CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;GRANDCHAMBER;ENG — 23 février 2017

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ITALY   (Application no. 43395/09)                     JUDGMENT     STRASBOURG   23 February 2017                   This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision. In the case of de Tommaso v. Italy, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as a Grand Chamber composed of:   András Sajó, President,   Guido Raimondi,   Josep Casadevall,   Işıl Karakaş,   Mark Villiger,   Boštjan M. Zupančič,   Ján Šikuta,   Ledi Bianku,   Nebojša Vučinić,   Kristina Pardalos,   Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,   Helen Keller,   Ksenija Turković,   Dmitry Dedov,   Egidijus Kūris,   Robert Spano,   Jon Fridrik Kjølbro, judges, and Johan Callewaert, Deputy Grand Chamber Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 20 May 2015, 24 August 2016 and 23   November 2016, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last ‑ mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.     The case originated in an application (no. 43395/09) against the Italian Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by an Italian national, Mr Angelo de Tommaso (“the applicant”), on 28 July 2009. 2.     The applicant was represented by Mr D. Conticchio, a lawyer practising in Casamassima. The Italian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their co-Agents, Ms P. Accardo and Mr G. Mauro Pellegrini. 3.     The applicant alleged, in particular, that the preventive measures to which he had been subjected for a period of two years were in breach of Articles 5, 6 and 13 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 4. 4.     The application was allocated to the Second Section of the Court (Rule 52 § 1 of the Rules of Court). 5.     On 18 October 2011 the Government were given notice of the application. 6.     On 25 November 2014 a Chamber of the Second Section, composed of Işıl Karakaş, Président, Guido Raimondi, András Sajó, Nebojša Vučinić, Helen Keller, Egidijus Kūris, Robert Spano, judges, and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar, relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, neither of the parties having objected (Article 30 of the Convention and Rule 72). 7.     The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined in accordance with Article 26 §§ 4 and 5 of the Convention and Rule 24. 8.     The applicant and the Government each filed written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application. 9.     A hearing took place in public in the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 20 May 2015 (Rule 59 § 3). There appeared before the Court: (a)     for the Government Ms   P. Accardo, Mr   G. Mauro Pellegrini,   co-Agents ;   (b)     for the applicant Mr   D. Conticchio ,   Counsel, Ms   L. Fanizzi , Ms   M. Casulli ,   Advisers .   The Court heard addresses by Ms Accardo and Mr Conticchio, and also their replies to questions from judges. THE FACTS I.     THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 10.     The applicant, Mr Angelo de Tommaso, is an Italian national who was born in 1963 and lives in Casamassima. 11.     On 22 May 2007 the Bari public prosecutor recommended that the Bari District Court place the applicant under special police supervision ( sorveglianza speciale di pubblica sicurezza ) for two years, on the basis of Act no.   1423/1956, and impose a compulsory residence order on him during that time. The public prosecutor submitted that the applicant’s previous convictions for drug trafficking, absconding and unlawful possession of weapons showed that he associated with criminals and was a dangerous individual. He also noted that the applicant had been given a “warning” by the police but had persisted in his criminal conduct. 12.     In submissions of 6 March 2008 the applicant challenged the prosecutor’s recommendation. He argued that there had been a case of mistaken identity and that the alleged breaches of the terms of his special supervision concerned a person who shared his first name and surname but had been born in 1973. He further submitted that no criminal charges had been brought against him since a conviction dating back to 2002. Although he had been convicted of absconding in 2004, that was not a decisive factor for the imposition of the measure in question. He argued that there was no need to place him under special supervision. 13.     In a decision of 11 April 2008, served on 4 July 2008, the Bari District Court placed the applicant under special supervision for two years. It rejected his arguments, finding that the statutory requirements for the imposition of the measure were indeed satisfied, there being no doubt that he was dangerous. 14.     The District Court found that the applicant had “active” criminal tendencies and that the evidence before it showed that he had derived most of his means of subsistence from criminal activity. 15.     The court observed, in particular: “The subject was issued with a ‘verbal warning for public safety’ on 18   September 2006, but this did nothing to improve his conduct; he continued to associate regularly with key figures in the local underworld ( malavita locale ) and carried on committing offences (see statement of charges pending: breach of supervision order on 25 April 2007; breach of supervision order on 29 April 2007).” 16.     