CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 17 janvier 2017

.s800EAC49 { font-size:12pt } .sFE10DC93 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:center } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s29100277 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold } .sA36B60A1 { font-family:Arial; font-style:italic } .s2E932ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:11pt } .s4ACA9207 { page-break-before:always; clear:both; mso-break-type:section-break } .s9793A85B { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sB9D5CABB { width:28.35pt; display:inline-block } .sD3B63DAD { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:12pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .sD86A583 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:19.85pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-19.85pt; text-align:left } .s275CCCF2 { width:5.86pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s61E420C2 { font-family:Arial; font-variant:small-caps } .s76464287 { width:240.14pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s8C6F25BE { width:213.46pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s98FBE5B1 { width:3.85pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sB18E0E84 { width:4.67pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .sB8E995B8 { width:228.8pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s359C8033 { width:230.82pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s79DE5897 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA8776625 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:29.2pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.6pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sF7A86111 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:21.25pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .sADADF4A7 { font-family:Arial; text-decoration:underline } .s4DDA3AA3 { font-family:Arial; font-weight:bold; font-style:italic } .sAADB120E { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:28.35pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .sBB89D636 { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:36pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .sA5F256BE { margin-top:6pt; margin-left:35.45pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:7.1pt; font-size:10pt } .s72C8F48C { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:36.6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-15.05pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sA20670C4 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:48.75pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s59DEA84 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:59.5pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:10pt } .s4B243ECC { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sAD454B34 { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; text-align:left; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sFB5E6511 { width:180.74pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s734AA7BF { width:171.61pt; text-indent:0pt; display:inline-block } .s379BC09C { margin-top:36pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .s5E1364CA { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid; font-size:14pt } .s364B195D { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:17.85pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-0.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sE22B0691 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.2pt; font-size:11pt } .sF13A94BC { margin:0pt 28.35pt 3pt 34pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-after:avoid; line-height:12pt } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s92A5AB2 { font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } .s4BAE41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:11pt } .s3F015572 { margin:0pt 28.35pt 3pt 51pt; text-indent:-17pt; page-break-after:avoid; line-height:12pt } .sB6D33163 { font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } .s35B94E0 { font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt; font-style:italic; text-decoration:underline; color:#0069d6 } .s66E9FC38 { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#000000 } .sFA0E4E80 { margin-top:18pt; margin-left:31.75pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:-17.85pt; page-break-inside:avoid; page-break-after:avoid } .sB343B0AA { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#000000 } .s8EB5F569 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super } .s4B8D41EE { font-family:Arial; font-size:10pt } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .sC36A6361 { font-family:Arial; color:#000000 }     GRAND CHAMBER             CASE OF HUTCHINSON v. THE UNITED KINGDOM   (Application no. 57592/08)                     JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   17 January 2017       This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of Hutchinson v. the United Kingdom, The European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber), sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   András Sajó, President,   Işıl Karakaş,   Josep Casadevall,   Luis López Guerra,   Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,   Angelika Nußberger,   Päivi Hirvelä,   Ganna Yudkivska,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos,   Erik Møse,   Helena Jäderblom,   Paul Mahoney,   Faris Vehabović,   Ksenija Turković,   Branko Lubarda,   Yonko Grozev, judges,   and Johan Callewaert, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 21 October 2015 and 10 October 2016, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 57592/08) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a British national, Mr Arthur Hutchinson (“the applicant”), on 10 November 2008. 2.     The applicant, who had been granted legal aid, was represented by Kyles Legal Practice, North Shields. The United Kingdom Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr P. McKell of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 3.     