CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITYCOM;ENG — 15 novembre 2016

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s2EF17D91 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center; font-size:2pt } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s8229ABDD { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .s5F897A7E { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:14.2pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s7E985A65 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; font-size:1pt } .sF7A4323 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .s50892CF2 { width:19.21pt; display:inline-block } .sE2060DF6 { width:160.4pt; display:inline-block } .s62334F5 { width:54.22pt; display:inline-block } .s21A0813B { width:114.06pt; display:inline-block }     FIFTH SECTION DECISION Application no. 36007/07 Oleksandr Mykolayovych SHAPOVAL against Ukraine The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting on 15   November 2016 as a Committee composed of:   André Potocki, President,   Ganna Yudkivska,   Síofra O’Leary, judges, and Anne-Marie Dougin, Acting Deputy Section Registrar, Having regard to the above application lodged on 31 July 2007, Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant, Having deliberated, decides as follows: THE FACTS The applicant, Mr Oleksandr Mykolayovych Shapoval, is a Ukrainian national, who was born in 1970 and lives in Kremenchuk. He was represented before the Court by Mr V. Protsenko, a lawyer practising in Kremenchuk. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, most recently Mr I. Lishchyna. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows. On 15 February 2001 the applicant bought a car from a private person. On 30 July 2001 an officer of the Svitlovodsk Police Unit seized it to attach as material evidence in an ongoing criminal investigation. It turned out that the car had been stolen and that the applicant had bought it after some of its parts and identification plate had been tampered with. The applicant complained to the Svitlovodsk City Court (“the Svitlovodsk Court”) that the car, which he had acquired bona fide , had been seized unlawfully and claimed its return. On 8 November 2001 the court allowed the applicant’s claim in part. It found that, indeed, the police officer had acted without the requisite documents for the seizure. At the same time, the applicant’s claim for the return of the car was rejected, as that issue could be decided only within the respective criminal proceedings. The above decision was not appealed against and became final. On 25 January 2002 the applicant brought a civil claim against the police seeking compensation in respect of non-pecuniary damage. He relied, in particular, on the judicial decision on 8 November 2001. On 22 March 2005 the Svitlovodsk Court allowed his claim in part. It awarded him 10,000 Ukrainian hryvnias (UAH) to be paid by the expert centre which had issued a compliance certificate for the stolen car, and UAH 2,000 to be paid by Kirovograd Regional Police Department. On 13 December 2006 the Kirovograd Regional Court of Appeal quashed that judgment and found against the applicant. It held that, according to the documents, the expert centre had examined a different car than that seized from the applicant. As to the seizure itself, the appellate court noted that, although it had been carried out with some procedural irregularities, they did not undermine the overall lawfulness of that measure. It was noted that the car had been attached as material evidence in the criminal proceedings, which had been completed by a judgment of the Svitlovodsk Court of 23 April 2002 (not challenged on appeal in the relevant part). In sum, the Court of Appeal did not discern any unlawfulness in the police officer’s actions which had caused moral damage for the applicant. The applicant appealed on points of law. He submitted, in particular, that the unlawfulness of the police officer’s actions had been established by a final judicial decision. On 2 March 2007 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant’s request for leave to appeal on points of law with a standard wording that his cassation appeal was unfounded. That ruling, which was delivered in written proceedings, was sent to the applicant on 17 April 2007. COMPLAINT The applicant complained under Article 6   § 1 of the Convention of the Convention that the civil proceedings in his case had not been fair. THE LAW The applicant complained that the reasoning of the appellate court’s decision of 13 December 2006 was deficient and ran contrary to the factual findings of the final judgment of 8 November 2001. He also submitted that the ruling of the Supreme Court lacked any reasoning at all. Accordingly, the applicant argued that he had not had a fair trial in the determination of his civil rights and obligations. The Government contested the applicant’s arguments. They further observed that the applicant had brought proceedings for damages only against the police in respect of the seizure of his car, but not against the person, from whom he had bought that car. The Government therefore considered that the applicant had not complied with the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. The Court does not find it necessary to analyse the above objection of the Government as it considers the application to be in any event inadmissible for the following reasons. According to the Court’s long-standing and established case-law, it is not for this Court to deal with alleged errors of law or fact committed by the national courts unless and in so far as they may have infringed rights and freedoms protected by the Convention (see, for example, García Ruiz v.   Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999 ‑ I; and Perez v.   France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 82, ECHR 2004 ‑ I). While Article 6 of the Convention guarantees the right to a fair hearing, it does not lay down any rules on the admissibility of evidence or the way in which evidence should be assessed, these being primarily matters for regulation by national law and the national courts. Normally, issues such as the weight attached by the national courts to given items of evidence or to findings or assessments in issue before them for consideration are not for the Court to review. The Court should not act as a fourth instance and will not therefore question under Article 6 § 1 the judgment of the national courts, unless their findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable (see Bochan v.   Ukraine (no. 2) [GC], no. 22251/08, § 61, ECHR 2015, and the case-law references cited therein). Turning to the present application, the Court notes that the applicant’s complaint is mainly directed against the reasoning employed by the domestic courts. The Court, however, finds no indication of arbitrariness or unreasonableness in the courts’ factual and legal assessment of the applicant’s case. Indeed, in substantiation of his compensation claim the applicant relied on the final judicial decision finding that the police officer had seized his car without having the requisite authority and documents. The appellate court rejected his claim having found no evidence of unlawfulness in the police officer’s actions, which had entailed moral damage for the applicant. That conclusion cannot be said to manifestly disregard the earlier judicial assessment of the impugned officer’s actions or run contrary to it. Thus, the Court of Appeal observed that the procedural irregularities during the seizure had no consequences for that measure itself and that the applicant had therefore suffered no moral damage. In so far as the applicant’s complaint concerns the scarce reasoning given by the Supreme Court, the Court observes that leave-to-appeal proceedings and proceedings involving only questions of law, as opposed to questions of fact, may comply with the requirements of Article 6 even if the reasoning for refusing a request for leave to appeal was not detailed (see, among other authorities, Glender v. Sweden (dec.), no. 28070/03, 6 September 2005). In   the circumstances of the present case, the Court is satisfied that there was no need for detailed reasoning since it was clear that the request for leave to appeal was refused because the applicant had not demonstrated the existence of arguable grounds which would have justified referral of the case to the Chamber of the Supreme Court (see Stepenska v.   Ukraine (dec.), no. 24079/02, 12 June 2006, and Kocherga v. Ukraine (dec.), no. 26017/07, 5   April 2011). It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention. For these reasons, the Court, unanimously, Declares the application inadmissible.   Done in English and notified in writing on 8 December 2016.   Anne-Marie Dougin   André Potocki   Acting Deputy Registrar   President