The District Court further held: “The findings of the investigation (see documents and certificates in the case file) show that Mr Angelo de Tommaso remains personally involved in various criminal activities, among which the greatest threat to public order and safety is posed by offences against property and weapon- and drug-related offences. This negative picture is compounded by the contents of the recent report issued by the Gioia del Colle carabinieri on 26 January 2008, from which it appears that far from having receded, the subject’s criminal tendencies are still thought to be active and operational. The evidence in the file indicates that he has no fixed and lawful occupation (having declared himself available for employment from February 2008) and that the serious offences under consideration are such as to warrant the conclusion that he has, up until now, derived a significant part of his means of subsistence from criminal activity, by repeatedly resorting to crime either alone or in association with habitual offenders (whether in his municipality of residence or elsewhere). To ensure more thorough monitoring, it is therefore necessary to order not only special police supervision for a period of two years (a measure deemed reasonable on account of the subject’s character as clearly emerges from the acts attributed to him), but also compulsory residence for the same duration.” 17.     The preventive measure imposed the following obligations on the applicant: –     to report once a week to the police authority responsible for his supervision; –     to start looking for work within a month; –     to live in Casamassima and not to change his place of residence; –     to lead an honest and law-abiding life and not give cause for suspicion; –     not to associate with persons who had a criminal record and who were subject to preventive or security measures; –     not to return home later than 10 p.m. or to leave home before 6 a.m., except in case of necessity and only after giving notice to the authorities in good time; –     not to keep or carry weapons; –     not to go to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels and not to attend public meetings; –     not to use mobile phones or radio communication devices; and –     to have with him at all times the document setting out his obligations ( carta precettiva ), and to present it to the police authority on request. 18.     On 14 July 2008 the applicant appealed to the Bari Court of Appeal. 19.     On 31 July 2008 the Bari prefecture ordered the withdrawal of the applicant’s driving licence. 20.     In a decision of 28 January 2009, served on the applicant on 4   February 2009, the Court of Appeal allowed his appeal and quashed the preventive measure ex tunc . 21.     The Court of Appeal observed, firstly, that for a preventive measure to be imposed it was necessary to establish that the individual posed a “current danger”, which was not necessarily linked to the commission of a specific offence, but rather to the existence of a complex situation of a certain duration indicating that the individual had a particular lifestyle that prompted alarm for public safety. 22.     In the Court of Appeal’s view, the requirement of a “current” danger to society implied that the relevant decision should relate to the time of the assessment and should remain valid throughout its implementation; any previous circumstances could be taken into account only in relation to their impact on the “current” element. 23.     The court found that at the time the measure had been imposed, the applicant’s dangerousness could not have been inferred from any criminal activity. 24.     It then observed that in several final judgments delivered between September 1995 and August 1999 the applicant had been convicted of tobacco smuggling. He had subsequently changed his sphere of activity and until 18 July 2002 had been involved in drug trafficking and handling illegal weapons, offences for which he had been sentenced to four years’ imprisonment in a judgment of 15 March 2003, which had become final on 10 March 2004; he had served his sentence from 18 July 2002 to 4   December 2005. 25.     The Court of Appeal accordingly noted that the applicant’s most recent illegal activities relating to drugs dated back to more than five years before the preventive measure had been imposed. All that the court could hold against him was an offence of absconding, committed on 14   December 2004 (while he had been subject to a compulsory residence order). 26.     The court also pointed out that the breaches of the terms of special supervision committed on 25 and 29 April 2007 concerned a different person, who had the same first name and surname as the applicant but had been born in 1973. 27.     The Court of Appeal held that the District Court had omitted to assess the impact of the rehabilitation purpose of the sentence on the applicant’s personality. It observed in particular: “While it is true that the application of special supervision is compatible with the status of detention, which relates solely to the time of the execution of the sentence, the assessment of dangerousness is inevitably even more significant in the case of an individual who has fully served his sentence and has committed no further offences after his release, as is the case for Mr de Tommaso. The note of 26 January 2008 in which the carabinieri mentioned that Mr de Tommaso associated with convicted offenders (to whom he had been caught speaking) does not appear sufficient to establish his dangerousness, bearing in mind that Mr de Tommaso has not been the subject of any further judicial proceedings since the decision to impose the preventive measure. Lastly, the Court of Appeal notes that the material produced by the defence before the District Court and at the hearing before this division indicates that, notwithstanding the typically casual nature of work as a farm labourer, the subject has, at least since his release from prison in 2005 up to the present day, consistently been in lawful employment providing him with a respectable source of income. In conclusion, in March 2008 there were no specific facts from which to infer persistent dangerousness on the part of the subject, who, after serving his lengthy sentence of imprisonment, has not displayed any conduct justifying the assessment made in the judgment appealed against, which is therefore to be quashed.” II.     