The applicant alleged in particular that his whole life sentence gave rise to a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. 4.     The application was allocated to the Fourth Section of the Court (Rule   52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). On 10 July 2013 the complaint concerning Article 3 was communicated to the Government and the remainder of the application was declared inadmissible pursuant to Rule 54 § 3 of the Rules of Court. In its judgment of 3 February 2015, a Chamber of the Fourth Section composed of Judges Raimondi, Nicolaou, Bianku, Tsotsoria, Kalaydjieva, Mahoney and Wojtyczek, and also of F. Aracı, Deputy Section Registrar, declared by a majority the applicant’s Article 3 complaint admissible. The Chamber also held, by six votes to one, that there had been no violation of Article 3. A dissenting opinion of Judge   Kalaydjieva was appended to the judgment. 5.     On 1 June 2015, pursuant to a request by the applicant dated 5 March 2015, the Panel of the Grand Chamber decided to refer the case to the Grand Chamber in accordance with Article 43 of the Convention. 6.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined according to the provisions of Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24 of the Rules of Court. 7.     The applicant and the Government each filed written observations (Rule 59 § 1 of the Rules of Court) on the merits. In addition, third-party comments were received from the European Prison Litigation Network (the “EPLN”), which had been granted leave to intervene in the written procedure (Article   36 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 3 of the Rules of Court). The Government replied to these comments in the course of their oral submissions at the hearing (Rule 44 § 6 of the Rules of Court). 8.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 21 October 2015 (Rule 59 § 3 of the Rules of Court). There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Mr   P. McKell,   Agent , Mr   J. Wright QC, Attorney-General , Mr   J. Eadie QC,   Counsel , Ms   A. Foulds, Ms   C. Gaskell, Mr   J. Gerard, Ms   J. Earl,   Advisers ; (b)     for the applicant Mr   J. Bennathan QC, Ms   K. Thorne ,   Counsel , Mr   J. Turner ,   Adviser.   The Court heard addresses by Mr Wright and Mr Bennathan, and their answers to questions put by the Court. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 9.     The applicant was born in 1941 and is detained in Her Majesty’s Prison Durham. 10.     In October 1983, the applicant broke into a family home, where he stabbed to death a man, his wife and their adult son. He then repeatedly raped their 18 year ‑ old daughter, having first dragged her past her father’s body. He was arrested several weeks later and charged with these offences. At trial he pleaded not guilty, denying the killings and claiming that the sexual intercourse had been consensual. On 14 September 1984, he was convicted of three counts of murder, rape, and aggravated burglary. 11.     The trial judge sentenced the applicant to a term of life imprisonment and, in accordance with the rules on sentencing then in force, recommended a minimum period (tariff) of 18 years to the Secretary of State for the Home Office. When asked to give his opinion again on 12   January 1988, the judge wrote that “for the requirements of retribution and general deterrence this is genuinely a life case”. On 15   January 1988 the Lord Chief Justice recommended that the period should be set at a whole life term stating that “I do not think that this man should ever be released, quite apart from the risk which would be involved”. On 16   December 1994, the Secretary of State informed the applicant that he had decided to impose a whole life term. 12.     Following the entry into force of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the applicant applied to the High Court for a review of his sentence, arguing that he should receive the 18-year tariff mentioned at his trial. On 16 May 2008, the High Court gave its judgment. It found that there was no reason to depart from the Secretary of State’s decision. The seriousness of the offences alone was such that the starting point was a whole life order. A number of very serious aggravating factors were present, and no mitigating factors. On 6 October 2008, the Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant’s appeal. II.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE 13.     The domestic law and practice relating to the procedure for setting a whole life order under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 is set out in paragraphs   12-13 and 35-41 of the Court’s judgment in Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, ECHR 2013 (extracts). At the hearing in the present case, the Government indicated that there were on that date 56 prisoners serving whole life sentences. No prisoner in this category has been released since the date of the Vinter judgment. A.     The Human Rights Act 1998 14.     The Human Rights Act provides, as relevant: “Section 2 - Interpretation of Convention rights. (1)     A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right must take into account any— (a)     judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of Human Rights, ... Section 3 - Interpretation of legislation. (1)     So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights. ... Section 6 - Acts of public authorities. (1)     It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right. (2)     Subsection (1) does not apply to an act if— (a)     as the result of one or more provisions of primary legislation, the authority could not have acted differently; or (b)     in the case of one or more provisions of, or made under, primary legislation which cannot be read or given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights, the authority was acting so as to give effect to or enforce those provisions. (3)     In this section “public authority” includes— (a)     a court or tribunal, and (b)     any person certain of whose functions are functions of a public nature, but does not include either House of Parliament or a person exercising functions in connection with proceedings in Parliament. ... Section 7 - Proceedings. (1)     A person who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) in a way which is made unlawful by section 6(1) may— (a)     bring proceedings against the authority under this Act in the appropriate court or tribunal, or (b)     rely on the Convention right or rights concerned in any legal proceedings, but only if he is (or would be) a victim of the unlawful act. ... Section 8 - Judicial remedies. (1)     In relation to any act (or proposed act) of a public authority which the court finds is (or would be) unlawful, it may grant such relief or remedy, or make such order, within its powers as it considers just and appropriate. ...” B.     The Crime (Sentences) Act 1997 15.     Section 30 of the Act provides, as relevant: “(1)     The Secretary of State may at any time release a life prisoner on licence if he is satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist which justify the prisoner’s release on compassionate grounds.” C.     Prison Service Order 4700 16.     The policy of the Secretary of State for Justice on the exercise of the power of release on compassionate grounds is set out in chapter 12 of the Indeterminate Sentence Manual (“the Lifer Manual”), issued as Prison Service Order 4700. The criteria, as formulated in April 2010, provide as follows: “the prisoner is suffering from a terminal illness and death is likely to occur very shortly (although there are no set time limits, 3 months may be considered to be an appropriate period for an application to be made to Public Protection Casework Section [PPCS]), or the ISP is bedridden or similarly incapacitated, for example, those paralysed or suffering from a severe stoke; and the risk of re-offending (particularly of a sexual or violent nature) is minimal; and further imprisonment would reduce the prisoner’s life expectancy; and there are adequate arrangements for the prisoner’s care and treatment outside prison; and early release will bring some significant benefit to the prisoner or his/her family”. D.     Court of Appeal decision in R v. Newell ; R v. McLoughlin 17.     A special composition of the Court of Appeal was constituted to hear these appeals, including the Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales, the President of the Queen’s Bench Division, the Vice-President of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, one other Lord Justice of Appeal and a senior High Court judge. It gave its decision (“ McLoughlin ”) on 18 February 2014, in light of the judgment of this Court in the Vinter case. 18.     The appellant Newell challenged as contrary to Article 3 of the Convention the whole life order imposed on him for a murder committed while he was already serving a life sentence for a previous murder. The McLoughlin case took the form of a reference by the Attorney General under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1986, who contended that the trial judge had been mistaken in his view that the judgment in Vinter precluded the imposition of a whole life order. The trial judge had instead imposed a life sentence with a tariff of forty years for a murder committed by a man with previous convictions for murder and manslaughter. 19.     In its decision, the Court of Appeal traced the development of the whole life sentence and the review of such sentences. It stated at paragraph   7 (citations omitted): “i)     On 7 December 1994 the then Home Secretary announced a policy in relation to prisoners serving a whole life tariff (...). “In addition, I have decided that for those life sentence prisoners for whom it is decided that the requirements of retribution and deterrence can be satisfied only by their remaining in prison for the whole of their life, there will in future be an additional ministerial review when the prisoner has been in custody for 25 years. The purpose of this review will be solely to consider whether the whole life tariff should be converted to a tariff of a determinate period. The review will be confined to the considerations of retribution and deterrence. Where appropriate, further ministerial reviews will normally take place at five-yearly intervals thereafter. Existing prisoners who fall into this category and who have already served 25 years or more in custody will not be disadvantaged. Their cases will be reviewed by ministers as soon as is practicable and after any representations they may wish to make.” ii)     That policy was modified by a different Home Secretary on 10 November 1997 (Hansard HC Deb 10 November 1997, vol 300, cols. 419-420: written answer): “So far as the potential for a reduction in tariff is concerned, I shall be open to the possibility that, in exceptional circumstances, including for example exceptional progress by the prisoner whilst in custody, a review and reduction of the tariff may be appropriate. I shall have this possibility in mind when reviewing at the 25-year point the cases of prisoners given a whole life tariff and in that respect will consider issues beyond the sole criteria of retribution and deterrence described in the answer given on 7 December 1994.” iii)     In a challenge by Myra Hindley to the whole life tariff imposed on her, Lord   Bingham CJ held in the Divisional Court in R v Home Secretary ex p Hindley [ ... ] that whereas the narrow policy set out in 1994 was unlawful, this had been corrected by the 1997 policy which permitted the taking into account of exceptional progress whilst in prison. In the appeal to the House of Lords counsel for the Home Secretary made clear that the Home Secretary was prepared to review any whole life tariff, even in the absence of exceptional circumstances (...) Lord Steyn, when approving the legality of the Home Secretary’s 