration for the basis of their findings – the Court considers it necessary to highlight the following. 55.     The Court takes note of the efforts made by the Government to make changes to the legislation (in the form, inter alia , of the 2010 amendments) in the wake of the execution phase before the Committee of Ministers in connection with a series of judgments delivered against Malta concerning this subject matter (see Ghigo , cited above; Edwards , cited above and Fleri   Soler and Camilleri v.   Malta , no.   35349/05, ECHR 2006 ‑ X). Indeed, in the first two of those cases the Court, having regard to the systemic situation it had identified, considered that general measures at national level were called for. Nevertheless, despite the passage of ten years, those cases remain open before the Committee of Ministers. In this connection, the Court cannot but note that the rents provided for by the amended law remain in stark contrast to the values of such property. 56.     In relation to the present case, the Court observes that the amelioration brought about by the 2010 amendments increased the annual rent payable to the applicant in 2010 from EUR 93 to EUR 185 – the latter sum will continue to increase by a few euro every three years thereafter (for example, the rent in 2014 was EUR 197). The Court also observes that according to the court-appointed architect’s valuation and also the Government’s own estimate, the annual rent of the property at issue for 2010 was EUR 2,850 and EUR 2,000 respectively. Thus, for the same year, according to the new laws in force, the applicant was to receive in rent less than 10% of the market value estimated by the Government. 57.     Having regard to the meagre amount of rent received by the applicant, which persists to date despite the relevant amendments, the Court finds that a disproportionate and excessive burden continues to be imposed on the applicant, who has been ordered to bear most of the social and financial costs of supplying housing accommodation to C.C. It follows that the Maltese State has failed to strike the requisite fair balance between the general interests of the community and the protection of the applicant’s right of property ( ibid ; see also, mutatis mutandis, in connection with the above-mentioned amendments, Anthony Aquilina v. Malta , §§ 63 and 67, no.   3851/12, 11 December 2014 ). 58.     There has accordingly been a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. II.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 13 OF THE CONVENTION 59.     The applicant complained that he had not had an effective remedy, capable of redressing the violation under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention, as demonstrated by the Constitutional Court’s judgment. He relied on Article 13 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in [the] Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.” A.     Admissibility 1.     The parties’ observations 60.     The Government submitted that the applicant could have instituted a fresh set of constitutional redress proceedings to complain under Article   13 about the Constitutional Court judgment. 61.     The applicant submitted that such an action would not have been appropriate and that the ordinary action at such stage was to bring the complaint before the Court. 2.     The Court’s assessment 62.     The Court notes that it has already established, in the context of Maltese cases before it, that even though Maltese domestic law provides for a remedy, for the purposes of a complaint under Article 13, in respect of a final judgment of the Constitutional Court, the length of the proceedings detracts from the effectiveness of that remedy and that, in view of the specific situation of the Constitutional Court in the domestic legal order, in certain circumstances it is not a remedy which is required to be exhausted (see , passim, Saliba and Others v. Malta , no. 20287/10, § 78, 22   November 2011, and Bellizzi v. Malta , no. 46575/09, § 44, 21 June 2011). 63.     The Court notes that the applicant has suffered a violation of his rights for a period of over twenty years. He has already been through one set of constitutional redress proceedings, as a result of which the Court has found that he remained a victim of the violation recognised by the domestic courts (see paragraph 48 above). Given the nature of the complaint and the above-mentioned specific situation of the Constitutional Court in the domestic legal order, the Court finds that the institution of fresh constitutional redress proceedings was not a remedy which was required to be exhausted in the specific circumstances of this case. 64.     Accordingly, the Government’s objection that domestic remedies have not been exhausted is dismissed. 65.     The Court reiterates that Article 13 does not apply in the absence of an arguable claim (see Maurice v. France [GC], no. 11810/03, § 106, ECHR 2005 ‑ IX). 66.     In the present case the Court has found that the applicant’s complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 was not manifestly ill-founded and concluded that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol   No.   1. Thus, there is no doubt that the complaint relating to that provision is an arguable one for the purposes of Article 13 of the Convention. It follows that Article 13 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable in the present case. 67.     The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. B.     Merits 1.     The parties’ observations (a)     The applicant 68.     The applicant submitted that he had not had an effective remedy, capable of redressing the violation under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. 69.     As to the constitutional remedy, the applicant submitted that although the courts of constitutional jurisdiction had the power to award compensation for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage, the fact that an individual remained subject to a requisition order and relevant laws (unless Parliament or the authorities took further action) which had caused such a violation meant that the violation had not been brought to an end and the applicant remained subject to a continuing violation. It was unheard of to expect an applicant to repeatedly lodge constitutional proceedings to claim a violation for subsequent years. 70.     According to the applicant, while it was true that the courts of constitutional jurisdiction had “unlimited powers”, in his case those courts had failed to use their wide-ranging powers to rectify the breach. Indeed, recent case-law showed that the Constitutional Court was taking the view that it could award compensation only for