THE GOVERNMENT’S PARTIAL UNILATERAL DECLARATION 28.     On 7 April 2015 the Government submitted a letter containing a friendly-settlement proposal in respect of the part of the application concerning the complaint of a lack of a public hearing in the Bari District Court and Court of Appeal (Article 6 § 1 of the Convention), as well as a unilateral declaration under Rule 62A of the Rules of Court in relation to that complaint. 29.     In their declaration the Government, referring to the Court’s well ‑ established case-law ( Bocellari and Rizza v. Italy , no. 399/02, 13   November 2007; Perre and Others v. Italy , no. 1905/05, 8 July 2008; and Bongiorno and Others v. Italy , no.   4514/07, 5 January 2010), acknowledged that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of a public hearing, offered to pay a specified sum in respect of the costs relating to this part of the application and requested that this part of the application be struck out. III.     RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A.     Act no. 1423/1956 30.     Praeter delictum preventive measures against individuals date back to the nineteenth century in Italy. They were already in existence prior to the unification of Italy in 1861, and were subsequently reincorporated in the legislation of the Kingdom of Italy by the Pica Act (no. 1409/1863), and later by the 1865 Consolidated Public Safety Act ( Testo Unico di Pubblica Sicurezza ). 31.     In 1948 the Italian Constitution came into force, placing emphasis on protection of fundamental freedoms, in particular personal liberty (Article   13) and freedom of movement (Article 16), as well as the principle of legality in relation to criminal offences and security measures (Article 25, paragraphs 2 and 3). 32.     Nevertheless, preventive measures against individuals were not abolished altogether; following the introduction of the new Act no.   1423/1956, they were adapted to comply with the fundamental criteria referred to in judgments of the Constitutional Court, requiring judicial intervention and observance of the principle of legality in their application. 33.     Act no. 1423 of 27 December 1956, as in force at the material time, provides for the imposition of preventive measures against “persons presenting a danger for security and public morality”. 34.     Section 1 of the Act provides that preventive measures apply to: “(1)     individuals who, on the basis of factual evidence, may be regarded as habitual offenders; (2)     individuals who, on account of their behaviour and lifestyle and on the basis of factual evidence, may be regarded as habitually living, even in part, on the proceeds of crime; and (3)     individuals who, on the basis of factual evidence, may be regarded as having committed offences endangering the physical or mental integrity of minors or posing a threat to health, security or public order.” 35.     Under section 3, a measure entailing special police supervision, combined if need be with a prohibition on residence in a named district or province or an order for compulsory residence in a specified district ( obbligo del soggiorno in un determinato comune ), may be imposed on individuals referred to in section 1 who have not complied with an official police warning under section 4 and pose a threat to public safety. 36.     Before the measure of police supervision is imposed, the police issue an official warning urging the individual concerned to behave lawfully. If, despite the warning, the individual does not change his or her behaviour and poses a threat to public safety, the police may recommend that the judicial authorities impose the measure in question. 37.     Section 4 of the Act provides that the district court, sitting in camera , must give a reasoned decision within thirty days, after hearing submissions from the public prosecutor and the individual concerned, who has the right to file written pleadings and to be assisted by counsel. The preventive measures fall within the exclusive competence of the district court sitting in the provincial capital. 38.     The public prosecutor and the individual concerned may appeal within ten days; the appeal does not have suspensive effect. The Court of Appeal, sitting in camera , has to give a reasoned decision within thirty days (section 4(5) and (6)). Subject to the same conditions, an appeal on points of law may then be lodged with the Court of Cassation, which, sitting in camera , must give its ruling within thirty days (section   4(7)). 39.     When adopting one of the measures provided for in section 3, the district court must specify how long it is to remain in force – between one and five years (section 4(4)) – and must lay down the rules to be observed by the individual concerned (section 5(1)). 