1997 policy, recorded the way in which the policy had been clarified (...): “.... counsel for the Secretary of State submitted that the policy of imposing a whole life tariff merely involves the expression of the current view of the Secretary of State that the requirements of retribution and deterrence make it inappropriate ever to release such a prisoner. It does not rule out reconsideration. The Secretary of State envisages the possibility of release in the event of exceptional progress in prison; and, even in absence of such progress, the Secretary of State is prepared to reconsider any whole life tariff decision from time to time.” The Court of Appeal then set out the relevant criteria of the Lifer Manual (see paragraph 16 above), commenting that these were “highly restrictive” (paragraph 11 of the McLoughlin decision). It raised the question whether the statutory scheme was compatible with Article 3. In answering the question, it stated: “ (b)     Does the regime which provides for reducibility have to be in place at the time the whole life order is imposed? 19.     The Grand Chamber made clear, as is self-evident, that there is no violation of Article 3 if a prisoner in fact spends the whole of his life in prison. One example is an offender who continues to be a risk for the whole of his or her life. 20.     However, the Grand Chamber considered that the justification for detention might shift during the course of a sentence; although just punishment at the outset, it might cease to be just after the passage of many years. It said at paragraphs 110 and 121 of its judgment that for a life sentence to be compatible with Article 3, there must therefore be both a prospect of release and a possibility of review. It added at paragraph 122: “A whole life prisoner is entitled to know, at the outset of his sentence, what he must do to be considered for release and under what conditions, including when a review of his sentence will take place or may be sought. Consequently, where domestic law does not provide any mechanism or possibility for review of a whole life sentence, the incompatibility with Article 3 on this ground already arises at the moment of the imposition of the whole life sentence and not at a later stage of incarceration.” 21.     It made it clear that this requirement was quite different from the task of the judge in setting the sentence when saying at paragraph 124: “However, the need for independent judges to determine whether a whole life order may be imposed is quite separate from the need for such whole life orders to be reviewed at a later stage so as to ensure that they remain justified on legitimate penological grounds. Furthermore, given that the stated intention of the legislative amendment was to remove the executive entirely from the decision-making process concerning life sentences, it would have been more consistent to provide that, henceforth, the twenty-five year review, instead of being eliminated completely, would be conducted within a wholly judicial framework rather than, as before, by the executive subject to judicial control.” 22.     Thus whilst it is clear that the Grand Chamber accepted that a judge can impose a whole life order as just punishment, it concluded that a legal regime for a review during the sentence must be in place at the time the sentence is passed. 23.     Whilst we have accepted the submission on behalf of the Attorney General that the Strasbourg Court did not determine that the imposition of a whole life tariff itself violates Article 3, we return briefly to the arguments advanced contingently on the hypothesis that it did. In our judgment section 3 of the Human Rights Act could not be used to read down the legislation to preclude the imposition of whole life tariffs. That is because section 269(4) provides that if the court is of the opinion that no order for early release should be made because of the seriousness of the offence alone or in combination with others, it must order that those provisions do not apply. That being so, section 6(2) of the Human Rights Act disapplies the obligation on the court as a public authority to act compatibly with the Convention. 24.     The only remedy available in the domestic courts on this hypothesis would be a declaration of incompatibility, the discretionary remedy available under section 4 of the Human Rights Act when primary legislation is found to be incompatible with the Convention. Such a remedy is not available in the Crown Court and would not, in any event, affect the continuing operation of the statutory scheme. (c)     Is the regime under section 30 a regime for reducibility which is in fact compliant with Article 3? 25.     The questions therefore arise as to whether the provisions of section 30 provide such a regime compatible with Article 3 as interpreted by the Grand Chamber and on the assumption that, discharging our duty under s.2 of the Human Rights Act to take into account the decision of the Strasbourg Court, we should adopt that interpretation. 26.     Lord Phillips CJ in giving the judgment of this court in R v Bieber concluded that the regime was compatible and a whole life order was reducible, because of the power of the Secretary of State under section 30 of the 1997 Act. He said at paragraph   48: “At present it is the practice of the Secretary of State to use this power sparingly, in circumstances where, for instance, a prisoner is suffering from a terminal illness or is bedridden or similarly incapacitated. If, however, the position is reached where the continued imprisonment of a prisoner is held to amount to inhuman or degrading treatment, we can see no reason why, having particular regard to the requirement to comply with the Convention, the Secretary of State should not use his statutory power to release the prisoner.” In R v Oakes , this was reaffirmed in the judgment of this court – see paragraph 15. 27.     