40.     Section 5 provides that when imposing the measure of special supervision, the district court orders the person suspected of living on the proceeds of crime to look for work and housing within a short space of time and inform the authorities accordingly. The individual will not be allowed to travel away from the designated address without permission. The court also orders the individual: to lead an honest and law-abiding life and not give cause for suspicion; not to associate with individuals who have a criminal record and are subject to preventive or security measures; not to return home later than a specified time in the evening or to leave home before a specified time in the morning, except in case of necessity and only after giving notice to the authorities in good time; not to keep or carry weapons; not to go to bars, nightclubs, amusement arcades or brothels; and not to attend public meetings. In addition, the district court may impose any other measures it deems necessary in view of the requirements of protecting society, in particular a ban on residing in certain areas. 41.     Section 6 provides that where special supervision is combined with a compulsory residence order or an exclusion order, the president of the district court may in the course of the proceedings make an order ( decreto ) for the temporary withdrawal of the individual’s passport and the suspension of the validity of any equivalent document entitling the holder to leave the country. Where there are particularly serious grounds, the president may also direct that the compulsory residence or exclusion order should be enforced provisionally in respect of the individual concerned until the preventive measure has become final. 42.     In accordance with section 9, a breach of the above rules is punishable by a custodial sentence. B.     Case-law of the Constitutional Court 43.     Act no. 1423/1956 initially provided for the possibility of imposing preventive measures against individuals in certain cases of “ordinary dangerousness” only – in other words, when it was established that the individual posed a danger to public safety. Its scope was later extended to cover other situations of “special dangerousness”, a notion applicable to individuals suspected of belonging to Mafia-type organisations (Act no. 575/1965) or involved in subversive activities (Act no. 152/1975, introduced in response to the emergence of extreme left-wing and right-wing political terrorism during the “years of lead” (“ anni di piombo ”). Finally, the categories of “ordinary dangerousness” were amended and reduced to three by Act no. 327/1988. 44.     The Constitutional Court has found on several occasions that the preventive measures provided for in Act no. 1423/1956 were compatible with fundamental freedoms. 45 .     In judgment no. 2 of 1956 it held: “Article 16 of the Constitution remains to be examined: ‘Every citizen has the right to reside and travel freely in any part of the national territory, subject to the general restrictions that may be laid down by law for health or security reasons. No restrictions may be imposed for political reasons.’ ... It is a more delicate matter to determine whether the grounds of ‘public order and safety and public morality’ referred to in section 157 of the Public Safety Act constitute ‘health or security reasons’ within the meaning of Article 16. ... An interpretation of ‘security’ as concerning solely physical integrity must be rejected, as this would be too restrictive; it thus appears rational and in keeping with the spirit of the Constitution to interpret the term ‘security’ as meaning a situation in which the peaceful exercise of the rights and freedoms so forcefully safeguarded by the Constitution is secured to citizens to the greatest extent possible. Security therefore exists when citizens can carry on their lawful activities without facing threats to their physical and mental integrity. ‘Living together in harmony’ is undeniably the aim pursued by a free, democratic State based on the rule of law. That being so, there is no doubt that ‘persons presenting a danger to public order and safety or public morality’ (section 157 of the Public Safety Act) constitute a threat to ‘security’ as defined above and as contemplated by Article 16 of the Constitution. With regard to morality, it is true that this does not entail having regard to individuals’ personal convictions, which in themselves are uncontrollable, or moral theories, the manifestation of which, like any other manifestation of thought, takes place freely or is governed by other legal rules. Nevertheless, citizens have the right not to be disturbed and offended by immoral conduct where this also endangers health – as referred to in Article 16 of the Constitution – or creates an environment conducive to common crime. With regard to public order, without entering into a theoretical debate on the definition of this concept, it is sufficient to point out that, for the purposes of Article   16 of the Constitution and section 157 of the Public Safety Act, danger to public order cannot result merely from conduct of a social or political nature – which is governed by other legal rules – but must result from outward signs of intolerance or rebellion vis-à-vis legislative rules and legitimate orders issued by the public authorities, since such conduct could easily give rise to situations of alarm and to violence indisputably posing a threat to the ‘security’ of all citizens, whose freedom of movement would become limited as a result. To sum up, the expression ‘health or security reasons’ in the text of Article 16 of the Constitution must be interpreted as referring to facts posing a danger to citizens’ security as defined above. This conclusion is also accepted in the virtually uniform case-law of the Court of Cassation and by many legal authors. It has been observed that the generic wording of Article 16 applies to an infinite number of cases which are difficult to foresee and which can be encompassed by the summary expression ‘health or security reasons’, and that the purpose of this provision of the Constitution is to reconcile the need not to allow unrestricted freedom of movement for individuals posing a danger to society with the need to avoid sweeping, uncontrolled policing power.” 46 .     In judgment no. 27 of 1959 the Constitutional Court held that despite the restrictions on fundamental freedoms which they entailed, preventive measures satisfied the legitimate requirement laid down in the Constitution of guaranteeing “the orderly and peaceful course of social relations, not only through punitive criminal legislation, but also through a system of preventive measures intended to prevent the commission of future offences”. It added that such measures were necessary and proportionate to the aim pursued, because the categories of individuals concerned were sufficiently restricted and specific. Accordingly, it concluded that the measures were compatible with the principle of legality set forth in Articles   13 and 16 of the Constitution in the case of restrictions on rights relating to personal liberty. 47.     In judgment no. 45 of 1960 the Constitutional Court held that the Constitution permitted administrative authorities to take measures restricting freedom of movement, such as an “order to leave a district”, as provided for in Act no. 1423/1956. It also specified that measures restricting personal liberty were to be taken by the judiciary alone. 48.     In judgment no. 126 of 1962, reiterating its previous definition of “public morality”, the Constitutional Court noted that this concept was an aspect of public safety, a ground on which citizens’ freedom of movement could be restricted in accordance with Article 16 of the Constitution. 49.     In judgment no. 23 of 1964 the Constitutional Court held that preventive measures did not breach either the principle of legality or the presumption of innocence. In particular, it observed that the principle of legality, enshrined in the Constitution in relation both to restrictions on personal liberty (Article 13) and to criminal offences and security measures (Article 25), was applicable to preventive measures. However, observance of that principle had to be reviewed in accordance with special criteria taking into account the nature and purposes of the measures concerned. Their preventive aims meant that they were not imposed on the basis of a specific finding that a particular act had been committed, but rather on a pattern of behaviour indicating a danger to society. 50.     The Constitutional Court held that as a result, when determining the different categories of individuals concerned, the legislature had to use different criteria from those employed to define the constituent elements of a criminal offence (and could also have recourse to elements of presumption); the criteria applied had to correspond to objectively identifiable types of behaviour. The approach to be adopted in defining preventive measures was different from, but no less strict than, the approach to defining criminal offences and penalties. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court concluded that the Act contained a sufficiently precise description of which types of conduct were held to represent a “danger to society” in the case of “idlers, those who are unfit for work and vagrants” and other categories of individuals. 51.     Next, concerning the principle of presumption of innocence, the Constitutional Court held, firstly, that this principle did not apply, since preventive measures were not based on guilt and had no bearing on an individual’s criminal responsibility. Nor did the measures amount to a departure from this principle, given that an acquittal on grounds of insufficient evidence could never in itself justify a finding that a person posed a danger to society, since other factual indications of dangerousness had to be present. 52.     In judgment no. 32 of 1969 the Constitutional Court pointed out that simply belonging to one of the categories of individuals designated by the Act was not a sufficient ground for imposing a preventive measure. On the contrary, it was necessary to establish the existence of specific conduct indicating that the individual concerned posed a real and not merely theoretical danger. 53.     The Constitutional Court has found a violation of the Constitution on only three occasions on account of certain procedural or substantive aspects of the system for the application of preventive measures. 54.     In judgment no. 76 of 1970 it declared section 4 of Act no.   1423/1956 unconstitutional in that it did not provide for the compulsory presence of counsel during proceedings for the application of preventive measures. 55 .     