The Grand Chamber whilst accepting that the interpretation of section 30 of the 1997 Act as set out in R v Bieber would in principle be consistent with the decision in Kafkaris , was concerned that the law might be insufficiently certain. It added at paragraphs 126-7: “The fact remains that, despite the Court of Appeal’s judgment in Bieber , the Secretary of State has not altered the terms of his explicitly stated and restrictive policy on when he will exercise his section 30 power. Notwithstanding the reading given to section 30 by the Court of Appeal, the Prison Service Order remains in force and provides that release will only be ordered in certain exhaustively listed, and not merely illustrative, circumstances, ... These are highly restrictive conditions. Even assuming that they could be met by a prisoner serving a whole life order, the Court considers that the Chamber was correct to doubt whether compassionate release for the terminally ill or physically incapacitated could really be considered release at all, if all it meant was that a prisoner died at home or in a hospice rather than behind prison walls. Indeed, in the Court’s view, compassionate release of this kind was not what was meant by a “prospect of release” in Kafkaris , cited above. As such, the terms of the Order in themselves would be inconsistent with Kafkaris and would not therefore be sufficient for the purposes of Article 3.” 28.     The Grand Chamber therefore concluded that section 30 did not, because of the lack of certainty, provide an appropriate and adequate avenue of redress in the event an offender sought to show that his continued imprisonment was not justified. It concluded at paragraph 129: “At the present time, it is unclear whether, in considering such an application for release under section 30 by a whole life prisoner, the Secretary of State would apply his existing, restrictive policy, as set out in the Prison Service Order, or would go beyond the apparently exhaustive terms of that Order by applying the Article 3 test set out in Bieber . Of course, any ministerial refusal to release would be amenable to judicial review and it could well be that, in the course of such proceedings, the legal position would come to be clarified, for example by the withdrawal and replacement of the Prison Service Order by the Secretary of State or its quashing by the courts. However, such possibilities are not sufficient to remedy the lack of clarity that exists at present as to the state of the applicable domestic law governing possible exceptional release of whole life prisoners.” 29.     We disagree. In our view, the domestic law of England and Wales is clear as to “possible exceptional release of whole life prisoners”. As is set out in R v Bieber the Secretary of State is bound to exercise his power under section 30 of the 1997 Act in a manner compatible with principles of domestic administrative law and with Article 3. 30.     As we understand the Grand Chamber’s view, it might have been thought that the fact that the policy set out in the Lifer Manual has not been revised is of real consequence. However, as a matter of law, it is, in our view, of no consequence. It is important, therefore, that we make clear what the law of England and Wales is. 31.     First, the power of review under the section arises if there are exceptional circumstances. The offender subject to the whole life order is therefore required to demonstrate to the Secretary of State that although the whole life order was just punishment at the time the order was made, exceptional circumstances have since arisen. It is not necessary to specify what such circumstances are or specify criteria; the term “exceptional circumstances” is of itself sufficiently certain. 32.     Second, the Secretary of State must then consider whether such exceptional circumstances justify the release on compassionate grounds. The policy set out in the Lifer Manual is highly restrictive and purports to circumscribe the matters which will be considered by the Secretary of State. The Manual cannot restrict the duty of the Secretary of State to consider all circumstances relevant to release on compassionate grounds. He cannot fetter his discretion by taking into account only the matters set out in the Lifer Manual. In the passages in Hindley to which we have referred at paragraph 7 the duty of the Secretary of State was made clear; similarly the provisions of section 30 of the 1997 Act, require the Secretary of State to take into account all exceptional circumstances relevant to the release of the prisoner on compassionate grounds. 33.     Third, the term “compassionate grounds” must be read, as the court made clear in R v Bieber , in a manner compatible with Article 3. They are not restricted to what is set out in the Lifer Manual. It is a term with a wide meaning that can be elucidated, as is the way the common law develops, on a case by case basis. 34.     Fourth, the decision of the Secretary of State must be reasoned by reference to the circumstances of each case and is subject to scrutiny by way of judicial review. 35.     In our judgment the law of England and Wales therefore does provide to an offender “hope” or the “possibility” of release in exceptional circumstances which render the just punishment originally imposed no longer justifiable. 36.     It is entirely consistent with the rule of law that such requests are considered on an individual basis against the criteria that circumstances have exceptionally changed so as to render the original punishment which was justifiable no longer justifiable. We find it difficult to specify in advance what such circumstances might be, given that the heinous nature of the original crime justly required punishment by imprisonment for life. But circumstances can and do change in exceptional cases. The interpretation of section 30 we have set out provides for that possibility and hence gives to each such prisoner the possibility of exceptional release. Conclusion 37.     