In judgment no. 177 of 1980 the Constitutional Court found that one of the categories of individuals laid down in section 1 of the 1956 Act as in force at the time, namely those “whose outward conduct gives good reason to believe that they have criminal tendencies”, was not defined in sufficient detail by the law and did not make it possible to foresee who might be targeted by the preventive measures or in what circumstances, since too much discretion was left to the authorities. The Constitutional Court also concluded that there had been a breach of the principle of legality, which was applicable in relation to preventive measures by virtue of Article 13 (personal liberty) and Article 25 (security measures). Summarising its entire body of case-law in this area, the Constitutional Court held: “(3)     The question of preventive measures and associated issues have been brought before this court ever since its inception. As early as judgment no. 2 of 1956, the court set forth certain important principles, such as the requirement of judicial intervention for all measures restricting personal liberty and the outright rejection of suspicion as a condition for the imposition of such measures, which must be based on specific facts in order to be lawful. In judgment no.   11 of the same year (1956) the court held that ‘the great difficulty in ensuring a balance between the two fundamental requirements – not hindering the activity of crime prevention, and guaranteeing respect for the inviolable rights of the human being – appears to have been resolved through recognition of the traditional rights of habeas corpus in the sphere of the principle of strict legality’. In the same judgment the court further noted: ‘Consequently, the person concerned cannot in any circumstances be subjected to a deprivation or restriction of his or her (personal) liberty unless the deprivation or restriction is provided for in abstract terms by the law, proceedings have been lawfully instituted to that end and there has been a reasoned decision by a judicial body.’ The constitutionality of a ‘system of measures for the prevention of unlawful acts’ designed to guarantee ‘orderly and peaceful relations between citizens’ has been confirmed by subsequent judgments of this court (judgments no. 27 of 1959; no.   45 of 1960; no.   126 of 1962; nos.   23 and 68 of 1964; no.   32 of 1969; and no.   76 of 1970) concerning Articles 13, 16 and 17 and Article 25 § 3 of the Constitution. Sometimes the court has emphasised the parallel with security measures (as provided for in Article 25 § 3 of the Constitution), while at other times it has played it down; sometimes it has confirmed that these two types of measures, both relating to the danger posed to society by the individual, pursue the same aim –   crime prevention – while at other times it has on the contrary highlighted the differences between them. Reference should be made here not only to the observation in judgment no. 27 of 1959 as to the ‘restricted and qualified’ nature of the ‘categories of individuals who may be placed under special supervision (section 1 of the Act)’ (no. 1423/1956), but also and above all to this court’s judgment no. 23 of 1964, in which it declared ill ‑ founded ‘the question of the constitutionality of section 1 of Act no. 1423 of 27   December 1956, having regard to Articles 13, 25 and 27 of the Constitution’. The reasoning of that judgment states that ‘in determining the circumstances (requiring a preventive measure), the legislature should normally use different criteria from those employed to define the constituent elements of a criminal offence; it may also have recourse to elements of presumption, although these must always correspond to objectively identifiable types of behaviour. This does not mean less rigour, but a different type of rigour in defining and adopting preventive measures in comparison with the definition of criminal offences and the imposition of sentences.’ With regard specifically to subsections 2, 3 and 4 of section 1 of Act no.   1423/1956, the court ruled out the possibility that ‘preventive measures could be adopted on the basis of mere suspicion’, instead requiring ‘an objective assessment of the facts revealing the individual’s habitual behaviour and standard of living, or specific outward signs of his or her criminal tendencies, which must have been established in such a way as to preclude purely subjective and unverifiable assessments by the authority ordering or applying the preventive measures’. (4)     In accordance with previous decisions of this court, it should be noted that the constitutionality of preventive measures – in so far as they restrict personal liberty to varying degrees – is necessarily subject to observance of the principle of legality and the existence of judicial safeguards (judgment no.   11 of 1956). These two conditions are equally essential and closely linked, since the absence of one deprives the other of all effect by rendering it purely illusory. The principle of legality in the context of prevention –   that is, the reference to the ‘cases provided for by law’ – as deriving from Article 13 or Article 25 § 3 of the Constitution means that although in the majority of cases the application of the measure is linked to a prospective assessment, it must be based on ‘cases of dangerousness’ provided for – described – by law, forming both the framework of the judicial examination and the basis of a finding of prospective danger, which can only be lawfully founded on that basis. Indeed, while jurisdiction in criminal matters means applying the law through an examination of the factual requirements in proceedings affording the necessary safeguards, among them the reliability of evidence, it is undeniable that even in proceedings relating to preventive measures the prospective assessment of dangerousness (which is entrusted to a judge and undoubtedly involves elements of discretion) is necessarily based on factual requirements that are ‘provided for by law’ and hence open to judicial scrutiny. Judicial intervention (and likewise the presence of defence counsel, the need for which has been unequivocally affirmed) in proceedings for the application of preventive measures would have little meaning (or indeed would dangerously distort the judicial function in the sphere of personal liberty) if it did not serve to guarantee the examination, in adversarial proceedings, of the cases provided for by law. Lastly, it should be noted that the imposition of preventive measures against individuals, which are likewise designed to prevent the commission of (other) offences (and do not always presuppose the commission of a – previous – offence; Article 49 §§ 2 and 4 and Article 115 §§ 2 and 4 of the Criminal Code), to the extent that they can be considered two species of the same genus, is linked to an examination of the cases provided for by law, and the assessment of dangerousness is based on this examination, whether such dangerousness is presumed or must be established in the precise circumstances. (5)     Thus, for preventive measures too the emphasis is on whether or not the factual requirements are defined sufficiently precisely by the law to allow a prospective assessment of the danger to society posed by the individual. The questions put to this court require it to examine whether the ‘indicators of danger to society’ – to use the term commonly employed by legal authors – defined in the impugned legislative provisions are sufficient for the purposes outlined above. To that end, it should be noted that in terms of precision, the fact that the definition in the legislation refers to a single type of behaviour or a pattern of behaviour is not decisive, since the only thing that can be assessed is an individual’s behaviour or conduct in relation to the outside world, as reflected in his or her acts and omissions. Similarly, for preventive measures it is also crucial that the legislative definition –the cases provided for by law – should make it possible to identify the type(s) of behaviour whose presence in the specific circumstances of the case may form a basis for a prospective, that is to say forward-looking, assessment. It should also be observed that the types of behaviour required for the imposition of preventive measures – since their aim is to prevent criminal offences – cannot be defined without an explicit or implicit reference to the offence, offences or categories of offences sought to be prevented, so that the description of the type(s) of behaviour concerned becomes all the more crucial in that it can be inferred from their presence in the specific circumstances that there is a reasonable prospect (of the risk) that such offences will be committed by the individuals in question. (6)     In the light of the foregoing considerations, the question of the constitutionality of the final point of section 1(3) of Act no. 1423/1956 must be declared well-founded. The provision in question (unlike, for example, the first subsection of the same section 1) does not describe one or more types of behaviour, or any ‘outward conduct’, that could automatically prompt a judicial examination. The question as to what forms of ‘outward conduct’ are relevant is referred to the judge (and prior to that, to the appropriate prosecution and police authorities) when the factual circumstances are being established, even before the examination on the merits. The conditions for the assessment of ‘criminal tendencies’ have no conceptual autonomy vis-à-vis the assessment itself. The legal formulation does not therefore have the function of properly defining the circumstances, that is, identifying the particular ‘cases’ concerned (as required both by Article 13 and by Article 25 § 3 of the Constitution), but it leaves an uncontrollable margin of discretion to those involved. ... The expression ‘criminal tendencies’ used in the 1956 legislation may appear to evoke the concept of ‘propensity for crime’ in Article 108 of the Criminal Code, but the comparison does not hold true in substantive terms, since the wording of the latter provision requires the following to be established: an intentional offence against life or limb, motives indicating a particular propensity for crime, and the especially bad character of the guilty party. In the instant case, however, the expression ‘criminal tendencies’ is to be understood as a synonym of danger to society, with the result that the entire legislative provision, which allows for the adoption of measures restricting personal liberty without identifying either the requirements or the specific aims justifying them, must be declared unconstitutional.” 56 .     In judgment no. 93 of 2010, relying on Article 6 of the Convention and on the Bocellari and Rizza v. Italy judgment (no. 399/02, 13 November 2007), in which the European Court had found a violation of Article 6 in relation to proceedings for the application of measures involving property under the 1956 Act, the Constitutional Court declared section 4 of Act no.   1423/1956 unconstitutional in that it did not afford the person concerned the opportunity to request a public hearing during the proceedings for the application of preventive measures, whether at first instance or on appeal. However, in judgment no. 80 of 2011 the Constitutional Court clarified that it was unnecessary to provide for the possibility of requesting a public hearing in the Court of Cassation. 