Judges should therefore continue to apply the statutory scheme in the CJA 2003 and in exceptional cases, likely to be rare, impose whole life orders in accordance with Schedule 21. Although we were told by Mr Eadie QC that it might be many years before the applications might be made under section 30 and the three applicants in Vinter (Vinter, Bamber and Moore) did not seek to contend that there were no longer justifiable penological grounds for their continued detention, we would observe that we would not discount the possibility of such applications arising very much sooner. They will be determined in accordance with the legal principles we have set out.” III.     RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS 20.     The Court makes reference to the materials referred to in the Vinter   judgment (at §§ 59-81). It refers in particular to one of the Council of Europe texts mentioned there, Recommendation Rec(2003)22 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on conditional release (parole). This provides, as relevant: “ Discretionary release system 16.     The minimum period that prisoners have to serve to become eligible for conditional release should be fixed in accordance with the law. 17.     The relevant authorities should initiate the necessary procedure to enable a decision on conditional release to be taken as soon as the prisoner has served the minimum period. 18.     The criteria that prisoners have to fulfil in order to be conditionally released should be clear and explicit. They should also be realistic in the sense that they should take into account the prisoners’ personalities and social and economic circumstances as well as the availability of resettlement programmes. ... 20.     The criteria for granting conditional release should be applied so as to grant conditional release to all prisoners who are considered as meeting the minimum level of safeguards for becoming law-abiding citizens. It should be incumbent on the authorities to show that a prisoner has not fulfilled the criteria. 21.     If the decision-making authority decides not to grant conditional release it should set a date for reconsidering the question. In any case, prisoners should be able to reapply to the decision-making authority as soon as their situation has changed to their advantage in a substantial manner. ... VIII.     Procedural safeguards 32.     Decisions on granting, postponing or revoking conditional release, as well as on imposing or modifying conditions and measures attached to it, should be taken by authorities established by law in accordance with procedures covered by the following safeguards: a.     convicted persons should have the right to be heard in person and to be assisted according to the law; b.     the decision-making authority should give careful consideration to any elements, including statements, presented by convicted persons in support of their case; c.     convicted persons should have adequate access to their file; d.     decisions should state the underlying reasons and be notified in writing. 33.     Convicted persons should be able to make a complaint to a higher independent and impartial decision-making authority established by law against the substance of the decision as well as against non-respect of the procedural guarantees.”   21.     The Court also refers to the 2006 European Prison Rules, in particular Rule 30.3 which provides: “Prisoners shall be informed about any legal proceedings in which they are involved and, if they are sentenced, the time to be served and the possibilities of early release.” THE LAW I.     ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION 22.     The applicant complained that his whole life order violated Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” A.     The Chamber judgment 23.     The Chamber noted that the Government initially considered themselves not to be in a position to submit observations on the merits of the case, as they recognised that the principles set out in the Vinter case were applicable. The Government changed their stance following the McLoughlin decision, arguing that a whole life sentence was now to be regarded as reducible. The Chamber examined the McLoughlin decision and recalled that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic law. It further observed that it was a well ‑ entrenched and necessary part of the legal tradition of the United Kingdom to develop the law through judicial interpretation. As the Court of Appeal had specifically addressed the doubts raised in Vinter regarding the clarity of the applicable domestic law, and set out an unequivocal statement of the legal position, that interpretation had to be accepted by the European Court. It concluded that the power of release under section 30 of the 1997 Act, exercised in the manner delineated in McLoughlin , was sufficient to comply with the requirements of Article 3. B.     The parties’ submissions 1.     The Government 24.     The Government agreed with the Chamber judgment. They maintained that the Court of Appeal had set out, authoritatively and conclusively, the operation of domestic law in clear and unequivocal terms. By virtue of sections 3 and 6 of the Human Rights Act, section 30 of the 1997 Act had to be interpreted and applied broadly enough so as to comply with Article 3 in every case. The Lifer Manual did not and could not restrict or in any way fetter this obligation. Therefore, as the Court of Appeal had stated, the fact that the text of the Manual had not been revised was of no legal consequence. The Manual remained valid inasmuch as it laid out the approach to be taken where release was sought on grounds of advanced terminal illness or severe incapacity. The McLoughlin decision had further clarified that the Secretary of State was obliged under domestic law to consider all relevant circumstances of each case in a manner compatible with Article 3 – there was no remaining unclarity as to the law in this regard. Section 30 operated in precisely the way that the Vinter judgment had held would be sufficient to satisfy with the requirements of Article 3. 