57.     In judgment no. 282 of 2010 the Constitutional Court was called upon to determine whether or not section 9(2) of Act no. 1423 of 27   December 1956 was compatible with Article 25, paragraph 2, of the Constitution in so far as it provided for criminal penalties in the event of failure to observe the requirement laid down in section 5(3), first part, of the same Act no. 1423/1956, namely “to lead an honest and law-abiding life and not give cause for suspicion”, and whether or not it infringed the principle that the situations in which criminal-law provisions are applicable must be exhaustively defined by law ( principio di tassatività ). 58.     In the submission of the court that had referred the question to the Constitutional Court, the obligation to lead an honest and law-abiding life and not give cause for suspicion, although included within the conditions imposed on the person subject to special supervision, constituted an obligation of a general nature applicable to the entire community, and not specifically to the individual concerned. Accordingly, the referring court contended that precisely because of its general scope, the obligation in question could not constitute a requirement, with prescriptive, typical and specific content, of the measure of special supervision, in that it was not possible to determine with any precision what conduct was capable of giving rise to the offence of breaching the terms of special supervision, given the vague and indeterminate nature of the elements used to characterise that offence. 59 .     In the Constitutional Court’s view, the inclusion in the description of the offence in question of summary expressions, words with multiple meanings, general clauses or elastic concepts did not entail a breach of Article 25, paragraph 2, of the Constitution in so far as the overall description of the act alleged to have been committed nevertheless enabled the trial court – having regard to the aim pursued by the relevant criminal provision and to the wider legislative context in which it was to be viewed – to establish the meaning of that element by means of an interpretative process not extending beyond its ordinary task: in other words, in so far as that description enabled it to express a judgment as to the correspondence between the concrete circumstances and the abstract definition of the offence, underpinned by a verifiable hermeneutic basis, and, correspondingly, enabled the person to whom the provision applied to have a sufficiently clear and immediate perception of its relative prescriptive value. In that context, the requirement to “lead an honest life”, assessed in isolation, in itself appeared generic and capable of taking on multiple meanings. However, if it was viewed in the context of all the other requirements laid down in section 5 of Act no. 1423/1956, its content became clearer, entailing a duty for the person concerned to adapt his or her own conduct to a way of life complying with all of the above-mentioned requirements, with the result that the wording “lead an honest life” became more concrete and geared to the individual. 60.     The Constitutional Court also found that the requirement to be “law ‑ abiding” referred to the duty for the person concerned to comply with all the prescriptive rules requiring him or her to behave, or not to behave, in a particular way; not only the criminal laws, therefore, but any provision whose non-observance would be a further indication of the person’s danger to society as already established. 61.     Lastly, regarding the requirement to “not give cause for suspicion”, the Constitutional Court noted that this too should not be seen in isolation but in the context of the other requirements set out in section 5 of Act   no.   1423/1956, such as the obligation for the person under special supervision not to frequent certain places or associate with certain people. C.     Case-law of the Court of Cassation 62 .     In judgment no. 10281 of 25 October 2007 the plenary Court of Cassation noted that the prerequisite for imposing a preventive measure in respect of a specified individual was a finding that the individual posed a “current danger”, which was not necessarily linked to the commission of an offence, although this might be a relevant factor. What was important, in the Court of Cassation’s view, was the existence of a complex situation of a certain duration indicating that the individual’s lifestyle raised an issue in terms of public safety. The assessment of this “current danger” was therefore “an assessment on several levels, taking into account various types of behaviour noted in the individual, which do not necessarily constitute grounds for a prosecution but nevertheless provide an indication of his or her danger to society”. 63 .     In judgment no. 23641 of 2014 the Court of Cassation held that the assessment of dangerousness for the purposes of applying a preventive measure did not involve a mere assessment of subjective danger but corresponded to the assessment of “facts” which could be examined from a historical perspective and were themselves “indicators” of whether the individual concerned could be included in one of the criminological categories defined by law. Accordingly, in the Court