25.     As for the basis for the Secretary of State’s review of sentence, it was clear that the term used in section 30, “exceptional circumstances”, encompassed exceptional progress towards rehabilitation. The relevant yardstick in the Secretary of State’s review would be that stated in Vinter , i.e. whether there had been any changes in the life of the prisoner and such progress towards rehabilitation that continued detention could no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds. A whole life prisoner therefore knew what he must do to have a prospect of release, and what criteria would apply to the review. No greater specificity was required; it was neither necessary nor practicable to seek to lay down in greater detail what a prisoner must be able to demonstrate to be considered for release or reduction of sentence. The European Court itself had not identified specific criteria in its Article 3 case law, but expressed itself in more general terms. In every individual case, therefore, all the relevant circumstances of the prisoner would be taken into account. This permitted the necessary flexibility in the review, adapting it to each set of individual circumstances. 26.     The domestic law was both accessible and foreseeable for prisoners. It was enough that they sought legal advice, which was available to them, or asked the prison administration, and they would receive an explanation of the applicable legal provisions. To every request the Secretary of State was required to give a reasoned response, which would be subject to judicial review. That review would not merely react to the decisions of the Secretary of State, but would bear on the merits of the case. The procedure had the capacity to develop the practical working out of the relevant considerations in this context, such as what amounted to a legitimate penological ground. Nor would successful judicial review merely mean the Secretary of State taking the decision again. It was within the power of the courts to directly order the release of a prisoner, if this was warranted. 27.     Regarding the timing of the review, the Government recalled that Vinter had regarded this matter as being within the margin of appreciation of the domestic authorities, which should not now be narrowed. That judgment did not prescribe a review after twenty-five years, but simply observed that the comparative and international materials reflected clear support for this particular arrangement. In any event, identifying such a timeframe was more relevant to a system which did not provide for a review for a very long period, which was not the case in the domestic system. Legal certainty did not require a specific time constraint on sentence review, when that review was premised on the ability of the prisoner to make a case that their detention was no longer justified. This they could do at any time; they were not obliged to wait an indeterminate number of years. That could be regarded as more advantageous to the prisoner than being required to serve a long, minimum term of years before being permitted to apply for review. Regarding the circumstances of the applicant, they noted that he had not suggested at any stage that there was no legitimate penological ground for his continued detention. There was nothing to stop him applying to the Secretary of State at any time in the future for a review of sentence. 2.     The applicant 28.     The applicant disagreed with the Chamber judgment, which he criticised as being inconsistent with Vinter , as well as with other cases decided by this Court since that judgment. He considered that the situation in domestic law remained contrary to Article 3, the McLoughlin decision having failed to remedy the deficiencies identified in Vinter . The Court of Appeal had proceeded on the incorrect assumption that the European Court was mistaken in its analysis of domestic law. Consequently, McLoughlin had merely sought to correct that perceived error, without developing the de jure situation. The review of whole life sentences was still based on a vague discretion vested in a Government minister. He considered that the Court should now rule that such a function must be entrusted to judges not politicians, this proposition finding clear support in the relevant international and comparative materials referred to in Vinter , and being implicit in the Vinter reasoning itself. He drew an analogy in this respect with the evolution that took place both in domestic case-law and Convention case-law requiring the removal of any role for the executive in the determination of sentences. Even if executive review could still be accepted in principle, the domestic system was deficient since the review was conducted by a partisan political figure, as illustrated by public remarks made by the then-Secretary of State following the McLoughlin decision. The procedure therefore did not offer any prospect of fairness, balance and certainty. 29.     The McLoughlin decision had indicated that the statutory terminology was to be given a broad meaning, but this should not be regarded as sufficient to meet the requirements of Article 3, as laid down in Vinter and subsequent judgments of this Court. The meaning of the terms “exceptional circumstances” and “compassionate grounds” had not been elucidated. Greater specificity was required for the sake of legal certainty; without it, a prisoner’s motivation to attempt rehabilitation would be completely undermined. The only detailed point of reference for whole life prisoners remained the Lifer Manual, the restrictive wording of which had been criticised in Vinter . 30.     Concerning the timing of the review, this issue was still affected by legal uncertainty. It was not stipulated in any legal provision, and had not been addressed in the McLoughlin decision. Whole life prisoners had no clarity as to when their sentences would be reviewed. The applicant recalled that prior to 2003, such sentences were systematically reviewed after twenty-five years, and that the proposal had been made in Parliament (a   proposal put forward by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in 2013 and debated in the House of Lords in 2014) to reintroduce this practice via legislation. The Court’s post- Vinter cases confirmed that a specific timeframe must be provided for in domestic law. Were the Court to now find no violation of Article 3, this would cause chaos in the relevant Convention case-law. 31.     Nor had the situation improved de facto since the Vinter judgment. The applicant criticised the Government’s refusal to revise the Lifer Manual despite the criticism expressed by this Court and subsequently by the Court of Appeal. As a matter of fact, no whole life prisoner had ever been released in the way envisaged in Vinter . It could only discourage such prisoners from making the huge effort required to achieve rehabilitation to know that ultimately their fate would be decided by political decision, rather than an independent and impartial judge. 32.     The applicant further submitted that the system of sentence review should not be treated as falling within the margin of appreciation of the respondent State. This was, first, because of the absolute nature of Article 3. Further, to find a violation in the present case would not impose any particular solution on the United Kingdom. The domestic system had included a twenty-five year review in the past, which could easily be re ‑ introduced and entrusted to the Parole Board. This was not in any way complicated, as the legislative proposal made in Parliament showed. A violation would not mean that the whole life order as such was contrary to the Convention – the requirement was that it be reducible. Nor would it mean that the applicant should be released; this was a quite separate issue to be assessed elsewhere at another time. 3.     The third party intervener 33.     The EPLN underlined the need for the law relating to the consideration of the release of whole life prisoners to be clear, foreseeable and accessible to those affected by it. Imposing an irreducible life sentence could no longer be regarded as a matter within the margin of appreciation of States, since Article 3 required reducibility. It was only regarding certain details of the requisite review that the State could claim a margin of appreciation, although it was ultimately for the Court to determine whether the review included the necessary procedural safeguards, having regard to the international consensus in this area and the great importance of what is at stake for the prisoner. Any margin available should be narrow. 34.     Referring to the relevant international instruments cited in the Vinter   judgment, the EPLN argued that purely punitive or retributory sentencing is not compatible with human rights principles. Rehabilitation must be at the heart of sentencing, implying some prospect of release for life prisoners. For this to be a realistic prospect, there must be sentence planning, the opportunity to progress through the prison system, and structured reviews. The relevant international instruments identified certain basic procedural standards, demanding clarity and foreseeability as regards the timing of the review and the criteria governing it. These points had been endorsed in the Vinter judgment. In subsequent cases they had been reiterated and further developed. It was not just a question of rehabilitating the prisoner, but a matter of personal safety as well. A prisoner with no real prospect of ever being released risked the destruction of his personality, posing real danger to himself and to those in contact with him in the prison environment. To illustrate this point, a statement from a serving life prisoner was also submitted. 35.     The EPLN submitted that the Vinter judgment was not based on any misunderstanding of the domestic system, but had correctly revealed its shortcomings, i.e. the lack of a fixed timeframe and clear, published criteria. No steps had been taken domestically to develop the review into something more than mere compassionate release, already held to be insufficient. This stood in contrast to German constitutional law, cited in Vinter , which held that the preconditions for release and the procedures must be stipulated in law. The Court of Appeal had failed to identify and embed the essential procedural requirements of Article 3 in domestic law. 36.     The statutory duty on the Secretary of State to act compatibly with Article 3 was not sufficient, as it only concerned the point in time when the review took place. It had no bearing on the processes and procedures that must be in place prospectively. There were still no clear published criteria at the domestic level, nor any specific timeframe, contrary to foreseeability and legal certainty, and to the emerging international consensus. Nor were any procedural safeguards provided for, such as disclosure, the right to make oral representations at a review hearing, or the right to be given the reasons for a negative decision. It had not been shown that, notwithstanding these flaws, the system in fact operated in a Convention-compliant way. C.     The Court’s assessment 37.     The parties’ submissions were confined to the issue whether, in light of the McLoughlin ruling, the applicant’s situation in relation to his whole life sentence is in keeping with the requirements of Article 3 as these were laid down in the Vinter judgment ( Vinter and Others , cited above §§   123 ‑ 131). In this connection, the Court will examine, first, whether the unclarity in the domestic law has now been dispelled, and, if so, whether the relevant requirements are now met in the applicant’s case. No separate examination will be made as to a possible violation of Article 3 in the period of the applicant’s imprisonment prior to the McLoughlin ruling. 1.     Whether the domestic law has been clarified 38.     In Vinter , the Court considered t